GDT CG1, LLC v. Oklahoma County Board of Equalization

2007 OK CIV APP 101, 172 P.3d 628, 2007 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 77, 2007 WL 3274520
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedJune 28, 2007
Docket104,354
StatusPublished

This text of 2007 OK CIV APP 101 (GDT CG1, LLC v. Oklahoma County Board of Equalization) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GDT CG1, LLC v. Oklahoma County Board of Equalization, 2007 OK CIV APP 101, 172 P.3d 628, 2007 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 77, 2007 WL 3274520 (Okla. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

KENNETH L. BUETTNER, Judge.

T1 Plaintiffs/Appellants GDT CGI, LLC (Property Owner), Ministries of Jesus, Inc. (MJT), and Transformation Fitness Center, LLC (Fitness Center) (collectively, Appellants) appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of Defendants/Appellees Board of Equalization of Oklahoma County and Oklahoma County Assessor (collectively, County) which affirmed County's ruling that Appellants were not entitled to an ad valo-rem tax exemption. The question presented is whether a non-profit fitness center, which charges most users a fee comparable to other fitness centers in the area, but which offers free services to persons referred by its charitable free health clinic owner, is used exclusively for charitable purposes and thus qualifies for exemption from ad valorem taxation pursuant to 68 O.S8.Supp.2004 § 2887. The record shows that MJI purchased Fitness Center to further its purpose of ministering to the physical, emotional, and spiritual needs of its clients, without charge. Although Fitness Center charges membership fees to some clients, it also offers free services to MJI patients, and free sports programs to those unable to pay, and is therefore part of MJT's charitable operation. Fitness Center is therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation. We reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of Appellants.

T2 Appellants filed their Application for Ad Valorem Tax Exemption in April 2006. County denied the exemption based on its finding that Appellants were operating a commercial business (Fitness Center) on the property. Appellants appealed the denial to County's Board of Equalization, pursuant to 68 0.98.2001 § 2877(A), which denied the exemption after holding two hearings on the *630 matter. Appellants then challenged the Board's denial by seeking trial de novo in the District Court pursuant to 68 0.8.2001 § 2880.1(A).

13 In their appeal to the District Court, Appellants claimed Property Owner owns the real property at issue and leases it without cost 1 to Fitness Center, which uses the property to operate a not-for-profit fitness center. Appellants averred that as a single member limited liability company owned by MJI, a § 501(c)8) publicly supported charity, Fitness Center is treated as an activity of MJL. 2 Appellants argued that the IRS treats organizations like Fitness Center as charitable programs where they are dedicated exclusively to the charitable purposes of the tax-exempt owner. Appellants asserted that the IRS treats not-for-profit, tax-exempt fitness centers as charitable programs under the "community benefit" doctrine because they contribute to education and health of the community. Appellants asserted further that Fitness Center qualifies for the exemption because it is "dedicated exclusively to the charitable purposes of its owner," MJL

14 Appellants claimed Fitness Center was accessible and affordable to a significant segment of the community, charged comparable or lower fees than similar facilities, was equipped for those with special needs, and offered occupational and physical therapy, nutritional and educational programs, and offered scholarships for those unable to afford its services. Appellants asserted the primary focus of Fitness Center was to meet the healthcare needs of MJT's patients and to provide health, recreation, and education to the community.

15 Appellants asserted that in denying their ad valorem exemption, County relied on an opinion issued by the District Attorney, which Appellants claimed was factually and legally erroneous. Appellants claimed the District Attorney erred in presuming MJI is a church and in labeling Fitness Center as a commercial entity. Appellants asserted the District Attorney also assumed that they sought an exemption because funds generated by Fitness Center are used to support MJI's free medical clinic, but Appellants asserted that the activities and programs conducted by Fitness Center are in and of themselves exempt activities as recognized by the IRS. Appellants asserted that the real property and personal property at issue are used exclusively and directly for charitable purposes and that Appellants are therefore enti *631 tled to an exemption from ad valorem taxes according to 68 0.8.2001 § 2887(9). Appellants asked the District Court for judgment declaring their right to exemption from ad valorem tax on the property.

T6 In its Answer, filed June 80, 2006, County generally denied the allegations of Appellants' Petition. County asserted Appellants relied on authority related to the IRS, which County claimed differs from the law applicable to ad valorem taxation. County denied any inference that the property at issue was exempt from ad valorem taxes. County requested judgment in its favor.

T7 Appellants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment November 7, 2006. Appellants listed 7 undisputed facts in support of their motion. 3 County responded with a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. County disputed only one of Appellants' facts (the claim that Fitness Center charged lower fees than other fitness centers), and County listed 7 additional facts it contended proved it was entitled to summary judgment against Appellants. 4

T8 In Appellants' Response to County's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellants noted that County had disputed only whether Fitness Center charges fees comparable to other fitness centers in the area. Appellants asserted, however, that the fees generated had yet to exceed the cost of operating Fitness Center, and that any profits in the future would be put into the operation of MJI, and that the purpose for which Fitness Center operates is charitable. Appellants further responded to each of County's undisputed facts. 5 Appellants added *632 four additional undisputed facts in their Response. 6

T9 County filed a Reply to Appellants' Response, but County did not dispute Appellants' additional facts. County urged that the undisputed facts failed to show that Appellants operated Fitness Center exclusively for a charitable purpose. County further asserted IRS regulations are not applicable to determination of ad valorem tax exemption.

10 In its Order granting summary judgment to County, the trial court found that "the real property at issue is not used exelu-sively for a charitable purpose." The trial court held therefore that the property did not qualify for exemption from ad valorem tax.

111 Summary judgment proceedings are governed by Rule 13, Rules for District Courts, 12 0.9.2001, Ch. 2, App.1. Summary judgment is appropriate where the record establishes no substantial controversy of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brown v. Alliance Real Estate Group, 1999 OK 7, 976 P.2d 1048, 1045. Summary judgment is not proper where reasonable minds could draw different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. Id. Further, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Vance v. Fed. Natl. Mortg. Assn., 1999 OK 73, 988 P.2d 1275.

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Bluebook (online)
2007 OK CIV APP 101, 172 P.3d 628, 2007 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 77, 2007 WL 3274520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gdt-cg1-llc-v-oklahoma-county-board-of-equalization-oklacivapp-2007.