Geleng v. Independent Living Systems, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 7, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-21060
StatusUnknown

This text of Geleng v. Independent Living Systems, LLC (Geleng v. Independent Living Systems, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Geleng v. Independent Living Systems, LLC, (S.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 23-21060-CV-WILLIAMS

MELINDA GELENG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INDEPENDENT LIVING SYSTEMS, LLC,

Defendant. /

ORDER THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Lisette Reid’s Report and Recommendation (DE 95) (“Report”) granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (DE 90) (“Motion”). In the Motion, Plaintiffs David Asato, Katrina Berres, Ge Xiao Fang, Melinda Geleng, Mathew George, Maria Gomez, Dimitri Gutierrez, Chelsea Jensen, Rhianna McMullen, David Perez, Mark Salzano, Ernest Scoggan, and Ryan Smith (“Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives”) and Defendant Independent Living Systems, LLC, (“Defendant” or “ILS”) (collectively, the “Settling Parties”) notify the Court that they have agreed to settle this Action pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in an executed Settlement Agreement and Release (DE 90-1) (“Settlement”) and request the Court’s preliminary approval of the Agreement. (DE 90 at 8.) In the Report, Judge Reid finds the following: (1) th[e] Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the Parties to this Action; (2) the proposed Settlement Class meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and should be certified for settlement purposes only; (3) the persons and entities identified in the Motion and Settlement should be appointed Class Representatives and Class Counsel; (4) the Settlement is the result of informed, good-faith, arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties and their capable and experienced counsel, and is not the result of collusion; (5) the Settlement is within the range of reasonableness and should be preliminarily approved; (6) the proposed Notice program and proposed forms of Notice satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and constitutional due process requirements, and are reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise the Settlement Class of the pendency of the Action, class certification, the terms of the Settlement, Class Counsel’s application for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses (“Fee Application”) and request for a Service Award for Plaintiffs, and their rights to opt-out of the Settlement Class or object to the Settlement; (7) good cause exists to schedule and conduct a Final Approval Hearing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), to assist the Court in determining whether to grant Final Approval of the Settlement and enter the Final Approval Order, and whether to grant Class Counsel’s Fee Application and request for a Service Award for Plaintiffs[.]

(DE 95 at 1–2.) No objections were filed to the Report, and the time to object has passed. Upon careful review of the Report, the Motion, the record, and the applicable law, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (DE 90) is GRANTED. 2. As used in this Preliminary Approval Order, unless otherwise noted, capitalized terms shall have the definitions and meanings accorded to them in the Settlement Agreement. See (DE 90-1 ¶¶ 1.1–1.53.) 3. The Court currently has jurisdiction over the subject matter and Parties to these proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1332. 4. Venue is proper in this District. I. Provisional Class Certification and Appointment of Class Representative and Class Counsel 5. It is well established that “[a] class may be certified solely for purposes of settlement [if] a settlement is reached before a litigated determination of the class certification issue.” Borcea v. Carnival Corp., 238 F.R.D. 664, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “There is a strong judicial policy in favor of settlement, in order to conserve scarce resources that would otherwise be devoted to protracted litigation.” Id. In deciding whether to provisionally certify a settlement class, a court must consider the same factors that it would consider in connection with a proposed litigation

class—i.e., all Rule 23(a) factors and at least one subsection of Rule 23(b) must be satisfied—except that the Court need not consider the manageability of a potential trial, since the settlement, if approved, would obviate the need for a trial. Id.; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). 6. The Court finds, for settlement purposes, that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 factors are present, and that certification of the proposed Settlement Class is appropriate under Rule 23. The Court therefore provisionally certifies the following Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States whose personal information was exposed or potentially accessed in the Data Breach at ILS.

7. Specifically, the Court finds, for settlement purposes only and conditioned on final certification of the proposed class and on the entry of the Final Approved Order, that the Settlement Class satisfies the following factors of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: (a) Numerosity: in the Action, approximately 3.9 million individuals located throughout the United States are members of the proposed settlement class. The proposed Settlement Class is thus so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) Commonality: “[C]ommonality requires the plaintiff[s] to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury,’” and the plaintiffs’ common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution— which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Here, the commonality requirement is satisfied. Multiple questions of law and fact centering on Defendant’s class-wide

practices are common to Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class and would generate common answers central to the viability of the claims were this case to proceed to trial, and Defendant is alleged to have injured all members of the Settlement Class in the same way from the Data Security Incident. (c) Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Settlement Class because they concern the same alleged Defendant’s practices, arise from the same legal theories, and allege the same types of harm and entitlement to relief stemming from the Data Security Incident. Rule 23(a)(3) is therefore satisfied. See Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that typicality is satisfied where “claims or defenses of the class and the class

representative arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory.”); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that named plaintiffs are typical of the class where they “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”).

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Related

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
521 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
131 S. Ct. 2541 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Fabricant v. Roebuck
202 F.R.D. 310 (S.D. Florida, 2001)
Borcea v. Carnival Corp.
238 F.R.D. 664 (S.D. Florida, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
Geleng v. Independent Living Systems, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/geleng-v-independent-living-systems-llc-flsd-2025.