Gangadeen v. City of New York

654 F. Supp. 2d 169, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71079, 2009 WL 2461001
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 12, 2009
Docket07 Civ. 10965(DLC)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 654 F. Supp. 2d 169 (Gangadeen v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gangadeen v. City of New York, 654 F. Supp. 2d 169, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71079, 2009 WL 2461001 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

DENISE COTE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Milford Gangadeen, Akindra Reape, and Sharon Halloway 1 bring suit alleging that defendants 2 violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment, New York State Civil Service Law Section 75-b, and the New York City Human Rights Laws. 3 Following the completion of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims, and the motion became fully submitted on July 10, 2009. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claims is granted, and the Court *174 declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 306 (2d Cir.2003).

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, unless they are identified as being advanced by either the plaintiffs or defendants. Plaintiffs Gangadeen, Reape, and Holloway were employed by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”) as Special Officers (“SOs”). 4 The Bureau of the Public Health Laboratory (“BPHL”) is a licensed and regulated laboratory located in the DOHMH building on First Avenue in New York City. DOHMH’s Public Health Laboratory (“PHL”) is a testing and analysis location for potential specimens of biological weapons of mass destruction. Numerous inspections and reviews have found the BPHL in substantial regulatory compliance, and its license has been continuously renewed.

SOs employed by DOHMH are often assigned to security posts at the DOHMH building on First Avenue, including to the intake post at the PHL. The SOs are supervised by Thomas Breuers, the Director of Security for DOHMH. The SOs are designated peace officers under New York Criminal Procedure law, and their duties include monitoring the safety of the DOHMH premises. According to DOHMH Police Force Patrol Procedures, an SO must “[o]bserve any unusual conditions including fire and safety hazards; where possible, correct the situations and report all such conditions.” As for the requirement in that manual that “Health police shall immediately notify their supervisors of any serious incident or condition,” Breuers testified that this refers to the notification of criminal activities.

Dr. Sara T. Beatrice is the Director of the PHL. Beatrice does not supervise or manage non-BPHL employees who are assigned to the DOHMH building, such as the SOs. It is the role of the Health and Safety Unit of the BPHL to insure the safety of BPHL employees. The director of the BPHL Health and Safety Unit is Jacqueline Terlonge, who reports to Beatrice.

BPHL monitors the air in New York City to test for the presence of agents of bio-terrorism, and it conducts tests on substances brought by various other agencies to determine if the substances are hazardous. Federal regulations provide a protocol for the handling of suspected bioterrorism samples brought to the BPHL.

Machines known as autoclaves are used to decontaminate samples sent to BPHL after testing. The autoclaves are not located in areas to which the public has access. After going through the autoclave, the samples — contained in red bags labeled with a biohazard insignia — are removed and placed in carts to be picked up by a medical waste carter. After samples have been autoclaved, there may be an offensive odor.

In response to an April 22, 2005 memorandum from SOs to their union delegate Al Soto, expressing the SOs’ complaint that odors emitted from the autoclave had caused dizziness and nausea, DOHMH conducted an air quality test on May 17, 2005. The test found that the air quality was satisfactory with no contaminants, but recommendations were made to reduce the odor emanating from the autoclave. A subsequent test performed on August 21, 2008 confirmed that the air quality was at acceptable levels.

BPHL also conducts weekly surface testing of the specimen intake area in the *175 building; all such testing has revealed no select agent contamination in the intake area. On February 21, 2006, the BPHL tested samples from the residence and workplace of a drummer who had become ill with symptoms of anthrax poisoning. Dr. Heller, the person responsible for the BPHL Select Agent Program, reported that no breaches occurred in the integrity of the samples, but plaintiff Gangadeen states that FBI agents went to their vehicles and opened the samples, potentially exposing everyone there to anthrax spores, and failed to re-decontaminate the submissions in violation of the laboratory’s Standard Operating Procedure Manual. No employee of BPHL, including Dr. Heller, reported any issue related to the laboratory’s handling of the anthrax samples. Gangadeen alleges that he was exposed to anthrax and treated months later for a rash with an antibiotic, but he did not complain about the handling of the samples to anyone at BPHL and has provided no evidence to corroborate his receipt of this medical treatment. 5 Gangadeen admits that he did not submit a line of duty injury request or otherwise report to Breuers or his staff that he had been exposed to anthrax. Indeed, Gangadeen made a log entry on February 23, 2006 that all accessioning protocols relating to the anthrax were followed, stating: “All accessioning protocol was followed as per Dr. Heller’s instructions. Nothing further to report.”

SOs assigned to the intake area do not wear protective gear, because they do not handle specimens or open bags that are presented to the BPHL for testing. Specimens are removed from their protective packaging by BPHL technologists in a secure laboratory, and SOs are not in that laboratory or involved in the unpacking, testing, or transporting of specimens.

Breuers testified that SOs were trained in connection with the “accession” process, which was a method of maintaining and documenting the legal chain of custody of specimens submitted for testing that involved numbering and entering the specimens in a database; Reape, however, states that SOs were not so trained. Defendants have produced an email from the intake coordinator stating that “Officer Reape was trained in receiving BW samples. Next time PO RE APE [works] this location she should do the sample intake and have someone watch over her.”

A. The Plaintiffs’ Employment History

Halloway

Halloway was hired by DOHMH in April 2001, and was transferred to PHL following September 11, 2001. In 2004, Halloway requested a transfer from the PHL, but did not specify a particular facility or assignment to which she wished to be transferred. In a letter dated September 30, 2004, she was offered a transfer to a field assignment, but she declined the offer because of the easier commute by public transpiration to the PHL building. Halloway did not make any additional requests for a transfer. 6

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Soto v. Marist College
S.D. New York, 2019
Blythe v. City of New York
963 F. Supp. 2d 158 (E.D. New York, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
654 F. Supp. 2d 169, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71079, 2009 WL 2461001, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gangadeen-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2009.