Gadhave v. Thompson

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 19, 2023
Docket3:21-cv-02938
StatusUnknown

This text of Gadhave v. Thompson (Gadhave v. Thompson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gadhave v. Thompson, (N.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION KIRAN RAMESH GADHAVE, § § Plaintiff, § § Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-2938-D VS. § § KIRT THOMPSON, in his official § capacity as Director, U.S. Citizenship § and Immigration Services, § Texas Service Center, et al., § § Defendants. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Kiran Ramesh Gadhave (“Dr. Gadhave”) seeks judicial review of the denial by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) of his Form I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers as an alien of “extraordinary ability.” On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court grants defendants’ motion, denies plaintiff’s motion, and enters judgment dismissing this action with prejudice.1 I Dr. Gadhave, a citizen of India, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Entomology at Texas A&M University who purports to be “a leader in the fields of entomology and microbial biology.” R. (ECF No. 25) at 297. In 2021 Dr. Gadhave filed 1Defendants point out in their cross-motion that Mary Elizabeth Brennan Seng is now serving as Acting Director of the Texas Service Center and has been automatically substituted for defendant Kirt Thompson under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). with USCIS a Form I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (“Petition”), asserting entitlement to preferential treatment in visa issuance as an alien of “extraordinary ability.” USCIS issued a Request for Evidence (“RFE”) seeking additional documentation to

support the Petition, with which Dr. Gadhave complied, and then denied the Petition. After the denial, Dr. Gadhave sought judicial review of USCIS’s decision in this court. USCIS later reopened proceedings on the Petition. After further RFEs, to which Dr. Gadhave responded, USCIS again denied the Petition. Dr. Gadhave seeks judicial review of the denial of his Petition2 and moves for

summary judgment. Defendants have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court has heard oral argument on the motions. II The general “genuine dispute of material fact” standard for summary judgment does

not apply to claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. San Joaquin River Grp. Auth. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 819 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2011). Instead, “when a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.” Redeemed Christian Church of God v. USCIS, 331 F.Supp.3d 684, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (Rosenthal, C.J.) (quoting Am. Bioscience, Inc. v.

Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). In this context, summary judgment “serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is

2In his amended complaint, Dr. Gadhave seeks declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and judicial review. - 2 - supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Id. (quoting Stuttering Found. of Am. v. Springer, 498 F.Supp.2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2007)).

Under the APA, an agency decision may be reversed by the district court only if the plaintiff shows that the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Nat’l Hand Tool Corp. v. Pasquarell, 889 F.2d 1472, 1475 (5th Cir. 1989). An agency acts arbitrarily and

capriciously if it has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

Brown v. Napolitano, 391 Fed. Appx. 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “A decision is not arbitrary or capricious if the agency considers the relevant factors and ‘articulates a rational relationship between the facts found and the choice made.’” Willingham v. Dep’t of Labor, 475 F.Supp.2d 607, 612 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Robinson, J.) (quoting State of La. ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1988)). The agency need not “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.” Wang v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Although the district court must ensure that the agency engaged in “reasoned - 3 - decisionmaking,” the agency is “entitled to considerable deference in its interpretation of the governing statute.” Pasquarell, 889 F.2d at 1475 (citations omitted). “A reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and the court is to show proper deference

to agency expertise.” Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (Fitzwater, J.). “Even if statutory or regulatory language is ambiguous, deference is usually given to the agency’s interpretation.” Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 2000).

III The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) requires that USCIS give priority in employment-based visas to certain classes of people. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b). One such visa is the First Preference EB-1 visa, “colloquially dubbed the ‘Einstein’ or ‘genius’ visa.” Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2022). An EB-1 visa is granted only when

(i) the alien has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics, which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation; (ii) the alien seeks to enter the United States to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability; and (iii) the alien’s entry into the United States will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A). The INA’s enabling regulation defines “extraordinary ability” as “a level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). “This narrow definition reflects the - 4 - stringency of the ‘extraordinary ability’ standard. After all, a different visa is available to those whose ability is merely ‘exceptional.’” Amin, 24 F.4th at 387 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)). As a result, even highly accomplished individuals often fail to win the

“extraordinary ability” designation. See, e.g., Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Related

Defensor v. Meissner
201 F.3d 384 (Fifth Circuit, 2000)
Anna Brown v. Janet Napolitano
391 F. App'x 346 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Amer Bioscience Inc v. Thompson, Tommy G.
269 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Circuit, 2001)
Wei Guang Wang v. Board of Immigration Appeals
437 F.3d 270 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Kazarian v. US Citizenship & Immigration Services
596 F.3d 1115 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh
719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas, 1989)
Stuttering Found. of America v. Springer
498 F. Supp. 2d 203 (District of Columbia, 2007)
Willingham v. Department of Labor
475 F. Supp. 2d 607 (N.D. Texas, 2007)
Visinscaia v. Napolitano
4 F. Supp. 3d 126 (District of Columbia, 2013)
Amin v. Mayorkas
24 F.4th 383 (Fifth Circuit, 2022)
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity
853 F.2d 322 (Fifth Circuit, 1988)

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Gadhave v. Thompson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gadhave-v-thompson-txnd-2023.