Geary Distributing Company, Inc., Cross-Appellant v. All Brand Importers, Inc., Cross-Appellee

931 F.2d 1431, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10253, 1991 WL 70880
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedMay 22, 1991
Docket89-3593
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 931 F.2d 1431 (Geary Distributing Company, Inc., Cross-Appellant v. All Brand Importers, Inc., Cross-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Geary Distributing Company, Inc., Cross-Appellant v. All Brand Importers, Inc., Cross-Appellee, 931 F.2d 1431, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10253, 1991 WL 70880 (11th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This appeal involves the retroactive application of Florida’s beer, distribution statute, Fla.Stat. § 563.022, to an existing alcoholic beverage distribution contract between All Brand Importers, Inc. (All Brand) and Geary Distributing Company, Inc. (Geary). The district court held that the beer distribution statute could be retroactively applied to the contract between All Brand and Geary and that All Brand had violated the statute by unreasonably withholding its consent to a proposed assignment by Geary of its rights under the contract. The court awarded Geary compensatory damages, interest and attorneys’ fees totalling $114,-351.22. Both All Brand and Geary appeal.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

All Brand is a New York corporation in the business of supplying alcoholic beverages at wholesale to distributors in several *1433 states including Florida. Geary is a Florida corporation that did business as a distributor of alcoholic beverages in Orange, Volusia and Brevard Counties in Florida. In 1978, Geary and All Brand entered into an oral agreement that authorized Geary to distribute All Brand products, including Foster’s Lager and Moosehead beer. The distribution agreement was in effect until 1987, when the present dispute arose. There was no written agreement evidencing the terms of the oral agreement. In 1984, All Brand signed a proposed written agreement, but Geary refused to sign. Both parties maintain that this written document reflects the content of their oral agreement, except for a provision concerning exclusivity of the distributorship. A copy of the 1984 document is attached as Appendix A to this opinion.

In 1985, Geary ceased its operations in Orange County and sought to assign its distributorship rights for Orange County to Jim Taylor Corporation. Geary, pursuant to its oral agreement with All Brand, asked All Brand to consent to the assignment of distributorship rights. All Brand, after reviewing Taylor’s qualifications, eventually consented to the assignment.

Later, Geary sought to assign its distributorship rights for Volusia County to Central Florida Distributors. Geary asked that All Brand consent to the assignment. All Brand, after reviewing Central Florida Distributors’ qualifications, consented to this assignment also.

Then in September 1987, Geary requested All Brand’s consent to Geary’s assignment of the distribution rights for Brevard County to Grantham Distribution Company. According to the terms of an agreement between Geary and Grantham, Geary would receive an additional $75,000 if Geary could ensure Grantham that it would be designated All Brand’s distributor for Brevard County. All Brand refused to consent to the assignment to Grantham. All Brand maintains that it had a number of valid business reasons for refusing to consent to this assignment.

After All Brand refused to consent to the assignment to Grantham, Geary filed this action in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. Geary alleges that All Brand unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. Geary relies upon a recently enacted Florida statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 563.022 (West Supp.1990) (the beer distribution statute), as the principal basis for its cause of action. 1 The beer distribution statute provides that a manufacturer may not unreasonably withhold consent to the assignment of distribution rights. See Fla. StatAnn. § 563.022(5)(b)(7) (West Supp. 1990).

All Brand removed the case to federal court and answered Geary’s complaint by asserting that Florida’s statute of frauds, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 725.01 (West 1988), precludes this cause of action and that retroactive application of the beer distribution statute would violate the Florida Constitution’s contract clause, 2 and the United States Constitution’s contract clause. 3 Geary maintains that the beer distribution statute supersedes the statute of frauds and controls this cause of action.

The district court agreed with Geary and held that the beer distribution statute supersedes the Florida statute of frauds and is the controlling statute in the case. In making that determination the district court concluded that the beer distribution statute could be applied retroactively without violating the United States Constitution’s contract clause. The court, however, failed to explicitly address All Brand’s contention that the retroactive application of the beer distribution statute would violate the Florida Constitution’s contract clause.

*1434 After a bench trial, the district court found that All Brand had unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The court awarded Geary $75,000 in compensatory damages, $14,351.22 in interest, and $25,000 in attorneys’ fees. No evidentiary hearing was held on Geary’s request for attorneys’ fees. Both parties appeal.

II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES ON APPEAL

All Brand contends that the district court erred by retroactively applying the beer distribution statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 563.022, to the contract at issue in this case. Geary contends that the district court erred by failing to conduct an eviden-tiary hearing to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded in this case.

III. DISCUSSION

The district court ruled that retroactive application of the beer distribution statute does not violate the United States Constitution’s contract clause. We need not address this question because we hold that retroactive application of the beer distribution statute violates the Florida Constitution’s contract clause. 4

The Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o ... law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” Fla. Const, art. I, § 10. The correct interpretation of this provision of the Florida Constitution is a question of Florida law. “Therefore, federal courts are required to construe the [Florida Constitution] ... as would the Supreme Court of Florida.” Royal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 215, 216 (11th Cir.1991). Where the Supreme Court of Florida has not addressed a particular issue, federal courts are then bound by the decisions of the Florida district courts of appeal that address the disputed issue, unless there is an indication that the supreme court would not adhere to the district court’s decision. Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., 861 F.2d 1248, 1257 n. 14 (11th Cir.1988); Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231, 1235 n. 7 (5th Cir.

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931 F.2d 1431, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10253, 1991 WL 70880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/geary-distributing-company-inc-cross-appellant-v-all-brand-importers-ca11-1991.