1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARREN GILBERT, No. 2:22–cv–01300–KJM–KJN 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND ORDER 13 v.
14 BAGGA GRANDSONS INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Presently pending before the court is plaintiff Darren Gilbert’s (“plaintiff”) motion for 18 default judgment against defendants Bagga Grandsons Incorporated LLC (d/b/a Stop & Shop 19 Food Market) and Lakhbir & Sukhbir, LLC (“defendants”).1 (ECF No. 10.) After defendants 20 failed to file an opposition to the motion in accordance with Local Rule 230(c), the motion was 21 submitted on the record and written briefing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (ECF No. 12.) 22 For the reasons discussed below, the court now recommends that plaintiff’s motion for 23 default judgment be GRANTED. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 This motion is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of 28 Civil Procedure 72, and Local Rule 302(c)(19). 1 I. Background 2 This is a civil rights action filed by plaintiff under Title III of the Americans with 3 Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189) (“ADA”) and related California statutes, 4 alleging discrimination at the store known as Stop & Shop Food Market, located at 6007 Dry 5 Creek Road in Rio Linda, California. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Defendants own and operate 6 the Stop & Shop Food Market and the real property in and on which the facility is located. (Id. at 7 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff is a physically disabled man who relies on a wheelchair, knee scooter, or prosthetic 8 for mobility. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 9 Plaintiff alleges that on February 17, 2022, he visited the Stop & Shop Food Market to 10 purchase refreshments. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff parked in the designated accessible parking stall, 11 but found that the access aisle next to his parking space was too narrow for him to unload from 12 his van. (Id.) As a result, plaintiff was unable to unload from his van safely and could not enter 13 the Stop & Shop Food Market to make a purchase. Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the 14 amount of $4,000, attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $3,850.87, and an injunction 15 requiring the removal of the barriers to plaintiff’s access. (ECF No. 10-1 at 11.) 16 A clerk’s default was entered against defendants on September 30, 2022, due to 17 defendants’ failure to respond to the action within the time permitted by the Federal Rules of 18 Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion on November 17, 2022. (ECF 19 No. 10.) 20 II. Legal Standard – Default Judgment 21 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 22 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 23 against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 24 automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 25 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 26 (9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies 27 within the district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 28 1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors: 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 2 the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due 3 to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 4 5 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 6 disfavored. Id. at 1472. 7 As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 8 complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 9 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 10 Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); accord Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 11 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, although well-pleaded allegations in the 12 complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the 13 pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. 14 Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 15 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 16 2007) (stating that a defendant does not admit facts that are not well-pled or conclusions of law); 17 Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not 18 be entered on a legally insufficient claim”). A party’s default does not establish the amount of 19 damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. 20 III. Discussion 21 A. The Eitel Factors Weigh in Favor of Granting Default Judgment 22 1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 23 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 24 judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of granting 25 a default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would potentially 26 face prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment. Absent entry of a default judgment, 27 plaintiff would be without another recourse against defendants. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor 28 favors the entry of a default judgment. 1 2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and 2 the Sufficiency of the Complaint 3 The court considers the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of the 4 complaint together below because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must 5 consider whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim that supports the 6 relief sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 7 a.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARREN GILBERT, No. 2:22–cv–01300–KJM–KJN 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND ORDER 13 v.
14 BAGGA GRANDSONS INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Presently pending before the court is plaintiff Darren Gilbert’s (“plaintiff”) motion for 18 default judgment against defendants Bagga Grandsons Incorporated LLC (d/b/a Stop & Shop 19 Food Market) and Lakhbir & Sukhbir, LLC (“defendants”).1 (ECF No. 10.) After defendants 20 failed to file an opposition to the motion in accordance with Local Rule 230(c), the motion was 21 submitted on the record and written briefing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (ECF No. 12.) 22 For the reasons discussed below, the court now recommends that plaintiff’s motion for 23 default judgment be GRANTED. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 This motion is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of 28 Civil Procedure 72, and Local Rule 302(c)(19). 1 I. Background 2 This is a civil rights action filed by plaintiff under Title III of the Americans with 3 Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189) (“ADA”) and related California statutes, 4 alleging discrimination at the store known as Stop & Shop Food Market, located at 6007 Dry 5 Creek Road in Rio Linda, California. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Defendants own and operate 6 the Stop & Shop Food Market and the real property in and on which the facility is located. (Id. at 7 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff is a physically disabled man who relies on a wheelchair, knee scooter, or prosthetic 8 for mobility. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 9 Plaintiff alleges that on February 17, 2022, he visited the Stop & Shop Food Market to 10 purchase refreshments. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff parked in the designated accessible parking stall, 11 but found that the access aisle next to his parking space was too narrow for him to unload from 12 his van. (Id.) As a result, plaintiff was unable to unload from his van safely and could not enter 13 the Stop & Shop Food Market to make a purchase. Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the 14 amount of $4,000, attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $3,850.87, and an injunction 15 requiring the removal of the barriers to plaintiff’s access. (ECF No. 10-1 at 11.) 16 A clerk’s default was entered against defendants on September 30, 2022, due to 17 defendants’ failure to respond to the action within the time permitted by the Federal Rules of 18 Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion on November 17, 2022. (ECF 19 No. 10.) 20 II. Legal Standard – Default Judgment 21 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 22 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 23 against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 24 automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 25 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 26 (9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies 27 within the district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 28 1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors: 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 2 the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due 3 to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 4 5 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 6 disfavored. Id. at 1472. 7 As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 8 complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 9 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 10 Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); accord Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 11 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, although well-pleaded allegations in the 12 complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the 13 pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. 14 Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 15 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 16 2007) (stating that a defendant does not admit facts that are not well-pled or conclusions of law); 17 Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not 18 be entered on a legally insufficient claim”). A party’s default does not establish the amount of 19 damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. 20 III. Discussion 21 A. The Eitel Factors Weigh in Favor of Granting Default Judgment 22 1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 23 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 24 judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of granting 25 a default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would potentially 26 face prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment. Absent entry of a default judgment, 27 plaintiff would be without another recourse against defendants. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor 28 favors the entry of a default judgment. 1 2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and 2 the Sufficiency of the Complaint 3 The court considers the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of the 4 complaint together below because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must 5 consider whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim that supports the 6 relief sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 7 a. ADA 8 Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the 9 basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 10 advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 11 leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 12 Discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . 13 where such removal is readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 14 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The ADA defines the term 15 “readily achievable” as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty 16 or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). 17 “To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) [he or she] 18 is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, 19 or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 20 accommodations by the defendant because of [his or her] disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 21 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, “[t]o succeed on a ADA claim of discrimination 22 on account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) 23 the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier 24 prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Parr v. L & 25 L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 26 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 27 Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that: (1) he is disabled (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8 ); (2) 28 defendant owns, leases, and/or operates the Stop & Shop Food Market, which is a place of public 1 accommodation (id. at ¶¶ 7, 9); (3) plaintiff was denied full and equal access to defendant’s 2 facilities, privileges, and accommodations because of plaintiff’s disability (id. at ¶ 10); (4) 3 defendant’s facility contains a specified architectural barriers—the access aisle at designated 4 accessible parking is too narrow—in violation of the ADA (id. at ¶ 10); and (5) defendant had the 5 means and ability to remove such barriers (id. at ¶ 15). Because plaintiff’s allegations are taken 6 as true following the entry of default, the court concludes that plaintiff has met his burden to state 7 a prima facie Title III discrimination claim. 8 b. Unruh Civil Rights Act 9 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are 10 free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 11 disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, 12 primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 13 advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 14 whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). As expressly provided by statute, a violation of the ADA 15 also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); see also 16 Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 664-65 (2009). Here, because plaintiff’s complaint 17 properly alleges a prima facie claim under the ADA, plaintiff has also properly alleged facts 18 supporting a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.2 19 Accordingly, the second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of a default judgment. 20 ////
21 2 Courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “in exceptional circumstances, there 22 are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Many district courts in California decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state disability claims 23 brought alongside ADA claims in federal court. See, e.g., Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171–72 24 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, however, the interests of judicial economy and convenience favor exercising supplemental jurisdiction. Because the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh 25 Act, and the Eitel factors favor default judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim, “it makes no sense to 26 decline jurisdiction, […] over a pendent state law claim that that court has effectively already decided.” Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2021) (reversing a district court’s 27 decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim where the ADA claim had 28 previously been decided). 1 3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 2 Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, “the court must consider the amount of money at 3 stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 4 1176-77; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. 5 Cal. 2003). In this case, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief; statutory damages under the Unruh Civil 6 Rights Act corresponding to one obstructed visit to the Stop & Shop Food Market in the amount 7 of $4,000.00; and attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $3,850.87. (ECF No. 10-1 at 11.) 8 Although the court more closely scrutinizes the requested statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and 9 costs below, the court does not find the overall sum of money at stake to be so large or excessive 10 as to militate against the entry of default judgment, particularly when reduced for the reasons 11 discussed below. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that this factor favors the entry 12 of a default judgment. 13 4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts 14 Because the court may assume the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint (except as 15 to damages) following the clerk’s entry of default, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of 16 material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. 17 Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court 18 clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact 19 exists”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 20 1177. As such, the court concludes that the fifth Eitel factor favors a default judgment. 21 5. Factor Six: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 22 In this case, there is simply no indication in the record that defendant’s default was due to 23 excusable neglect. Accordingly, this Eitel factor favors the entry of a default judgment. 24 6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 25 Procedure Favoring Decisions on the Merits 26 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 27 F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 28 alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 1 PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 2 Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of the policy 3 in favor of decisions on the merits—and consistent with existing policy would prefer that this 4 case be resolved on the merits—that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default 5 judgment. 6 In sum, after considering and weighing all the Eitel factors, the court concludes that 7 plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment against defendant, and recommends that such a default 8 judgment be entered. All that remains is a determination of the specific relief to which plaintiff is 9 entitled. 10 B. Terms of the Judgment to Be Entered 11 After determining that a party is entitled to entry of default judgment, the court must 12 determine the terms of the judgment to be entered. Plaintiff seeks statutory damages in the 13 amount of $4,000, attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $3,850.87, and an injunction 14 requiring the removal of the architectural barriers to plaintiff’s access. (ECF No. 10-1 at 11.) 15 Because plaintiff satisfactorily alleged his ADA claim, the court recommends that plaintiff be 16 granted injunctive relief, as described below, to remedy the architectural barrier at issue. The 17 court also recommends plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $4,000.00, which 18 corresponds to his visit to Stop & Shop Food Market ($4,000.00 minimum statutory damages per 19 visit). 20 Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $3,850.87. The statutes at issue 21 specifically contemplate the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. 22 Code § 52(a). Plaintiff requests $743.87 in costs for pre-filing investigation, which are 23 reasonable and should be awarded. (ECF No. 10-2 at ¶¶ 12-13.) Attorney Tanya E. Moore, who 24 has been practicing law for 20 years, spent 8.9 hours of work on this case, at a rate of $300 per 25 hour, for a total of $2,670.00. (ECF No. 10-1 at 7-8.) Paralegal Whitney Law spent 1.5 hours on 26 this matter, at a rate of $115 per hour, for a total of $172.50. (Id.) Paralegal Isaac Medrano spent 27 2.3 hours on this matter, for a total of $264.50 at $115 per hour. (Id.) The same rates have been 28 found to be reasonable by court in this district and the hours spent appear reasonable. See Block 1 v. Starbucks, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154849 at * 17-20 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018). The court 2 therefore finds the requested amount of attorneys’ fees are also reasonable. 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 4 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 5 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 10-1) be GRANTED; 6 2. Judgment be entered in plaintiff’s favor and against defendants; 7 3. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $4,000.00; 8 4. Plaintiff be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $3,850.87; 9 5. Plaintiff be granted an injunction requiring defendant to provide a properly 10 configured and identified accessible parking stall and adjacent access aisle that is 11 less narrow and van accessible at the property known as known as Stop & Shop 12 Food Market, located at 6007 Dry Creek Road in Rio Linda, California, in 13 compliance with the accessibility requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 14 Act and California Code of Regulations, Title 24; 15 6. The Clerk of Court be directed to vacate all dates and close this case. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 17 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 18 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 19 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 20 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 21 shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 22 objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 23 waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 24 Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 ORDER 2 IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff shall forthwith personally serve a copy of 3 || this order and findings and recommendations on defendant at its address at 6007 Dry Creek Road 4 | Rio Linda, CA 95673 and file proof of service with the court within seven days of this order. 5 || Dated: August 11, 2023 Foci) Aharon 7 KENDALL J. NE ailb.1300 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28