GMO TRUST v. BAUSCH HEALTH COMPANIES INC.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedNovember 29, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-01823
StatusUnknown

This text of GMO TRUST v. BAUSCH HEALTH COMPANIES INC. (GMO TRUST v. BAUSCH HEALTH COMPANIES INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GMO TRUST v. BAUSCH HEALTH COMPANIES INC., (D.N.J. 2022).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GMO TRUST et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 22-1823 (MAS) (LHG) v. MEMORANDUM OPINION BAUSCH HEALTH COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs GMO Trust and others’ Motion to Remand

(“Plaintiffs”).' (ECF No. 9.) Defendants Bausch + Lomb Corporation (“Bausch + Lomb”) and Bausch Health Companies Inc. (“Bausch Health”, and together with Bausch + Lomb, “Defendants”) opposed (ECF No. 10), and Plaintiffs replied (ECF No. 11). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion. I. BACKGROUND This story begins like countless others in this district, with Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (““Valeant”), now known as Bausch Health. For the past five years, Plaintiffs have pursued large-scale securities fraud claims against Defendants’ predecessor, Valeant. (Pls.’ Moving Br. 1, ECF No. 9; Defs.” Opp’n Br. 4, ECF No. 10.) Plaintiffs are sixty-two investment entities that are plaintiffs in twelve opt-out actions remaining against Valeant in this Court.

' Plaintiffs include GMO Trust, GMO Alpha Only Fund, GMO Benchmark Free Fund, GMO Implementation Fund, GMO Developed World Stock Fund, GMO International Large/Mid Cap Equity Fund, GMO International Equity Fund, GMO Tax-Managed International Equities Fund, GMO Funds PLC, GMO Global Equity Allocation Investment Fund, GMO World Equity Allocation Investment Fund PLC, GMO Global Real Return (UCITS) Fund, GMO Offshore Master Portfolios II Ltd., GMO Event-Driven Master Portfolio, GMO Global Equity Trust, GMO Master Portfolios (Onshore), L.P., GMO Mean Reversion Fund (Onshore), GMO Tax-Managed Global Balanced Portfolio, GMO Mean Reversion Special Solution Fund, L.P., Brahman Partners II, L.P., Brahman Partners If, L.P., Brahman Partners IJ Offshore, Ltd., Brahman Institutional Partners, L.P., Brahman C.P.F. Partners, L.P., Brahman Partners IV, L.P., Brahman Partners IV (Cayman), Ltd., BH Investments Fund, L.L.C., and East 71, Ltd., VALIC Company I, VALIC Company H, SunAmerica Series Trust, and Seasons Series Trust, Discovery Global Citizens Master Fund, Ltd., Discovery Global Focus Master Fund, Ltd., Discovery Global Macro Master Fund, Ltd., and Discovery Global Opportunity Master Fund, Ltd., MSD Torchlight Partners, L.P. and MSD Torchlight Partners (MM), L.P., Incline Global Master LP and Incline Global ELS LP, Okumus Opportunistic Value Company Ltd., Maples Liquidation Services Limited as Voluntary Liquidator of Maverick Neutral Levered Fund, Ltd., Maverick Capital Ltd., as assignee of Maverick Fund, L.D.C. and Maverick Select Fund, Ltd., Maverick Fund II, Ltd., Maverick Long Enhanced Fund, Ltd., Maverick Long Fund, Ltd., and Maverick Fund USA, Ltd., Pacific Select Fund and Pacific Funds Series Trust, Stichting PGGM Depositary, Stichting Bedrijfstakpensioenfonds voor het Schilders-Afwerkingsen Glaszetbedrijf, USAA Mutual Funds Trust, Internationale Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH, Plaintiff GIC Private Ltd., 2012 Dynasty UC LLC, Flinn Investments, LLC, Lawrence Flinn, Jr. 1975 Trust FBO Adriane S. Flinn, Lawrence Flinn, Jr. 1975 Trust FBO Lawrence Flinn III, LFJR 2010 GRAT Remainder Trust, LFJR 2012 Dynasty LLC - Series A, Lawrence Flinn, Jr. 1975 Trust FBO Marion Flinn Moulton, Stephanie and Lawrence Flinn, Jr. Charitable Trust, and Stephanie S. Flinn Master Partnership.

Plaintiffs are litigants that are currently pursuing securities claims against Bausch Health. They are also potential judgment creditors of Bausch Health. To illustrate the dispute, the Court outlines the facts that led here. A. The Underlying Securities Litigation Plaintiffs, purchasers of Valeant (now Bausch Health) equity securities, allege that between 2013 and 2016, Bausch Health and its executives engaged in widespread securities fraud. (Notice of Removal Ex. A (Compl.) { 78, ECF No. 1-1.) According to Plaintiffs, Bausch Health appointed J. Michael Pearson (“Pearson”) as its Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) in 2008. (id. 79.) With Pearson came a unique, and ultimately fatal, corporate strategy: instead of pursuing the traditional pharmaceutical business strategy of research and development in new drugs, Bausch Health sought to grow and sustain its business through acquisitions of assets from other pharmaceutical companies that had already done the leg work. (/d.) The unique strategy worked, for a moment at least. Bausch Health acquired multiple companies, including Bausch + Lomb which has grown into a profitable eye health business. (Jd. {| 80.) But the strategy also had its blemishes—blemishes that led to the securities litigation before this Court. Bausch Health’s legal trouble began with the unsuccessful acquisition of pharmaceutical company Allergan, Inc. (“Allergan”). Ud. □ 81.) In the early 2010’s, Bausch Health made overtures to acquire Allergan. Allergan opposed the takeover, however. (/d.) According to Allergan, Bausch Health “was nothing more than a ‘roll up’ that increased revenue through a growth-by-acquisition business relying on unsustainable price increases.” (/d.) This characterization led to closer scrutiny of Bausch Health’s business strategy and financial health. Ud.) In an attempt to stamp out any concerns about the company’s unusual strategy, beginning in 2014, Bausch Health’s executives, and Pearson in particular, reassured the public that Bausch

Health’s growth was through volume increases, a sustainable practice. (Id. § 82.) In 2014 and 2015, Bausch Health reported strong growth on its products that Plaintiffs claim were ultimately untrue. (id. {| 83-84.) Instead, Plaintiffs claim that Bausch Health’s growth was sustained through (1) price increases just as Allergan had alleged and (2) a covert mail-order pharmacy network to fraudulently illustrate growth in its dermatology segment. (/d. {| 85, 87-88.) As Bausch Health’s fraud was gradually revealed to the market, the price of Bausch Health stock plummeted from over $250 per share in mid-2015 to under $25 per share by mid-2016, resulting in a market capitalization loss of almost $100 billion. (id. 4 109.) As a result, several putative securities fraud class actions were filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against Bausch Health, its former and present directors and officers, and others. (/d. 4] 110; Zn re Valeant Pharms. Int'l, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 15-7658 (D.N.J. 2015). B. Bausch Health’s Planned Spin-Off The securities fraud litigation, however, is not the source of the instant dispute (or, at least not directly). In August 2020, during the pendency of the ongoing securities litigation, Bausch Health announced its plan to spin off (the “Spin-Off’) its eye health business into a separate, independent public company, Bausch + Lomb. Ud. {| 127.) Defendants touted the Spin-Off as an opportunity to “unlock value.” Ud. 130.) Plaintiffs offer another explanation: the Spin-Off is simply Defendants’ attempt to shield themselves from the liabilities associated with the ongoing securities litigation. Ud. § 130-31.) This is because, Plaintiffs argue, the Spin-Off would cause Bausch Health to be “in a significantly worse financial position than prior to the [S]pin-[O]ff.” Ud. { 6.) For instance, investment banks have concluded that, even without accounting for the liabilities contingent on the judgment rendered in Plaintiffs’ securities fraud action, Defendants will have a sizably negative equity value with debt levels far exceeding the company’s asset levels. (/d.

{{ 170-74.) Simply put, if successful, Defendants’ Spin-Off would prove a lifeboat for its most profitable business line while the rest of the company sinks.

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