Garfielde v. United States

93 U.S. 242, 23 L. Ed. 779, 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1377
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 18, 1876
Docket937
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 93 U.S. 242 (Garfielde v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garfielde v. United States, 93 U.S. 242, 23 L. Ed. 779, 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1377 (1876).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Hunt

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Court of Claims holds that the proposal on’ the part of Garfielde, and the acceptance of the proposal by the department, created ^a contract of the same force and effect as if a formal contract had been written out and signed by the parties. Many authorities are cited to sustain'the proposition. We believe it to bé sound, and that it should be so held in the -present' case.

That court held that the .contract alleged by the petitioner was invalid,- for’, the reason that the Postmaster-General exceeded his authority in making it without the previous publication required by the aet of Congress of. June 8, 1872. 17 Stat. 318, sect, - 243. ..

Th,at act required, “that, before making any contract for carrying' the mail, . .-. the Postmaster-General shall give public notice . . . such notice’ shall describe the route, the. time at which the mail is to be made up, the timé at which it is to be delivered, and the. frequency of the service.”

Among the instructions issued by the authority and official •sanction of. the Postmaster-General are the following, which -were referred to and proved or admitted - by the parties at the trial: —

“Special Notice. — All instructions and regulations promulgated by the Postmaster-General, conformably to law, for the guidance of persons employed by the department, are entitled to the same respect and obedience as acts of Congress. . . .
• “ Sect. 268. The Postmaster-General’ may order an .increase or extension of service on a route, by allowing therefor a pro rata increase on the contract pay. He may change schedules of departures and arrivals in all cases, and particularly to make them .conform to connections with railroads, without increase.of pay, provided the running-time be not abridged. He may also order 'an increase of speed, allowing, within the restrictions of the law, a pro rata .increase of pay for the additional stock or carriers, if any. The contractor may, however, in casemf increase of speed, relin *245 quish. the contract, by giving prompt notice to the department that he prefers doing to carrying the order into effect. The Postmaster-General may also discontinue or curtail the service, in whole or in part, in order to place on the route a greater degree of'service, or whenever the public interests, in his judgment, shall require such discontinuance or curtailment fov any other cause; he allowing, as a full indemnity to the contractor, one month’s extra pay on the amount of service dispensed with, and a pro rata compensation for the amount of service retained and continued.”
“ Sect. 267. Bidders should first propose for service strictly according to the advertisement, and then, if they desire, separately for different service; and, if the regular bid be the lowest offered for the advertised .service, the other proposition may be considered.”
“Sect. 275. The law provides that contracts for the transportation of the mail shall be awarded to 'the lowest bidder tendering sufficient guaranties for faithful performance, without other reference to the mode of such transportation than may be necessary to provide for the due celerity, certainty, and security thereof.”

The notice in the present case called for proposals for carrying the mails on route No. 43,182, from Portland, Oregon, to Sitka, Alaska. The distance was stated to be fourteen hundred miles. The duty was required to be performed each way once in each month, in safe alrd suitable steamboats, by the way of Port Townsend and San Juan. The time of departure and arrival at each terminus was specified, and ten days was allowed for the passage. It was then added, “ Proposals invited to begin at Port Townsend (W. T.), five hundred miles less.”

We are of the opinion that this was a sufficient notice, under sect. 243, supra, that proposals were desired for carrying the mail from Port Townsend to Sitka. The rigorous and strained construction which would defeat it, would defeat the reasonable intent of the statute. Each terminus was given, — to; wit, Port Townsend and Sitka, — as was the route to be followed, — to wit, by way of San Juan, —and the length of time to be occupied, — to wit, ten days for the whole distance, of which this distance bore the proportion of nine to fourteen, — and the time of making up and delivery, upon the same principle. The steamer should leave Portland on the first day of every month; of the ten days allowed for the passage to Sitka,, five-fourteenths would be *246 occupied in reaching Port Townsend, and nine-fourteenths would be allowed for the residue. The whole time and the whole number' of miles being given, it was a simple arithmetical question of when the steamer would leave Port Townsend, and when, on it's return, it would reach that port.

The object of the . statute was 'to secure notice of the intended post-routes, of the service required, and the manner of its performance, that bidders might compete, that favoritism should be prevented, that efficiency and economy in the service should be obtained. It was not required that papers of this character should be drawn,- as if they were subject to the criticism or dissection of a demurrer' in a court' of law.

Accordingly, it appears that this notice for the abridged distance is in conformity to-the usages of the Post-Office Department for many years past, proof having been made of nine hundred similar advertisements published by the Postmaster-General. Long practice and constant usage favor the-construction we have given to these proposals. .

Great aid is also given by the two hundred and sixty-third regulation, above- recited. It is there-provided, that the Postmaster-General may, in his discretion, change the schedule of departures and arrivals, without increase of pay,, if the running time be not abridgéd. Under this authority, he had the power to name the precise days of the month on which the steamer of Garfielde, the claimant, should leave-Port Townsend or Sitka, or both of these places. The supposed defects in the advertisement are capable of a remedy, if needed, under this- authority.

The damages are regulated by the same section. The claimant states, in his proposal, that he has full knowledge of the laws and- regulations of the department on the subject of mail transportation. He no doubt knew that this regulation provided that the Postmaster-General could discontinue entirely the service for which he proposed, whenever in his judgment the public interests required it,- and that for such discontinuance. or . month’s pay was to be deemed a full indemnity to the contractor. ’ There was reserved to. the Postmaster-General the power to annul the contract when his judgment advised that it should be done, and the compensation to the - contractor was specified., An indemnity. agreed upon- as the amount to be *247 paid for cancelling a contract, must, we think, afford the measure of damages for illegally refusing to award it.

Judgment reversed, and cause remitted,

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Bluebook (online)
93 U.S. 242, 23 L. Ed. 779, 1876 U.S. LEXIS 1377, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garfielde-v-united-states-scotus-1876.