ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
AKIN, Justice.
The- issue dispositive of this appeal is whether Congress may, consistent with the third article of the federal constitution, preclude the judicial branch from “re-strainpng] or affectpng] the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver” of a federally insured savings and loan association. Because doing so in effect confers upon an agency of the executive branch those powers constitutionally committed to the judiciary, we hold that it may not.
Glen Ridge I Condominiums and others obtained financing from Empire Savings and Loan for real estate investment in the “1-30 corridor” of Dallas County. Glen Ridge appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its suit to enjoin the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, acting as receiver of Empire, from foreclosing on its property. After consideration of Glen Ridge’s motion for rehearing, we agree that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction. Consequently, we withdraw our former opinion, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand for consideration of Glen Ridge’s claims under state law.
When Empire became insolvent, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board appointed FSLIC as receiver of Empire and ordered FSLIC to liquidate Empire’s assets. FSLIC then posted the property of Glen Ridge for foreclosure pursuant to deeds of trust given to Empire to secure financing for land acquisition and condominium construction.
Glen Ridge sued FSLIC, Empire, and the various trustees in state court seeking cancellation of the deeds of trust, damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. FSLIC moved to dismiss, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter by virtue of section 1464(d)(6)(C) of title twelve of the United States Code, which provides that “no court may ... restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a receiver.” The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit. Glen Ridge asserts in this appeal that this section violates the constitutional scheme of separated powers to the extent that it vests exclusive power in an administrative agency to adjudicate rights created by state common law without the consent of the litigants and [377]*377subject only to appellate review under the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Northern Pipeline Prohibits FSLIC Adjudication
Article III, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested ... in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges ... shall hold their offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
As an element of the constitutional system of checks and balances, these provisions were designed to give federal judges maximum independence from the executive or legislative branches of the government. United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16, 76 S.Ct. 1, 5, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955). These provisions have produced confusion and controversy, and have never been fully defined. Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1463, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962); see Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 197 (1982); see also 1616 Reminc Limited Partnership v. Atchison & Keller Company, 704 F.2d 1313, 1316 (4th Cir.1983). We have, however, found guidance in two decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Company, 458 U.S. 50. 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the bankrupt Northern Pipeline sued Marathon in federal bankruptcy court for breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Marathon moved for dismissal on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conferred article III judicial power upon bankruptcy judges who lacked the life tenure and salary protections of article III. The Supreme Court agreed with Marathon and rejected the government’s contention that article I endowed Congress with sufficient authority for the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction of Northern Pipeline’s claims.
The court’s plurality opinion identified three categories of legislative courts which could validly exercise parts of the federal judicial power. These were the territorial courts,1 courts-martial, and courts or administrative agencies which adjudicate public rights. 458 U.S. at 64-67, 102 S.Ct. at 2867-69. Bankruptcy courts were clearly neither territorial courts nor courts-martial. Thus, the court was squarely faced with the question of whether bankruptcy courts only adjudicated questions concerning public rights.
Public rights arise, at a minimum, between the government and persons subject to its authority as a result of constitutional or legislative provisions and are typically found in connection with the exercise of congressional power granted by constitutional provisions concerning interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the post office, veterans, and debts of customs agents. 458 U.S. at 68, 70, 102 S.Ct. at 2871; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51, 52 S.Ct. 285, 292, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). Other public rights derive from congressionally-created benefits, such as the restructuring of debtor-creditor relationships, radio station licenses, pilot licenses, and certifications for common carriers. 458 U.S. at 71, 102 S.Ct. at 2871. Public rights contrast with such state-created private rights as the right to recover contract damages. 458 U.S. at 71-72, 102 S.Ct. at 2871-72.
The plurality decided that Northern Pipeline’s right to recover contract damages from Marathon was not a public right, but a private right that must be adjudicated by an article III court. Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence stated that the lawsuit sought recovery under counts which were traditionally actions at common law and which could not be adjudicated over Marathon’s objection by a non-article III tribunal. Both opinions held that the Bankruptcy Act, in purporting to grant jurisdiction of such actions to the bankruptcy courts, was unconstitutional. 458 U.S. at 76, 87, 90, 102 S.Ct. at 2874, 2880-81.
[378]*378FSLIC contends that the issues in this lawsuit concern its public right to liquidate Empire’s assets and thereby recoup the insurance payments it has made to depositors of Empire. This contention overlooks the fact that, even though the government is currently a party, the substantive rights at issue arose between two private parties. Furthermore, the substantive rights in issue here arose out of transactions conducted according to state law and not out of constitutional or legislative provisions governing FSLIC.
FSLIC, as receiver of a state-chartered savings and loan has the right to liquidate the latter’s assets. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(b)(1), (c)(1); 1464(d)(ll). FHLBB regulations provide only that FSLIC may “exercise all rights and powers of such institution ... including ... [those arising] under any ... deed of trust.” 12 C.F.R. § 569(a)(6). This regulation provides FSLIC with no other or different rights than those arising under state law, and obtained by Empire under the deeds of trust. These rights had already vested before FSLIC became involved. Consequently, the rights did not arise between FSLIC and Glen Ridge under federal statutory law, but between Empire and Glen Ridge under the laws of this state.
Indeed, Glen Ridge does not contest FSLIC’s right to liquidate these assets validly owned by Empire, and thereby recoup insurance payments, but rather it challenges the validity of Empire’s claims to certain assets. Since the determination of these claims are governed by state-created rights in the deeds of trust, this lawsuit does not concern FSLIC’s public right to liquidate assets but instead concerns traditional common law remedies. Consequently, federal jurisdiction over this lawsuit is proper only in an article III court, and the grant of this jurisdiction to a non-article III body by section 1464(d)(6)(c) is unconstitutional. It follows that the state court, ex-ercing its concurrent jurisdiction, erred in dismissing the suit.
Thomas Analysis Does Not Alter Unconstitutionality
This conclusion is further supported by the holding in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, Co., 473 U.S. 568, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985). The United States Supreme Court there held that article III did not prohibit Congress from granting a non-article III body jurisdiction over disputes among participants in a pesticide registration program, conducted by the Environmental Portection Agency pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 105 S.Ct. at 3328. Under the Act, manufacturers were required to submit research data for EPA review before registration. Manufacturers of pesticides similar to those previously registered were allowed to use research data that had been previously filed, provided that they compensated the original registrant for such use. Disputes over the amount of compensation were referred to, and decided by, arbitrators rather than article III courts.
In Thomas, the Court noted that, although the dispute was between private parties, it arose from a scheme that constituted a “public use” and bore many of the characteristics of a public right. The Court also pointed out that the dispute arose within the confines of a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program and concerned a highly technical field peculiarly suited to specialized administrative action. 105 S.Ct. at 3337-8. Stressing that the right of FIFRA participants to use another participant’s trade secrets and the latter’s right to compensation for such use arose only in connection with the unique and complex scheme of FIFRA regulation, the court concluded that:
Our holding is limited to the proposition that Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly “private” right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.
105 S.Ct. at 3340.
FSLIC argues that its right to collect and liquidate assets of a failed savings and loan [379]*379are so closely integrated into the FHLBB regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the article III judiciary. Likewise, FSLIC contends that the right of Glen Ridge to enjoin foreclosure and rescind the underlying debts is appropriate for agency resolution because FSLIC’s claims-resolution process is an integral part of its recoupment of insurance payments from debtors of the failed savings and loan. Because resolution of the dispute between Glen Ridge and FSLIC occurs outside the basic fabric of the FHLBB regulatory scheme, we cannot agree.
FHLBB regulations weave a complex network of provisions around most aspects of FSLIC receiverships. For instance, the Code of Federal Regulations contains eight pages of rules and forty-six factual examples concerning FSLIC determination of claims to deposit insurance. See 12 C.F.R. § 564. Similarly, the rules for determining the priority of third-party creditors of the failed savings and loan and prescribing FSLIC actions with respect to the underlying debts are extensive. 12 C.F.R. § 569(a)(7), (8). In these areas, and others such as the sale and assumption of a failed thrift to another savings and loan, FSLIC operates a complex regulatory scheme in a highly technical field, as required by the Thomas holding.
The regulations governing FSLIC recovery of debts held under deeds of trust and defenses to such recovery contrast markedly with the comprehensive provisions outlined above. All that is said with respect to such recovery and defenses is:
[The] receiver shall collect all obligations and money due such insured institution, and may ... institute ... actions, suits, or other proceedings ... [and] exercise all rights and powers of such institution ... including ... power under any ... deed of trust....
12 C.F.R. § 569(a)(6). No provisions set forth substantive rules or guidelines for resolving Glen Ridge’s claims. Unlike Thomas, these regulations give no rights or remedies to Glen Ridge, nor do they provide substitutes for those rights or remedies already held by Glen Ridge or Empire under Texas law. FHLBB regulations concerning the dispute with Glen Ridge fall short of the unique, complex, and highly technical regulatory scheme that underlies Thomas. Thus, none of the rights here in issue are so closely integrated into the FHLBB regulatory process that they are appropriate for agency resolution with only limited involvement by the judiciary.
Interpretation of Northern Pipeline by Thomas
In discussing Northern Pipeline, the Thomas court stated:
The Court’s holding in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.
105 S.Ct. at 3335. FSLIC contends that its adjudication of Glen Ridge’s contract claims avoids article III infirmity because FSLIC cannot render final judgment or issue binding orders and because it is subject to more than ordinary appellate review. Because FSLIC action on adjudication is equivalent to final judgment and because FSLIC is subject to less than ordinary appellate review, we cannot agree.
FSLIC may do all things necessary to collect obligations owed to the failed thrift. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d). If no court may take jurisdiction of any dispute arising out of efforts to collect, FSLIC action will be self-executing. Upon adjudicating Glen Ridge’s claims adversely to Glen Ridge, section 1729(d) allows FSLIC to sell the contested properties without any final judgment or binding orders of a court. The sale will effectively determine title and all parties will be bound thereby. Accordingly, the difference between FSLIC’s final determination upon adjudicating Glen Ridge’s claims and a court’s judgment of foreclosure and order of sale will be in name and form only. Such a difference is insufficient as a basis for deciding whether article III requires involvement by the federal judiciary. Thomas, 105 S.Ct. at 3336. We [380]*380hold that, for purposes of applying Northern Pipeline as interpreted by Thomas, FSLIC’s final determination on adjudication is a final judgment and binding order.
FSLIC is not subject to ordinary appellate review, but instead the review provided by the federal Administrative Procedure Act is less than ordinary appellate review. A reviewing court may reverse FSLIC only if an adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706. If a finding is supported by substantial evidence, it is final and conclusive. Phillips Construction Co. v. United States, 394 F.2d 834, 836 (Ct.Cl.1986). Substantial evidence is a narrow standard of review when contrasted to ordinary appellate review. Vigil v. Post Office Department of the United States, 406 F.2d 921, 924 (10th Cir.1969). Under ordinary appellate review, the reviewing court may reverse if a finding is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Siemans America, 653 F.2d 471, 477 (C.C.P.A.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1016, 71 L.Ed.2d 304 (1982), Picken-Bond Construction Company v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 586 F.2d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir.1978); accord Ridco, Inc. v. Sexton, 623 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Tex.Civ.App.— Fort Worth 1981, no writ). Likewise, a finding may be reversed where the finding of fact is clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, and consequently the fact-finder will be sustained by less evidence than under a weight-of-the-evidence standard. Refrigerated Transport Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 663 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir.1981). The substantial evidence standard restricts an appellate court more than the clearly erroneous standard and the fact finder will accordingly be sustained on less evidence under the substantial evidence standard. SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States International Trade Commission, 718 F.2d 365, 382 (Fed.Cir.1983). Since it is more difficult for an appellate court to reverse an administrative agency under the substantial evidence standard than under ordinary appellate review, FSLIC determinations are subject to less than ordinary appellate review.
FINALITY OF AGENCY ACTION
• Arguing that Glen Ridge is required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, FSLIC maintains that we should defer consideration of this case until completion of FSLIC adjudication and then step aside for review in a federal district court pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Because FSLIC action in the trial court was final agency action for purposes of judicial review, we cannot agree.
Under the APA, judicial review is available from final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Whether final agency action has occurred is determined pragmatically. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Finality is viewed flexibly where all parties are before the court and a judicially resolvable legal issue is presented. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 1204, 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1942).
For purposes of raising the crucial issue concerning the constitutionality of FSLIC’s exclusive authority to adjudicate its dispute with Glen Ridge, finality could occur either from Glen Ridge’s proceeding administratively and appealing the result, or proceeding in a court and appealing a court’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. The deprivation of judicial adjudication is the same in either case. We hold that the grant of FSLIC’s motion to dismiss the state-court action was the equivalent of final agency action and authorized constitutional review. Because we have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal district courts concerning violations of the United States Constitution, Ex parte Royal, 117 U.S. 241, 247-248, 6 S.Ct. 734, 737-38, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886); Snypp v. State of Ohio, 70 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir.1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 563, 55 S.Ct. 74, 79 L.Ed. 663 (1934), the appeal of Glen Ridge is properly before us.
[381]*381STATE LAW AS THE FEDERAL RULE OF DECISION
FSLIC cites Northern Pipeline and Thomas for the proposition that non-article III adjudication is warranted whenever federal law supplies the rule of decision. According to FSLIC, whenever a federal court applies choice-of-law doctrines to choose federal law, a federal rule of decision resolves the controversy, despite the possibility that the federal law may adopt a state common-law rule rather than fashion a special federal rule. FSLIC concludes that a federal court would choose federal law as the rule-of-decision in this case and that, accordingly, Congress may assign the case to the FSLIC instead of an article III court. We do not agree.
To hold that the mere act of choosing federal law under choice-of-law doctrines creates a federal rule of decision for article III purposes, where the actual substantive law remains the same as the common law of the state, would place form over substance. The Supreme Court in Thomas stated that article III can only be applied on the basis of substance rather than form. 105 S.Ct. at 3336. Consequently, where the form of the federal rule of decision may be “federal” under choice of law, but the actual substance of the rule of decision remains that of the state rule, Northern Pipeline and Thomas require adjudication by an article III tribunal.
The conflict between the rights of Glen Ridge, as a private litigant, and FSLIC, as an agency of the United States, involves the rights of the United States arising under a nationwide federal program and will be governed by a juridical construct to be formally called “federal law”. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979); see Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 202, 60 S.Ct. 480, 486, 84 L.Ed. 694 (1940); D’Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 315 U.S. 447, 456, 62 S.Ct. 676, 679, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1943). If this construct will be filled with federal common law specially created to bridge the interstices of FSLIC’s enabling legislation, the resulting public right may be adjudicated by a non-article III body. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 726, 99 S.Ct. at 1457.
When a court must decide whether the federal rule of decision will adopt state law or fashion a nationally uniform federal common-law rule, it must adhere to the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728-730, 99 S.Ct. at 1459. The court must decide whether the federal program in issue requires a nationally uniform body of law to deal with the facts at bar; whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program; and the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. 440 U.S. at 728, 99 S.Ct. at 1458.
FSLIC argues that its ability, as receiver, to collect debts owed to the failed savings and loan and thereby recoup the money paid out to depositors by FSLIC, as insurer, is crucial to the national savings and loan industry and, accordingly, requires nationally uniform federal common law. We cannot agree. In Kimbell, the government similarly argued that a nationally uniform federal common law was necessary because applying state law to federal lending programs would undermine their ability to recover disbursed funds. 440 U.S. at 733, 99 S.Ct. at 1461. The Supreme Court rejected the government’s arguments and adopted state law as the federal rule of decision. 440 U.S. at 733-34, 99 S.Ct. at 1461. Other federal decisions have likewise rejected nationally uniform bodies of laws in favor of application, or adoption, of state law despite the fact that state laws would be inconvenient to, and would cause varying effects upon, the efforts of the United States and its agencies to collect loans, judgments or other debts. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 355, 86 S.Ct. 500, 508, 15 L.Ed.2d 404 (1966); see Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296-297, 61 S.Ct. 995, 997-98, 85 L.Ed. 1361 (1941); Custer v. McCutcheon, 283 U.S. 514, 519, 51 S.Ct. 530, 531, 75 L.Ed. 1239 (1931); Fink v. O’Neill, 106 U.S. 272, 275, 1 S.Ct. 325, 327, 27 L.Ed. 196 (1882); [382]*382United States v. Harpootlian, 24 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.1982).
The cases in which a nationally uniform body of common law has been crafted concern situations that occur on a day-to-day basis or that involve the intimate workings of federal agencies or instrumentalities. See, e.g., Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 191, 60 S.Ct. 480, 481, 84 L.Ed. 694 (1940) (insider dealing by officer of national bank in violation of specific provision of National Banking Act); United States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301, 302, 305- 306, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1606-07, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (subrogation rights of United States for tort injuries to soldier); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 177, 182-183, 64 S.Ct. 908, 913-14, 88 L.Ed. 1209 (1944) (state taxation of munitions plant during World War II); Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367, 63 S.Ct. 573, 575, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943) (issuance of federal government commercial paper).
International Union (UAW) v. Hoosier Cardinal Corporation, 383 U.S. 696, 703-704, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1111-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), demonstrates the difference in reasoning between the cases cited above and those adopting state law. A nationally uniform body of common law is crafted in those situations where its absence would threaten the functioning of those processes that the federal program is chiefly designed to promote. 383 U.S. at 703, 86 S.Ct. at 1112. Controversies dealing with collective bargaining rights provided by federal labor law in UAW, rights on forged endorsements of government paper in Clearfield Trust, and purchases of national bank stock by an officer of the bank in Dietrich presented issues basic to the function of those processes which the federal program was chiefly designed to promote and required national uniformity.
Where the issue of national uniformity arises in connection with actions which occur only after such processes have broken down, the need for national uniformity is not compelling. UAW, 383 U.S. at 704, 86 S.Ct. at 1112. Consequently, issues dealing with recovery of judgments in Fink and the priority of liens on a debtor’s property in Yazell presented situations outside the basic processes that the federal program was chiefly designed to promote and national uniformity was not compelling.
The dispute in this case does not concern those processes that FSLIC was chiefly designed to promote: payment of insurance to depositors, ordering priorities of third-party creditors, sale of a failed thrift under a purchase and assumption, or liquidation of unchallenged assets of the failed thrift. Instead, it concerns cancelling title to assets claimed by the thrift and preventing FSLIC from exercising Empire’s power of foreclosure, which constitute matters outside those processes that are the chief function of FSLIC and situations arising after those processes have broken down. We conclude that a nationally uniform body of federal common law applicable to disputes between FSLIC and debtors of the failed savings and loan concerning the validity of the debt and of the underlying title to assets is not required.
Next, we must determine whether application of state law to disputes between FSLIC and debtors of the failed savings and loan over validity of the debt would frustrate specific legislative objectives. FSLIC argues that a specific objective of Congress was speedy resolution of all claims against the failed thrift because such claims are integral to FSLIC’s collection and liquidation of assets. It concludes that subjecting FSLIC to state law on disputed claims would frustrate this objective.
Gleii Ridge’s claims are calculated to defend its property rights. The effect of defending against FSLIC seizure and sale of assets is fundamentally different from the effect of litigation regarding more basic FSLIC functions. Insurance payments to depositors are not based on the collecti-bility of the thrift’s assets. Sale of unchallenged assets will proceed despite the disposition of the challenged assets. Even though the purchase price of a sale and assumption may need to be adjusted, because of the ongoing litigation, the sale of the majority of the other items may proceed. Finally, the claims of third party [383]*383creditors can be satisfied from assets not subject to dispute and augmented later should FSLIC prevail. Of course, if the challenge is meritorious, the asset will not have been subject to distribution and no function of FSLIC will have been impeded. Without some evidence of the proliferation of such claims, we cannot hold that claims of fraud in the initial transaction are sufficiently common that they will so impede FSLIC liquidations as to frustrate legislative objectives. The delay incident to adjudication under state law will tend to support application of a uniform federal rule, but will not be dispositive of the issue because it is outweighed by the state’s interests in preserving the integrity of its real property laws.
The final part of the Kimbell analysis requires us to consider the extent to which creation and application of a nationally uniform federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated upon state laws. The basic dispute concerns the right of FSLIC to foreclose on real property and the right of Glen Ridge to defeat such foreclosure under various Texas real property laws. In determining whether to adopt state law as the federal rule of decision, a court must have due regard for local interest in control over local real property, recognize that real property law is an area uniquely within the province of the state, and give special consideration to state real property law. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210, 66 S.Ct. 992, 995, 90 L.Ed. 1172 (1946); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155, 64 S.Ct. 474, 480, 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944); Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351, 60 S.Ct. 285, 288, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939); Sunderland v. United States, 226 U.S. 226, 232-233, 45 S.Ct. 64, 65, 69 L.Ed. 259 (1924).
The state-created rights upon which Glen Ridge sues are designed to promote honesty and performance of obligations in real estate transactions and to assure that real property interests are protected against dishonesty and nonperformance of obligations. Participants in such transactions expect and rely upon these rights. If a nationally uniform federal rule of decision is applied to strip these parties of the benefit of laws carefully crafted for their protection by replacing them with federal rules crafted for the benefit of the FSLIG, commercial relationships in Texas would be severely disrupted.2 We conclude that the convenience to FSLIC of a uniform rule is outweighed by the disruption of commercial relationships that would occur if a uniform federal rule of decision supplanted state common law.
SECTION 1730(k)(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
FSLIC contends that, regardless of whether the Kimbell analysis requires a nationally uniform federal law, section 1730(k)(l) provides an independent foundation upon which an edifice of federal common law should be erected. Section 1730(k)(l) provides:
(A)ny civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without regard to the amount in controversy....
[Emphasis added.]
Citing D’Oench, Duhme and Co., Inc., FSLIC argues that this “arising under” language means that federal law necessarily supplies the rule of decision. If so, a non-article III body may adjudicate. We do not agree because this language is jurisdictional and not a source for creation of federal common law.
“Arising under” is one of several distinct classes of the jurisdiction described in Arti-[384]*384ele III, Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution. Chase Manhattan Bank v. South Acres Development Company, 434 U.S. 236, 237, 98 S.Ct. 544, 545, 54 L.Ed.2d 501 (1978). Section 1730(k)(l) was intended to confer that class of jurisdiction upon federal district courts for all suits involving the federal agency, whether based on the express terms of its legislation or not. Hancock Financial Corporation v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 492 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.1974) (1730(k)(l) was intended as a grant of original jurisdiction to district courts); see De-Vilbiss v. Small Business Administration, 661 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir.1981) (similar language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is “merely jurisdictional.”)
In D’Oench, the enabling legislation of FDIC included a provision identical to 1730(k)(l) which stated that “[a]ll suits to which the Corporation shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 264(j). The concurring opinion in D’Oench argued that section 264(j) was not merely jurisdictional and that the Court should decide whether that section freed the federal in all FDIC litigation to “make its own law from materials found in the common law,” 315 U.S. at 468, 62 S.Ct. at 684. The majority in D’Oench declined to hold that this section alone was a sufficient basis for creation of federal common law. 315 U.S. 455-456, 62 S.Ct. at 678-79. We conclude from D’Oench that statutes such as § 1730(k)(l) merely confers jurisdiction and does not mandate that federal common law be created for every suit involving the administrative agency. Consequently, § 1730(k)(l) does not dictate that this case must be governed by a uniform body of federal common law and provides no independent basis for exclusive FSLIC jurisdiction.
WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT CREATE PUBLIC RIGHTS
Next, FSLIC contends that this suit may be adjudicated by an administrative agency because it concerns public rights created when Congress waived sovereign immunity and allowed Glen Ridge to proceed against FSLIC. In this respect, FSLIC asserts that it inherently possesses sovereign immunity which would prohibit Glen Ridge’s suit and, therefore, when Congress waived this immunity, it created a public right which Glen Ridge now asserts. We do not agree.
Waiver of sovereign immunity is purely a procedural matter and is entirely distinct from the extent of the sovereign’s liability. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 540, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1352, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980); Boyer v. Chaloux, 288 F.Supp. 366, 370 (N.D.N.Y., 1968); University of Kentucky v. Guynn, 372 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky.1963); Berger v. State of Connecticut, 130 S.2d 293, 295 (Conn.1957); Commercial Standard Fire and Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 429 S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1968, no writ); Nueces County, Texas v. The Nellie B., 174 F.Supp. 846, 850 (S.D. Tex.1959); and City of Newark v. United States, 149 F.Supp. 917 (D.N.J., 1957). After the sovereign has consented to be sued, its liability is based on the substantive law applied to private citizens. City of Newark, 174 F.Supp. at 921.
Glen Ridge defends against FSLIC foreclosure upon principles of the substantive law of Texas. The mere waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress does not alter these principles. Accordingly, the rights of Glen Ridge are not thereby made public rights. An article III court must adjudicate these private rights.
CONDITIONS OF WAIVER OF IMMUNITY MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FSLIC also claims that this case involves public rights because of the conditions on the waiver of sovereign immunity. The plurality in Northern Pipeline acknowledged that the public rights doctrine “may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued”. 458 U.S. at 67, 102 S.Ct. at 2869. FSLIC reads this to mean that the conditions themselves are public rights which may be [385]*385adjudicated by an administrative agency rather than an article III court.
FSLIC asserts that the prohibition of section 1464(d)(6)(C) that “no court may ... restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a ... receiver” is a condition upon the waiver of sovereign immunity expressed in section 1725(c)(4). Because Congress may permissibly attach conditions to its waiver of sovereign immunity, FSLIC concludes that the condition in 1464(d)(6)(C) converts Glen Ridge’s state common-law rights into public rights. Because the condition is itself unconstitutional, we cannot agree.
No act of congress can authorize a violation of the federal constitution. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). As stated in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 9, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968):
(T)he Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress ... specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.
This rule applies even in areas where legislative action is ordinarily conclusive. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 50-52, 56 S.Ct. 720, 725-26, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936), Almedia-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). Furthermore, what the Constitution prohibits by express statutory action cannot be achieved by indirection. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 404, 84 S.Ct. 454, 456, 11 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964).
Article III prohibits Congress from removing jurisdiction of Glen Ridge’s state common law causes of action from article III courts and placing them in FSLIC. Even though Congress’ determination of what conditions to attach to its waiver of sovereign immunity would ordinarily be conclusive, Congress may not indirectly avoid the effect of article III by purporting to authorize a constitutional violation as a condition to a waiver of sovereign immunity.
FSLIC IS NOT AN ADJUNCT TO AN ARTICLE III COURT
The final contention by FSLIC is that it is an adjunct to an article III court. Accordingly, it maintains that it may properly assume jurisdiction over Glen Ridge’s claims. We cannot agree.
A non-article III body may adjudicate cases falling within the judicial power of the United States if it is a properly constituted adjunct to an article III court. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81-85, 102 S.Ct. at 2876—79; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683; Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51-57, 52 S.Ct. at 292-94. The basic question is whether the relationship betweenthe two bodies preserves the essential attributes of the judicial power within the article III tribunal, and administrative agency adjudication is permissible where the article III court retains sufficient control. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77 and 79, 102 S.Ct. at 2874-75.
The classic example of an adjunct is that of the magistrates created by the Federal Magistrates Act, which passes article III scrutiny because:
(1) the magistrates are appointed and removed by article III judges;
(2) magistrate positions are created by the article III judiciary;
(3) cases are referred to a magistrate by an article III judge to whom the magistrate is an adjunct;
(4) the reference may be cancelled at any time by the article III judge;
(5) reference to a magistrate may only be made with the uncoerced consent of the parties to the lawsuit;
(6) the contempt power is retained in the article III judge; and
(7) the article III court provides appellate review.
Wimmer v. Cook, 11A F.2d 68, 73-74 (4th Cir.1985); Gairola v. Commonwealth of Virginia Department of General Services, 753 F.2d 1281, 1284-1285 (4th Cir.1985); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instrome-[386]*386dix, Inc., 725 F.2d 587, 542-547 (9th Cir.1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir.1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 113-115 (2d Cir.1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn, Loeb, Incorporated v. Clark Oil and Refining Corporation, 739 F.2d 1313, 1315-1316 (8th Cir.1984); Puryear v. Ed’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir.1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1040-1045 (7th Cir.1984); Fields v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 743 F.2d 890, 893-894 (D.C.Cir.1984); and Wharton Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 929-930 (3d Cir.1983). FSLIC possesses only two of these criteria: it lacks the power to punish by contempt3 and its determination is reviewed by an article III court. As to all five of the remaining criteria, FSLIC fails the test of adjunct status.
Congress created a different type of adjunct in the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission. This Commission administers a system similar to that of worker’s compensation, which replaced the traditional negligence action of admiralty law. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.
The Supreme Court in Crowell held that article III imposed no obstacle to this system because:
(1) the administrative agency made only specialized, narrowly confined factual determinations regarding a particularized area of law;
(2) the agency possessed only a limited power to issue compensation orders which could only be enforced by the district court;
(3) the agency was required by law to seek enforcement of its compensation orders in the district court; and
(4) Congress created the rights in issue by replacing the seaman’s traditional negligence action for traditional damages, with a statutory strict liability action for statutory damages.
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 37-38, 43-45, 52 S.Ct. at 287, 289-90; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 78, 85-86, 102 S.Ct. at 2878-79. The first and fourth criteria also underlay the decision in Thomas, 105 S.Ct. at 3329, 3337-3339. Thus, FSLIC contends that it qualifies for adjunct status under each of these criteria. We do not agree.
FSLIC adjudication of Glen Ridge’s causes of action would not involve narrow, specialized subject matter but rather a broad series of extensive, complicated financial and real estate transactions that may implicate broad areas of fraud, contract, real estate, and financial law. Consequently, FSLIC fails the first test of adjunct status under the Crowell/Northem Pipeline analysis.
Further, allowing FSLIC to adjudicate Glen Ridge’s claims with no interference or restraint from any court makes FSLIC determinations equivalent to final judgments rather than limited orders enforceable only by the district court. There is no provision among the FSLIC statutes requiring FSLIC to seek enforcement of any orders in district court. Thus, FSLIC fails the second and third prongs of the Cro-well/Northem Pipeline analysis.
Likewise, the fourth criterion of this analysis refutes FSLIC’s claim to adjunct status. In contrast tos the legislation at issue in Crowell and Thomas, neither federal banking legislation nor FHLBB regulations specifically create rights in either FSLIC or Glen Ridge with respect to the deeds of trust or any causes of action connected therewith. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1464; 12 C.F.R. § 569(a)(6).
Because FSLIC meets only one of seven criteria of the Magistrate Act cases and fails each of the criteria of the Cro-well/Northem Pipeline test, it is not a properly constituted adjunct to an article III court. Consequently, it may not constitutionally adjudicate Glen Ridge’s claims.
We hold that the grant of jurisdiction to FSLIC to adjudicate Glen Ridge’s state law, claims is unconstitutional because it violates article III of the Constitution of the [387]*387United States. Consequently, the trial court may exercise jurisdiction over these causes of action. However, with respect to the causes of action under federal securities laws and those aimed at actions of FSLIC as receiver, i.e. for disparagement of title and violation of state foreclosure laws, which are constitutionally within the authority of FSLIC, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for trial of the state law causes of action only.
REVERSED and REMANDED in part and AFFIRMED in part.
Before DEVANY, LAGARDE and THOMAS 1 JJ.