1 2 3 6 7 DEE'ANGELO LAMAR GATHRITE, Case No. 25-cv-02369-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9
10 R. DIAZ, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff has filed a second 15 amended complaint (dkt. 10). 17 1. Standard of Review 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases where prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 21 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 22 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 23 Pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 24 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 27 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 1 detailed factual allegations in a complaint, the complaint must do more than recite elements of a 2 cause of action and state conclusions; rather, a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 3 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 4 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 5 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has explained the standard this way: “While 6 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 7 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 8 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 9 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 11 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 12 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 14 2. Legal Claims 15 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing due to 16 falsified evidence. 17 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the Due Process 18 Clause itself and applicable state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 19 Changes in conditions so severe that they affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 20 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 21 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are 22 less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to 23 deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest if (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly 24 restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation (i.e., give the inmate a kind of right 25 to avoid it), and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. at 477–87. 26 Generally, liberties of “real substance” are limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 27 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” 1 Prisoners may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 2 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 3 prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in prison 5 disciplinary proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the 6 time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may 7 prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence they rely on and 8 reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, 9 when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 10 goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented 11 are legally complex. Id. at 563–71. 12 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 13 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. 14 Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 15 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 16 allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under Section 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 17 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). 18 A false charge that results in discipline not amounting to a deprivation of a protected 19 liberty interest under Sandin is not actionable under Section 1983 if it does not implicate another 20 constitutional right, such as the First Amendment right to be free from retaliation. See Smith v. 21 Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653–54 (3d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that led 22 to disciplinary confinement were false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary confinement 23 imposed was too short to be an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). 24 Plaintiff states that Defendants Palacios and Lizama allegedly searched his cell on the 25 instructions of Defendant Weber and found a weapon and a medical syringe. As a result, Plaintiff 26 received a Rules Violation Report and was found guilty at a subsequent hearing by Defendant 27 Covarrubias, which was approved by Defendant Diaz. For punishment, Plaintiff lost privileges for 1 caused medical and psychological harm. Plaintiff contends that this incident never happened 2 because he was never housed in the cell that was searched and his cell was not searched; therefore, 3 the disciplinary finding was illegal and based on false evidence. He also appears to argue that 4 there was an additional disciplinary finding using this evidence, but there was no hearing, and he 5 was not allowed to challenge the evidence. 6 Liberally construed, this states a claim against all Defendants for violating Plaintiff’s due 7 process rights.
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1 2 3 6 7 DEE'ANGELO LAMAR GATHRITE, Case No. 25-cv-02369-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9
10 R. DIAZ, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff has filed a second 15 amended complaint (dkt. 10). 17 1. Standard of Review 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases where prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 21 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 22 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 23 Pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 24 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 27 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 1 detailed factual allegations in a complaint, the complaint must do more than recite elements of a 2 cause of action and state conclusions; rather, a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 3 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 4 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 5 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has explained the standard this way: “While 6 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 7 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 8 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 9 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 11 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 12 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 14 2. Legal Claims 15 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing due to 16 falsified evidence. 17 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the Due Process 18 Clause itself and applicable state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 19 Changes in conditions so severe that they affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 20 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 21 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are 22 less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to 23 deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest if (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly 24 restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation (i.e., give the inmate a kind of right 25 to avoid it), and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. at 477–87. 26 Generally, liberties of “real substance” are limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 27 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” 1 Prisoners may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 2 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 3 prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in prison 5 disciplinary proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the 6 time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may 7 prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence they rely on and 8 reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, 9 when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 10 goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented 11 are legally complex. Id. at 563–71. 12 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 13 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. 14 Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 15 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 16 allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under Section 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 17 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). 18 A false charge that results in discipline not amounting to a deprivation of a protected 19 liberty interest under Sandin is not actionable under Section 1983 if it does not implicate another 20 constitutional right, such as the First Amendment right to be free from retaliation. See Smith v. 21 Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653–54 (3d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that led 22 to disciplinary confinement were false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary confinement 23 imposed was too short to be an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). 24 Plaintiff states that Defendants Palacios and Lizama allegedly searched his cell on the 25 instructions of Defendant Weber and found a weapon and a medical syringe. As a result, Plaintiff 26 received a Rules Violation Report and was found guilty at a subsequent hearing by Defendant 27 Covarrubias, which was approved by Defendant Diaz. For punishment, Plaintiff lost privileges for 1 caused medical and psychological harm. Plaintiff contends that this incident never happened 2 because he was never housed in the cell that was searched and his cell was not searched; therefore, 3 the disciplinary finding was illegal and based on false evidence. He also appears to argue that 4 there was an additional disciplinary finding using this evidence, but there was no hearing, and he 5 was not allowed to challenge the evidence. 6 Liberally construed, this states a claim against all Defendants for violating Plaintiff’s due 7 process rights. 9 The Court orders that the following Defendants be served electronically at Salinas Valley 10 State Prison: Correctional Officers A. Lizama and R. Palacios, Sergeant J. Weber, Lieutenant F. 11 Covarrubias, and Assistant Warden R. Diaz. 12 Service on the listed Defendants will be effected via the California Department of 13 Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners 14 in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on CDCR via 15 email the following documents: the operative second amended complaint (dkt. 10), this order of 16 service, the notice of assignment of prisoner case to a United States magistrate judge and 17 accompanying magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form, a CDCR 18 Report of E-Service Waiver form and a summons. The Clerk is also requested to serve a copy of 19 this order on Plaintiff. 20 No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR shall provide 21 the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the Court which Defendants 22 listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by the United 23 States Marshal Service (USMS) and which Defendants decline to waive service or could not be 24 reached. CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver and of the 25 notice of assignment of prisoner case to a magistrate judge and accompanying magistrate judge 26 jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form to the California Attorney General’s Office, 27 which, within 21 days, shall file with the court a waiver of service of process for the Defendants 1 consent or declination to consent form as to the defendants who waived service. 2 Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk is requested to prepare 3 for each Defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service 4 Waiver a USM-285 Form. The Clerk will provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 forms 5 and copies of this order, the summons and the operative complaint for service upon each 6 Defendant who has not waived service. The Clerk will also provide to the USMS a copy of the 7 CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver. 8 In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows: 9 No later than sixty days from the date of service, Defendants shall file their motion for 10 summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual 11 documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and shall 12 include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the events at issue. If 13 Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion, they shall so 14 inform the court prior to the date that such motion is due. Moreover, all papers filed with the court 15 shall be promptly served on Plaintiff. 16 At the time the dispositive motion is served, Defendants shall also serve, on a separate 17 paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th 18 Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003); see Woods v. 19 Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that Rand and Wyatt notices must be given 20 at the time motions for summary judgment or motion to dismiss for non-exhaustion are filed, not 21 earlier); Rand, 154 F.3d at 960 (establishing the separate paper requirement). 22 Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the court and 23 served upon Defendants no later than thirty days from the date the motion is served upon him. 24 Additionally, Plaintiff must read the attached page headed “NOTICE – WARNING,” which is 25 provided to him pursuant to Rand, 154 F.3d at 953-954, and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 26 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 27 If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 1 note of the attached page headed “NOTICE — WARNING (EXHAUSTION),” which is provided 2 || to him as required by Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.4. 3 If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than fifteen days after the 4 || opposition is served. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 5 No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. All 6 communications by Plaintiff with the court must be served on Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel, 7 if and when counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or 8 Defendants’ counsel. 9 Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No 10 || further court order is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 11 Finally, it is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 12 || wnformed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 13 Change of Address.” He also must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 14 || do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 3 15 Civil Procedure 41(b). a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Datea: July 28, 2025 Hh] lo 19 ROBERT M. ILLMAN 20 United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
2 If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. 3 A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if 4 granted, end your case. 5 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 6 Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-- 7 that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 8 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your 9 case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly 10 supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your 11 complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to 12 interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts 13 shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of 14 material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, 15 if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be 16 dismissed and there will be no trial. 18 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are seeking 19 to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case. You have the right to 20 present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you did exhaust your administrative 21 remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations (statements signed under penalty of 22 perjury) or authenticated documents, that is, documents accompanied by a declaration showing 23 where they came from and why they are authentic, or other sworn papers, such as answers to 24 interrogatories or depositions. If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to 25 exhaust and it is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.