Gabriel Perez Moreno v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 GABRIEL PEREZ MORENO, Case No. 1:26-cv-00886-JLT-CDB (HC) 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 13 v. CORPUS AND DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., [A-Number 240-174-004] 15 Respondents. (Doc. 1) 16 7-Day Objection Period 17 18 Petitioner Gabriel Perez Moreno (“Petitioner”), a federal immigration detainee proceeding 19 pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 2, 2026, while in custody of the Immigration and 21 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, 22 California, where he remains detained. (Doc. 1). 23 Respondents are the unnamed Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention facility, the 24 current or acting San Francisco ICE Field Officer, the current or acting ICE Director, the current 25 or acting Homeland Security Secretary, and the current or acting United States Attorney General 26 (collectively, “Respondents”). Id. at 1. 27 For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s petition for 28 writ of habeas corpus be granted and that Respondents’ motion to dismiss be denied. 1 I. Relevant Background 2 The relevant facts are derived from the parties’ respective filings. See (Docs. 1, 11, 13). 3 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who lawfully entered the United States on a 4 “nonimmigrant Visitor for Pleasure” visa on July 28, 2015, near San Ysidro, California. See (Doc. 5 1 ¶ 23 [“tourism visa”] & Doc. 11-5 at 1, Ex. 5) (January 21, 2026, Notice to Appear). Petitioner’s 6 visa permitted him to remain in the United States until January 22, 2016. (Doc. 11-5 at 1, Ex. 5). 7 On January 19, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by the Fresno Police Department, booked into 8 the Fresno County Jail, and thereafter referred to ICE based upon biometric confirmation of his 9 identity. (Doc. 11-1 at 2, Ex. 1) (January 21, 2026, Form I-831). On January 21, 2026, Petitioner 10 was released from jail and arrested by ICE as a “nonimmigrant overstay,” placed into removal 11 proceedings pursuant to Section 240 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), and 12 detained under section 236 of the INA “pending a final administrative determination in 13 [Petitioner’s] case[.]” Id.; (Doc. 11-4 at 1, Ex. 4) (January 21, 2026, Notice of Custody 14 Determination). Petitioner requested an immigration judge review his custody determination that 15 same day. Ex. 4. Petitioner’s Form I-831 indicates that he has no criminal convictions. Ex. 1 at 16 3. 17 Petitioner alleges that he is provider of his family, including his wife and three children, 18 and that he entered the United States in 2015 on a tourism visa for the continued treatment of his 19 15-year-old daughter who has a rare stomach illness. (Doc. 1 ¶ 23). He alleges that his family 20 belongs to a “Christian church” since they came to the country and that he has filed taxes “until this 21 day” and his response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss and answer to the petition includes a copy 22 of several federal income tax returns bearing his name for various years. Id.; see (Doc. 13 at 2, 17- 23 26). 24 II. Governing Authority 25 A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus 26 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United 27 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus 28 shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should 1 not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not 2 entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 3 Relevant here, “in cases that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus 4 jurisdiction remains in the district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner 5 “challenges his confinement on statutory and constitutional grounds.” Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443 6 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 7 2008) (holding “the district court has jurisdiction over Torres’s habeas petition challenging his 8 detention” in ICE custody). 9 B. Statutory Immigration Framework (8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226) 10 Two statutes govern the detention and removal of inadmissible noncitizens from the United 11 States: 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. Relevant here is the legal background presented by the district 12 court in Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503 (N.D. Cal. 13 Sept 12, 2025), which the undersigned adopts herein: 14 1. Full Removal Proceedings and Discretionary Detention (§ 1226) 15 The “usual removal process” involves an evidentiary hearing before 16 an immigration judge. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1229(a), also known as “full removal,” by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. 18 Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011). Section § 1226 provides that while removal proceedings are pending, a noncitizen “may be arrested and 19 detained” and that the government “may release the alien on ... conditional parole.” § 1226(a)(2); accord Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 20 108 (during removal proceedings, applicant may either be “detained” or “allowed to reside in this country”). When a person is apprehended 21 under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial custody determination. Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) 22 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). A noncitizen will be released if he or she “demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 23 would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. 24 § 236.1(c)(8)).

25 “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v. 26 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1)). If, at this hearing, the detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of 27 the evidence that he or she is not “a threat to national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a 28 1 poor bail risk,” the IJ will order his or his release. Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). 2 Once released, the noncitizen’s bond is subject to revocation. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), “the DHS has authority to revoke a noncitizen’s 3 bond or parole ‘at any time,’ even if that individual has previously been released.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 968 (N.D. 4 Cal. 2019). However, if an immigration judge has determined the noncitizen should be released, the DHS may not re-arrest that 5 noncitizen absent a change in circumstance. See Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2021). Where the release 6 decision was made by a DHS officer, not an immigration judge, the Government’s practice has been to require a showing of changed 7 circumstances before re-arrest. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 8 2. Expedited Removal and Mandatory Detention (§ 1225) 9 While “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States,” 10 U.S. immigration law also “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under 11 §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” a process that provides for expedited removal. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (2018). Under § 1225, a 12 noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” is considered “an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. 13 § 1225(a)(1). For certain applicants for admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 authorizes “expedited removal.” § 1225(b)(1). § 1225(b)(1) provides 14 that:

15 “If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) 16 who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 17 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7)], the officer shall order the alien 18 removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an 19 intention to apply for asylum under section 208 [8 USCS § 1158] or a fear of persecution.” 20 Sections 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) and 1182(a)(7) respectively refer 21 to noncitizens who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to meet document requirements. Clause (iii) of § 1225(b)(1) 22 allows the Attorney General (who has since delegated the responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security Secretary) to 23 designate for expedited removal noncitizens “who ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who ha[ve] not 24 affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States 25 continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.” 26 § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).

27 To summarize, under § 1225(b)(1), two groups of noncitizens are subject to expedited removal. First, there are “arriving” noncitizens 28 1 who are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or failure to meet document requirements. The implementing agency regulations 2 define “arriving alien” as applicants for admission “coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 3 C.F.R. § 1.2. The second group –designated noncitizens –includes noncitizens who meet all of the following criteria: (1) they are 4 inadmissible due to lack of a valid entry document or misrepresentation; (2) they have not “been physically present in the 5 United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”; and (3) they are 6 among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has designated for expedited removal. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 109; § 7 1225(b)(1).

8 “Initially, DHS’s predecessor agency did not make any designation [under (3)], thereby limiting expedited removal only to ‘arriving 9 aliens,’” that is, noncitizens encountered at ports of entry. Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 169432, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025). In the following years, DHS extended by designation expedited removal to noncitizens who arrive 11 by sea and who have been present for fewer than two years, and to noncitizens apprehended within 100 air miles of any U.S. 12 international land border who entered within the last 14 days. Id. This was the status quo until January 2025, when the Department of 13 Homeland Security revised its § 1225 designation to “apply expedited removal to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” 14 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025). Under this designation, expedited removal applies to 15 noncitizens encountered anywhere within the United States, who have been in the United States for less than two years and are 16 inadmissible for lack of valid documentation or misrepresentation. In short, expedited removal was expanded to apply for the first time to 17 vast numbers of noncitizens present in the interior of the United States. 18 Under the expedited removal statute § 1225(b)(1), if an applicant 19 “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum” or “a fear of persecution,” the immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an 20 interview by an asylum officer.” §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). If the asylum officer determines that the applicant has a “credible fear,” the 21 applicant “receive[s] ‘full consideration’ of his asylum claim in a standard removal hearing.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 110. If the 22 officer determines there is no “credible fear,” the officer “shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or 23 review.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, the officer’s decision may be appealed by the applicant to an immigration judge, who must 24 conduct the review “to the maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date of the 25 determination.” Id. Detention under § 1225(b)(1) is “mandatory” “pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and if 26 found not to have such a fear, until removed.” Id. (citing § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under 27 this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until 28 removed.”) 1 [Section] 1225 also contains a provision that applies to applicants for 2 admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. This provision, 1225(b)(2), states that, subject to statutory 3 exceptions, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking 4 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a [full 5 removal proceedings] of this title.” § 1225(b)(2). In other words, noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited 6 removal but are subject to mandatory detention while their full removal proceedings are pending. This is in contrast to the default 7 detention regime under § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary release and review of detention through a bond hearing. 8 3. The Government’s Recent Change in Position 9 Until this year, the DHS has applied § 1226(a) and its discretionary 10 release and review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without valid documentation. This practice 11 was codified by regulation. The regulations implementing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 12 (“IIRIRA”) state that “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly 13 referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 14 (Mar. 6, 1997). In fact, the government has conceded in other contexts that “DHS’s long-standing interpretation has been that 15 1226(a) [discretionary detention] applies to those who have crossed the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter 16 apprehended.” Dkt. No. 17 (citing Solicitor General, Transcript of Oral Argument at 44:24–45:2, Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 17 (2022) (No. 21-954)) . . .

18 In 2025, however, the Government’s policy changed dramatically. The DHS revised its § 1225 designation to “apply expedited removal 19 to the fullest extent authorized by statute.” Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025) (emphasis 20 added). The Secretary of Homeland Security memorandum directed federal immigration officers to “consider ... whether to apply 21 expedited removal” to “any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable to expedited removal but to whom expedited removal has not been 22 applied.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 33. Officers are encouraged to “take steps to terminate any ongoing removal proceeding and/or any active 23 parole status.” Id. The memorandum states that DHS shall take the actions contemplated by the memorandum “in a manner that takes 24 account of legitimate reliance interests,” but states that “the expedited removal process includes asylum screening, which is 25 sufficient to protect the reliance interests of any alien who has applied for asylum or planned to do so in a timely manner.” Huffman 26 Memorandum (Jan. 23, 2025).

27 Since mid-May of 2025, the Department of Homeland Security has made a practice of appearing at regular removal proceedings in 28 immigration court, moving to dismiss the proceedings, and then re- 1 arresting the individual in order to place them in expedited removal proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 35–40. If the immigration judge does 2 not dismiss the full removal proceedings, ICE still makes an arrest, apparently in reliance on § 1225(b)(2)’s detention provision. 3 4 Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503 at *1-4 (internal footnotes omitted). 5 III. Exhaustion 6 A. Governing Authority 7 “Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before 8 filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 9 Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, requires 10 that, “as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative 11 remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 (citing United 12 States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of exhaustion, ‘no one is 13 entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed ... remedy has been 14 exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)). 15 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it 16 may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.” 17 Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 18 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although 19 courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, this 20 discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion 21 requirement has been satisfied or properly waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v. 22 Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762, n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring 23 exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly 24 to be disregarded.”). 25 B. Analysis 26 Respondents contend that Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies as he 27 “has not requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge.” (Doc. 11 at 3). 28 The undersigned finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as it 1 would be futile to seek release by administrative means given the BIA’s decision in Matter of 2 Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and although the record shows Petitioner requested 3 a bond hearing at the time he was detained, it does not show that Petitioner was ever provided a 4 bond hearing. See Ex. 4 (“I do request an immigration judge review of this custody 5 determination.”); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 998 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] court may waive 6 the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, 7 pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the 8 administrative proceedings would be void.’”) (quoting Laing, 370 F.3d at 1000); Chavez v. Noem, 9 -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (“The Court therefore finds 10 the prudential exhaustion requirements waived for futility. Because Petitioners need to show only 11 one of the Laing factors applies, … the Court need not address the other factors.”) (internal citation 12 omitted); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n.9 13 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“In addition, pursuit of administrative remedies would almost certainly 14 be futile given the BIA’s recent holding that all noncitizens present in the United States without 15 admission are ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be 16 detained.”) (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). 17 For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the prudential exhaustion requirement 18 be waived for Petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief. 19 IV. Discussion 20 Petitioner asserts a single cause of action for violation of his Fifth Amendment right to 21 procedural due process. See (Doc. 1 at 16-17). However, the substance of his allegations 22 necessarily requires the Court to determine what relief Petitioner is entitled to under the applicable 23 statutory scheme. On this point, Respondents concede that § 1226(a) applies (see Doc. 11 at 1) and 24 the record does not show that he has been afforded a bond hearing despite requesting such when he 25 was detained on January 21, 2026. Accordingly, the undersigned construes Petitioner’s claim as 26 seeking relief for Respondents’ failure to provide him a bond hearing as required under that statute. 27 A. Statutory Scheme: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) Applies 28 “Under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may request a bond hearing 1 before an IJ at any time before a removal order becomes final.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 2 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19). “If at this hearing the 3 detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of the evidence that he is not a threat to national 4 security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk, the IJ 5 will order his release.” Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). 6 Here, Respondents’ contention that “Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before an 7 immigration judge” is refuted by the fact that Petitioner made a request for an immigration judge 8 to review his custody determination at the time he was arrested and detained by immigration 9 authorities based on a warrant for arrest under § 1226(a). Cf. (Doc. 11 at 3) with (Doc. 11-3 at 1, 10 Ex. 3, Ex. 4). Because the record does not show Petitioner ever received or was denied a bond 11 hearing for which he is entitled by statute, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has shown a 12 violation of his rights under § 1226(a). 13 Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend the Court grant Petitioner’s petition and 14 recommend the Court order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a statutorily-compliant bond 15 hearing as set forth below. 16 B. Relief 17 The undersigned considers whether Petitioner is entitled to a pre-deprivation or post- 18 deprivation bond hearing, and further, addresses what standards should apply at that hearing. 19 The undersigned concludes that Petitioner is entitled only to a post-deprivation bond 20 hearing. Respondents arrested Petitioner after he was referred to the ICE-ERO Criminal Alien 21 Program based on battery charges and immediately following his release from county jail on those 22 charges. See Ex. 1 at 2. Though Petitioner offers explanations that the “charges against” him were 23 dismissed, ICE’s reliance upon those violations was “not obviously pretex[t]ual.” Martinez 24 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25 28, 2025) (“If Respondent’s view of the facts is correct, it is at least arguable that providing 26 Petitioner with notice and a pre-deprivation hearing would have been impracticable and/or would 27 have motivated his flight.”) (citing cases); accord O.A.C.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01652-DAD- 28 CSK (HC), 2025 WL 3485221, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025). Further, Petitioner has never been 1 afforded a bond hearing before an immigration judge, despite his request for such a custody 2 determination. Under these circumstances, the undersigned will recommend the Court order 3 Respondents to provide Petitioner with a statutorily-compliant bond hearing at which Petitioner 4 bears the burden to prove that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. 5 V. Conclusion and Recommendation 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be GRANTED. 8 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) be DENIED. 9 3. Respondents be ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance 10 with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) at which the parties will be allowed to present evidence and 11 argument about whether Petitioner is a danger to the community and presents a flight 12 risk if not detained. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 13 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from 14 detention. 15 4. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor for Petitioner and 16 close this case. 17 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 18 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days 19 after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections 20 with the Court. Although this objection period is shorter than provided by Local Rule, such an 21 adjustment is warranted given the nature of Petitioner’s harm, the finding of a violation of the U.S. 22 Constitution by Respondents, and the fact that the parties have extensively briefed the issues 23 involved. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“The court 24 may require a response within a shorter period if exigencies of the calendar require.”). Any 25 objections filed should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 26 Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause shown. 27 The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to 28 refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document 1 | and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages 2 | filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing 3 | these findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that 4 | failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 5 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 6 | 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 7 | ITISSO ORDERED. S| Dated: _ April 7, 2026 | hrnnrD bo 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]