MILLER, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Steven Alan Ganrude appeals the denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus. He claims the habeas court erred in denying his motion for discovery of information regarding sentences imposed for similar offenses and that his life sentence for aggravated assault enhanced by his habitual offender status violates the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] The criminal activities which led to Ganrude’s conviction and life sentence took place at the 1991 South Dakota State Fair and are detailed in this Court’s unanimous affirmance on direct appeal. State v. Ganrude, 499 N.W.2d 608 (S.D.1993). Briefly, the facts are that Ganrude and several companions forced 17-year-old Ryan Bowar to endure four to five hours of terror and humiliation at knifepoint. Bowar reported the incident to law enforcement despite Ganrude’s threats to kill Bowar’s family and rape and kill his sister if he did. Ganrude was found guilty of aggravated assault and was adjudicated a habitual offender. He received a life sentence.
[¶ 3.] After we affirmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, Ganrude filed an application for habeas corpus, claiming his life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Following a hearing, his application was denied.
[¶ 4.] Ganrude raises two issues in this habeas appeal:
1. Whether the habeas court erred in denying Ganrude’s motion for discovery of information regarding sentences imposed for similar, crimes.
2. Whether Ganrude’s life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 5.] 1. The habeas court did not err in denying Ganrude’s motion for discovery of information regarding sentences imposed for similar crimes.
[¶ 6.] The habeas court cited State v. Bonner, 1998 SD 30, 577 N.W.2d 575 as supporting authority for denying Gan-rude’s discovery motion. In Bonner, we stated:
In summary, to assess a challenge to proportionality we first determine whether the sentence appears grossly disproportionate. To accomplish this, we consider the conduct involved, and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court. If these circum[809] stances fail to suggest gross dispropor-tionality, our review ends. If, on the other hand, the sentence appears grossly disproportionate, we may, in addition to examining the other Solern factors, conduct an intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis to aid our comparison or remand to the circuit court to conduct such comparison before resentencing. We may also consider other relevant factors, such as the effect upon society of this type of offense.
Id. at ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580 (emphasis added). The habeas court informed Gan-rude that if it ruled in his favor oh the first prong of Bonner, the grossly disproportionate portion of his Eighth Amendment claim, it would then address the second prong regarding sentencing comparisons. Following a hearing, the court ruled against Ganrude on the first prong and denied his motion for discovery of information relevant to the comparative analysis.
[¶ 7.] Ganrude claims Bonner applies only to review on direct appeal of sentences and does not bar a habeas petitioner from pursuing discovery to show disproportionality. However, the rule of Bonner applies to an Eighth Amendment challenge, regardless of whether the challenge is brought on direct appeal or in a habeas action. The “shock the conscience” test that Bonner, 1998 SD 30 at ¶ 13, 577 N.W.2d at 579, replaced for federal constitutional analysis has been applied in both types of actions to Eighth Amendment challenges. Compare State v. Raymond, 1997 SD 59, 563 N.W.2d 823 with Bult v. Leapley, 507 N.W.2d 325 (S.D.1993). The habeas court did not err in denying Gan-rude’s motion for discovery of materials relevant to the second prong of Bonner when it had ruled against his claim on the first prong.
[¶ 8.] 2. Ganrude’s life sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
[¶ 9.] “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶ 15, 577 N.W.2d at 579 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 869 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). We determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime by considering the conduct involved and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the sentencing court and to the legislature. Bonner, supra. We have also stated that life sentences:
‘are rare and should involve a history of much more serious offenses that by reason of their brutality of calculated destructiveness render irrelevant the goal of rehabilitation and require in vindication of public safety and the moral underpinnings of the criminal law that the offender forfeit his right to ever again be set free.... ’
Bult, 507 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7, 12 (S.D.1983)).
[¶ 10.] The maximum sentence for aggravated assault, a Class 3 felony, is 15 years imprisonment and may include a fine of $15,000.00. SDCL 22-18-1.1; 22-6-1(5). Further, SDGL 22-7-8 mandates that if a defendant has been convicted of three or more additional felonies, with one or more of them being crimes of violence, the sentence for the principal felony is enhanced to that of a Class 1 felony, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. When Ganrude was sentenced for the aggravated assault of Ryan Bowar, he had a significant criminal history of eight prior felony convictions, including five separate burglaries, two of which are considered violent crimes under South Dakota criminal statutes.1
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MILLER, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Steven Alan Ganrude appeals the denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus. He claims the habeas court erred in denying his motion for discovery of information regarding sentences imposed for similar offenses and that his life sentence for aggravated assault enhanced by his habitual offender status violates the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] The criminal activities which led to Ganrude’s conviction and life sentence took place at the 1991 South Dakota State Fair and are detailed in this Court’s unanimous affirmance on direct appeal. State v. Ganrude, 499 N.W.2d 608 (S.D.1993). Briefly, the facts are that Ganrude and several companions forced 17-year-old Ryan Bowar to endure four to five hours of terror and humiliation at knifepoint. Bowar reported the incident to law enforcement despite Ganrude’s threats to kill Bowar’s family and rape and kill his sister if he did. Ganrude was found guilty of aggravated assault and was adjudicated a habitual offender. He received a life sentence.
[¶ 3.] After we affirmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, Ganrude filed an application for habeas corpus, claiming his life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Following a hearing, his application was denied.
[¶ 4.] Ganrude raises two issues in this habeas appeal:
1. Whether the habeas court erred in denying Ganrude’s motion for discovery of information regarding sentences imposed for similar, crimes.
2. Whether Ganrude’s life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 5.] 1. The habeas court did not err in denying Ganrude’s motion for discovery of information regarding sentences imposed for similar crimes.
[¶ 6.] The habeas court cited State v. Bonner, 1998 SD 30, 577 N.W.2d 575 as supporting authority for denying Gan-rude’s discovery motion. In Bonner, we stated:
In summary, to assess a challenge to proportionality we first determine whether the sentence appears grossly disproportionate. To accomplish this, we consider the conduct involved, and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court. If these circum[809] stances fail to suggest gross dispropor-tionality, our review ends. If, on the other hand, the sentence appears grossly disproportionate, we may, in addition to examining the other Solern factors, conduct an intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis to aid our comparison or remand to the circuit court to conduct such comparison before resentencing. We may also consider other relevant factors, such as the effect upon society of this type of offense.
Id. at ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580 (emphasis added). The habeas court informed Gan-rude that if it ruled in his favor oh the first prong of Bonner, the grossly disproportionate portion of his Eighth Amendment claim, it would then address the second prong regarding sentencing comparisons. Following a hearing, the court ruled against Ganrude on the first prong and denied his motion for discovery of information relevant to the comparative analysis.
[¶ 7.] Ganrude claims Bonner applies only to review on direct appeal of sentences and does not bar a habeas petitioner from pursuing discovery to show disproportionality. However, the rule of Bonner applies to an Eighth Amendment challenge, regardless of whether the challenge is brought on direct appeal or in a habeas action. The “shock the conscience” test that Bonner, 1998 SD 30 at ¶ 13, 577 N.W.2d at 579, replaced for federal constitutional analysis has been applied in both types of actions to Eighth Amendment challenges. Compare State v. Raymond, 1997 SD 59, 563 N.W.2d 823 with Bult v. Leapley, 507 N.W.2d 325 (S.D.1993). The habeas court did not err in denying Gan-rude’s motion for discovery of materials relevant to the second prong of Bonner when it had ruled against his claim on the first prong.
[¶ 8.] 2. Ganrude’s life sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
[¶ 9.] “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶ 15, 577 N.W.2d at 579 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 869 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). We determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime by considering the conduct involved and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the sentencing court and to the legislature. Bonner, supra. We have also stated that life sentences:
‘are rare and should involve a history of much more serious offenses that by reason of their brutality of calculated destructiveness render irrelevant the goal of rehabilitation and require in vindication of public safety and the moral underpinnings of the criminal law that the offender forfeit his right to ever again be set free.... ’
Bult, 507 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7, 12 (S.D.1983)).
[¶ 10.] The maximum sentence for aggravated assault, a Class 3 felony, is 15 years imprisonment and may include a fine of $15,000.00. SDCL 22-18-1.1; 22-6-1(5). Further, SDGL 22-7-8 mandates that if a defendant has been convicted of three or more additional felonies, with one or more of them being crimes of violence, the sentence for the principal felony is enhanced to that of a Class 1 felony, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. When Ganrude was sentenced for the aggravated assault of Ryan Bowar, he had a significant criminal history of eight prior felony convictions, including five separate burglaries, two of which are considered violent crimes under South Dakota criminal statutes.1
[810] [¶ 11.] The record shows Ganrude was 30 years old when he committed this aggravated assault. He had previously been incarcerated in Minnesota county jails as well as in Minnesota state correctional facilities. He held a G.E.D. completed while in prison. The record showed no evidence of steady employment. By his. own account, he had no family. As observed by the sentencing court, he had a career in crime. His 1986 burglary conviction resulted in the following comments by a corrections officer on his presentence investigation report: “[Ganrude has] an ongoing history of self-destructive antisocial behavior. He had considerable difficulty as a juvenile and he has been locked up almost constantly since becoming an adult. He is currently, looking at his third period of incarceration in a prison setting and he is not yet 25 years old.” Ganrude admitted at the habeas hearing that in the 12 years between ages 18 and 30, he spent 6-8 years in prison and during , his 4-6 years of freedom, he committed eight felonies, excluding the aggravated assault on Bo-war.
[¶ 12.] The sentencing court also took into account Ganrude’s written statements to the court concerning the crime and the victim impact statements of the minor victim and his family. Ganrude!s comments showed no remorse. He considered himself a victim and questioned why he was being “crucified” by Beadle County. Meanwhile, 17-year-old Bowar was nervous, had headaches and nightmares, had difficulty sleeping, had dropped out of school and lost interest in work, was insulting to people, was afraid, to be alone and had no friends. Bowar spoke with his pastor every other day but had not received additional counseling because of the cost. Bowar reported he felt Ganrude represented a continued threat to him as soon as he is released from prison. Bo-war’s father stated he feared Ganrude would make good on his threats to kill the Bowar family when he is released from prison.2 This report was completed 7½ months after the crime, indicating it had great impact still on the victim and his family.
[¶ 13.] On appeal, Ganrude admits his acts were offensive but claims they were not sufficiently serious to warrant a life sentence. This argument ignores his habitual offender status that .enhanced his sentence for aggravated assault to a life sentence.3 He also claims he served his time for those prior felonies and should not be punished again. Although this argument is not developed beyond this bare claim, we have previously held that this state’s habitual offender statutes do not violate a defendant’s right against double jeopardy. State v. Nilson, 364 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D.1985) (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 1258, 92 L.Ed. 1683, 1687 (1948)). Any argument on the efficacy of the habitual offender statutory scheme is more properly addressed to the legislature rather than to the courts.
[¶ 14.] In assessing whether Ganrude’s life sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime, we consider “the conduct involved, and any relevant past conduct, with utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing court.” Bonner, supra. [811] Here, relevant past conduct shows a significant criminal history of eight prior felonies, including crimes of violence. SDCL 22-7-8 mandated that Ganrude’s sentence for aggravated assault be enhanced to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. His lack of remorse and failure (even now) to acknowledge the seriousness of his conduct are also to be considered.
[¶ 15.] The sentencing court noted Gan-rude is a “career criminal” who trivializes his past criminal conduct. This observation continued to ring true at the habeas hearing. Ganrude has a history of disregard for the law. He has ignored the warnings of his previous felony convictions. State v. Anderson, 1998 SD 98, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d 151, 155. A life sentence, under this record, is not grossly disproportionate and presents no Eighth Amendment violation. We affirm.4
[¶ 16.] SABERS, KONENKAMP, and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.
[¶ 17.] AMUNDSON, Justice, dissents.