GLYNN v. MAINE OXY-ACETYLENE SUPPLY CO

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedJanuary 28, 2022
Docket2:19-cv-00176
StatusUnknown

This text of GLYNN v. MAINE OXY-ACETYLENE SUPPLY CO (GLYNN v. MAINE OXY-ACETYLENE SUPPLY CO) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GLYNN v. MAINE OXY-ACETYLENE SUPPLY CO, (D. Me. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

ERNEST J. GLYNN, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs ) ) v. ) 2:19-cv-00176-NT ) MAINE OXY-ACETLYENE SUPPLY ) CO., et al., ) ) Defendants ) RECOMMENDED DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO APPROVE CLASS NOTICE

Defendants move for approval of notice to class members pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B). (Motion, ECF No. 119.) Plaintiffs agree that a notice should be sent to class members and propose a draft notice modeled, as is Defendants’ proposed notice, on the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) exemplar class notice. Defendants and Plaintiffs disagree on some of the content of the notice. Following a review of the parties’ submissions, and after consideration of the parties’ positions on the issues in dispute, I recommend the Court grant the motion in part and approve a notice in the form attached to this recommended decision as Exhibit A. DISCUSSION A. Information Regarding Possible Individual Settlement The Court certified the class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). (Order, ECF No. 66.) Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides that for a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). A notice issued by a court pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(B) “must contain all information ‘that a reasonable person would consider

material in making an informed, intelligent decision of whether to opt out or remain a member of the class and be bound by the final judgment.’” Andrews v. Plains All American Pipeline, L.P., Case No. CV 15-4113 PSG (JEMx), 2017 WL 10059268, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2017), (quoting Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651, 655 (N.D. 1997)). Defendants’ proposed notice informs class members that they can opt out of the

class and enter into an individual settlement as Defendant has established a settlement fund for potential class members. (Defendants’ Draft Notice at 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, ECF No. 119-1.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ proposed notice would encourage class members to bypass the class representatives and class counsel and opt out of the class. (Response, ECF No. 123.)

Defendants do not cite any authority that requires a class notice to include information concerning the possibility of individual settlements. The FJC’s exemplar does not contain any such language. Defendants’ language could limit the number of class members. “The core purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) is to vindicate the claims of consumers and other groups of people whose

individual claims would be too small to warrant litigation.” Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). To allow “plaintiffs to be ‘picked off’ at an early stage in a putative class action may waste judicial resources by ‘stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement.’” Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 345 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). The Court has determined that a class action is appropriate. The proposed language is not necessary for the putative class members to make an informed decision and

would be inconsistent with the purpose of a class action. Furthermore, reference generally to a settlement fund and possible individual settlements does not provide putative class members with meaningful information. The amount of the fund and the possible settlement amounts are not described and thus could cause a putative class member to opt out and potentially be left with relatively limited

resources, as compared to the class, to sue Defendants if the putative class member determined that the amount available for settlement was insufficient. That is, given the lack of detail regarding a possible settlement, the proposed language could prompt some putative class members to opt out based on erroneous assumptions regarding the amount available in an individual settlement. The proposed language, therefore, cannot be

considered helpful or material to the putative class members’ assessment. B. Information Regarding the Related Department of Labor Action Defendants’ proposed notice includes information regarding the related lawsuit brought against Defendants by the United States Department of Labor (DOL), Walsh v. Maine Oxy-Acetylene Supply Co. et. al., Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00326-NT (the DOL

Action). (Defendants’ Draft Notice at 1, 2, 5, 6, 7.) Plaintiffs argue that reference to the DOL Action would suggest that action is in some way superior to the class action and could cause putative class members to opt out based on the erroneous suggestion. While a class member could benefit from the DOL action, the objectives of the two actions are not necessarily identical. As the Court noted when it certified the class, “in the past, the DOL has ‘strenuously object[ed]’ to the idea that its pursuit of ERISA action

should presumptively usurp a private class action.” (Order at 20, quoting In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 777(LBS)(AJP), 2012 WL 1569827, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012).) As another court observed, [p]rivate ERISA litigants seek to redress individual grievances. However, in suing for ERISA violations, the Secretary seeks not only to recoup plan losses, but also to supervise enforcement of ERISA, to guarantee uniform compliance with ERISA, to expose and deter plan asset mismanagement, to protect federal revenues, to safeguard the enormous amount of assets and investments funded by ERISA plans, and to assess civil penalties for ERISA violations.

Herman v. South Carolina Nat’l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1423 (11th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, a class member could conceivably benefit from both actions. In short, reference to the DOL action could generate some confusion among putative class members and is not material to their assessment of whether to participate in the class action. C. Statute of Limitations Warning Plaintiffs’ proposed notice advises putative class members that if a class member chooses to opt out of the class, “you may not be permitted to assert your individual claims arising from events occurring in 2012 and 2013.” (Plaintiffs’ Draft Notice at 6, 7, ECF No. 123-1.) The “commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). The tolling extends “to apply not only to plaintiffs who seek to intervene in a pending class action, but also to would-be class members who file actions of their

own.” Basch v. Gound Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Crown, Cork & Seal, Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349-52 (1983)).

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Related

Herman v. South Carolina National Bank
140 F.3d 1413 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah
414 U.S. 538 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper
445 U.S. 326 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker
462 U.S. 345 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Basch v. Ground Round, Inc.
139 F.3d 6 (First Circuit, 1998)
Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc.
323 F.3d 32 (First Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
GLYNN v. MAINE OXY-ACETYLENE SUPPLY CO, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glynn-v-maine-oxy-acetylene-supply-co-med-2022.