Golden v. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 8, 2026
• Docket: 25-2058
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHIDDY GOLDEN, an individual, No. 25-2058 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-02935-SB-JPR v. MEMORANDUM*

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC, a business entity, form unknown; EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., is a business entity, form unknown; EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC, is a business entity, form unknown; TRANSUNION, a business entity, form unknown; DOES, 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 30, 2026**

Before: GOULD, FRIEDLAND, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellant Chiddy Golden (“Golden”) appeals the district court’s entry of

final judgment against him following a trial and jury verdict in favor of Appellee

Ford Motor Credit Company (“Ford”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

We review a jury verdict for substantial evidence, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Ford and without reweighing the evidence. Engquist v.

Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2007); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-

Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Gilbrook v.

City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Substantial evidence is

such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the

evidence.” (quoting Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365,

1371 (9th Cir.1987))). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion and will reverse only if the error was prejudicial. C.B. v. City of Sonora,

769 F.3d 1005, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Challenges to a district court’s

management of trial are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Amarel v. Connell, 102

F.3d 1494, 1513 (9th Cir. 1996). Finally, we reverse on the basis of judicial

misconduct only when the court’s actions showed actual bias or created the

appearance of bias. United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 2008).

1. The jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence. There was

2 25-2058 sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the jury’s verdict that Golden failed

to make a payment obligated by a lease agreement he entered into, and that Ford

therefore did not violate either the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) or the

California Credit Reporting Act (“CCRA”) in reporting that missed payment.

Although Golden contends that he did not sign a lease agreement authorizing

additional payments, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find

against him on that issue. Second, substantial evidence supports the jury’s

determination that Ford was not estopped from enforcing the lease provision

requiring continued payments after the end of the lease given that Golden still had

possession of the vehicle. Because there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the

jury’s verdict, we must uphold it and Golden’s arguments fail.

2. The district court did not err in admitting various exhibits into evidence.

Golden, through his prior counsel, stipulated to the admission of many of the

exhibits and did not object to any of the exhibits’ admission at trial. United States

v. Cook, 53 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The objection was waived by not

being made at trial.”). Golden is bound by his prior counsel’s actions regardless of

whether he now disagrees with them. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,

633–34 (1962) (“Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in

the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of

this freely selected agent.”); cf. Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d

3 25-2058 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24,

27 (9th Cir. 1980) (“A district court is vested with broad discretion to make

discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a fair and orderly

trial.”).

3. We also discern no error with the district court’s management of the trial

and imposition of time limits. See Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications

Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Generally, a district court may impose

reasonable time limits on a trial.”). The record reflects that the district court was

flexible with its time limitations, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court

to ostensibly impose a shorter time period than that requested by the parties. See

Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1514 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it applied its time limitations flexibly); Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l

Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 451 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court did

not abuse its discretion when it gave the parties significantly less time than they

requested but allowed parties to request additional time if necessary).

4. To the extent that Golden seeks reversal of the district court’s judgment

based on judicial misconduct, we disagree that reversal is warranted. None of the

conduct with which Golden takes issue, including statements made by the judge to

Golden outside the presence of the jury, evinces bias or partiality. Kern v. Levolor

Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 779–80 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Litigants are entitled to a

4 25-2058 judge who is detached, fair and impartial.”). The district court did not abuse its

discretion by intervening to ensure that Golden was responsive to the questions

asked him. See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A

trial judge is more than an umpire, and may participate in the examination of

witnesses to clarify evidence, confine counsel to evidentiary rulings, ensure the

orderly presentation of evidence, and prevent undue repetition.”).

5. We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Golden’s

motion for a new trial and to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59. An appealing party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days

“after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

And a party wishing to challenge an order disposing of a Rule 59 motion must file

a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal following entry of the relevant

order. Id. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv); id. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). Golden did not do so, and we therefore

lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of his Rule 59 motion. See

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that parties

generally must file an amended or new notice of appeal to challenge a post-

judgment order arising after a first notice of appeal was filed).

AFFIRMED.2

2 Golden’s two Motions for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 9 & Dkt. 10, are denied.

5 25-2058