Gayot v. Perez

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 3, 2023
Docket7:16-cv-08871
StatusUnknown

This text of Gayot v. Perez (Gayot v. Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gayot v. Perez, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANDREW GAYOT, Plaintiff, 16-CV-8871 (KMK) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL DUTCHESS COUNTY, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendant. KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: Andrew Gayot (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se action, for which the filing fees have been paid, alleging that Duchess County (“Defendant” or the “County”) violated his federally protected rights. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to replead. I. Standard of Review The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16–17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief

if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However, the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. II. Background Plaintiff filed this Action on November 15, 2016 against three individual defendants, (see Compl. (Dkt. No. 2)), and filed an Amended Complaint on March 30, 2017, (see. Am. Compl.

(Dkt. No. 8). On November 21, 2018, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice for failure to exhaust. (See Op. & Order 16 (Dkt. No. 37).) On January 8, 2021, Plaintiff informed the Court that his claim was properly exhausted and requested that he be allowed to file a new Complaint that replaced the individual defendants with “Dutchess County [sic].” (See Letter from Andrew Gayot to Court (December 28, 2020) (Dkt. No. 39); Letter from Andrew Gayot to Court (December 28, 2020) (Dkt. No. 40).) On February 3, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request and set a deadline of March 5, 2021. (See Dkt. No. 41.) On June 14, 2022, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (See Order to Show Cause (Dkt. No. 43).) On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (See Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) (Dkt. No. 46).) The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s SAC. Plaintiff alleges that several officers at Downstate Correctional facility violated his rights from August to December 2016. (SAC 4.)

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that a Sergeant Candidus “questioned Plaintiff’s relationship with his attorney in violation of Plaintiff’s right to attorney-client privilege.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that he has repeatedly experienced interference with his mail. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the interference with his mail resulted in denial of his access to the courts because he was unable to properly answer legal notices in a pending mortgage foreclosure action. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against Defendant for a “failure . . . to properly train or supervise [its] subordinates[,] [which] amont[s] to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of those who come into contact with [its] employees.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he has experienced “stress, anxiety, [and] emotional distress in conjunction with financial loss of $225,612” and requests relief in the form of “$250,000 for pain, suffering, and financial loss.” (Id. at 5.)

III. Discussion A. Duchess County The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1988). In addition, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Under certain circumstances, a plaintiff may bring claims against a municipality, but “Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable [under § 1983] unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Wachtler v. County Of Herkimer
35 F.3d 77 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Roe v. City of Waterbury
542 F.3d 31 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
Gayot v. Perez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gayot-v-perez-nysd-2023.