Gibson v. Midland Valley Railroad

233 P. 116, 117 Kan. 673, 1925 Kan. LEXIS 71
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedFebruary 7, 1925
DocketNo. 25,669
StatusPublished

This text of 233 P. 116 (Gibson v. Midland Valley Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gibson v. Midland Valley Railroad, 233 P. 116, 117 Kan. 673, 1925 Kan. LEXIS 71 (kan 1925).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Hopkins, J.:

The action was one to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff to his eye caused by a hot cinder from one of defendant’s engines. The plaintiff recovered and defendant appeals.

The facts were substantially as follows: Fifth street, in Arkansas City, runs north and south. The defendant’s track crosses it from a northwesterly to a southeasterly direction. The plaintiff, with one Williams, was riding in an automobile going south on Fifth street. Williams was driving. As they came near the defendant’s' [674]*674track they saw a train approach from the south and stop near Fifth street. They did not attempt to cross the track until they saw the train start to back. Observing that the train was going to back, they crossed and turned to go in a southeasterly direction on the street next south of defendant’s track. When they were about 75 or 100 feet from defendant’s engine a hot cinder struck the plaintiff in the left eye. The injury was such that he eventually lost its sight.

The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,500, and answered special questions as follows:

“Q. 1. Do you find the defendant guilty of any negligence? If so, state what act or acts constituted such negligence. A. Yes. The act of spinning the locomotive wheels in starting train.
“Q. 2. Do you find that a railroad locomotive can be operated in the handling of cars without emitting sparks and cinders? A. No.
“Q. 3. Do you find that defendant’s locomotive was in good repair and equipped with proper spark arresters? If not, state in what respect it was out of repair and in what respect the spark arresters were not proper. A. No evidence to show the condition of repair on May 2, 1921. Last report as of April 27 or 26 showed spark arresters in good condition.
“Q. 4. Situated as the defendant’s engineer was at the time of the transaction in controversy, would an ordinary engineer usually have anticipated danger to the person of those about to use the crossing arising out of the manner he managed the engine at the time the plaintiff claims to have received an injury to his eye? A. No. However, an engineer should know that the spinning of drive-wheels in the city might cause damage to persons or property.
“Q. 5. How long after the alleged injury before plaintiff had his eye treated by a doctor? A. Five days.
“Q. 6. Would plaintiff have suffered any permanent injury to his eye from the alleged injury had he gone immediately to a competent eye doctor for treatment, and if so state what? A. We feel he. would. As to what extent it is impossible to determine.
“Q. 7. If you find for the plaintiff, state how much you allow for permanent injury. A. $2,000; $500 for pain and suffering.
“Q. 8. Did plaintiff see and know that cinders were being exhausted before and at the time he drove upon and over the street crossing? A. We think not.
“Q. 9. Under all the circumstances shown by the evidence, would a cautious and prudent man in the position of the plaintiff, at the time plaintiff drove upon and over the crossing, seeing the locomotive as it was then being operated, have anticipated an injury to plaintiff. A. No.
“Q. 10. Is the present condition of plaintiff’s eye due to an infection, as testified to by Doctor Spain? A. We think it is due to the original injury.”

It is first contended by the defendant that the act of negligence [675]*675found by the jury was not the negligence charged in the plaintiff’s petition. No copy of the petition appears in the abstract, but the plaintiff, in a counter-abstract, sets out a charge of. negligence:

“The plaintiff claims that the ‘defendant, although it knew that this plaintiff was . . . near to said locomotive, and knew the danger to this plaintiff of emitting large sparks and live coals and cinders from said locomotive, carelessly and negligently and without any regard to the- right of this plaintiff, applied steam to said locomotive and started the same, and carelessly and negligently, and without any regard to the right of this plaintiff, caused, permitted and allowed said locomotive to throw out a great quantity of large live sparks, cinders and coals, causing said live sparks, cinders and coals to strike and fall beyond the right of way of the defendant, and on the highway aforesaid, to the damage of this plaintiff and the traveling public on said highway, and causing one thereof to fall in the left eye of this plaintiff, burning the same so that the sight thereof was entirely lost and destroyed, and causing this plaintiff to suffer great and intense pain, etc.’ ”

There appears to have been no motion by the defendant attacking the charge of negligence, and under the circumstances it was sufficient. (Kirkland v. Railway Co., 104 Kan. 388, 179 Pac. 362; 29 Cyc. 570.)

On the question of the -spinning of the wheels, and as to whether the negligence found by the jury supported the charge, there was substantial evidence that the engineer reversed his engine and opened the throttle — he said, “enough to move the train.” There was substantial evidence that the engineer “started up fast,” that the wheels were spinning and the engine made “loud puffs” . . . “the slipping of the wheels make the draft sharper, . . . this has a tendency to throw out sparks; that . . . when the wheels spin the exhaust is more rapid and greater draft created; . . . the more rapid the exhaust the more suction there is.” The defendant says, “When boiled down the testimony simply amounts to this: that the wheels of the engine slipped and this causes more cinders to be thrown out on the start.”

Even at the risk of repetition, it may not be amiss to detail some of the evidence. Some of it was: “We could see cinders falling and hear them. The cinders were as big as peas or bigger, just a fog of them . . . Could hear them light above the sound of our running motor.”

The defendant’s engineer in charge of the engine testified th&t he “had 10 cars — 8 loads and 2 empties; . . . the track was down grade towards the depot (the direction in which he was backing); . . . there was nothing in the track condition to warrant the [676]*676spinning wheels; . . . the track was straight; . . it was not necessary to slip the wheels in backing. ... I don’t.know whether I let the wheels slip or not. I might have done it, but there was no occasion for it. It is possible to operate an engine, properly-equipped, so that it will not throw out live coals and cinders as big as these grains of corn and peas here which will travel with the wind something like 70 to 100 feet, and light while they are red hot.”

Williams testified: “A sluice of cinders came out of the engine. They were hot; could hear the cinders drop on top of the automobile and see them bounce off the radiator. . . . The cinders were red, bright red, fresh hot cinders. ... Q. As you -started to cross the track what did the engine or engineer do? A. He started to back up and the wheels started to spin. Q. Just when did the wheels start to spin? A. When he started to back up. . . . The engine puffed and wheels spun a little bit, then ceased a little bit, then started again. The puffing was loud and continued. . . .

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
233 P. 116, 117 Kan. 673, 1925 Kan. LEXIS 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibson-v-midland-valley-railroad-kan-1925.