1 2 3 6 7 DEE’ANGELO LAMAR GATHRITE, Case No. 25-cv-02369-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND
10 R. DIAZ, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff has filed an 15 amended complaint (dkt. 8). 17 1. Standard of Review 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases where prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 21 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 22 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 23 Pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 24 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 27 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 1 detailed factual allegations in a complaint, the complaint must do more than recite elements of a 2 cause of action and state conclusions; rather, a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 3 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 4 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 5 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has explained the standard this way: “While 6 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 7 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 8 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 9 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 11 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 12 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 14 2. Legal Claims 15 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing due to 16 falsified evidence. 17 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the Due Process 18 Clause itself and applicable state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 19 Changes in conditions so severe that they affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 20 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 21 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are 22 less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to 23 deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest if (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly 24 restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation (i.e., give the inmate a kind of right 25 to avoid it), and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. at 477–87. 26 Generally, liberties of “real substance” are limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 27 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” 1 Prisoners may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 2 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 3 prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in prison 5 disciplinary proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the 6 time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may 7 prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence they rely on and 8 reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, 9 when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 10 goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented 11 are legally complex. Id. at 563–71. 12 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 13 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. 14 Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 15 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 16 allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under Section 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 17 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). 18 A false charge that results in discipline not amounting to a deprivation of a protected 19 liberty interest under Sandin is not actionable under Section 1983 if it does not implicate another 20 constitutional right, such as the First Amendment right to be free of retaliation. See Smith v. 21 Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653–54 (3d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that led 22 to disciplinary confinement were false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary confinement 23 imposed was too short to be an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). 24 Plaintiff states that Defendants claimed to have searched his cell and his person and found 25 a weapon and a medical syringe. As a result, Plaintiff received a Rules Violation Report and was 26 found guilty at a subsequent hearing. For punishment, Plaintiff lost privileges for sixty days, 27 including loss of access to the phone, canteen, and day room. Plaintiff alleges this caused medical 1 in the cell that was searched; therefore, the disciplinary finding was illegal and based on false 2 evidence. 3 The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend to provide further information. 4 Plaintiff now alleges that Defendant Covarrubias found him guilty and Defendant Diaz approved 5 the guilty finding even though there was no hearing and Plaintiff was not allowed to challenge the 6 evidence. Liberally construed, this states a claim against these Defendants for a violation of 7 Plaintiff’s due process rights.
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1 2 3 6 7 DEE’ANGELO LAMAR GATHRITE, Case No. 25-cv-02369-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND
10 R. DIAZ, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff has filed an 15 amended complaint (dkt. 8). 17 1. Standard of Review 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases where prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 21 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 22 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 23 Pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 24 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 27 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 1 detailed factual allegations in a complaint, the complaint must do more than recite elements of a 2 cause of action and state conclusions; rather, a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 3 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 4 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 5 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has explained the standard this way: “While 6 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 7 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 8 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 9 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 11 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 12 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 14 2. Legal Claims 15 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing due to 16 falsified evidence. 17 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the Due Process 18 Clause itself and applicable state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 19 Changes in conditions so severe that they affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 20 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 21 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are 22 less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to 23 deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest if (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly 24 restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation (i.e., give the inmate a kind of right 25 to avoid it), and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. at 477–87. 26 Generally, liberties of “real substance” are limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 27 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” 1 Prisoners may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 2 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 3 prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in prison 5 disciplinary proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the 6 time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may 7 prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence they rely on and 8 reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, 9 when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 10 goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented 11 are legally complex. Id. at 563–71. 12 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 13 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. 14 Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 15 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 16 allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under Section 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 17 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). 18 A false charge that results in discipline not amounting to a deprivation of a protected 19 liberty interest under Sandin is not actionable under Section 1983 if it does not implicate another 20 constitutional right, such as the First Amendment right to be free of retaliation. See Smith v. 21 Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653–54 (3d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that led 22 to disciplinary confinement were false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary confinement 23 imposed was too short to be an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). 24 Plaintiff states that Defendants claimed to have searched his cell and his person and found 25 a weapon and a medical syringe. As a result, Plaintiff received a Rules Violation Report and was 26 found guilty at a subsequent hearing. For punishment, Plaintiff lost privileges for sixty days, 27 including loss of access to the phone, canteen, and day room. Plaintiff alleges this caused medical 1 in the cell that was searched; therefore, the disciplinary finding was illegal and based on false 2 evidence. 3 The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend to provide further information. 4 Plaintiff now alleges that Defendant Covarrubias found him guilty and Defendant Diaz approved 5 the guilty finding even though there was no hearing and Plaintiff was not allowed to challenge the 6 evidence. Liberally construed, this states a claim against these Defendants for a violation of 7 Plaintiff’s due process rights. 8 However, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim against Defendants Palacios, Weber, or Lizana 9 for conducting the search that allegedly found the contraband. Plaintiff does not state whether his 10 real cell or his person were actually searched. He also does not state whether any contraband was 11 found during these searches. This information is necessary to determine whether the evidence 12 against Plaintiff was actually false, or if the officers simply gave the wrong cell number in an 13 otherwise accurate report. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint and attempt to state a 14 claim against these Defendants, or he may elect to only continue against Covarrubias and Diaz. 16 1. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed, Plaintiff may either inform 17 the court that he only wishes to proceed against Covarrubias and Diaz, or he may file a second 18 amended complaint. A second amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number 19 used in this order and the words “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. 20 Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include 21 in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 22 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the original Complaint by reference. Failure to 23 reply within the designated time will result in dismissal of all Defendants except for Covarrubias 24 and Diaz. 25 2. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 26 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk, headered “Notice of 27 Change of Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 1 Procedure 41(b). 3 Dated: June 6, 2025 4 MeA— 5 ROBERT M. ILLMAN 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12
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