Ghedi v. Mayorkas

16 F.4th 456
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedOctober 25, 2021
Docket20-10995
StatusPublished
Cited by46 cases

This text of 16 F.4th 456 (Ghedi v. Mayorkas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456 (5th Cir. 2021).

Opinion

Case: 20-10995 Document: 00516068148 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2021

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED October 25, 2021 No. 20-10995 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

Abdulaziz Ghedi,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; David Pekoske, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration; Troy Miller, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General; Christopher Wray, in his official capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Charles Kable, IV, in his official capacity as Director of the Terrorist Screening Center,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:19-CV-1919

Before Stewart, Costa, and Willett, Circuit Judges. Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge: Case: 20-10995 Document: 00516068148 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/25/2021

No. 20-10995

Abdulaziz Ghedi is an international businessman who regularly jets across the globe. Frequent travelers, however, are not always trusted travelers. In recent years, Ghedi has had repeated run-ins with one of America’s most beloved institutions: modern airport security. Ghedi complains that ever since he refused to be an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation a decade ago, he has been placed on a watchlist, leading to “extreme burdens and hardship while traveling.” Unsurprisingly, the Government refuses to confirm or deny anything. Ghedi says these intrusive security annoyances have harmed him both professionally and reputationally. The law, however, is not on his side. Modern air travel is chock-full of irritations and indignities that leave many passengers not just bothered but humiliated. But Ghedi has not pleaded plausible claims, nor sued the right people. While Ghedi’s hassles are certainly atypical, they do not dispense with our jurisdictional limits or with ordinary pleading standards. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Ghedi’s complaint. I A Understanding Ghedi’s claims starts with understanding 21st century airport security, a byzantine structure featuring an alphabet soup of federal agencies. One such agency is DHS—the Department of Homeland Security. According to its website, one of its “top priorities is to resolutely protect Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats.” 1 That includes “secur[ing] the nation’s air . . . borders to prevent illegal activity while facilitating lawful travel and trade.” 2 DHS leaves the day-to-day of

1 Mission, DHS (July 3, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/mission. 2 Id.

2 Case: 20-10995 Document: 00516068148 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/25/2021

airport security to specialized federal agencies, including the TSA (Transportation Security Administration), which generally screens passengers, 3 and CBP (Customs and Border Protection), which specifically screens international passengers. 4 Still, it would be easier for DHS, TSA, and CBP to guard our airports if they knew who to look out for in the first place. To that end, the FBI administers a special anti-terrorism program called the TSC, or Terrorist Screening Center. According to the FBI’s website, the TSC is “a multi-agency center” that that manages “the watchlist.” 5 What is the watchlist? The FBI describes it as a “database” containing the “identities of those who are known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activities.” 6 The TSC then provides those identities to “front-line screening agencies,” like TSA, to aid in “positively identifying known or suspected terrorists who are attempting to . . . enter the country, [or] board an aircraft . . . .” 7 The Government admits, though, that within the watchlist are at least two sub-lists—the No Fly List and the Selectee List. Inclusion on either comes with consequences. The No Fly List is exactly what it sounds like: a

3 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1). 4 6 U.S.C. § 211(c). 5 Terrorist Screening Center, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and- structure/national-security-branch/tsc; see also 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (providing statutory authority for the watchlist). 6 Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 5; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b) (implementing the watchlist). 7 Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 5; 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (providing for sharing the watchlist with front-line agencies).

3 Case: 20-10995 Document: 00516068148 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/25/2021

list of individuals that the TSA prohibits from flying. 8 In contrast, someone on the Selectee List may still fly. The TSA, however, will subject the individual to “enhanced screening” before boarding. 9 According to the Government, enhanced screening differs from standard screening in two ways. First, it takes more time for the passenger. The TSA will search the passenger’s person multiple times and in multiple ways instead of using a single search. Second, the screening itself is more intrusive. TSA will search the passenger’s property for trace amounts of explosives, physically search luggage, power electronics on and off, and examine the passenger’s footwear. Still, merely undergoing enhanced screening does not mean that the TSC has placed a passenger on the Selectee List. According to the Government, any passenger with an “SSSS” printed on his boarding pass must undergo enhanced screening. And those passengers might have an SSSS printed on their boarding passes due to inclusion on the Selectee List, “random selection,” or “reasons unrelated to any status.” Passengers not on the Selectee List can even end up with an SSSS designation on multiple, consecutive flights. The Government neither confirms nor denies who is included on either list since that would reveal information of “considerable value” to terrorists. Passengers that undergo enhanced screening for unexplained reasons do have at least one remedy, though. Congress has required the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide passengers “delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft” by TSA a “timely and fair process” to

8 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b)(1); Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2017). 9 § 1560.105(b)(2); Beydoun, 871 F.3d at 462–63; Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 2019).

4 Case: 20-10995 Document: 00516068148 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/25/2021

challenge why. 10 Congress directly required the TSA to do that too. 11 The response is the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, or DHS TRIP. Anyone “who believe[s] they have been improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft” because of the Selectee List may seek redress. 12 The “TSA, in coordination with the TSC and other appropriate Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies, if necessary, will review [the aggrieved passenger’s] documentation and information[,] . . . correct any erroneous information, and provide the individual with a timely written response.” 13 B Ghedi is president of an American company that operates globally. He is also first-generation American.

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16 F.4th 456, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ghedi-v-mayorkas-ca5-2021.