George G. Reyes v. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

Fifth Circuit

George G. Reyes v. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections

345 F.2d 722, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5478

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMay 24, 1965

Docket22147_1

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 345 F.2d 722 (George G. Reyes v. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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George G. Reyes v. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, 345 F.2d 722, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5478 (5th Cir. 1965).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

By this appeal from the District Court’s denial of Reyes’ petition for habeas corpus, the Texas practice of permitting the reading to the jury of the indictment allegations of prior felony convictions in a prosecution under the Texas Habitual Offender Statute, Texas Penal Code art. 63, is asserted to be a denial of due process. This presents nothing different from, and is therefore governed by, the decision of this Court in Breen v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1965, 341 F.2d 96, and Reed v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1965, 343 F.2d 723, which followed Breen in holding that this did not amount to such a violation. Without suggesting that it has any precedential significance, as a matter of historical interest it rounds out the picture to note that the Supreme Court, on April 26, 1965, denied certiorari in Stephens v. Texas 1 wherein a similar issue was raised. Since this also disposes of petitioner’s motion for a hearing en banc, 2 the mandate shall issue forthwith.

Affirmed.

1

. See Stephens v. State, 1964, Tex.Cr. App., 377 S.W.2d 139 (decision from which review was sought), cert. denied 1965, 85 S.Ct. 1344.

2

. See Rule 25a of this Court.

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PER CURIAM.

By this appeal from the District Court’s denial of Reyes’ petition for habeas corpus, the Texas practice of permitting the reading to the jury of the indictment allegations of prior felony convictions in a prosecution under the Texas Habitual Offender Statute, Texas Penal Code art. 63, is asserted to be a denial of due process. This presents nothing different from, and is therefore governed by, the decision of this Court in Breen v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1965, 341 F.2d 96, and Reed v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1965, 343 F.2d 723, which followed Breen in holding that this did not amount to such a violation. Without suggesting that it has any precedential significance, as a matter of historical interest it rounds out the picture to note that the Supreme Court, on April 26, 1965, denied certiorari in Stephens v. Texas 1 wherein a similar issue was raised. Since this also disposes of petitioner’s motion for a hearing en banc, 2 the mandate shall issue forthwith.

Affirmed.

1

. See Stephens v. State, 1964, Tex.Cr. App., 377 S.W.2d 139 (decision from which review was sought), cert. denied 1965, 85 S.Ct. 1344.

2

. See Rule 25a of this Court.

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345 F.2d 722, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5478, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-g-reyes-v-george-j-beto-director-texas-department-of-ca5-1965.

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