SIMMS, Vice Chief Justice:
The question presented in this appeal is whether the opinion of an investigating officer, relating the cause of an automobile-pedestrian accident, is admissible under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 O.S.1981, § 2101, et seq.
Appellant, Louise Gabus, was the plaintiff below. She brings this appeal from the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial after the investigating officer of an automobile-pedestrian accident was permitted to state his opinion that the accident was caused by appellant’s failure to yield the right of way.
At approximately 6:40 a.m. on October 2, 1979, appellant was struck by a 1977 Cadillac driven by Ralph L. Harvey as she attempted to cross a four-lane street to reach a bus stop. She brought a negligence action against Harvey and his employer, Marlin Oil Corporation, to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of the accident. It was stipulated that Harvey was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
Much of the evidence introduced by the parties at trial was conflicting. Both Harvey and appellant testified, and each side also called witnesses who testified as to what they saw.
Harvey called as a witness C.D. Gilbert, an officer with the Oklahoma City Police Department, who was qualified as an expert without objection. The officer testified as to his investigation of the accident, which he had not witnessed. Over the objection of appellant’s counsel, the officer was allowed to respond to a question posed by Harvey’s counsel as to what caused the accident to happen. The officer stated that, in his opinion, the pedestrian had failed to yield right of way to the moving car.
Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that the officer’s opinion invaded the province of the jury because it determined the ultimate issue of fault. The motion was overruled, and the trial proceeded. The jury returned a verdict finding appellant 75% negligent and Harvey 25% negligent.
I.
Appellant asserts that in reaching its verdict the jury was unduly prejudiced by the officer’s testimony that she had failed to yield the right of way. She contends that after the officer had been warned by the trial court not to state an opinion of fault, Harvey’s counsel improperly provoked the officer’s opinion testimony of same.1 Harvey counters that the testimo[255]*255ny was proper under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 O.S.1981, §§ 2704, 2702, 2403, and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it admitted the opinion in evidence.
This Court has not previously ruled on the application of 12 O.S.1981, § 2704 to expert opinion testimony as to the ultimate issue of fault in a negligence case.
Prior to the adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code in 1978, Oklahoma had long recognized the common law rule that expert opinion evidence regarding the ultimate fact for the jury's consideration was generally not admissible. An exception to this rule was acknowledged where the conclusion to be drawn from the facts depended upon professional or scientific knowledge, or was so technical that a person of common understanding and experience was unable to evaluate or appreciate the significance of the facts or to draw a proper conclusion from them. See, e.g., Braggs v. Reese, Okl., 357 P.2d 997 (1960); Johnson v. Wade, Okl., 642 P.2d 255 (1982); decided on facts arising prior to adoption of the new Code.
From a plain reading of § 2704 it is apparent that the admissibility requirements for testimony on the ultimate fact are liberalized under the Code:
“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” [emphasis added]
So, although opinion testimony is not objectionable solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, the testimony must be “otherwise admissible” under other rules of evidence.
Section 2704 is identical to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Title 28, U.S.C.). In its note following Rule 704, the Federal Advisory Committee commented:
“The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach ...” [emphasis added]
Section 2702 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, governing the admissibility of testimony by experts, is the same as Federal Rule 702. It provides:
“If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” [emphasis added]
Thus, §§ 2704 and 2702 expand slightly the pre-Code standard which admitted expert testimony only where the trier of fact was otherwise unable to understand the issues.
Expert testimony on the ultimate issue is not admissible without limitation, however.
The test under § 2702 is usefulness. Will the expert testimony assist the trier of fact? If not helpful, then expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible.2 [See, [256]*256Frank T. Read, Oklahoma Evidence Handbook, p. 184, § 2702 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence, § 704-2 (1981); McCormick, Evidence, § 12 (2d ed. 1972).]
Section 2403 gives the trial judge the additional discretion to exclude statements of opinion that otherwise meet the § 2702 requirement, but their probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
The testimony as to causation introduced here did not assist the jury. It concerned facts that could be readily appreciated by any person who drives an automobile or crosses streets. No special skill or knowledge was needed to understand these facts and draw a conclusion from them. In such a case as this, where the normal experiences and qualifications of laymen jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from the facts and circumstances, expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. The expert conclusion here was not helpful and should not have been admitted.
In Lewis v. Schaffer, Okl., 369 P.2d 639, 641 (1962), this Court upheld the exclusion of a patrolman’s opinion as to causation of a vehicular collision under similar circumstances. While Lewis is a pre-Code case, its underlying rationale for the exclusion of this type of expert evidence is still sound:
“It is clear that the patrolman’s statement that defendant failed to yield the right-of-way constituted an opinion or conclusion on his part as to the cause of the collision.... In our opinion, the cause of the collision in controversy was within the knowledge and understanding of an ordinary 'person.”
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SIMMS, Vice Chief Justice:
The question presented in this appeal is whether the opinion of an investigating officer, relating the cause of an automobile-pedestrian accident, is admissible under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 O.S.1981, § 2101, et seq.
Appellant, Louise Gabus, was the plaintiff below. She brings this appeal from the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial after the investigating officer of an automobile-pedestrian accident was permitted to state his opinion that the accident was caused by appellant’s failure to yield the right of way.
At approximately 6:40 a.m. on October 2, 1979, appellant was struck by a 1977 Cadillac driven by Ralph L. Harvey as she attempted to cross a four-lane street to reach a bus stop. She brought a negligence action against Harvey and his employer, Marlin Oil Corporation, to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of the accident. It was stipulated that Harvey was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
Much of the evidence introduced by the parties at trial was conflicting. Both Harvey and appellant testified, and each side also called witnesses who testified as to what they saw.
Harvey called as a witness C.D. Gilbert, an officer with the Oklahoma City Police Department, who was qualified as an expert without objection. The officer testified as to his investigation of the accident, which he had not witnessed. Over the objection of appellant’s counsel, the officer was allowed to respond to a question posed by Harvey’s counsel as to what caused the accident to happen. The officer stated that, in his opinion, the pedestrian had failed to yield right of way to the moving car.
Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that the officer’s opinion invaded the province of the jury because it determined the ultimate issue of fault. The motion was overruled, and the trial proceeded. The jury returned a verdict finding appellant 75% negligent and Harvey 25% negligent.
I.
Appellant asserts that in reaching its verdict the jury was unduly prejudiced by the officer’s testimony that she had failed to yield the right of way. She contends that after the officer had been warned by the trial court not to state an opinion of fault, Harvey’s counsel improperly provoked the officer’s opinion testimony of same.1 Harvey counters that the testimo[255]*255ny was proper under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 O.S.1981, §§ 2704, 2702, 2403, and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it admitted the opinion in evidence.
This Court has not previously ruled on the application of 12 O.S.1981, § 2704 to expert opinion testimony as to the ultimate issue of fault in a negligence case.
Prior to the adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code in 1978, Oklahoma had long recognized the common law rule that expert opinion evidence regarding the ultimate fact for the jury's consideration was generally not admissible. An exception to this rule was acknowledged where the conclusion to be drawn from the facts depended upon professional or scientific knowledge, or was so technical that a person of common understanding and experience was unable to evaluate or appreciate the significance of the facts or to draw a proper conclusion from them. See, e.g., Braggs v. Reese, Okl., 357 P.2d 997 (1960); Johnson v. Wade, Okl., 642 P.2d 255 (1982); decided on facts arising prior to adoption of the new Code.
From a plain reading of § 2704 it is apparent that the admissibility requirements for testimony on the ultimate fact are liberalized under the Code:
“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” [emphasis added]
So, although opinion testimony is not objectionable solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, the testimony must be “otherwise admissible” under other rules of evidence.
Section 2704 is identical to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Title 28, U.S.C.). In its note following Rule 704, the Federal Advisory Committee commented:
“The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach ...” [emphasis added]
Section 2702 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, governing the admissibility of testimony by experts, is the same as Federal Rule 702. It provides:
“If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” [emphasis added]
Thus, §§ 2704 and 2702 expand slightly the pre-Code standard which admitted expert testimony only where the trier of fact was otherwise unable to understand the issues.
Expert testimony on the ultimate issue is not admissible without limitation, however.
The test under § 2702 is usefulness. Will the expert testimony assist the trier of fact? If not helpful, then expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible.2 [See, [256]*256Frank T. Read, Oklahoma Evidence Handbook, p. 184, § 2702 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence, § 704-2 (1981); McCormick, Evidence, § 12 (2d ed. 1972).]
Section 2403 gives the trial judge the additional discretion to exclude statements of opinion that otherwise meet the § 2702 requirement, but their probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
The testimony as to causation introduced here did not assist the jury. It concerned facts that could be readily appreciated by any person who drives an automobile or crosses streets. No special skill or knowledge was needed to understand these facts and draw a conclusion from them. In such a case as this, where the normal experiences and qualifications of laymen jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from the facts and circumstances, expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. The expert conclusion here was not helpful and should not have been admitted.
In Lewis v. Schaffer, Okl., 369 P.2d 639, 641 (1962), this Court upheld the exclusion of a patrolman’s opinion as to causation of a vehicular collision under similar circumstances. While Lewis is a pre-Code case, its underlying rationale for the exclusion of this type of expert evidence is still sound:
“It is clear that the patrolman’s statement that defendant failed to yield the right-of-way constituted an opinion or conclusion on his part as to the cause of the collision.... In our opinion, the cause of the collision in controversy was within the knowledge and understanding of an ordinary 'person.” [emphasis added]
In support of his view that the officer’s testimony that appellant failed to yield right of way was admissible, Appellee Harvey relies on Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir.1971), which held admissible a patrolman’s opinion that one of the parties to a negligence action involving an automobile accident had failed to yield the right of way. The 10th Circuit construed a Kansas statute similar to Oklahoma’s § 2704 in holding that the patrolman’s opinion was admissible as “an aid to the jury insofar as it synthesized the ... facts which jurors unaided could not have synthesized for themselves.” (at p. 1231)
However, in Lollis v. Superior Sales Co., 224 Kan. 251, 580 P.2d 423, 431 (1978), the Supreme Court of Kansas overruled previous contrary authority that had been decided under the Frase rationale. The Kansas Court wholly disallowed expert opinion testimony of this sort in automobile negligence cases, and established this rule:
“In an automobile accident negligence case, an expert witness, whether an investigating police officer or other expert, may not state his opinion as to which of the parties was at fault in causing the accident or his opinion concerning what acts of the parties contributed to the accident.” (overruling in part Ziegler v. Crofoot, 213 Kan. 480, 516 P.2d 954 (1973), and Massoni v. State Highway Commission, 214 Kan. 844, 522 P.2d 973 (1974)).
See also Kleibrink v. M.K.T.R. Co., Inc., 224 Kan. 437, 581 P.2d 372 (1978).
We agree with the rationale of the Kansas Court, and we are persuaded to adopt the same rule here. Accordingly, we find that the officer’s opinion as to appellant’s failure to yield right of way should have been excluded not just because it bore on an ultimate issue, but because the conclu[257]*257sion of the officer did not assist the jury in its deliberations. It was not useful since the jury was just as capable of drawing a proper conclusion from those facts as was the officer.
II.
Finding the officer’s testimony regarding causation inadmissible, we also conclude that its effect upon the jury was plainly prejudicial and its admission constituted reversible error. 12 O.S.1981, § 78.
We recognize that the determination of whether the threshold requirements for admissibility of an expert’s opinion testimony have been met is to be made by the trial judge. 12 O.S.1981, § 2105, and that decision will not be overturned by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion. However, we find that the trial judge made a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, against reason and evidence, in admitting this testimony. Abel v. Tisdale, Okl., 619 P.2d 608 (1980).
This is not a case where the jury needed the opinion of an expert about fault. Permitting the officer to make observations based upon this evidence effectively put the stamp of expertise upon an issue that the jury was fully competent to decide. The vice of admitting such testimony is that it permits the jury to substitute the opinion of the officer for the combined judgment of the jury, encouraging a contest by experts rather than a trial by witnesses.
In Maben v. Lee, Okl., 260 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1953), this Court emphasized the prejudicial effect of the admission of an investigating officer’s opinion as to fault in an automobile collision case:
“... Such testimony given by a witness occupying an official position, assuredly must have greatly impressed the jury, particularly since the average laymen undoubtedly would be inclined to place the stamp of authenticity upon testimony by such an officer ...”
See also, Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457, 119 N.W.2d 489 (1963); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Buchman, Fla.App., 358 So.2d 836, 842 (1978).
We find it highly probable that in this case the jury was unduly influenced by the opinion of one whose opinion was not need-' ed by them to reach an intelligent conclusion as to the cause of the accident.
It was, therefore, prejudicial error to admit expert testimony on the issue of fault over the objections of the other party.
REVERSED AND REMANDED for a new trial not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
BARNES, C.J., and HARGRAVE, OPA-LA, and WILSON, JJ., concur.
HODGES, LAVENDER, DOOLIN, JJ., dissent.