Gant v. Industrial Commission

56 N.W.2d 525, 263 Wis. 64, 1953 Wisc. LEXIS 309
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 6, 1953
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 56 N.W.2d 525 (Gant v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gant v. Industrial Commission, 56 N.W.2d 525, 263 Wis. 64, 1953 Wisc. LEXIS 309 (Wis. 1953).

Opinions

[67]*67Currie, J.

The farms of Gant and of Oren Hendrickson were four miles apart. However, Gant owned a separate 71-acre tract which was only about a half mile distant from the Hendrickson farm, which tract Mr. Hendrickson and his sons, Robert and David, rented from Gant on shares for the 1948 season to be planted in corn and oats. Gant under the leasing arrangement was to supply half the fertilizer and half the seed, but no labor. Without the Hendricksons asking him to do so, Gant came over during May with his own son and two tractors and the two Gants worked two or three days helping the Hendricksons disk and harrow 56 acres of the' the tract to be planted in corn. The reason Gant did this was because he could see that the Hendricksons were getting behind in their work as he had been in the neighborhood looking after some cows he had there.

Nothing was said between the parties about paying Gant for the work he and his son had performed. However, the testimony disclosed that it was the custom among farmers of the community to exchange work. The fact that the Hendricksons had not offered to pay Gant for his services would tend to support the inference that the parties were observing such custom of exchange of work which prevailed in the community, that when one farmer helped out another, the latter would repay in equivalent services at some future time. The Hendricksons talked it over among themselves and decided they would help out Gant at some future date when he needed help in repayment for what he and his son had dóne.

In the fall of 1948 the Hendricksons bought a corn picker. About November 15th, Robert was operating it on the tract leased from Gant when Gant drove over and talked to Robert. Robert’s testimony of what then transpired is as follows:

“Well, I was picking corn down on his [Gant’s] land that we rented from him, and he come driving in there one day [68]*68pretty excited. He said it was getting awful late and he had a lot of corn standing in the held yet, so I told him not to worry and to quit picking it by hand; that when I finished over there, I would go over and pick it for him.”

Some time later Gant came to the Hendrickson farm and asked Mr. Hendrickson for Robert. According to Mr. Gant: “I stopped in there and I told his father to tell Robert that he could come and pick that corn.” Mr. .Hendrickson informed Robert of Gant’s call and shortly thereafter Robert went over to Gant’s farm with the corn picker and a tractor to operate it. Gant was there at the time Robert arrived with the tractor and picker and showed Robert the held he wanted picked. Gant told Robert he wanted the middle of the held picked hrst and then the outside edges so as to make less driving on the ends, and to avoid slippery conditions.

Robert was asked at the hearing who had control over the work he was to do on the Gant farm and his answer was: “Well, I took it upon myself to go over there, and Gant told me what to do and where to do it.”

Although the Hendricksons had bought the corn picker to do custom picking of corn for other farmers, as well as to pick the Hendricksons’ own corn, nothing had been said between Gant and either Mr. Hendrickson or Robert about paying anything for Robert’s services in picking Gant’s corn with the picker. This establishes that the parties did not understand that any custom picking of Gant’s corn was contemplated and tends to support the inference that Robert’s services in picking corn for Gant was in repayment for Gant’s services the previous May in helping the Hendricksons disk and harrow the cornland on the leased 71 acres.

' In the words of Mr. Hendrickson: “Well, we was exchanging. He helped us in the spring of the year putting in them crops, making the bed ready for the corn, and we helped him out to pick his corn.”

[69]*69While operating the picker on the Gant farm it became clogged and while attempting to remove the material, which was responsible for impeding the proper operation of the mechanism, Robert’s right hand and forearm got caught in the mechanism and were mangled.

Upon this review of the facts we now consider the applicable principles of law which are determinative of the issue raised by appellants that Robert at the time of his injury was not an employee of Gant as a matter of law in spite of the commission’s finding that he was.

In view of the provision of sec. 102.23 (1), Stats., that the Industrial Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive, such findings must be sustained if there is any credible evidence to support them. Jasper son v. Industrial Comm. (1939), 231 Wis. 142, 146, 285 N. W. 391. Appellants do not challenge this rule but contend that, inasmuch as the facts are not in dispute, the determination by the commission that the relationship of employer and employee existed between Gant and Robert at time of injury is a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact, and therefore is not conclusive on review.

Appellants are undoubtedly correct in their contention that the adjudication of whether an employer and employee relationship existed is the "ultímate conclusion as to liability’’ and therefore constitutes a conclusion of law even though it may have been labeled a finding of fact by the commission. Tesch v. Industrial Comm. (1930), 200 Wis. 616, 624, 229 N. W. 194. However, when facts are not in dispute but permit the drawing of different inferences therefrom, the drawing of one of such permissible inferences by the commission is an act of fact finding, and the inference so derived constitutes a finding of an ultimate fact and not a conclusion of law. Hipke v. Industrial Comm. (1952), 261 Wis. 226, 231, 52 N. W. (2d) 401; Ebner v. Indtistrial Comm. (1948), 252 Wis. 199, 201, 31 N. W. (2d) 172; Green Valley Co-op. [70]*70Dairy Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1947), 250 Wis. 502, 505, 506, 27 N. W. (2d) 454.

We deem the determination by the commission, that Robert at the time of the accident was performing labor for Gant pursuant to an implied contract arising from the exchange-of-work custom which prevailed among farmers of the community, lies in the category of the drawing of an inference from undisputed facts. The other permissible inference which the commission could have drawn from the facts was that Robert, in picking corn for Gant, was acting as a'mere volunteer and not pursuant to any implied contract, but the commission did not choose to do so. In this field of drawing legitimate inferences from undisputed facts, inasmuch as the commission was thereby engaged in fact finding, the ultimate fact so found is beyond our power to review.

We, therefore, are confronted with but one question of law and that is whether Robert at the time of his injury was an employee of Gant, in view of the commission’s finding that the services he was then rendering were being performed pursuant to an implied contract whereby Gant was being repaid for work he had previously furnished to the Hendrickson partnership. The decision of this court in Northern Trust Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1939), 231 Wis. 133, 285 N. W. 339, would seem to compel that this question be answered in the affirmative.

In the Northern Trust Co. Case, one Gilbert was the manager of the Maytag farm and one Reynolds was the manager of the Young estate farm in the same neighborhood. Both farms carried workmen’s compensation insurance. For many years there had been an exchange of labor between the two farms.

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Bluebook (online)
56 N.W.2d 525, 263 Wis. 64, 1953 Wisc. LEXIS 309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gant-v-industrial-commission-wis-1953.