Baptist Health Care Corp. v. Okmulgee County Board of Equalization

1988 OK 11, 750 P.2d 127, 1988 Okla. LEXIS 19, 1988 WL 10625
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 9, 1988
Docket65796
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 1988 OK 11 (Baptist Health Care Corp. v. Okmulgee County Board of Equalization) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baptist Health Care Corp. v. Okmulgee County Board of Equalization, 1988 OK 11, 750 P.2d 127, 1988 Okla. LEXIS 19, 1988 WL 10625 (Okla. 1988).

Opinion

SIMMS, Justice:

Appeal by the Baptist Health Care Corporation from a judgment, following de novo hearing, which held the Okmulgee Baptist Village is subject to ad valorem taxation. The relevant facts are undisputed.

The appellant provides nine residential community centers for the elderly statewide. The Okmulgee Baptist Village is one such center. In December, 1984, the Ok-mulgee County Assessor placed the Okmul-gee Baptist Village on the county ad valo-rem tax rolls. The Village appealed to the County Excise Board, which upheld the Assessor’s actions. The Village then appealed that decision to the district court where de novo review was held.

The evidence presented to the district court is, in large part, undisputed and uncontested. Okmulgee Baptist Village accepted its first resident in late 1984. The Village was built and operated through contributions from the Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma and individual members of the various Baptist congregations.

Appellant is a not-for-profit, tax-exempt corporation and operates the Village as part of its statewide ministry for the elderly. Additional testimony was presented which showed that the center is open to all, regardless of religious affiliation, race, or ability to pay. While most residents pay some rent, the revenues received do not compensate for expenses incurred in operation and the center operates at a loss. Annual contributions from various Baptist congregations are used to pay the difference.

I.

The facts of this case are virtually identical to the facts and circumstances in Glass v. Oklahoma Methodist Home for the Aged, Okl., 502 P.2d 1268 (1972). The issues raised are equally similar. In Glass, this Court addressed the issue of whether an institution like the Okmulgee Baptist Village could claim a constitutional tax exemption as property being “used exclusively for religious and charitable purposes” when rent was collected from the residents. See, Okla. Const. Art. 10, § 6. There, as in this case, the evidence was clear that revenues from rent fell far short of meeting the operational costs of the facility, and that income from charitable donations provided nearly all of the funds for operating and maintaining the facility.. In addition, the evidence in this case, as in Glass, makes it abundantly clear that “the overall purposes and practices of [the Okmulgee Baptist Village are] charitable in nature ...” Supra, at 1274. Following stare decisis, we can only conclude that the District Court of Okmulgee County erred in finding that the *129 Okmulgee Baptist Village was subject to ad valorem taxation.

II.

Prior to placing the Okmulgee Baptist Village on the ad valorem tax rolls, the Assessor requested an opinion from the district attorney asking whether the Village was subject to taxation. The district attorney responded that the Village was subject to such tax, relying on his interpretation of 68 O.S. 1981, § 2405(h) and (i). 1 The appellants argue that this reliance is misplaced because that statute places unconstitutional limitations on the broad tax exemption created in our constitution, Art. 10, § 6. 2

We are not persuaded that § 2405 places unconstitutional limitations upon the constitutional exemption at issue here. This question, too, is controlled by our opinion in Glass v. Oklahoma Methodist Home for the Aged, supra.

In Glass, this Court stated that contributions from outside sources cannot be considered as “income” when determining whether the institution is truly non-profit. Clearly, the facts of this case mandate the same result. The facts show that the contributions from church members provide the primary means of support for the Village. Rent receipts constitute an inconsequential revenue source when compared to the basic operational budget which appears to be met to a large degree through the benevolence of the Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma and the various Baptist congregations. While the evidence did show that the staff and administrator in charge of the Village are paid salaries, this does not come within the statutory prohibition that no income shall “inure to the benefit of any private stockholder”. Section 2405(h) does not disqualify the Village from exemption here. Similarly, § 2405(i) cannot act to disqualify them from exemption because the facts show that the Village paid no rent to any private individual or corporation.

We do not believe that § 2405 places limitations on the constitutionally granted tax exemption. Rather, we are of the opinion that this statute simply adds definition to the phrase “property used exclusively for religious and charitable purposes”. Okla. Const. Art. 10, § 6. Property which produces income for private profit, or which is not available to all regardless of ability to pay, or which itself is income property, cannot be property which is used “exclusively” for religious or charitable purpose. See, e.g., London Square Village, Inc. v. Okla. County Equalization and Excise Board, Okl., 559 P.2d 1224 (1976).

This interpretation of 68 O.S.Supp.1987, § 2405, is also in harmony with our opinion in Glass, supra. In that case, we examined the “income” at issue together with a seven part test adopted from the Supreme Court of Oregon in Oregon Methodist Home Inc. v. Horn, 226 Or. 298, 360 P.2d 293 (1961), and concluded that the Oklahoma Methodist Home for the Aged was *130 properly entitled to the same constitutional exemption at issue here. The facts from this case satisfy those same tests. 3 Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred when it failed to direct the Okmulgee County Assessor to remove the Okmulgee Baptist Village from the Okmulgee County ad valorem tax roles.

The cause is Reversed and Remanded to the District Court of Okmulgee County with directions to enter judgment accordingly for the appellant.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS, OPALA and WILSON, JJ., concur. DOOLIN, C.J., KAUGER, SUMMERS, JJ., concur by reason of stare decisis. HODGES, J., not voting.
1

. The relevant provision of 68 O.S. 1981, § 2405 (now 68 O.S.Supp.1987, § 2405, states:

"The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
******
(g) All property used exclusively and directly for fraternal or religious purposes within this state.

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Bluebook (online)
1988 OK 11, 750 P.2d 127, 1988 Okla. LEXIS 19, 1988 WL 10625, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baptist-health-care-corp-v-okmulgee-county-board-of-equalization-okla-1988.