UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILMER GARCIA RAMIREZ, et al., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 18-00508 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 462, 463 : U.S. IMMIGRATION AND : CUTSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al., : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2021, this Court entered a permanent injunction requiring Defendants—namely, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the Acting Director of ICE, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”), and the Secretary of Homeland Security—to comply with their
obligations under 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). That provision requires ICE to consider placing
former unaccompanied alien children transferred to its custody “in the least restrictive setting
available,” after assessing whether they pose a danger to themselves, a danger to the community,
or a risk of flight, and to make them eligible for alternatives to detention. The injunction
followed a four-week bench trial, after which the Court concluded that Defendants had violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by failing to follow the procedures required by
§ 1232(c)(2)(B) and by refusing to take actions the statute mandates.
Since December 2025, the Court has twice held that Defendants violated both the
permanent injunction and subsequent Court orders by detaining former unaccompanied alien
children without a material change in circumstances demonstrating that they posed a flight risk or a danger to themselves or the community. Now, Plaintiffs move to enforce the Court’s latest
order, which it issued in June 2026. This is the third enforcement motion Plaintiffs have filed in
the span of months, and each has been prompted by Defendants’ continued noncompliance. As
before, the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to comply with the Court’s orders. For
the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
This matter arises from the Court’s ongoing supervision and enforcement of its prior
orders governing the detention and release of former unaccompanied children (“age-outs”) under
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). This case has a complex factual and procedural history that has been
recounted in several of this Court’s prior opinions in this matter. See, e.g., Garcia Ramirez v.
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 812 F. Supp. 3d 86, 90 (D.D.C. 2025), opinion clarified, No. CV
18-508 (RC), 2026 WL 1557609 (D.D.C. June 2, 2026). The Court therefore presumes
familiarity with those prior opinions and recounts here only the facts, allegations, and procedural
history relevant to the present motion.
A. Factual Background
On June 2, 2026, this Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion to clarify and enforce the
Court’s December 2025 Order. See Order Granting in Part & Den. in Part Pls.’ Mots. Clarify &
Enforce (“June 2026 Order”), ECF No. 455. Among other things, the Court clarified that
“materially changed circumstances regarding the statutory risk factors under § 1232(c)(2)(B)” as
referenced in the Court’s December 2025 Order “turns on whether an age-out’s circumstances
have materially changed such that the age-out now presents a danger to themselves, a danger to
the community, or a risk of flight.” Id. at 1. The Court further clarified that Defendants must
“produce . . . on an ongoing basis concerning any age-outs who have been rearrested and
2 detained since July 2025 . . . all records Defendants relied upon to justify the age-out’s rearrest
and detention . . . .” Id. at 2.
Pursuant to the June 2026 Order, Defendants produced the records upon which they
relied to rearrest and detain certain age-outs, including H.M.A. and Y.Z.P. Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot.
Enforce Order (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 1–2, ECF No. 464. Plaintiffs contend that those records
indicate that Defendants rearrested and detained H.M.A. and Y.Z.P. without a material change in
circumstances establishing that either individual posed a danger to the community or a risk of
flight. Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce Order (“Pls.’ Mot. Enforce”) at 1, ECF No. 462. As of July 2026,
both H.M.A. and Y.Z.P. have remained detained for nearly seven months.
1. H.M.A.
On December 4, 2025, Defendants rearrested H.M.A. at the Detroit Immigration Court
after he appeared for his removal hearing. Pls.’ Mot. Enforce Ex. D, Mathur Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No.
462-3. According to the records Defendants produced, ICE rearrested H.M.A. because he failed
to report for an ICE check-in on October 14, 2024. Pls.’ Mot. to Clarify & Enforce Order (“Pls.’
Mot. Clarify & Enforce”) Ex. A, ECF No. 443-3. Before missing that check-in, however, H.M.A.
had attended all prior ICE check-ins. See Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. E at 2, ECF No. 463-5. Agency
records also indicate that ICE requested that H.M.A. surrender his passport or provide proof that
he had applied to obtain one, which Defendants assert he failed to do. Id. Although agency
records identify H.M.A.’s missed check-in as the basis for his rearrest and detention, Defendants
now contend that his failure to obtain a passport also justified his detention. See Defs.’ Opp’n
Ex. A, Griffin Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 464-1.
3 2. Y.Z.P.
On December 13, 2025, Defendants re-arrested and detained Y.Z.P. after he pleaded
guilty in the Court of Montgomery County, Texas, to the misdemeanor offense of “collision
involving damage to vehicle.” See Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. A at 5, ECF No. 463-2. In November
2025, Y.Z.P. was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in damage to another vehicle.
Id. at 9. According to the county, Y.Z.P. did not immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the
accident (or as close as possible to the scene), and the damage to all vehicles amounted to $200
or more. Id. The offense carried a punishment of “a fine not to exceed $2000 and/or confinement
in jail not to exceed 180 days.” Id. At a probable cause hearing, a local judge set Y.Z.P.’s bail at
$5,000, citing Y.Z.P.’s criminal history, or rather, the lack thereof.1 Id. at 11. After pleading
guilty, Y.Z.P. received a sentence of “Confinement in Lieu of Payment” for time served of 15
days, which was credited toward any “incarceration, fines, and costs.” Id. at 2–3.
Defendants’ records identify Y.Z.P.’s misdemeanor conviction as the basis for his
rearrest and detention. See Pls.’ Mot. Clarify & Enforce Ex. A. Now, Defendants also assert that
Y.Z.P. posed a risk of flight based on an alleged missed ICE check-in. See Pls.’ Mot. Enforce Ex.
D, Mathur Decl. ¶ 10.
B. Procedural Background
Shortly after the Court issued its June 2026 Order, Plaintiffs filed the present motion to
enforce, contending that Defendants’ newly-produced records demonstrate that Defendants re-
arrested and detained H.M.A. and Y.Z.P. without a material change in circumstances as required
by the Court’s prior orders. See Pls.’ Mot. Enforce. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs
1 Defendants’ records indicate that besides the misdemeanor offense of “collision involving damage to vehicle,” Y.Z.P. has no other criminal history. See Pls. Mot. Seal Ex. C. at 6, ECF No. 463-3.
4 submitted a declaration from Y.Z.P. describing the circumstances underlying his misdemeanor
conviction and his community ties.2 See Pls.’ Mot. Enforce, Ex. A, Y.Z.P. Decl., ECF No. 463-1.
Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the challenged detention determinations were
supported by materially changed circumstances bearing on the statutory risk factors under 8
U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B), including risk of flight and danger to the community. Defs.’ Opp’n at 1.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Enforce
“District courts have the authority to enforce the terms of their mandates.” Flaherty v.
Pritzker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2014). That authority is grounded in “the interest of the
judicial branch in seeing that an unambiguous mandate is not blatantly disregarded by parties to
a court proceeding.” Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 733 F.2d 920, 922
(D.C. Cir. 1984). A court “should grant a motion to enforce if a ‘prevailing plaintiff
demonstrates that a defendant has not complied with a judgment entered against it.’” Sierra Club
v. McCarthy, 61 F. Supp. 3d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Heartland Hosp. v. Thompson, 328
F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C 2004)). In determining compliance with an order, the Court is guided
not only by the text of that order but also by its related opinions. See City of Cleveland v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 561 F.2d 344, 346–47 (D.C. Cir. 1977). That said, “[s]uccess on a motion to
enforce a judgment gets a plaintiff only ‘the relief to which [the plaintiff] is entitled under [its]
original action and the judgment entered therein.’” Heartland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 415
F.3d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Watkins v.
Washington, 511 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
2 Pursuant to the protective order governing this case, ECF No. 63, Plaintiffs seek leave to file under seal exhibits in support of their Motion to Enforce, see Pls.’ Mot. Seal, ECF No. 463. The Court grants such leave.
5 B. APA
Under the APA, the reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if an
agency “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants improperly re-arrested and detained H.M.A. and
Y.Z.P. without a material change in circumstances demonstrating that either individual posed a
risk of flight or a danger to themselves or the community. The Court addresses each detention
determination in turn.
A. H.M.A.
Plaintiffs first challenge Defendants’ determination that H.M.A. posed a risk of flight.
See Pls.’ Mot. Enforce at 6–7. Defendants initially relied on H.M.A.’s failure to report for an ICE
check-in. Pls.’ Mot. Clarify & Enforce Ex. A. Now, Defendants additionally contend that
H.M.A.’s failure to obtain a passport justified his detention. Defs.’ Opp’n at 4–5. Neither
rationale supports Defendants’ detention determination, however.
a. Missed Check-in
Defendants rely on H.M.A.’s missed ICE check-in as evidence that he posed a risk of
flight. But that conclusion overlooks the most probative indicator of flight risk—whether the
6 noncitizen actually appears for immigration proceedings. Courts have routinely held that a
noncitizen’s attendance at immigration proceedings demonstrates a lack of flight risk. See, e.g.,
De La Rosa v. Warden of Fla. Soft Side S. Det. Ctr., No. 2:26-CV-504-SPC-NPM, 2026 WL
685621, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2026) (“[B]y attending his removal hearing,” “[noncitizen]
proved he is no flight risk”); Patel v. Tindall, 810 F. Supp. 3d 824, 834 (W.D. Ky. 2025) (“In
attending his IJ hearing and other proceedings, he is demonstrating that he is not a flight risk.”).
Likewise, the BIA recognizes that “the alien’s record of appearance in court” is a factor to
consider when determining whether a noncitizen is likely to abscond. See In Re Guerra, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). This principle is also reflected in DHS regulations authorizing
immigration authorities to release a noncitizen on their own recognizance. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1236.1(c)(8) (requiring that a noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer” that
they are “likely to appear for any future proceeding”).
Yet nothing in the record indicates that Defendants considered H.M.A.’s actual history of
appearance in determining that he posed a flight risk. Although H.M.A. missed an ICE check-in,
he later appeared for his removal hearing. Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. E at 3. That appearance
undermines any inference that H.M.A. was likely to abscond or fail to appear for future
proceedings—the very purpose immigration detention is intended to serve. See Mohammed H. v.
Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining that immigration detention
serves “to [ensure] future appearances”) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)).
Although a missed check-in may constitute a technical violation of a noncitizen’s release
conditions, courts have recognized that such violations do not, standing alone, establish that
detention is necessary. See J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2025)
(collecting cases). Rather, the government must consider whether the alleged violation bears on
7 the noncitizen’s likelihood of appearing for future proceedings. See Herman v. DHS, No. 5:26-
CV-01995-MBK, 2026 WL 1723960, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2026) (“[S]upervision
conditions are not intended to be a contest to determine whether a person can comply. Rather,
any violations must be evaluated by reference to the purpose of supervision, namely, ensuring
that the person is likely to appear for hearings or removal.”).
Here, the record does not reflect that Defendants undertook that analysis. Instead,
Defendants appear to have treated H.M.A.’s missed check-in as dispositive while disregarding
evidence that he complied with all prior check-ins and, most significantly, appeared for his
removal hearing after the missed appointment. See Pls.’ Mot. Clarify & Enforce Ex. A; cf.
Herman, 2026 WL 1723960, at *10 (holding that immigration judge abused its discretion in
finding a noncitizen to be a flight risk; alleged monitoring device violations were not probative
of flight risk where such violations were followed by the noncitizen’s check-in appearance).
Because Defendants failed to consider evidence directly bearing on the likelihood that H.M.A.
would appear for future proceedings, they failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.
Their decision to re-arrest and detain H.M.A. was therefore arbitrary and capricious. See Int’l
Dark-Sky Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 106 F.4th 1206, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. at 43).
b. Passport
Defendants’ alternative rationale fares no better. Relying on the declaration of ICE’s
Acting Chief of the Juvenile and Family Management Division, Defendants now contend that
H.M.A.’s failure to obtain a passport independently demonstrated that he posed a flight risk.
Defs.’ Opp’n Ex. A, Griffin Decl. ¶ 12.
8 That rationale, however, was not one Defendants invoked when they re-arrested and
detained H.M.A. See Pls.’ Mot. Clarify & Enforce Ex. A. The record identifies only H.M.A.’s
missed ICE check-in as the basis for detention. Id. Defendants now raise the passport issue seven
months later in response to Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 7–8. And “[i]t is a
‘foundational principle of administrative law’ that judicial review of agency action is limited to
‘the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of California, 591 U.S. 1, 20 (2020) (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.
743, 758 (2015)). ICE’s belated justification “can be viewed only as [an] impermissible post hoc
rationalization[]” and is therefore “not properly before [the Court].” Id. at 22; see also Citizens to
Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (rejecting “litigation affidavits”
from agency officials as “merely ‘post hoc’ rationalizations”); Am. Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981) (“[T]he post hoc rationalizations of the agency . . . cannot
serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action.”).
Even if the Court were to consider this belated explanation, it still does not establish that
H.M.A. posed a flight risk. Defendants assert that H.M.A.’s conditions of release required him to
obtain a passport and that his failure to do so justified his re-arrest.3 Defs.’ Opp’n at 7–8; see also
Defs.’ Opp’n Ex. A, Griffin Decl. ¶ 10. But, as explained above, a technical violation of release
conditions is insufficient, standing alone, to establish that a noncitizen poses a flight risk. See
J.A.E.M., 812 F. Supp. 3d at 1068; Herman, 2026 WL 1723960, at *10. Defendants therefore
3 Notably, Defendants have not provided Plaintiffs with a copy of any such conditions of release, see Pls. Mot. Enforce Ex. D, Mathur Decl. ¶ 11, despite purportedly relying on such conditions to detain H.M.V. and despite this Court requiring Defendants to produce to Plaintiffs all records upon which it relied to re-arrest and detain age-outs, pursuant to the Court’s prior June 2026 Order.
9 must explain why H.M.A.’s failure to obtain a passport demonstrates that he was unlikely to
appear for future proceedings. They do not.
Instead, ICE states only that it “requires passports for aliens to both ensure proper
identification and biometrics information and for use in the event removal becomes necessary.”
Defs.’ Opp’n Ex. A, Griffin Decl. ¶ 12. That explanation identifies the administrative and
logistical reasons ICE prefers noncitizens to possess passports. It does not, however, explain why
a noncitizen’s failure to obtain a passport bears on the likelihood that the individual will appear
for future proceedings. Nor do Defendants identify any authority recognizing the absence of a
foreign passport as an indicator of flight risk. To the contrary, the factors traditionally considered
in assessing flight risk focus on matters such as appearance history, community ties, and
compliance with court proceedings—not possession of a foreign passport. See, e.g., In Re
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). Indeed, the BIA has found a noncitizen to present a
flight risk even where the individual had provided a foreign passport, underscoring that passport
possession is not itself determinative. See Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 806 (BIA
2020).
Nor is any inference of flight risk apparent here. ICE was already in possession of
H.M.A.’s birth certificate, see Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. E, and Defendants identify no way in which
the lack of a passport impeded their ability to identify H.M.A. Indeed, the absence of a passport
or travel documents may undermine, rather than support, an inference of flight risk because it
limits a noncitizen’s ability to travel. See Parlak v. Baker, 374 F. Supp. 2d 551, 561 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (finding no flight risk where, among other things, the noncitizen was “essentially state-
less,” lacked a passport or travel documents, and thus had no place to go), vacated on other
grounds, appeal dismissed sub nom. Parlak v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 05-2003, 2006
10 WL 3634385 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2006). Accordingly, even if the Court were to consider
Defendants’ post hoc passport rationale, it would not support the conclusion that H.M.A. posed a
flight risk.
B. Y.Z.P.
Plaintiffs next challenge Defendants’ determination that Y.Z.P.’s circumstances
materially changed so as to justify his re-arrest and continued detention. Pls.’ Mot. Enforce at 7–
8. Defendants rely on Y.Z.P.’s misdemeanor conviction, asserting that it demonstrates he poses a
danger to the community. Defs.’ Opp’n at 6–7. Defendants also contend that Y.Z.P.’s alleged
failure to attend an ICE check-in establishes that he poses a risk of flight. Id. at 7–8. These
arguments, however, are unavailing.
a. Risk of Danger to the Community
Defendants’ reliance on Y.Z.P.’s misdemeanor conviction suffers from two related
defects. First, the record does not reflect that Defendants considered the facts necessary to
determine whether the conviction demonstrated that Y.Z.P. posed a danger to the community.
Criminal history, standing alone, does not necessarily establish that a noncitizen poses such a
danger. Calderon-Rodriguez v. Wilcox, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033 (W.D. Wash. 2019). Rather,
when determining whether a noncitizen poses a danger to the community, a noncitizen’s
“criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity,
and the seriousness of the offenses” must be considered. In Re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40.
This principle is also reflected in DHS regulations concerning the detention of noncitizens
ordered removed, which provide that “[t]he detainee’s criminal conduct and criminal
convictions, including consideration of the nature and severity of the alien’s convictions,
sentences imposed and time actually served, probation and criminal parole history, evidence of
11 recidivism, and other criminal history” is a “factor[] [that] should be weighed in considering
whether to recommend further detention or release of a detainee.” See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
Defendants should have thus considered whether the circumstances surrounding Y.Z.P.’s
offense demonstrated a material change in his risk of danger. See Int’l Ladies’ Garment
Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[An] agency must examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” (citation modified)). But the record
does not reflect that Defendants conducted any such analysis at the time of Y.Z.P.’s re-arrest and
detention. Instead, it appears Defendants relied on the mere existence of a misdemeanor
conviction without considering the underlying circumstances of the offense, including its nature,
severity, or whether it demonstrated any ongoing danger to the community. See Pls.’ Mot.
Clarify & Enforce Ex. A.
Second, ICE now attempts to supply that missing analysis through a post hoc
rationalization. According to ICE, Y.Z.P.’s misdemeanor conviction demonstrated that he
“fail[ed] to take responsibility for his own actions, and a disregard for the law and for another
person’s property and safety.” Defs.’ Opp’n Ex. A, Griffin Decl. ¶ 16. But ICE advances this
explanation only in response to Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce, nearly seven months after Y.Z.P.’s
re-arrest and detention. A justification provided post hoc cannot sustain an agency’s action.
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419; Am. Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc., 452 U.S. at 539.
Regardless, it would not cure the deficiencies in Defendants’ decision-making. ICE did
not account for the relevant circumstances surrounding Y.Z.P.’s offense. ICE’s assertion that
Y.Z.P. failed to take responsibility ignores that he pleaded guilty to the offense and thereby
accepted responsibility. More fundamentally, the record does not reflect that Defendants
12 considered the underlying facts necessary to assess the severity of the offense. That omission is
significant because the Montgomery County court documents upon which Defendants relied
contain little factual detail regarding the circumstances of the offense. See Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. B.
Those documents identify only the existence of a misdemeanor conviction, but do not provide
the factual context necessary to evaluate the nature and severity of the conduct or determine
whether the offense reflected that Y.Z.P. posed a danger to the community.4 See id. at 2, 5, 9.
That context matters. An offense for “collision involving damage to a vehicle” may
encompass a broad range of conduct with materially different implications for dangerousness.5
For instance, a high-speed collision involving substantial damage followed by immediate flight
from the scene presents a markedly different assessment of dangerousness than an accident
involving relatively minor damage where an individual initially stopped, departed only after the
other driver failed to remain at the scene, and later cooperated fully with law enforcement.
Determining whether Y.Z.P.’s offense demonstrated dangerousness therefore required
Defendants to consider the underlying facts of the incident, not merely the fact of conviction.
The importance of that omission becomes apparent when considering the facts
Defendants failed to examine. In his declaration, Y.Z.P. provides those underlying facts, which
4 Those documents state only that Y.Z.P. was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in damage to another vehicle, Y.Z.P. did not immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident (or as close as possible to the scene), and the damage to all vehicles amounted to $200 or more. See Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. B at 2, 5, 9. 5 Tex. Transp. Code § 550.022(a) (collision involving damage to vehicle) requires a driver involved in a collision that causes only vehicle damage to: stop as close to the collision scene as possible, return to the scene if they did not stop, and remain at the scene until the drivers involved exchange contact and insurance information. The failure to do so constitutes a misdemeanor. § 550.022(c). If the collision results in vehicle damager greater than $200, the misdemeanor is characterized as a Class B misdemeanor. § 550.022(c)(2).
13 Defendants do not dispute.6 The declaration explains that Y.Z.P. initially stopped at the collision
scene but left only after the other driver failed to remain. See Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. A, Y.Z.P. Decl.
¶¶ 4–5. He further states that when officers later initiated a traffic stop, he immediately pulled
over, admitted his involvement in the accident, and complied with officers’ instructions. Id.
¶¶ 6–7. These facts bear directly on the nature and severity of the offense and, consequently,
whether it demonstrated danger to the community. Yet the record contains no indication that
Defendants sought out and considered such facts before determining that the misdemeanor
conviction warranted Y.Z.P.’s re-arrest and detention. See Pls. Mot. Clarify & Enforce Ex. A.
Defendants therefore failed to consider relevant evidence and important aspects of the
dangerousness inquiry, rendering their determination arbitrary and capricious. See Int’l Dark-Sky
Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1213.
6 Defendants do not dispute Y.Z.P.’s account of the circumstances underlying the misdemeanor offense. Instead, Defendants contend that the Court should not consider Y.Z.P.’s declaration because those facts were not before the agency when it decided to detain him. That those facts were not before the agency underscores the deficiency in Defendants’ decision- making. An agency’s failure “to consider evidence bearing on the issue before it constitutes arbitrary agency action within the meaning of § 706.” Butte Cnty., Cal. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[The agency’s] decision does not withstand review because the agency decisionmaker entirely ignored relevant evidence.”). Therefore, courts may consider extra-record evidence in order to determine whether the agency considered all of the relevant factors. James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 454 F. Supp. 3d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 2020). Here, Y.Z.P.’s declaration is offered only for that limited purpose. The Court does not rely on the declaration to substitute its judgment for the agency’s. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Env’tl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1981). By providing relevant context regarding the nature and severity of the offense, the declaration identifies the type of information Defendants failed to seek out for itself and consider in evaluating whether the offense reflected a danger to the community.
14 b. Risk of Flight
Defendants’ alternative rationale is equally unavailing. Defendants contend that Y.Z.P.’s
alleged failure to attend an ICE check-in demonstrates that he poses a risk of flight. See Defs.’
Opp’n 7–8. That rationale was not relied upon by Defendants when it re-arrested Y.Z.P. See Pls.’
Mot. Clarify & Enforce Ex. A. It therefore cannot properly serve as a basis for the agency’s
decision. Even if considered, it nevertheless fails.
In assessing flight risk, relevant considerations include not only an individual’s
appearance history, as explained above, but also factors such as a fixed address, length of
residence, and employment history. See Miri v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-00698-MEMF-MAR, 2026
WL 622302, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026). Those are precisely the types of considerations
Defendants failed to address. Y.Z.P. represents, and Defendants do not dispute, that before his
re-arrest he maintained steady employment, rented a room from a member of his church,
maintained a fixed residence, and regularly participated in his church community. See Pls.’ Mot.
Seal Ex. A, Y.Z.P. Decl. ¶¶ 10–11. The record also reflects that, before the alleged missed ICE
check-in, Y.Z.P. had appeared for all prior check-ins and reported changes to his contact
information. See Pls.’ Mot. Seal Ex. C at 3. Even if Y.Z.P. missed one scheduled check-in, that
fact must be evaluated alongside his prior compliance and substantial community ties, both of
which bear directly on the likelihood that he would appear for future proceedings.
Defendants likewise failed to account for Y.Z.P.’s Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, see
Pls. Mot. Seal Ex. C at 6, which affords him “significant benefits,” including a statutory path to
lawful permanent residency and, ultimately, United States citizenship, while also providing
protections against removal. See Walter A. v. Easterwood, No. 26-CV-1393 (SRN/LIB), 2026
WL 836428, at *20 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2026) (quoting Joshua M. v. Barr, 439 F. Supp. 3d 632,
15 657 (E.D. Va. 2020)). Those benefits diminish any incentive to abscond. See Matter of Andrade,
19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987) (stating that a noncitizen who is likely to be granted relief
has a greater motivation to appear for a deportation hearing than one who has less potential to
obtain relief).
Therefore, Defendants’ belated reliance on a missed ICE check-in does not establish that
Y.Z.P. posed a risk of flight. By failing to consider Y.Z.P.’s compliance history, community ties,
and significant incentive to appear for future proceedings, Defendants again failed to consider
relevant factors bearing on the flight risk inquiry. See Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union,
722 F.2d at 814. Defendants’ alternative rationale therefore cannot sustain the agency’s detention
determination. See Int’l Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1213.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce (ECF No. 462) is GRANTED,
and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal (ECF No. 463) is GRANTED.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: July 6, 2026 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge