Gillick v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co.

65 S.W.2d 927, 334 Mo. 135, 1933 Mo. LEXIS 701
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedDecember 6, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 65 S.W.2d 927 (Gillick v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gillick v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co., 65 S.W.2d 927, 334 Mo. 135, 1933 Mo. LEXIS 701 (Mo. 1933).

Opinion

*137 FRANK, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court setting aside an award made by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in favor of the employer and insurer and remanding the cause with instructions to make an award in favor of claimants. Both employer and insurer appealed.

Appellants concede that respondents offered evidence tending to show that on November 18, 1929, deceased was in the employ of Fruin-Colnon Construction Company as a bricklayer; that while in the course of his employment on a job at the Carter Carburetor Company Building in St. Louis, he stepped on a nail and sustained a puncture wound of his right foot; that said wound never completely healed, that it became infected and caused a lymphangitis, or infection, which extended up his right leg, producing an enlarged and swollen gland in his right inguinal region, and an infected mass about the size of a lemon in his abdomen; that as a result of this infection he suffered septicemia which affected the organs of his abdomen, including the appendix; that he underwent an operation for the removal of the appendix on February 24, 1930, and died on March 2, 1930'; that respondents’ medical witnesses testified that his death was the result of the puncture wound of the foot and the conditions produced by it.

*138 On the other hand, appellants contend that their evidence tends to show that deceased did not suffer an injury to his foot while in the employ of the construction company; that he made no report of -such an injury; that he suffered an attack of acute appendicitis on February 20, 1929, for which he underwent an operation four days later’; that as a result of the inflamed and infected condition of his appendix, he suffered peritonitis and septicemia; that appellants’ medical witnesses testified that said condition caused his death on March 2, 1929; that his death was not caused or contributed to by the alleged injury to his foot.

Section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which now appears as Section 3342, Revised Statutes 1929, provides that “upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the commission within its powers shall be conclusive and binding. The court, on appeal shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other: 1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers. 2. That the award was procured by fraud. 3. That the facts found by the commission do not support,the award. 4. That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.”

This case was first heard by a referee wlunmade an award in favor-of claimants. On review by the full commission, the award made by the referee was reversed. The finding and order of the full commission is as. follows:

“The above parties having submitted their disagreement or claim for compensation for the above accident to the undersigned members of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and after hearing the parties at issue,-their respective witnesses and evidence, the undersigned hereby find in favor of the above employer and insurer and against the above dependents and award no compensation for above accident. On review, award dated October 27, 1930, is hereby reversed and set aside with the finding that the accident of November 18, 1929, was neither directly nor indirectly the cause of employer’s death on March 2, 1930, .but said death resulted from causes independent of said accident.” ■ . ■

The findings made by the full commission were findings of the ultimate fact, and under the express provisions of Section 3342; Revised - Statutes 1929, and the decisions of this court construing that statute, such findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on all reviewing courts. [Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112, 40 S. W, (2d) 601, 604; Doughton v. Marland Refining Co., 331 Mo. 280, 53 S. W. (2d) 236.] Respondents do *139 not dispute tbe law as we have stated it, but contend that the award made by the commission is not supported by substantial, competent evidence. This contention presents the only issue for determination.

The evidence of the employer and insurer consisted of expert-testimony of three doctors; Dr. Roberts, Dr. Vosberg and Dr. Thomas. Each of these doctors gave it as their opinion that Gilliek’s death was caused by acute appendicitis, peritonitis and septicemia, and that the injury to his foot did not have anything to do with the cause of his death.

"We will first take the evidence of Dr. Roberts. A hypothetical question propounded to him concluded by calling for his opinion as to the cause of Gilliek’s death. His answer, over claimants’ objection w-as that death was due to acute appendicitis, peritonitis and septicemia. Respondents contend that the question was improper, and the answer thereto does not amount to substantial evidence, because the question omitted important facts shown by the evidence which claimants contend tended to show the true cause of the death, to-wit, the nail-puncture of the foot, the red streak running from the foot to the knee, the indurated mass containing a quart of pus and the lymphangitis.

It may be conceded that a hypothetical question which omits important elements of the case is improper. However, we do not agree with respondents that the matters which they claim were omitted from the question were, in fact, omitted. After the first hypothetical question was asked, and after it was answered by Dr. Roberts as above indicated, the referee hearing the case, asked the following question:

“Q. Doctor, while you are on that question, you heard Dr. Maizus testify as to a beef-like appearance and as to a growth on the outer side, an abscess; taking that further fact into consideration state your answer on that question. A. The answer still remains the same. ’ ’

The evidence shows that Dr. P. E. Keller performed an autopsy on the body of deceased and made a written report of the result which was introduced in evidence. The record further shows that on cross-examination of Dr. Roberts, claimants’ attorney, asked him the following questions:

“Q. During your examination of the appendix and the report, did you have the knowledge that there was a mass or abscess on the side, lateral side, and that the organs around the appendix were sort of a beef-like appearance ? A. I gathered from the autopsy, the mass being on the opposite side from the original infection of the foot the left side instead of the right.
“Q. You did take that into consideration in forming your opinion? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Assuming that this mass was on the same side of the body as *140 the infected foot, in your opinion could this lymphangitis have traveled up the right leg to this mass ? A. No, sir; not in the interior abdominal wall; it is impossible.
“Q. Can you in any way account for it being there? A.

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Bluebook (online)
65 S.W.2d 927, 334 Mo. 135, 1933 Mo. LEXIS 701, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gillick-v-fruin-colnon-construction-co-mo-1933.