Garot v. County of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 2, 2024
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01650
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 THOMAS RAINEY AND JUDY Case No.: 19-cv-01650-L-SBC RAINEY, CO-CONSERVATORS, ON 12 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BEHALF OF COLLEEN GAROT, QUOC TRAN, M.D.’S MOTION FOR 13 Plaintiff, GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT 14 v. DETERMINATION (ECF 244) 15 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Pending before the Court in this action alleging violations of Plaintiff’s federal rights 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and violations of California law is Defendant Quoc Tran, 20 M.D.’s (“Dr. Tran”) Motion for Good Faith Settlement Determination. (Motion [ECF No. 21 244.]) Defendants County of San Diego (“County”) filed a Response in Opposition. 22 (County Oppo. [ECF No. 245.]) Defendants Michael Stewart, PhD., and Liberty Healthcare 23 of California (collectively “Liberty Defendants”) filed a Response in Opposition. (Liberty 24 Oppo. [ECF No. 184.]) Defendant Dr. Tran filed a Reply. (Reply [ECF No. 251.] The 25 matter is submitted on the briefs without oral argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the 26 reasons stated below, Defendant Dr. Tran’s Motion is denied without prejudice and with 27 leave to amend. 28 // 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 On April 13, 2018, plaintiff Colleen Garot was arrested and taken to county jail 3 (Fourth Amended Complaint at 8 (ECF 53).) At the time of her arrest, Ms. Garot displayed 4 a black eye and forehead abrasions, and she claimed that these resulted from a neurological 5 disorder and a fall five days earlier. (Id. at 8–9.) Early the next morning on April 14, Ms. 6 Garot reported that she had fallen at some time in the night and “lost consciousness.” (Id. 7 at 9.) Medical staff noted a bump on the back of her head and gave her an icepack with 8 instructions to return it “when done.” (Id.) At about 11 p.m. that night, Ms. Garot was 9 examined by Dr. Quoc Tran, who noted her multiple facial bruises and left-eye swelling. 10 (Id.) The following day, April 15, Ms. Garot was placed in a safety cell because of her 11 “repeated, nonsensical statements.” (Id. at 10.) Over the next 36 hours, Ms. Garot’s 12 condition deteriorated: she hallucinated a cowboy and believed a dragonfly was on her arm. 13 (Id. at 10–11.) At about 6:30 a.m. on April 16, 2018, she was observed walking naked 14 around her cell, trying to climb the wall. (Id. at 11.) At 11:00 a.m., Dr. Friedrike Von Lintig 15 examined Ms. Garot in her safety cell, but noted “no acute [m]edical issues.” (Id.) Around 16 11:20 a.m., Ms. Garot suffered a seizure and was taken to the emergency room, where she 17 was diagnosed with a skull fracture, a subdural hematoma, and encephalopathy. (Id.) She 18 is now completely incapacitated. (Id.) 19 Ms. Garot’s conservators sued the County of San Diego, its sheriff, and the 20 numerous deputies and medical professionals with whom she had contact, alleging claims 21 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for professional negligence. (ECF 53.) Most of the defendants 22 were employees of the County, but some were institutions—and their employees—with 23 which the County had contracted to provide medical services. (ECF 200, at 9.) Plaintiff 24 asserts that her past and future medical expenses likely exceed $8,400,000. (ECF 180-1, at 25 8.) She also seeks non-economic damages of an additional $16,800,000, exposing 26 27 28 1 defendants to a total potential liability at trial of $25,200,000. (Id. at 9.)The Court approved 2 a settlement between County Defendants and Plaintiff that provided for a payment of $9.5 3 million to Garot’s conservators. (ECF 225). 4 Plaintiffs Thomas Rainey and Judy Rainey, in their capacities as conservators for 5 Colleen Garot, have now reached a settlement agreement with Defendant Dr. Tran that 6 provides that Dr. Tran will pay $775,379.96, the remainder of Dr. Tran’s insurance policy 7 limits, as consideration for a full release of claims. (Mot. at 8). Upon approval of the 8 settlement, all non-contractual crossclaims for indemnity or contribution that the other 9 parties may seek to bring against Dr. Tran will be barred. (Id.) Plaintiff and Dr. Tran now 10 seek a good faith determination under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 11 877.6 as to this settlement. County of San Diego and Liberty Defendants oppose the 12 motion. (ECF 245, 246.) 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Under California law, “[w]here a release . . . is given in good faith before . . . 15 judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, 16 or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights,” the release 17 shall “reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release” and 18 “discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other 19 parties.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877(a) & (b). A defendant may secure a determination that 20 its settlement was reached in good faith by giving “notice of settlement to all parties and 21 to the court, together with an application for determination of good faith settlement.” Cal. 22 Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(a)(2). Non-settling parties are then given an opportunity to contest 23 the good faith of the settlement. Id. If a court determines the settlement was entered in good 24 faith, “any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor” is barred from “any further claims against 25 the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or 26 comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” Cal. Civ. 27 Proc. Code § 877.6(c). Federal courts hearing state-law claims based on supplemental 28 jurisdiction apply sections 877 and 877.6, as substantive California law, to determinations 1 of good faith settlement. Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int’l LLC, 632 F.3d 2 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 The court has broad discretion in deciding whether a settlement was made in good 4 faith in the context of section 877.6. Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 194 Cal. App. 5 4th 939, 957 (2011). In making its determination, a court considers the factors set out in 6 Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, 38 Cal. 3d 488 (1985), which include: 7 (1) “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ potential recovery and the settlor’s proportionate 8 liability”; (2) “the amount paid in settlement”; (3) “the allocation of settlement proceeds 9 among plaintiffs”; (4) “a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he 10 would if he were found liable after a trial”; (5) “the financial conditions and insurance 11 policy limits of settling defendants”; and (6) any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious 12 conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants.” Id. at 499 (“Tech-Bilt 13 Factors”). 14 The court must base its determination on the information available at the time of 15 settlement. Id. Once the settling defendant has made a showing of the settlement, the 16 burden of proof shifts to the party asserting a lack of good faith. City of Grand Terrace v. 17 Super. Ct., 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261 (1987); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(d). 18 That party must show “that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these 19 factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 20 3d at 499–500. The policy goals of section 877.6 “include both the encouragement of 21 settlements and the equitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors.” Id. at 498– 22 99. Yet these goals are often in “inherent tension,” and the court’s determination of good 23 faith “plays a key role in harmonizing” these dual objectives. Bay Development Ltd. v. 24 Super. Ct., 50 Cal. 3d 1012, 1018–19 (1990). 25 Under current Ninth Circuit law, there is no federal right of indemnification or 26 contribution on a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hoa v. Riley, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 27 1145–46 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases). Nor does 42 U.S.C. § 1988 permit importing 28 rights of contribution or indemnification on a § 1983 claim from state law. Id. at 1147–48. 1 Therefore, when a court is assessing the reasonableness of a settlement that embraces both 2 state-law negligence claims and § 1983 claims, it limits its analysis of potential 3 contribution to the state-law claims. See, e.g., Frary v. Cnty. of Marin, No. 12-CV-03928- 4 MEJ, 2015 WL 3776394, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2015) (confining Tech-Bilt analysis to 5 potential liability under negligence claims and excluding claims arising under § 1983). 6 Defendant Dr. Tran contends he has entered the settlement with Plaintiff in good 7 faith, the settlement agreement is fair and reasonable, and a good faith settlement 8 determination by the Court will bar all current and future cross-complaints against Dr. Tran 9 for implied indemnity, partial indemnity, equitable indemnity, or declaratory relief based 10 on principles of comparative fault. (Mot. at 2). 11 The opposing Defendants argue that a manifest injustice would result if the Court 12 granted Dr. Tran’s Motion and extinguished the Defendants’ equitable indemnity rights 13 against Dr. Tran. (County Oppo. at 2; Liberty Oppo. at 2). Defendants argue that the Motion 14 should be denied because (1) Dr. Tran failed to timely file and serve his moving papers 15 within 28 days of the scheduled hearing date; (2) the settlement amount is far outside the 16 ballpark of his potential liability; and (3) Dr. Tran has failed to provide evidence of his 17 financial condition and insurance policy limits to show his inability to pay a larger amount 18 of his share of liability. (County Oppo. at 2, 5-6; Liberty Oppo. at 3, 7). 19 A. Timeliness 20 The Liberty and County Defendants contend that Defendant Tran’s Motion should 21 be stricken for failure to comply with Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(1) because it was filed on 22 November 15, 2023, two days after the required filing date. Dr. Tran counters that the 23 alleged delay did not result in any prejudice and should therefore not preclude 24 determination of good faith settlement. The Court agrees. Under Rule 7.1(e)(1), a party 25 filing a motion, application or notice must file it a minimum of “twenty-eight (28) days 26 prior to which the matter is noticed.” Civ. L. Rule 7.1(e)(1). Here, Dr. Tran noticed his 27 motion for December 11, 2023. Twenty-eight days prior to that date would have been 28 November 13, 2023, but Dr. Tran submitted his motion on November 15, 2023. 1 The Court finds no prejudice to the opposing parties. County and Liberty Defendants 2 became aware of the proposed settlement on October 23, 2023, when the parties were 3 advised during a telephonic status conference of the settlement. Moreover, the opposing 4 Defendants timely filed robust oppositions to Dr. Tran’s motion. For these reasons, the 5 Court denies County and Liberty Defendants’ request to strike the Motion. 6 B. Approximation of Plaintiff’s Potential Recovery and Settling Defendants’ 7 Proportionate Liability 8 The court must consider the amount to be paid to plaintiff in relation to the settling 9 parties’ approximate proportionate liability under the first, second, and fourth Tech-Bilt 10 factors. To meet the standard of good faith, the settlement amount must be “within the 11 reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of comparative liability for 12 the plaintiff’s injuries.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499. “California Civil Code section 13 1431.2(a) provides that liability for economic damages is joint and several, but liability for 14 noneconomic damages is apportioned according to the principles of comparative fault.” 15 C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). California courts have 16 interpreted California Civil Code section 1431.2 as limiting California Code of Civil 17 Procedure section 877 to economic damages only. See Greathouse v. Amcord, Inc., 35 18 Cal.App.4th 831, 838 (1995) A court is to determine whether the “settlement is grossly 19 disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the 20 settlor's liability to be.” City of Grand Terrace., 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1262. 21 The amount a plaintiff claims as damages is “not determinative in finding good 22 faith.” West v. Super. Ct., 27 Cal. App. 4th 1625, 1636 (1994). Instead, the court makes a 23 “‘rough approximation’ of what plaintiff would actually recover.” Id. “[A] ‘good faith’ 24 settlement does not call for perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability.” N. 25 Cnty. Contractor's Ass'n v. Touchstone Ins. Servs., 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1090 (1994) 26 (citation omitted). The settlement amount need only be “in the ballpark” of the settling 27 party’s proportionate share of liability. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499. 28 // 1 1. Approximation of Plaintiff’s Potential Recovery 2 The only cause of action at issue here is the professional negligence of the medical 3 providers. As previously determined by this Court, Plaintiffs’ total potential recovery on 4 the professional negligence claim is reasonably estimated at a minimum of $8,650,000 5 ($8,400,000 in economic damages plus $250,000 in non-economic damages under MICRA 6 after judgement). (See Order Good Faith Settlement Determination at 7 (ECF No. 225).) 7 2. Settling Defendants’ Proportionate Liability to Plaintiff 8 In addition to a settling defendant’s liability to the plaintiff, “[p]otential liability for 9 indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in 10 determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.” TSI Seismic Tenant 11 Space, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 149 Cal. App. 4th 159, 166 (2007). A settling defendant must 12 show, “through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within 13 the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.” Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur 14 Young & Co., 38 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1351 (1995). 15 Here, the opposing Defendants submitted numerous deposition transcript excerpts 16 that generally support a greater relative culpability on the part of Dr. Tran than the Liberty 17 or County Defendants. For instance, Dr. Tran saw Garot on her second day in jail after the 18 fall which caused her to lose consciousness. (Inman Dec., Ex. A (Dr. Tran Depo.) at 45:8- 19 11 (ECF Nos. 245, 245-1).) According to his testimony, Dr. Tran noted that Garot had a 20 bump on the back of her head from a recent fall “and that she had lost consciousness.” (Id. 21 at 39:13-17). Dr. Tran testified that he observed Garot’s multiple facial bruises and “left 22 perioribital swelling.” (Id. at 49:6-9). In his report, Dr. Tran reported that Garot “had a 23 chronic, unsteady gait and tremors and that her condition can be exacerbated, worsened by 24 the alcohol/drug withdrawal and she admitted to recently using.” (Id. at 55: 21-24). Dr. 25 Tran concluded that Garot “had multiple falls, she did have some injuries and, my opinion, 26 clinical opinion, was that these injuries were arrived from either drug or alcohol abuse and 27 also possibly withdrawal.” (Id. at 49:17-21). Yet Dr. Tran stated he did not order alcohol 28 withdrawal protocols. (Id. at 59:13-15). Despite having the authority to send Garot to the 1 ER, or order further testing, including a CT scan or MRI, Dr. Tran instead ordered that the 2 nurses “continue to monitor” Garot. (Id. at 61: 8-25; 62: 1-7). 3 According to Dr. Tran’s expert, Dr. Martin H. Weiss, “no act or omission by [Dr. 4 Tran] caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries” and that Garot did not have a 5 subdural hematoma at the time of Dr. Tran’s visit because she did not exhibit an altered 6 mental state or decreased level of consciousness. (Tran Oppo., Eduardo Gonzalez Dec. Ex. 7 B at ¶ 39(b) (ECF No. 251-1).) In addition, Dr. Tran argues that other Defendants, 8 including Liberty Defendant’s expert Richard Hayward, Ph.D. evaluated Ms. Garot after 9 Dr. Tran saw her, and that none of them noted any indications that Ms. Garot required an 10 urgent medical or neurological evaluation. (Reply at 4-5). 11 Opposing Defendants have submitted sufficient evidence from Dr. Tran’s deposition 12 testimony to support the conclusion that Dr. Tran’s proposed settlement amount of $775, 13 379.96 is not within a reasonable range considering his projected proportional liability. 14 City of Grand Terrace, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1261. Moreover, Dr. Tran has not provided 15 “substantial evidence that the subject settlement is in the ballpark.” Mattco Forge, 38 Cal. 16 App. 4th at 1351. Plaintiffs’ total potential recovery on the professional negligence claim is 17 reasonably estimated at a minimum of $8,650,000 yet the value of Dr. Tran’s proposed 18 settlement is $775,379. Considering Dr. Tran’s training as a medical professional and his 19 evaluation of Ms. Garot after her fall, this settlement appears to be “grossly 20 disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate 21 the settling defendant’s liability to be.” Torres v. Union Pacifica R.R. Co., 157 Cal.App.3d 22 499, 509 (1984). Dr. Tran argues without support that because the proffered settlement 23 amount constitutes the extent of his remaining insurance policy limits, it is therefore 24 sufficient. This is not the test. Instead, opposing Defendants have carried their burden to 25 show that that the settlement is “out of the ballpark” in relation to the Tech-Bilt factors and 26 it is therefore inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 27 3d at 499–500. For these reasons, the first, second, and fourth Tech-Bilt factors do not favor 28 a good faith determination. 1 3. Financial Condition and Insurance Policy Limits of Settling Defendants 2 One of the factors under Tech-Bilt is the settlor’s financial condition and insurance 3 policy limits. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500. A court may find a lack of good faith when 4 the settling defendant’s insurance policy limits far exceed the settlement amount. See, e.g., 5 Long Beach Mem’l Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 874–75 (2009). This factor is meaningful only 6 when the amount offered in settlement was not proportional to the defendant’s projected 7 liability, or when there is other evidence of bad faith. See Long Beach Mem’l, 172 Cal. 8 App. 4th at 873–75 (finding initially that the settlement amount was not proportional and 9 only then proceeding to label the proposed payout of ten percent of policy limits as “not 10 defensible”); Mattco Forge, Inc. 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1352–53 (finding first “no substantial 11 evidence the subject settlement is in the ballpark” and only then noting that the proposed 12 payment “represented a mere 14 percent of the available policy limits”). 13 Liberty and County Defendants argue that Dr. Tran has not provided evidence that 14 this is the only insurance policy he has that potentially applies to this matter, nor has he 15 provided evidence about his financial condition and his ability to pay. In response, Dr. Tran 16 asserts that the $775,379 amount constitutes his full remaining insurance policy limits. 17 Dr. Tran has not provided the Court with sufficient evidence of his financial 18 condition or insurance policy limits for the Court to determine whether the settlement was 19 made in good faith. Instead of providing the Court with this information, Dr. Tran 20 submitted the entirety of his Doctors Professional Liability Insurance Company, Inc. policy 21 without pointing to relevant portions of the policy or noting whether it was the only policy 22 Dr. Tran carried. Although this factor is not determinative of a good faith finding, it is of 23 particular importance in light the determination above that the proffered $775,379 24 settlement is not within the ballpark of Dr. Tran’s potential liability. See Long Beach 25 Mem’l, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 873–75. The Court is unable to weigh this factor in light of 26 the dearth of evidence provided by Dr. Tran, therefore the factor weighs against granting 27 the good faith determination. 28 // l 4. Other Tech-Bilt Factors 2 Finally, “the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs” is irrelevant here 3 || since there is only a single plaintiff. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499. And no party has alleged 4 ||or presented any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the 5 ||interests of non-settling defendants.” /d. The Court therefore finds no grounds for 6 || concluding that these factors weigh against a finding of good faith. 7 Hit, CONCLUSION AND ORDER 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion for Good Faith Settlement 9 || Determination without prejudice and with leave to amend. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED 11 Dated: January 2, 2024 fee Soop 13 H . James Lorenz, 4 United States District Judge

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