Me. Chief Justice Stone
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Communications Commission, by its order of May 2, 1941, as amended by its order of October 11, 1941, promulgated regulations which purport to require the Commission to refuse to grant a license to any broadcasting station which enters into certain defined types of contract with any broadcasting network organization. These regulations, it is alleged, affect adversely appellant’s contractual relations with broadcasting stations and impair its ability to carry on its business in maintaining and operating its nationwide broadcasting network. The regulations as amended on October 11,1941, together with a supplemental “minute” promulgated by the Commission on October 31, 1941, are set forth at the end of this opinion, post, p. 425. The question for our decision is whether appellant is entitled to secure a judicial review of the order by a suit brought under § 402 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1093, 47 U. S. C. § 402 (a), and the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219, 28 U. S. C. § 47.
Pursuant to § 402 (a) appellant brought the present suit against the United States in the Southern District of New York, to enjoin enforcement of the Commission’s order as contrary to the public interest and beyond the Commission’s statutory authority, and on the further ground, if the order be deemed within that authority, that the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by Congress in violation of Article I, § 1 of the Constitution, and operates to deprive appellant of property [409]*409without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The case was heard by a court of three judges, which permitted the Commission and the Mutual Broadcasting Company to intervene as defendants. It granted appellees’ motion to dismiss, the complaint for want of jurisdiction, 44 F. Supp. 688, and stayed the operation of the Commission’s order pending direct appeal to this Court.
In 1938 the Communications Commission authorized an investigation “to determine what special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain or other broadcasting are required in the public interest, convenience, or necessity.” Extensive hearings were held by a committee consisting of three members of the Commission, at whose request the national networks, including appellant, intervened. In June, 1940, the committee made a report, on the basis of which briefs were filed and oral argument was presented before the full Commission by the three national networks and other interested parties. In May, 1941, the Commission issued its “Report on Chain Broadcasting” and ordered the adoption of the regulations which, in their amended form, are the subject of the present controversy.
The relevant facts stated in the bill of complaint are as follows: Appellant or its predecessor has been engaged in the business of nationwide network or chain broadcasting since 1927. It has a large amount of physical property used in the business and has built up a valuable goodwill. For its broadcasts it maintains a staff of employees and expends large amounts for musicians and broadcasting performers. It has commitments by long-term contracts aggregating more than $4,000,000 for broadcasting expenditures, including those for the use of land and buildings and for the furnishing of news and broadcasting programs in the next few years. Appellant’s total property devoted to its broadcasting business exceeds $18,000,000 in value; [410]*410its earnings from the network exceeded $3,000,000 in both 1939 and 1940.
Chain broadcasting is the means by which radio programs are made available to all or a large part of the nationwide radio audience. It is defined by the Communications Act, 47 U. S. C. § 153 (p), as the “simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations.” The chain broadcaster prepares radio programs, for which it engages performers in advance, and simultaneously broadcasts them over a large number of radio stations to which the programs are transmitted from some central point of origination by wire telephone lines leased by the broadcaster, here the appellant. The programs, which are prepared well in advance of the broadcast and given by persons employed for the purpose by appellant, are of two classes—commercial programs sponsored and paid for by advertisers, and sustaining programs furnished by appellant and not paid for by any advertiser.
Appellant’s network comprises 123 stations in 122 cities in the United States. It is so operated as to enable ninety per cent of the radio audience of the United States to listen simultaneously to programs provided by appellant and broadcasted over these stations. Appellant owns and operates seven of the stations and leases an eighth, all licensed by the Commission. With the remaining 115 stations it enters into individual contracts, usually for periods of five years, terminable in some instances by appellant on twelve months’ notice. By these contracts, appellant undertakes to furnish each station with an average of at least sixty hours per week of network sustaining and sponsored programs. The sustaining programs are furnished without charge, the station being free to use them or not as it chooses. Appellant undertakes to furnish the station with all commercial programs which the sponsor requests the station to broadcast and to pay the station a specified [411]*411hourly rate for the use of its facilities in broadcasting such programs. Appellant agrees not to furnish its programs to other stations in the same city; the affiliated station, with exceptions not now material, agrees not to broadcast the program of any other network. Of critical importance in the present litigation is the stipulation of the affiliated station that it will, upon not less than twenty-eight days’ notice from appellant, broadcast the sponsored or commercial program furnished to it by appellant for at least fifty “converted” hours (averaging seventy-nine regular clock hours) per week.
’ These provisions of appellant’s contracts are alleged to be indispensable to the maintenance and efficient operation of its network and to the existence of a strong and efficient network broadcasting system, and necessary to enable appellant to compete with other advertising media. On May 2,1941, the Commission issued its order which, as amended by its order of October 11,1941, promulgated the “Chain Broadcasting Regulations” of which appellant complains, and which the Commission characterized in its Report as “the expression of the general policy we will follow in exercising our licensing power.”1 The regulations provide that no license shall be granted to a broadcast [412]*412station having contracts with a network organization, containing any of several provisions which are characteristic of appellant’s contracts with its affiliates. These include provisions by which the station is prevented from broadcasting the programs of any other network organization (3.101); or which prevent another station serving substantially the same area from broadcasting the network programs not taken by the station applying for license, or prevent another station serving a substantially different area from broadcasting any program of the network organization (3.102); or by which the station contracts for affiliation with the network for a period longer than two years (3.103); or by which the station “options for network programs any time subject to call on less than 56 days’ notice or more time than a total of three hours” within each of four specified segments of the broadcast day, the regulation declaring “such options may not be exclusive as against other network organizations and may not prevent or hinder the station from optioning or selling any or all of the time covered by the option, or other time, to other network organizations” (3.104); or which prevent the station (a) from rejecting network programs which the station reasonably believes to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable or (b) from substituting for the network program a program of outstanding local or national importance (3.105).
After making its order of May 2, 1941, the Commission deferred its effective date until further order. By its order of October 11, 1941, the Commission fixed the effective date as November 15, 1941, and directed “that the effective date of Regulation 3.106 with respect to any station may be extended from time to time in order to permit the orderly disposition of properties,” and “that the effective date of Regulation 3.107 shall be suspended indefinitely and any further order of the Commission placing said Regulation 3.107 in effect shall provide for not less [413]*413than six months’ notice and for further extension of the effective date from time to time in order to permit the orderly disposition of properties.”
The bill of complaint also alleges that the purpose and effect of the regulations are to prohibit station licensees from having agreements of the kind which appellant has with its affiliates; that prior to the order of May 2, 1941, it was the practice of the Commission to renew the licenses of stations annually and that the licensed stations have had a reasonable expectancy of the annual renewal of their licenses; that 115 licensed stations have such contracts with appellant, expiring at various times between the original effective date of the regulations and December 31, 1947. It is alleged that when their current licenses expire, at the latest, and perhaps earlier through the revocation of existing licenses, such stations face the loss of their licenses if they perform or continue in force or renew any existing contracts containing the described provisions.
The bill alleges that since the stations fear the loss of their licenses, as a result of the regulations, they will not negotiate for or renew affiliation contracts containing such provisions. And because they fear the loss of their licenses, the stations have threatened to cancel and repudiate their affiliation contracts, and many have notified appellant that they will not be bound by their contracts after the regulations become effective. As a consequence, appellant’s ability to conduct its business and maintain its public broadcasting service is seriously impaired and the regulations will make the operation of appellant’s business more costly, reduce its earnings and render its property and business less valuable.
The bill of complaint was filed October 30, 1941. The following day the Commission promulgated a supplemental “minute” setting up a procedure by which the validity of the regulations might be tested upon application for a license by an individual licensee. The minute declared [414]*414that if a station wished to challenge the regulations the Commission would grant a temporary extension of its license until there had been a final court determination of the issues. In the event of such litigation, and if the validity of the regulations were sustained, “the Commission will nevertheless grant a regular license to the licensee, otherwise entitled thereto, who has unsuccessfully litigated that issue, if the licensee thereupon conforms to the decision.”
An affidavit subsequently submitted by appellant in support of its motion for a temporary injunction states that since the Commission’s minute of October 31st, appellant has continued to receive indications that its affiliates will cancel and repudiate their contracts and refuse to renew them, and has received no indication that the minute has or will have the effect of inducing stations to assume the burden of testing the validity of the regulations. Attached to the affidavit are letters from five affiliates, written after October 31st, indicating their intention not to be bound by the contracts. The affidavit also states appellant’s belief that it would have received more such letters had it not been for its circulation of information concerning the pendency of this suit.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, as for present purposes we must, it is evident that application by the Commission of its regulations in accordance with their terms would disrupt appellant’s broadcasting system and seriously disorganize its business. As the bill alleges, station licenses have been renewable by the Commission annually,2 whereas appellant’s contracts are for five year periods and many of them will survive the expiration of the existing licenses to the affiliated stations. Under Regulations 3.101, 3.102,3.103 and 3.104, each affili[415]*415ate must repudiate his contract or be denied the renewal of his license. In either case, this would deprive appellant of the station’s participation in its network, for which its contracts call.
Regulation 3.104 not only requires all options by appellant to be exercised on 56 days’ rather than 28 days’ notice as at present, but provides that no option time is exclusive of other networks, and thus allows to appellant no option time within which it can command the use of affiliated stations for any program for broadcasting on a national scale. These sections together thus operate to break down the network enterprise in which appellant and its affiliates are by their contracts cooperating, and to substitute a system in which every station is available to every network on a “first come first served basis.”
The Commission concedes by its brief that, as provided by § 312 (a), “Any station license may be revoked . . . because of conditions revealed by such statements of fact as may be required [of a licensee] from time to time which would warrant the Commission in refusing to grant a license on an original application.” Consequently the regulations by their terms, read in conjunction with § 312 (a), expose licensees, who renew their affiliation contracts, to revocation proceedings by the Commission whenever, upon a statement which the Commission may require, it appears that the licensee has entered into an affiliation contract which the regulations proscribe.
A proceeding to set aside an order of the Commission under § 402 (a) and the Urgent Deficiencies Act is a plenary suit in equity. Hence the questions raised by the motion to dismiss are whether the Commission’s order is an “order,” review of which is authorized by § 402 (a) of the Act, and if so whether the bill states a cause of action in equity. The suit cannot be maintained unless both questions are answered in the affirmative.
[416]*416Section 402 (a) makes applicable the provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act to “suits to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission” except orders “granting or refusing an application for a construction permit for a radio station, or for a radio station license, or for renewal of an existing radio station license, or for modification of an existing radio station license, or suspending a radio operator’s license.” Review of the orders excepted from § 402 (a) is by appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under the provisions of § 402 (b). See Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Comm’n, ante, p. 4. Since the Commission’s order neither grants, denies nor modifies any license, any review in advance or independently of an application for a station license must be under § 402 (a), and then only if the Commission’s order promulgating the regulations is an “order” within the meaning of this section. The particular label placed upon it by the Commission is not necessarily conclusive, for it is the substance of what the Commission has purported to do and has done which is decisive. Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 284-85; A. F. of L. v. Labor Board, 308 U. S. 401, 408.
The Commission’s investigation of the contractual relations between the networks and the stations, which resulted in the order now under attack, was for the stated purpose of prescribing regulations of such relationships. The order authorizing the investigation recited that the proceeding was taken under § 303 (i) of the Act, which gives the Commission “authority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting.” Since the Commission is not in terms given authority to regulate contractual relations between the stations and the networks, regulation of them could be accomplished only by regulating licensed radio stations which participate in chain broadcasting. It was by regulations in terms applicable to such stations that the Coim [417]*417mission sought to control their contractual relationships with the networks.
The order is thus in its genesis and on its face, and in its practical operation, an order promulgating regulations which operate to control such contractual relationships, and it was adopted by the Commission in the avowed exercise of its rule-making power. Such regulations which affect or determine rights generally, even though not directed to any particular person or corporation, when lawfully promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, have the force of law and are orders reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564; United States v. B. & O. R. Co., 293 U. S. 454. And regulations of like character, by which the Communications Commission has prescribed generally the records and accounts to be kept by telephone companies subject to its jurisdiction, are similarly reviewable under § 402 (a). A. T. & T. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232.
The regulations here prescribe rules which govern the contractual relationships between the stations and the networks. If the applicant for a license has entered into an affiliation contract, the regulations require the Commission to reject his application. If a licensee renews his contract, the regulations, with the sanction of § 312 (a), authorize the Commission to cancel his license. In a proceeding for revocation or cancellation of a license, the decisive question is whether the station, by entering into a contract, has forfeited its right to a license as the regulations prescribe. It is the signing of the contract which, by virtue of the regulations alone, has legal consequences to the stations and to appellant. The regulations are not any the less reviewable because their promulgation did not operate of their own force to deny or cancel a license. It is enough that failure to comply with them penalizes licensees, and appellant, with whom they contract. If an administrative order has that effect it is reviewable and it [418]*418does not cease to be so- merely because it is not certain whether the Commission will institute proceedings to enforce the penalty incurred under its regulations for noncompliance. Assigned Car Cases, supra; A. T. & T. Co. v. United States, supra.
The regulations are rules which in proceedings before the Commission require it to reject and authorize it to cancel licenses on the grounds specified in the regulations without more. If the regulations are valid they alter the status of appellant’s contracts and thus determine their validity in advance of such proceedings. By striking them down by a determination proclaimed in advance that licenses shall be cancelled or refused because of a previous failure to comply with the regulations, they impose a penalty and sanction for noncompliance far more drastic than the fines customarily inflicted for breach of reviewable administrative orders.
Most rules of conduct having the force of law are not self-executing but require judicial or administrative action to impose their sanctions with respect to particular individuals. Unlike an administrative order or a court judgment adjudicating the rights of individuals, which is binding only on the parties to the particular proceeding, a valid exercise of the rule-making power is addressed to and sets a standard of conduct for all to whom its terms apply. It operates as such in advance of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular individual. It is common experience that men conform their conduct to regulations by governmental authority so as to avoid the unpleasant legal consequences which failure to conform entails. And in this case it is alleged without contradiction that numerous affiliated stations have conformed to the regulations to avoid loss of their licenses with consequent injury to appellant.
Such regulations have the force of law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after. When, as here, they [419]*419are promulgated by order of the Commission and the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are appropriately the subject of attack under the provisions of § 402 (a) and the Urgent Deficiencies Act. A. T. & T. Co. v. United States, supra; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423; Assigned Car Cases, supra; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80; United States v. B. & O. R. Co., supra.
It is no answer to say that the regulations are addressed only to the Commission and merely prohibit it from granting—and authorize it to cancel—licenses in the case of all stations entering into such contracts, and that accordingly all stations are left free to enter into contracts or not, as they choose. They are free only in the sense that all those who do not choose to conform to regulations which may be determined to be lawful are free by their choice to accept the legal consequences of their acts. Failure to comply with the regulations entails such consequences to the station owner and to appellant. These are the loss of the affiliated stations’ licenses if they adhere to their contracts, and disruption of appellant’s network through the declared unlawfulness of the contracts, if the regulations are valid.
The purposes sought to be accomplished by § 402 (a) and the Urgent Deficiencies Act would be defeated if a suitor were unable to resort to them to avoid reasonably anticipated irreparable injury resulting from such legal consequences of the Commission’s order, merely because the Commission as yet has neither refused to renew a license, as the regulations require, nor cancelled a license, as the regulations permit. Such an argument addressed ■to the form rather than the substance of the order was rejected in Powell v. United States, supra [300 U. S. 276]; [420]*420cf. A. F. of L. v. Labor Board, supra, 308 U. S. 408. The Powell case likewise repudiates the suggestion that, merely because the order is not in terms addressed to those whose rights are affected, they cannot seek its review. See also Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47; Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382.
The order here is not one, as the Government argues and as the court below seemed to think, where the complainant’s rights are affected only on the contingency of future administrative action, as in United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 273 U. S. 299; cf. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, supra, 307 U. S. 130. As the Court declared in the Los Angeles case, 309, 310, reviewable orders are “an exercise either of the quasi-judicial function of determining controversies or of the delegated legislative function of rate making and rule making.” And the Court pointed out that the “so-called order” in that case did not “determine any right or obligation” or change the plaintiff’s “existing or future status or condition,” and that it was “merely the formal record of conclusions reached after a study of data collected in the course of extensive research conducted by the Commission” and “is the exercise solely of the function of investigation.”
Here the Commission exercised its rule-making power by adopting regulations whose operation is not made subject to future administrative determinations, save only as the Commission may be called on to decide in any given case whether a station’s contract with a network is within the regulations. The regulations’ applicability to all who are within their terms does not depend upon future administrative action. Instead, they operate to control such action and to determine in advance the rights of others affected by it. The Commission gave its own recognition [421]*421that such is their operation by its successive postponements of the effective date of the order for a period now expired, and by its suspension of Regulations 3.106 and 3.107, in order to enable the networks to dispose of their properties.
Of course, the Commission was at liberty to follow a wholly different procedure. Instead of proclaiming general regulations applicable to all licenses, in advance of any specific contest over a license, it might have awaited such a contest to declare that the policy which these regulations embody represents its concept of the public interest. As a matter of sound administrative practice, both the rule-making proceeding and the specific license proceeding undoubtedly have much to commend them. But they are by no means the same, nor do they necessarily give rise to the same kind of judicial review. Having adopted this order under its rule-making power, the Commission cannot insist that the appellant be relegated to that judicial review which would be exclusive if the rule-making power had never been exercised and consequently had never subjected appellant to the threatened irreparable injury.
The court below assumed that if appellant had any equitable cause of action, it must be prosecuted in an ordinary suit and not under the provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act. But we think this mistakes both the nature of the regulations and the purpose of suits under that Act, as incorporated in § 402 (a). Such a cause of action obviously can arise only because of the operation of the regulations. The regulations are the effective implement by which the injury complained of is wrought, and hence must be the object of the attack. It is because they are an exercise of the rule-making power, and because they presently determine rights on the basis of which the Commission is required to withhold licenses and au[422]*422thorized to cancel them, that there is an order within the meaning of § 402 (a) and the Urgent Deficiencies Act.
The Commission argues that, since its Report characterized the regulations as announcements of policy, the order promulgating them is no more subject to review than a press release similarly announcing its policy. Undoubtedly, regulations adopted in the exercise of the administrative rule-making power, like laws enacted by legislatures, embody announcements of policy. But they may be something more.. When, as here, the regulations are avowedly adopted in the exercise of that power, couched in terms of command and accompanied by an announcement of the Commission that the policy is one “which we will follow in exercising our licensing power,” they must be taken by those entitled to rely upon them as what they purport to be—an exercise of the delegated legislative power—which, until amended, are controlling alike upon the Commission and all others whose rights may be affected by the Commission’s execution of them. The Commission’s contention that the regulations are no more reviewable than a press release is hardly reconcilable with its own recognition that the regulations afford legal basis for cancellation of the license of a station if it renews its contract with appellant.
Appellant’s standing to maintain the present suit in equity is unaffected by the fact that the regulations are not directed to appellant and do not in terms compel action by it or impose penalties upon it because of its action or failure to act. It is enough that, by setting the controlling standards for the Commission’s action, the regulations purport to operate to alter and affect adversely appellant’s contractual rights and business relations with station owners whose applications for licenses the regulations will cause to be rejected and whose licenses the regulations may cause to be revoked. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 266-68; Western Pacific R. Co. v. [423]*423Southern Pacific Co., supra; Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, supra; compare, in the case of an attack upon the validity of a statute, Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38-39; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510.
What we have said of the allegations of the complaint, and of the effect of the Commission’s order if those allegations are sustained upon the trial, is enough to establish the threat of irreparable injury to appellant’s business and to show also that the injury can not be avoided, as the Commission suggests, by appellant’s intervention in proceedings upon applications for renewal of licenses by its affiliates or in proceedings to cancel their licenses, if and when such proceedings are instituted. Appellant has sufficiently alleged that the affiliates are cancelling or threatening to cancel their contracts in order to conform to the regulations. It is to avoid the irreparable injury which would result from such wholesale cancellations of its contracts, induced by the force of the regulations, that appellant makes its attack on them now rather than in later proceedings on the individual applications for licenses in those cases, if any, in which the stations are willing to seek licenses without complying with the prerequisites laid down by the regulations.
The issues in such a proceeding are not necessarily the same as the issues here. Intervention in it would afford appellant no assurance either of an adjudication of appellant’s contentions or that the action of other stations would be governed by it. Moreover, if the Commission’s order is, as we hold, a reviewable order, appellant is free to seek review under § 402 (a). It is not thereby, as the court below seemed to think, improperly substituting a different procedure and court for that which Congress has prescribed for the trial of like issues so far as they may be raised on review of an order denying a license. Such issues may likewise be involved in a proceeding, upon the Commission’s own motion, for modification or cancellation [424]*424of a license, which concededly is reviewable under § 402 (a). See Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Comm’n, ante, p. 4. But review of the order by a licensee in such a proceeding affords no adequate remedy. If ever instituted, which is uncertain, it would come too late to save appellant from the injury wrought by the outlawry of its contracts.
Nor does the Commission’s minute, filed after the present suit was brought, afford an adequate basis for requiring appellant to seek relief by intervention in a proceeding on application for a license reviewable under § 402 (b). In that event the minute would not operate to broaden the issues involved in the renewal application. Nor would it afford a basis for restraining enforcement of the regulations as to other affiliated stations, pending adjudication of the validity of the regulations. Without full exploration of the subject, such as can be had only at the trial, we cannot say that the minute will afford a sufficient inducement to persuade the affiliated stations to cease cancellations and assume the initiative in litigating the validity of the regulations and of the contracts which they undertake to condemn. The affidavit filed in the court below on the application for a stay is to the contrary. And in any case, we are of the opinion that there are no equitable principles by which the right of appellant, upon the showing made by its complaint and affidavit, to test the order under § 402 (a) can justly be suspended to await action which the station owners may or may not take in assuming the burden of challenging the regulations.
We need not stop to discuss here the great variety of administrative rulings which, unlike this one, are not reviewable—either because they do not adjudicate rights or declare them legislatively, or because there are adequate administrative remedies which must be pursued before resorting to judicial remedies, or because there is no occasion to resort to equitable remedies. But we should [425]*425not for that reason fail to discriminate between them and this case in which, because of its peculiar circumstances, all the elements prerequisite to judicial review are present. The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined technique, but in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of which the regulations purport to control.
We conclude that the Commission’s promulgation of the regulations is an order reviewable under § 402 (a) of the Ant, and that the bill of complaint states a cause of action in equity. The stay now in effect will be continued, on terms to be settled by the court below.
Reversed.
Me. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Orders and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, considered in the foregoing opinion of the Court:
OEDER OF MAY 2, 1941, AS AMENDED OCTOBER 11, 1941
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered, That the following regulations be and they are hereby adopted:
Sec. 3.101. Exclusive affiliation of station.—No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, broadcasting the programs of any other network organization.
Sec. 3.102. Territorial exclusivity.—No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization which prevents or hinders [426]*426another station serving substantially the same area from broadcasting the network’s programs not taken by the former station, or which prevents or hinders another station serving a substantially different área from broadcasting any program of the network organization. This regulation shall not be construed to prohibit any contract, arrangement, or understanding between a station and a network organization pursuant to which the station is granted the first call in its primary service area upon the programs of the network organization.
Sec. 3.103. Term of affiliation.—No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, expressed or implied, with a network organization which provides, by original term, provisions for renewal, or otherwise for the affiliation of the station with the network organization for a period longer than two years: Provided, That a contract, arrangement, or understanding for a period up to two years, may be entered into within 120 days prior to the commencement of such period.
Sec. 3.104. Option time—No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station which options for network programs any time subject to call on less than 56 days’ notice, or more time than a total of three hours within each of four segments of the broadcast day, as herein described. The broadcast day is divided into 4 segments, as follows: 8:00a.m.to 1.00p.m.; 1:00p.m.to6:00p.m.; 6:00p.m. to 11:00 p. m.; 11:00 p. m. to 8:00 a. m. Such options may not be exclusive as against other network organizations and may not prevent or hinder the station from optioning or selling any or all of the time covered by the option, or other time, to other network organizations.
Sec. 3.105. Right to reject programs.—No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization which (a), with respect to programs offered pursuant to an affiliation contract, prevents or hinders the station from rejecting or refusing network programs which the station reasonably believes to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable; or which (b), with respect to network programs so offered or already con[427]*427tracted for, prevents the station from rejecting or refusing any program which, in its opinion, is contrary to the public interest, or from substituting a program of outstanding local or national importance.
Sec. 3.106. Network ownership of stations.—No license shall be granted to a network organization, or to any person directly or indirectly controlled by or under common control with a network organization, for more than one standard broadcast station where one of the stations covers substantially the service area of the other station, or for any standard broadcast station in any locality where the existing standard broadcast stations are so few or of such unequal desirability (in terms of coverage, power, frequency, or other related matters) that competition would be substantially restrained by such licensing.
Sec. 3.107. Dual network operation.—No license shall be issued to a standard broadcast station affiliated with a network organization which maintains more than one network: Provided, That this regulation shall not be applicable if such networks are not operated simultaneously, or if there is no substantial overlap in the territory served by the group of stations comprising each such network.
Sec. 3.108. Control by networks of station rates. — No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, fixing or altering its rates for the sale of broadcast time for other than the network’s programs.
[.Effective date.] These regulations shall become effective immediately: Provided, That, with respect to existing contracts, arrangements or understandings, or network organization station licenses, the effective date shall be deferred until November 15, 1941: Provided further, That the effective date of Regulation 3.106 with respect to any station may be extended from time to time in order to permit the orderly disposition of properties; and Provided further, That the effective date of Regulation 3.107 shall be suspended indefinitely and any further order of the Commission placing said Regulation 3.107 in effect shall provide for not less than six months’ notice and for [428]*428further extension of the effective date from time to time in order to permit the orderly disposition of properties.
THE MINUTE OP OCTOBER 31, 1941
The Commission today adopted the following minute setting forth the procedure that it will follow in applying the policies announced in the Chain Broadcasting Regulations:
If a station wishes to contest the validity of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations adopted in Docket No. 5060, or the reasonableness of their application to the particular station, its license will be set for hearing. In order to insure that the station may remain on the air and be in no w;ay injured by any such Commission proceeding and appeal to court from a decision in such proceeding, the Commission will grant such licensee a temporary extension of its license, with renewals from time to time until there has been a final determination of the issues raised at such hearing. In the event of such litigation, and if the validity of the application of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations to such licensee is sustained by the courts, the Commission will nevertheless grant a regular license to the licensee, otherwise entitled thereto, who has unsuccessfully litigated that issue, if the licensee thereupon conforms to the decision.
The supplementary decision and order in Docket No. 5060 indefinitely suspended Regulation 3.107, relating to the operation of more than one network by a single network organization. No similar suspension was made of that portion of Regulation 3.106, relating to network operation of more than one standard broadcast station with substantially overlapping service areas. The Commission will postpone indefinitely any action to prevent such dual station operation if it is shown that the operation of two stations in any city is indispensable to the continued operation of two networks by a single network organization.
The adoption of the foregoing procedure is without prejudice to the rights of any person who may petition the Commission for modification or stay of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations.