RUCKER, Justice
A jury convicted Howard Garrett of possession of cocaine and dealing in cocaine and also adjudged him a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Garrett to fifty years for dealing in cocaine enhanced by thirty years for being a habitual offender. The court did not sentence Garrett for possession of cocaine. In this direct appeal, Garrett raises two issues for our review which we rephrase as follows: (I) was Garrett tried before an impartial judge; and (2) did defense counsel’s stipulation to the dates of Garrett’s prior convictions constitute a guilty plea to the habitual offender charge? We affirm.
Facts
The record reveals that on December 2, 1998, Garrett sold .09 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant working for the Indianapolis Police Department. The informant wore a wire transmitter, and the transaction was recorded on audiotape. The State charged Garrett with possession of cocaine, dealing in cocaine, and being a habitual offender. The State offered Garrett a plea agreement that allowed him to plead guilty to a lesser dealing charge and receive a ten-year sentence enhanced by an additional ten years for the habitual offender count. Before trial the court discussed the offer with Garrett, but Garrett declined and proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Garrett as charged, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of eighty years. This appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.
Discussion
I.
Garrett contends that he was denied a fair trial under the state and federal constitutions because the trial .judge failed to remain impartial. His argument focuses on the trial court’s pre-trial statements in discussing the State’s plea offer. The record shows that on the morning of Garrett’s scheduled trial, the trial judge asked the State if it had made a plea offer to Garrett. The State responded that it had offered Garrett a guilty plea to a lesser dealing offense, as a Class B felony, with a ten-year sentence enhanced by an additional ten years for the habitual offender charge. Garrett told the court that he had rejected the offer. The court then questioned Garrett extensively about whether he understood the nature of the offer and the sentence he could receive if he was convicted as charged. After the court explained that Garrett would likely get the maximum eighty-year sentence, Garrett initially indicated that he would accept the plea. However, after reviewing a written draft of the State’s offer, he declined, and the case proceeded to trial.
Garrett contends that the trial court displayed its bias when, during the pre-trial
discussion, the judge threatened to impose the maximum sentence if Garrett proceeded to trial and was convicted. A threat Garrett maintains the court carried out
when it ordered him to serve the maximum sentence following his conviction. Garrett complains also that the court’s conduct “undermined the fundamental fairness of the proceedings by ridiculing the defense, by intimidating Mr. Garrett and pressuring him to accept the plea offer.... ” Brief of Appellant at 11. Thus, Garrett essentially argues that the judge punished him for exercising his right to trial.
See Hill v. State,
499 N.E.2d 1108, 1107 (Ind.1986) (“It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic sort.... Moreover, it is constitutionally impermissible for a trial court to impose a more severe sentence because the defendant has chosen to stand trial rather than plead guilty.’ ”) (quoting
Walker v. State,
454 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)).
We do not condone the trial judge’s inquiry and comments regarding Garrett’s defense or the depth of the court’s inquiry regarding Garrett’s decision to go to trial.
Declaring to Garrett “I’m telling you, if it’s me and you get found guilty with this record you’ll get the [maximum] eighty years” was clearly inappropriate. There was at least the possibility that hearing this statement from the judge would carry more weight with Garrett than the same message when undoubtedly delivered by Garrett’s counsel. Garrett resisted this additional improper pressure, but others may not. It may seem somewhat artificial to prevent a trial judge from making such direct predictions concerning a sentence that will be imposed, as opposed to outlining the parameters of permissible sentences. Nonetheless such conduct is not defensible in the name of candor.
Having said that, however, we must conclude that Garrett still cannot prevail. Where a defendant fails to object or otherwise challenge a trial judge’s remarks, any alleged error is waived on appeal.
Cornett v. State,
450 N.E.2d 498, 505 (Ind.1983) (holding that a defendant who failed to object to trial judge’s comments and move for a mistrial waived review of claim that the judge failed to maintain impartiality);
see also Smith v. State,
558 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (finding that defendant waived review of his claim that he was entitled to a change of judge where he failed to argue the merits of his claim during a hearing before the trial court). Here, our examination of the record shows that Garrett did not object to the trial court’s pre-trial comments nor did Garrett seek a change of judge following the discussion regarding the plea offer. This issue is thus waived for review. We also note that the record supports Garrett’s eighty-year sentence. Garrett offered no mitigating evidence, and before pronouncing sentence, the trial court reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report and cited in detail Garrett’s lengthy criminal history. Relying on Garrett’s criminal history and the lack of mitigating evidence, the trial court enhanced Garrett’s sentence. The court’s findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances are supported by the record and in turn support Garrett’s sentence.
II.
Garrett next contends that his adjudication as a habitual offender was improper. During the habitual offender phase of the trial, Garrett’s counsel stipulated to the existence of the prior offenses charged by the State. Garrett argues that the stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea, and the trial court’s acceptance of the stipulation without advising him on various rights which would be waived by pleading guilty was erroneous.
See generally Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Ind.Code § 35-35-l-2(a).
Garrett cites no authority to support his claim that a factual stipulation can amount to a guilty plea.
As
we observed in
Whatley v. State,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
RUCKER, Justice
A jury convicted Howard Garrett of possession of cocaine and dealing in cocaine and also adjudged him a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Garrett to fifty years for dealing in cocaine enhanced by thirty years for being a habitual offender. The court did not sentence Garrett for possession of cocaine. In this direct appeal, Garrett raises two issues for our review which we rephrase as follows: (I) was Garrett tried before an impartial judge; and (2) did defense counsel’s stipulation to the dates of Garrett’s prior convictions constitute a guilty plea to the habitual offender charge? We affirm.
Facts
The record reveals that on December 2, 1998, Garrett sold .09 grams of cocaine to a confidential informant working for the Indianapolis Police Department. The informant wore a wire transmitter, and the transaction was recorded on audiotape. The State charged Garrett with possession of cocaine, dealing in cocaine, and being a habitual offender. The State offered Garrett a plea agreement that allowed him to plead guilty to a lesser dealing charge and receive a ten-year sentence enhanced by an additional ten years for the habitual offender count. Before trial the court discussed the offer with Garrett, but Garrett declined and proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Garrett as charged, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of eighty years. This appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.
Discussion
I.
Garrett contends that he was denied a fair trial under the state and federal constitutions because the trial .judge failed to remain impartial. His argument focuses on the trial court’s pre-trial statements in discussing the State’s plea offer. The record shows that on the morning of Garrett’s scheduled trial, the trial judge asked the State if it had made a plea offer to Garrett. The State responded that it had offered Garrett a guilty plea to a lesser dealing offense, as a Class B felony, with a ten-year sentence enhanced by an additional ten years for the habitual offender charge. Garrett told the court that he had rejected the offer. The court then questioned Garrett extensively about whether he understood the nature of the offer and the sentence he could receive if he was convicted as charged. After the court explained that Garrett would likely get the maximum eighty-year sentence, Garrett initially indicated that he would accept the plea. However, after reviewing a written draft of the State’s offer, he declined, and the case proceeded to trial.
Garrett contends that the trial court displayed its bias when, during the pre-trial
discussion, the judge threatened to impose the maximum sentence if Garrett proceeded to trial and was convicted. A threat Garrett maintains the court carried out
when it ordered him to serve the maximum sentence following his conviction. Garrett complains also that the court’s conduct “undermined the fundamental fairness of the proceedings by ridiculing the defense, by intimidating Mr. Garrett and pressuring him to accept the plea offer.... ” Brief of Appellant at 11. Thus, Garrett essentially argues that the judge punished him for exercising his right to trial.
See Hill v. State,
499 N.E.2d 1108, 1107 (Ind.1986) (“It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising a constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic sort.... Moreover, it is constitutionally impermissible for a trial court to impose a more severe sentence because the defendant has chosen to stand trial rather than plead guilty.’ ”) (quoting
Walker v. State,
454 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)).
We do not condone the trial judge’s inquiry and comments regarding Garrett’s defense or the depth of the court’s inquiry regarding Garrett’s decision to go to trial.
Declaring to Garrett “I’m telling you, if it’s me and you get found guilty with this record you’ll get the [maximum] eighty years” was clearly inappropriate. There was at least the possibility that hearing this statement from the judge would carry more weight with Garrett than the same message when undoubtedly delivered by Garrett’s counsel. Garrett resisted this additional improper pressure, but others may not. It may seem somewhat artificial to prevent a trial judge from making such direct predictions concerning a sentence that will be imposed, as opposed to outlining the parameters of permissible sentences. Nonetheless such conduct is not defensible in the name of candor.
Having said that, however, we must conclude that Garrett still cannot prevail. Where a defendant fails to object or otherwise challenge a trial judge’s remarks, any alleged error is waived on appeal.
Cornett v. State,
450 N.E.2d 498, 505 (Ind.1983) (holding that a defendant who failed to object to trial judge’s comments and move for a mistrial waived review of claim that the judge failed to maintain impartiality);
see also Smith v. State,
558 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (finding that defendant waived review of his claim that he was entitled to a change of judge where he failed to argue the merits of his claim during a hearing before the trial court). Here, our examination of the record shows that Garrett did not object to the trial court’s pre-trial comments nor did Garrett seek a change of judge following the discussion regarding the plea offer. This issue is thus waived for review. We also note that the record supports Garrett’s eighty-year sentence. Garrett offered no mitigating evidence, and before pronouncing sentence, the trial court reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report and cited in detail Garrett’s lengthy criminal history. Relying on Garrett’s criminal history and the lack of mitigating evidence, the trial court enhanced Garrett’s sentence. The court’s findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances are supported by the record and in turn support Garrett’s sentence.
II.
Garrett next contends that his adjudication as a habitual offender was improper. During the habitual offender phase of the trial, Garrett’s counsel stipulated to the existence of the prior offenses charged by the State. Garrett argues that the stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea, and the trial court’s acceptance of the stipulation without advising him on various rights which would be waived by pleading guilty was erroneous.
See generally Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Ind.Code § 35-35-l-2(a).
Garrett cites no authority to support his claim that a factual stipulation can amount to a guilty plea.
As
we observed in
Whatley v. State,
685 N.E.2d 48 (Ind.1997) “a plea of guilty is a discrete judicial event that not only admits factual matters but also embodies significant procedural consequences.” Id. at 49. A stipulation that seeks to establish certain facts does not constitute a guilty plea.
Id.
(finding that a stipulation as to the existence of a defendant’s prior conviction used to enhance a handgun offense did not amount to a guilty plea). Such is the case here. The stipulation at issue only acknowledged that Garrett had been convicted of the prior offenses and sentenced on certain dates. Thus, it established only the fact that the prior offenses existed and did not amount to a guilty plea.
Our court of appeals has reached the same conclusion in a nearly identical case. In
Gann v. State,
570 N.E.2d 976 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), the parties stipulated during the habitual offender phase that “the State had true and accurate copies of the prior judgments of conviction, that these convictions were felonies, that the sentences imposed were reflected by the documents, and that the fingerprints provided were in fact Gann’s fingerprints.”
Id.
at 978. As Garrett argues here, the defendant in
Gann
contended that the stipulation amounted to a guilty plea that required the trial court to question him regarding his rights and consent to the stipulation.
Id.
at 979.
In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the court of appeals stated:
In this case, trial counsel did not stipulate that Gann was a habitual offender or that the evidence stipulated was sufficient to determine Gann was an habitual offender, but rather stipulated as to the evidence underlying the status. The State had witnesses in court, and was prepared to introduce the exhibits. Trial counsel presented a closing argument, and the evidence was submitted to the jury for its consideration. The jury deliberated for an hour to an hour and a half before reaching its decision. The stipulation in this case was not the equivalent of a guilty plea....
Id.
We agree with the court of appeals’ analysis in
Gann
and believe it applies in this case. Contrary to Garrett’s claim, his counsel did not stipulate that Garrett was a habitual offender, only to some of the facts underlying the status. As the State points out, the stipulation did not assent to all of the elements of the habitual offender charge. The State still had the burden at trial of proving that the offenses were unrelated.
See
Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8(d) (“A person is a habitual offender if the jury (if the hearing is by jury) or the court (if the hearing is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person had accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions.”). Moreover, both the State and Garrett’s counsel presented opening and closing argument during the habitual offender phase, and the case was submitted to the jury for its consideration. The stipulation was not the equivalent of a guilty plea and did not require the trial court to advise Garrett on various rights which would be waived by pleading guilty.
Conclusion
Judgment affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.