Giroux v . Town of Danbury CV-06-250-PB 01/15/08
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Philip Giroux
v. Civil N o . 06-cv-250-PB Opinion N o . 2008 DNH 006 Town of Danbury, et a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Philip Giroux brought this civil action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(d) against Danbury Police
Chief Dale Cole and Danbury Police Officer Andrew Ware. Giroux
claims that Cook and Ware violated his rights under the First and
Fourth Amendments by arresting him without probable cause,
failing to hold a prompt probable cause hearing following his
arrest, and making the arrest to prevent him from engaging in
constitutionally protected speech. He also asserts supplemental
state law causes of action against the same defendants for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons
stated below, I grant summary judgment with respect to Giroux’s
false arrest and First Amendment claims, and I give defendants 30 days to supplement their motion to assert a summary judgment
argument regarding Giroux’s timely judicial determination of
probable cause issue. I defer consideration of Giroux’s state
law claims pending submission of defendants’ supplemental motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
Giroux is a resident of Danbury, New Hampshire, a town
governed by a Board of Selectmen. In 1995, the Board of
Selectmen established the Danbury Workshop, Inc., a nonprofit
organization created to manage and operate the Danbury Community
Center (“DCC”). The DCC employs a director, staff, and
volunteers. Giroux served as the DCC Facilities Manager, but he
resigned from the position on May 1 3 , 2003. (Compl. ¶ 22.)
Despite his resignation, Giroux wished to remain a volunteer at
DCC and to continue participating DCC functions. Id.
1 The facts are drawn primarily from defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As required when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, I recite the facts in the light most favorable to Giroux, the non-moving party, and I note which facts are in genuine dispute. Latin Am. Music C o . v . Archdiocese of San Juan of the Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 499 F.3d 3 2 , 38 (1st Cir. 2007). The facts upon which I base my decision are undisputed.
-2- A. Communications with DCC Board and Staff Members
Giroux called Terri Towle, the DCC executive director,
several times during late May and early June 2003. Towle
recorded Giroux’s attempts to contact her and submitted them to
the police. Officer Norman Daigneault of the Danbury Police
Department interviewed Towle about the calls and listened to nine
voicemail messages from Giroux. (Aff. of Daigneault ¶ 3 , Sept.
4 , 2007, Ex. B of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.; Aff. of Cook ¶ 3 ,
Sept. 4 , 2007, Ex. B of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) Giroux does
not dispute the fact that he made these phone calls, but he does
dispute Towle’s characterization of the messages as threatening.
On June 4 , 2003, Sara Blay, the DCC treasurer, reported a
security concern about Giroux to her employer. (Incident and
Crime Report, J.Jill Group, June 4 , 2003, Ex. W to Pl.’s O b j . to
Mot. for Summ. J.) Specifically, Blay complained of a “stalking
situation with possible violent implications” and reported that
Giroux was making threatening phone calls to her house and
threatening her husband with physical harm. Id. Giroux does not
dispute the content of the report or the fact that Blay made the
report, although he does dispute the truth of Blay’s underlying
statement.
-3- Towle wrote a letter to Giroux on June 1 1 , 2003, thanking
him for his service and stating: “Given all that has happened,
we ask that you no longer visit or call the Center, or contact
its staff.” (Aff. of Daigneaut ¶ 6; Letter from Towle to Giroux,
June 1 1 , 2003, Ex. D. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) Officer
Daigneault hand-delivered the letter to Giroux on the same day.
(Aff. of Daigneaut ¶ 6.) Giroux does not dispute these facts,
although he argues that the letter’s language illegally banned
him from the DCC.
On June 1 9 , 2003, Giroux wrote a letter to Towle describing
some of his experiences with Towle and the DCC. (Aff. of Cook ¶
4 ; Letter from Giroux to Towle, June 1 9 , 2003, Ex. G of Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J.) Giroux, Towle and Audrey Pellegrino, the
Chairman of the DCC Board, exchanged several letters and phone
calls over the course of July and August 2003. (Aff. of Cook ¶
4-14.) Towle and Pellegrino reported Giroux’s letters and phone
calls to the Danbury Police Department because they found them to
be threatening and harassing. Id. Giroux claims that his
communications were intended only t o : 1 ) clear his name with
respect to a rumor allegedly started by Thomas Blay, husband of
DCC Treasurer Sara Blay, suggesting that Giroux was a child
-4- molester, 2 ) find out when he would be permitted to return to the
DCC, and 3 ) express genuine concern about the safety conditions
of the DCC/Town Hall well and a sidewalk on DCC property.
On July 2 3 , 2003, Dale Cook, Chief of Police for the Danbury
Police Department, made an officer report regarding the “domestic
violence” problem at the DCC. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 2 ; Officer
Report, Dale Cook, Chief of Police, Danbury Police Department,
July 2 3 , 2003, Ex. J of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) Cook noted in
his report that he called Pellegrino to find out why Towle had
not yet sought a restraining order against Giroux. Pellegrino
told him that Towle was afraid of Giroux and that Towle wanted
all of the DCC members to get restraining orders against Giroux,
but that Pellegrino would not personally seek a restraining
order. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 12-13.) Cook noted in his report: “At
this time, they are handling this themselves against my better
judgment.” Id.
B. Complaints to the Board of Selectmen
Giroux attended a meeting of the Danbury Board of Selectmen
on August 2 6 , 2003, at which he requested the Selectmen’s help in
dealing with the DCC Board and also mentioned his concerns about
monitoring of the DCC/Town Hall well water. (Minutes from
-5- Selectmen’s Meeting, Aug. 2 6 , 2003, Ex. Q of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot.
for Summ. J.) The Selectmen told Giroux that they would not get
involved in Giroux’s conflict with the DCC because the running of
the DCC was not under the Selectmen’s jurisdiction. Id. At the
meeting, the Selectmen decided to request that the DCC Board
attend the next Selectmen’s meeting to resolve the conflict. Id.
Following this meeting, Giroux came to Town Hall and made
various complaints to Christie Phelps, the Town Hall’s
administrative assistant. (Memos to File, Christie Phelps,
Administrative Assistant, Danbury Town Hall, Aug. 2 7 , 2003, Aug.
2 8 , 2003, Ex. K of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) According to
Phelps’s file, on August 2 7 , Giroux requested more information
about his being banned from the DCC and asserted that he had
evidence to show that the Blays were evading property taxes. Id.
On August 2 8 , he provided Phelps with a list of concerns
including issues about the DCC/Town Hall well and his
communication with various DCC personnel. Id.; Aff. of Cook ¶
14.
On August 2 9 , Giroux returned to Town Hall to get copies of
records involving the well water and requested that Chief Cook
perform a background check to help clear his name regarding the
-6- molestation rumors. (Memo to File, Christie Phelps, Aug. 2 9 ,
2003, Ex. B of Pl.’s O b j . to Def.’s Supplement to the Record.)
Giroux also told Phelps about his conflict with Thomas Blay and
mentioned that he was considering retaining a lawyer and making a
sign or doing a mass mailing to inform people about how
Pellegrino had misled the Selectmen. Id.
C. Events of September 2 , 2003
The Board of Selectmen meeting with the DCC Board was
scheduled for September 2 , 2003. Earlier that day, Giroux came
to Town Hall twice, once to request an application to carry a
concealed weapon and once to drop off the completed application.
(Compl. ¶ 8 0 ; Memo to File, Christie Phelps, Sept. 2 , 2003, Ex. B
of Pl.’s O b j . to Def.’s Supp. to the Record.) Giroux’s
application for the gun permit mentioned his ongoing personal
conflict with Thomas Blay. (Compl. ¶ 85.)
On the afternoon of September 2 , Thomas Blay called the
police to report an altercation with Giroux. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 6 ;
Statement of Thomas Blay, Sept. 2 , 2003, Ex. S of Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J.) Blay stated that he saw a sign on Giroux’s truck that
said “DCC Treasurer Sara Blay attempted possible tax fraud.”
(Statement of Thomas Blay, Sept. 2 , 2003; Compl. ¶ 85.) Blay
-7- reported that when he questioned Giroux about the sign, Giroux
grabbed him, poked him in the chest, and told Blay that he had
gotten a pistol and a permit that day and was going to the Town
Hall for the Selectmen’s meeting that night “to settle it.”
(Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 6 ; Statement of Thomas Blay, Sept. 2 , 2003.)
Giroux does not dispute the fact that Blay reported the above
statements to the police, although he does dispute the underlying
truth of Blay’s statements.
Blay called his wife, Sara, to report what had happened.
(Statement of Sara Blay, Sept. 9, 2003. Ex. P of Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J.) Sara Blay, Terri Towle, and Audrey Pellegrino decided
to drive to the meeting as a group. (Statement of Terri Towle,
Sept. 4 , 2003, Ex. O of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) When
Pellegrino and Sara Blay picked up Towle at her house, they saw
Giroux sitting in his truck, which was parked across the street
displaying the sign. (Statement of Sara Blay, Sept. 9, 2003;
Statement of Terri Towle, Sept. 4 , 2003.) Giroux does not
dispute these facts. (Compl. ¶ 126.)
Officer Daigneault received a call that Giroux could be on
his way to Town Hall, so he picked up Officer Andrew Ware, also
of the Danbury Police Department, and called for back-up of State
-8- Police and other available units. (Aff. of Daigneault ¶ 1 0 ; Aff.
of Ware ¶ 3 , Sept. 4 , 2007, Ex. Q to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.)
Chief Cook received the call and was met at the scene by Chief
Nason of the Bridgewater Police Department. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 16.)
Nason informed Cook that Giroux had been by Town Hall twice
already, that Thomas Blay had reported being assaulted by Giroux,
and that Giroux had told Blay that he was coming to Town Hall
with a pistol. Id. Chief Riley from the Hebron Police
Department confirmed that Giroux had purchased a handgun earlier
that day. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 8 ; Aff. of Ware ¶ 4.)
When Giroux arrived at Town Hall, he was arrested by Chief
Cook. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 9 ; Aff. of Daigneault ¶ 13.) Giroux gave
consent for the officers to search his car for a weapon, and no
weapon was found. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 9 ; Officer Report, Dale Cook,
Chief of Police, Danbury Police Department, Sept. 2 , 2003, Ex. M
of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) Giroux was booked at the Bristol
Police Department and was released on $2500 personal recognizance
bail with the conditions that he have no contact with the Blays,
Towle, or their family members, avoid drugs and excessive use of
alcohol, and turn his weapons in to the police department. (Aff.
of Cook ¶ 1 9 ; Orders and Conditions of Bail, Franklin District
-9- Court, Sept. 2 , 2003, Ex. N of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.)
D. Subsequent Events
Based on the events of September 2 , 2003, and statements
from Towle and the Blays, Officer Ware prepared two complaints
for stalking and a complaint for simple assault. (Aff. of Ware ¶
5 ; see Criminal Complaints, Sept. 1 8 , 2003, Ex. R of Def.’s Mot.
for Summ. J.; Application for Arrest Warrant and Supporting
Affidavit, Sept. 1 8 , 2003, Ex. E-1 of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot. for
Summ. J.) The complaint for stalking was dismissed with
prejudice by a margin order on October 3 1 , 2003. (Motion to
Dismiss Stalking Complaints for Failing to State an Offense, Oct.
1 0 , 2003, Ex. C-1 of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot. for Summ. J.) Giroux was
convicted on the simple assault charge. (Aff. of Ware ¶ 7.)
There were additional legal proceedings involving Giroux and the
defendants in this case; none are relevant here.2
2 Giroux was later charged with harassment for making offensive phone calls to Towle in February 2004. (Application for Arrest Warrant and Supporting Affidavit, Feb. 2 7 , 2004, Ex. K of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot. for Summ. J.) These charges were dismissed in September 2004. (Transcript of Hearing, Franklin District Court, Docket N o . 04-CR-475-481, Sept. 1 7 , 2004, Ex. L of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot. for Summ. J.) Giroux also brought a Right to Know lawsuit in 2005 seeking the minutes from various Board of Selectmen and DCC Board meetings. (Transcript of Hearing on Right to Know Petitions, Merrimack Superior Court, Case N o . 05-E-
-10- II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). A party seeking summary judgment must first identify the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v .
Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party to “produce evidence on which a reasonable finder
of fact, under the appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict
for i t ; if that party cannot produce such evidence, the motion
must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v . Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95
F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
III. ANALYSIS
Giroux alleges that his arrest on September 2 , 2003,
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures because: (1) Chief Cook, the arresting
146, Case N o . 05-E-14, Apr. 2 5 , 2005, Ex. Y of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot. for Summ. J.)
-11- officer, did not have probable cause to arrest him, and (2)
Officer Ware, the officer who prepared the complaints against
Giroux, failed to provide Giroux with a timely judicial
determination of probable cause following his arrest. Giroux
alleges that Chief Cook violated Giroux’s First Amendment rights
because he arrested Giroux as a pretext to stop Giroux from
displaying the sign on his truck, which contained protected
speech about a public figure. Finally, Giroux alleges that both
officers committed the torts of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress when they arrested him without
probable cause, failed to provide him with a timely judicial
determination of probable cause, and imposed excessive bail
conditions. I address each of Giroux’s claims in turn.
A. Fourth Amendment: False Arrest
Giroux argues that he was falsely arrested because Chief
Cook lacked probable cause to arrest him. Cook contends that
there was adequate probable cause o r , in the alternative, that he
is entitled to qualified immunity. When government officials
assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, I begin by
examining whether the facts as alleged demonstrate a
constitutional violation. Jennings v . Jones, 499 F.3d 2 , 11 (1st
-12- Cir. 2007). If I determine that there was no constitutional
violation, I need not proceed further because plaintiff’s claim
fails as a matter of law. Id.; Cox v . Hainey, 391 F.3d 2 5 , 30
(1st Cir. 2004).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of persons to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend.
IV. A warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment “where there is probable cause to believe that a
criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v .
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004); Beck v . Ohio, 379 U.S. 8 9 , 91
(1964); Logue v . Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1044 (1st Cir. 1997).
Probable cause for an arrest exists “when the arresting
officer, acting upon apparently trustworthy information,
reasonably concludes that a crime has been (or is about to be)
committed and that the putative arrestee likely is one of the
perpetrators.” Acosta v . Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5 , 9
(1st Cir. 2004); see Cox, 391 F.3d at 3 1 ; Roche v . John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 254 (1st Cir. 1996). The
inquiry is objective, not subjective, asking whether there was a
reasonable likelihood that the arrestee committed the alleged
crime. See, e.g., Cox, 391 F.3d at 3 1 ; Roche, 81 F.3d at 254.
-13- To determine whether probable cause existed for Giroux’s
arrest, I must first consider what Chief Cook knew at the time of
the arrest. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91 (defining the inquiry a s :
“whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the petitioner had committed or was committing an
offense.”). I note that it is the collective knowledge of the
officers involved, not the individual knowledge of the arresting
officer, that is the subject of the probable cause inquiry. See
United States v . Pardue, 385 F.3d 1 0 1 , 106 (1st Cir. 2004).
Giroux’s arrest is valid if the collective knowledge of all the
officers involved establishes probable cause for his arrest. Id.
Chief Cook and other officers present at the time of
Giroux’s arrest were aware of the ongoing conflicts and
communications between Giroux and various DCC board members and
staff during the summer of 2003.3 Officer Daigneault and Chief
Cook knew that Towle had been receiving unwanted telephone calls
3 Giroux does not dispute any of the officers’ assertions regarding what the officers knew at the time of his arrest and what had been reported to police, although he disputes some of the underlying allegations made in the reports.
-14- from Giroux beginning in June 2003. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 4-14; Aff.
of Daigneault ¶ 1 2 ; Police Report, June 4 , 2003, Ex. C of Def.’s
Mot for Summ. J.) Both Cook and Daigneault also knew that, on
June 1 0 , 2003, Towle had requested that a police officer deliver
a letter to Giroux asking him to stay away from the DCC and avoid
contacting the staff. (Aff. of Daigneault ¶ 5-6; Aff. of Cook ¶
9; Police Report, June 1 0 , 2003, Ex. C of Def.’s Mot for Summ. J.
at 7.) Cook knew that Giroux had a personal conflict with Sara
Blay, and Daigneault indicated this fact in a police report.
(Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 0 ; Police Report, June 4 , 2003, Ex. C of Def.’s
Mot for Summ. J. at 4 , 5.) On July 2 3 , 2003, Chief Cook noted in
his report that there was a domestic violence problem at the DCC,
that Towle was scared of Giroux, that he had advised Towle to get
a restraining order on Giroux, and that the DCC staff members
were “handling this themselves against my better judgment.”
(Aff. of Cook ¶ 12-13; Officer Report, Dale Cook, Chief of
Police, Danbury Police Department, July 2 3 , 2003, Ex. J of Def.’s
Mot for Summ. J. at 2.)
Cook also had knowledge about Giroux’s activities on
September 2 , 2003, prior to his arrest. Based on communications
from Chief Nason of the Bridgewater Police Department, Cook knew
-15- that Thomas Blay had reported being assaulted by Giroux earlier
in the day. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 6 ; Aff. of Ware ¶ 3.) Cook knew
that Blay had reported that Giroux said that he had purchased a
handgun and that he was going to the Selectmen’s meeting that
night. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 6 ; Aff. of Daigneault ¶ 9; Officer
Report, Norman Daigneault, Danbury Police Department, Sept. 3 ,
2003, Ex. L of Def.’s Mot for Summ. J.) Prior to the arrest,
Officer Riley from the Hebron Police Department confirmed this
handgun purchase to Cook. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 1 8 ; Aff. of Ware ¶ 4.)
Finally, Cook knew that Towle and Sara Blay would be at the
Selectman’s meeting that evening. (Aff. of Cook ¶ 17.)
The offenses of stalking and simple assault are defined by
New Hampshire statutory law. The offense of simple assault is
defined in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:2-a, which states that a
person is guilty of simple assault if he purposely or knowingly
causes unprivileged physical contact to another. The offense of
stalking is defined in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3, which
provides that a person commits the offense of stalking if he
“purposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a course of
conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a
reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety or the
-16- safety of a member of that person's immediate family, and the
person is actually placed in such fear.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
633:3 I ( a ) . A “course of conduct” is defined as two or more acts
evidencing a continuity of purpose, and the statute indicates
that phone calls and letters are acts that can establish a course
of conduct. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3 II(a)(7); see also N.H.
Rev. Stat. § 644:4 I I .
There is significant evidence in the record to support Chief
Cook’s reasonable belief that Giroux had committed the
misdemeanor crimes of both simple assault and stalking. Cook
knew that Thomas Blay had reported being assaulted by Giroux
prior to Giroux’s arrest, and: “The uncorroborated testimony of
a victim or other percipient witness, standing alone, ordinarily
can support a finding of probable cause.” Acosta, 386 F.3d at
10. Blay’s credibility was bolstered by the fact that, prior to
Giroux’s arrest, officers were able to confirm Blay’s report that
Giroux had purchased a weapon earlier in the day. Cook also had
probable cause to believe that Giroux had committed the crime of
stalking because he knew that Giroux had engaged in many acts of
unwanted and intimidating communication including phone calls,
-17- letters, and in-person confrontations with Towle and other DCC
personnel despite having been notified that they did not desire
further communication.
The fact that the officers purported to be arresting Giroux
only for stalking, not simple assault, does not make the arrest
illegal. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (holding that the
“subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal
offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.”);
United States v . Jones, 432 F.3d 3 4 , 41 (1st Cir. 2005)
(confirming that “the probable cause inquiry is not necessarily
based upon the offense actually invoked by the arresting officer
but upon whether the facts known at the time of the arrest
objectively provided probable cause to arrest.”) The objective
facts demonstrate that the officers had probable cause to arrest
Giroux for simple assault. The fact that he was booked on the
stalking charges alone is irrelevant. See Jones, 432 F.3d at 4 1 .
Under New Hampshire statutory law, a police officer may
arrest a person without a warrant on a charge of a misdemeanor or
a violation in a number of situations including when:
(c) He has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor or violation, and, if
-18- not immediately arrested, such person will not be apprehended, will destroy or conceal evidence of the offense, or will cause further personal injury or damage to property.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:10(c).
In this case, Cook arrested Giroux when he arrived at the
Town Hall because he had good reason to believe that Giroux had
threatened Thomas Blay that he would be coming to the meeting
with a gun “and was going to settle it.” (Aff. of Cook ¶ 16.)
Based on their understanding of what Giroux had said to Thomas
Blay earlier, the officers had probable cause to believe that if
Giroux was not immediately arrested, he would cause further
personal injury to Towle, Sara Blay, or other DCC personnel who
were present at the meeting. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
594:10(c).
In summary, I find that the facts and circumstances
described above were adequate to support the belief of a
reasonable police officer, standing in the shoes of Chief Cook,
that Giroux had committed a crime. Giroux has failed to allege
any evidence to suggest that the arrest was carried out in an
unreasonable manner. Because Giroux has failed to state adequate
grounds to establish that his arrest violated the Fourth
-19- Amendment, his false arrest claim fails as a matter of law. I
need not address the other qualified immunity prongs.
B. Fourth Amendment: Timely Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
Giroux also argues that Officer Ware violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by failing to facilitate a timely judicial
determination of probable cause following Giroux’s warrantless
arrest. In support of his claim, Giroux cites the New Hampshire
Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Manual, which states that a
person who is arrested must be brought before the court within 24
hours of the arrest. (N.H. Att’y Gen.’s Law Enforcement Manual,
Ex. J of Pl.’s O b j . to Mot. for Summ. J. at 61.) The Manual also
requires that an arresting officer prepare a “Gerstein” affidavit
if the person was arrested without a warrant. Id. Under
Gerstein v . Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), a person suspected of a
crime whose liberty is restrained for more than the brief period
of detention necessary to administratively process the arrest
must be afforded a judicial determination of probable cause in a
timely manner. A Gerstein affidavit is a sworn statement filed
by the arresting officer to provide a proper basis for a judicial
determination of probable cause. In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080,
-20- 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Chief Cook and Officer Ware fail to provide any facts or
legal authority to demonstrate why they are entitled to summary
judgment on this claim. Without additional facts regarding what
happened during the time Giroux was in police custody and during
the bail proceedings, I am unable to conclude that Giroux’s claim
lacks merit and I cannot grant summary judgment on this claim.
If defendants wish to seek summary judgment on this claim, they
may submit a supplement to their motion within 30 days,
describing the undisputed facts and legal authority that would
support summary judgment.
C. First Amendment Claim
Giroux brings a First Amendment claim, arguing that the sign
on his truck that stated “DCC Treasurer Sara Blay Attempted
Possible Tax Fraud” was a “motivating and substantial factor” in
his arrest. (Compl. ¶ 107.) Specifically, Giroux alleges that
Chief Cook interfered with Giroux’s First Amendment right when he
arrested Giroux with the intent to punish him and discourage him
from exercising his rights. (Compl. ¶ 114.) The only evidence
that Giroux provides to substantiate this claim is the fact that,
at the time of his arrest, his truck had a large sign containing
-21- protected speech. Giroux has presented no evidence, however, to
substantiate his claim that Cook arrested him for an
inappropriate or discriminatory reason or as a pretext to stop
Giroux from publicizing his message. Because I find that there
was adequate probable cause for Giroux’s arrest independent of
any consideration about the sign, Giroux’s First Amendment claim
also fails as a matter of law.
D. State Law Claims
Giroux also brings state law claims for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress; defendants have moved
for summary judgment on both claims. Because the basis of
federal jurisdiction over these claims is solely grounded in
supplemental jurisdiction, I will defer ruling on these claims
until defendants provide a supplement to their motion for summary
judgment regarding Giroux’s timely judicial determination of
probable cause claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. N o . 37) is granted in part and defendants are
-22- given 30 days to file a supplement to their motion for summary
judgment on the remaining claim. The clerk is ordered to enter
judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
January 1 5 , 2008
cc: Daniel J. Mullen, Esq. Philip Giroux, pro se
-23-