OPINION
By the Court,
Manoukian, J.:
This is an original proceeding wherein petitioners seek by prohibition to restrain respondent court from hearing the late filed water rights exceptions of Stanley E. Bailey and Justin W. [303]*303Livingston in the matter of the state water engineer’s final determination of the relative rights in and to the waters of Ophir Creek and its tributaries in Washoe County, Nevada.
Following the filing of a petition in the office of the state engineer requesting a determination of the rights of the various claimants to the above mentioned waters, the petition was granted, and the state engineer filed his preliminary order of determination pursuant to NRS 533.090. Although a number of parties filed objections to the preliminary order pursuant to NRS 533.145, neither Bailey nor Livingston did so as to petitioners herein.
The state engineer determined that petitioners were entitled to 85 acre feet of water per year and that respondents were entitled to 1800 acre feet, all incident to a decree establishing 1856 priority rights.
Following hearing on the objections, the state engineer on December 23, 1976, filed his final order of determination pursuant to NRS 533.165 and 533.450, after which he twice in writing notified all interested parties, including claimants Bailey and Livingston, that the hearing on the objections was scheduled in the district court March 31, 1977, and that all notices of exceptions must be filed five days prior thereto, pursuant to NRS 533.170.
Several claimants timely filed notices of exception but the record is devoid of any written notice by Bailey or Livingston challenging the correctness of the state engineer’s final determination as to the water rights of the petitioners. Although the record is not clear in some particulars, it is evident that Bailey and Livingston were represented by counsel at the March 31, 1977 hearing, where it appears that petitioners were either not present or unrepresented by counsel. Although the hearing commenced as scheduled, it was by stipulation continued without date. Thereafter the attorney general re-noticed the district court hearing on objections and the hearing was set for July 10, 1978. On October 21, 1977, the State Engineer again notified all interested parties of the new hearing date. On the morning of July 10, 1978, claimants Bailey and Livingston, for the first time in these proceedings, filed with the court clerk exceptions to that part of the final order of determination granting petitioners water rights.
Over petitioners’ objections that the court was without jurisdiction to consider the tardy claims, the respondent court asserted its authority to proceed, granting petitioners four days to pursue discovery. On July 11, 1978, petitioners filed the instant petition for prohibition and on motion we stayed the [304]*304trial court’s order relating to the claims of Bailey and Livingston pending resolution of the propriety of the respondent judge’s action in permitting the belated exceptions to be heard.
The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. We are asked to decide whether or not prohibition is the proper remedy with which to test the propriety of the district court’s action. Prohibition will issue when there is an act to be arrested which is without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial judge and there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.320, NRS 34.330; Ham v. District Court, 93 Nev. 409, 566 P.2d 420 (1977), and cases therein cited. In Culinary Workers v. Court, 66 Nev. 166, 170, 207 P.2d 990, 992 (1949), we stated, “[tjhe Writ of Prohibition is unquestionably appropriate as a remedy to hold proceedings in an inferior court which are not within the jurisdiction of such court. [Citations omitted.]”
Furthermore, the fact that an appeal is available from the final judgment does not preclude issuance of the writ, Public Service Comm. v. Court, 61 Nev. 245, 123 P.2d 237 (1942), particularly in circumstances where, as here, the trial court is alleged to have exceeded its jurisdiction and the challenged order is not appealable. NRAP 3A(b); Clack v. Jones, 62 Nev. 72, 140 P.2d 580 (1943).
Petitioners contend that the district court is without jurisdiction to consider the late filed exceptions of Bailey and Livingston, relying on NRS 533.170. Arguing for respondent court, Bailey and Livingston contend they have substantially complied with the law and that it was within the district court’s equitable authority to permit the tardy exceptions, citing State Engineer v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 88 Nev. 424, 498 P.2d 1329 (1972). We are constrained to agree with petitioners. NRS 533.170 in relevant part provides:
1. At least 5 days prior to the date set for hearing, all parties'm interest who are aggrieved or dissatisfied with the order of determination of the state engineer shall filewith the clerk of the court notice of exceptions to the order of determination of the state engineer. The notice shall state briefly the exceptions taken and the prayer for relief. A copy thereof shall be served upon or transmitted to the state engineer by registered or certified mail.
[305]*3052. The order of determination by the state engineer and the statements or claims of claimant and exceptions made to the order of determination shall constitute the pleadings, and there shall be no other pleadings in the cause. (Emphasis added.)
We find the language in NRS 533.170 plain and unambiguous (compare State ex rel. PSC v. District Court, 94 Nev. 42, 574 P.2d 272 (1978), and interpret the statutory notice requirements as mandatory, requiring strict compliance. Carpenter v. District Court, 59 Nev. 42, 73 P.2d 1310 (1937); see also Jahn v. District Court, 58 Nev.
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OPINION
By the Court,
Manoukian, J.:
This is an original proceeding wherein petitioners seek by prohibition to restrain respondent court from hearing the late filed water rights exceptions of Stanley E. Bailey and Justin W. [303]*303Livingston in the matter of the state water engineer’s final determination of the relative rights in and to the waters of Ophir Creek and its tributaries in Washoe County, Nevada.
Following the filing of a petition in the office of the state engineer requesting a determination of the rights of the various claimants to the above mentioned waters, the petition was granted, and the state engineer filed his preliminary order of determination pursuant to NRS 533.090. Although a number of parties filed objections to the preliminary order pursuant to NRS 533.145, neither Bailey nor Livingston did so as to petitioners herein.
The state engineer determined that petitioners were entitled to 85 acre feet of water per year and that respondents were entitled to 1800 acre feet, all incident to a decree establishing 1856 priority rights.
Following hearing on the objections, the state engineer on December 23, 1976, filed his final order of determination pursuant to NRS 533.165 and 533.450, after which he twice in writing notified all interested parties, including claimants Bailey and Livingston, that the hearing on the objections was scheduled in the district court March 31, 1977, and that all notices of exceptions must be filed five days prior thereto, pursuant to NRS 533.170.
Several claimants timely filed notices of exception but the record is devoid of any written notice by Bailey or Livingston challenging the correctness of the state engineer’s final determination as to the water rights of the petitioners. Although the record is not clear in some particulars, it is evident that Bailey and Livingston were represented by counsel at the March 31, 1977 hearing, where it appears that petitioners were either not present or unrepresented by counsel. Although the hearing commenced as scheduled, it was by stipulation continued without date. Thereafter the attorney general re-noticed the district court hearing on objections and the hearing was set for July 10, 1978. On October 21, 1977, the State Engineer again notified all interested parties of the new hearing date. On the morning of July 10, 1978, claimants Bailey and Livingston, for the first time in these proceedings, filed with the court clerk exceptions to that part of the final order of determination granting petitioners water rights.
Over petitioners’ objections that the court was without jurisdiction to consider the tardy claims, the respondent court asserted its authority to proceed, granting petitioners four days to pursue discovery. On July 11, 1978, petitioners filed the instant petition for prohibition and on motion we stayed the [304]*304trial court’s order relating to the claims of Bailey and Livingston pending resolution of the propriety of the respondent judge’s action in permitting the belated exceptions to be heard.
The threshold question is one of jurisdiction. We are asked to decide whether or not prohibition is the proper remedy with which to test the propriety of the district court’s action. Prohibition will issue when there is an act to be arrested which is without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial judge and there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.320, NRS 34.330; Ham v. District Court, 93 Nev. 409, 566 P.2d 420 (1977), and cases therein cited. In Culinary Workers v. Court, 66 Nev. 166, 170, 207 P.2d 990, 992 (1949), we stated, “[tjhe Writ of Prohibition is unquestionably appropriate as a remedy to hold proceedings in an inferior court which are not within the jurisdiction of such court. [Citations omitted.]”
Furthermore, the fact that an appeal is available from the final judgment does not preclude issuance of the writ, Public Service Comm. v. Court, 61 Nev. 245, 123 P.2d 237 (1942), particularly in circumstances where, as here, the trial court is alleged to have exceeded its jurisdiction and the challenged order is not appealable. NRAP 3A(b); Clack v. Jones, 62 Nev. 72, 140 P.2d 580 (1943).
Petitioners contend that the district court is without jurisdiction to consider the late filed exceptions of Bailey and Livingston, relying on NRS 533.170. Arguing for respondent court, Bailey and Livingston contend they have substantially complied with the law and that it was within the district court’s equitable authority to permit the tardy exceptions, citing State Engineer v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 88 Nev. 424, 498 P.2d 1329 (1972). We are constrained to agree with petitioners. NRS 533.170 in relevant part provides:
1. At least 5 days prior to the date set for hearing, all parties'm interest who are aggrieved or dissatisfied with the order of determination of the state engineer shall filewith the clerk of the court notice of exceptions to the order of determination of the state engineer. The notice shall state briefly the exceptions taken and the prayer for relief. A copy thereof shall be served upon or transmitted to the state engineer by registered or certified mail.
[305]*3052. The order of determination by the state engineer and the statements or claims of claimant and exceptions made to the order of determination shall constitute the pleadings, and there shall be no other pleadings in the cause. (Emphasis added.)
We find the language in NRS 533.170 plain and unambiguous (compare State ex rel. PSC v. District Court, 94 Nev. 42, 574 P.2d 272 (1978), and interpret the statutory notice requirements as mandatory, requiring strict compliance. Carpenter v. District Court, 59 Nev. 42, 73 P.2d 1310 (1937); see also Jahn v. District Court, 58 Nev. 204, 73 P.2d 499 (1937); In re Silver Creek, 57 Nev. 232, 61 P.2d 987 (1936). In Carpenter, vie held that the requirement of filing exceptions to the order of determination is mandatory and jurisdictional. We deem Carpenter controlling here. In the instant case, the relevant exceptions were first filed some fifteen months after the required date. While as a general rule our trial courts are afforded reasonable discretion in controlling the conduct of proceedings pending before them, see, Iveson v. District Court, 66 Nev. 145, 206 P.2d 755 (1949), the error complained of here is the trial judge’s exercise of jurisdiction where none was legally available. In Application of Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, 27, 202 P.2d 535, 540 (1949), this Court stated: “It is . . . settled in this state that the water law and all proceedings thereunder are special in character and the provisions of such law not only lay down the method of procedure, but strictly limit it to that provided.” See also Ruddell v. District Court, 54 Nev. 363, 17 P.2d 693 (1933); and In re Water Rights in Humboldt River, 49 Nev. 357, 246 P. 692 (1926).
Where, as here, a trial court misconceives the meaning of a mandatory statute and as a consequence acts when the law expressly enjoins it from acting, relief through an extraordinary writ is mandated. NRS 533.170; Carpenter v. District Court, supra.
Respondents’ reliance on American National is misplaced. That case involved a substantial user of water who failed to timely file proof of the application of water to beneficial use. The state engineer cancelled the permit to appropriate water pursuant to NRS 533.450. The district court reversed the action of the engineer and we affirmed holding the statute providing that in such circumstances the “permit shall be cancelled” was a legislative directive which did «of affect the district court’s power to grant equitable relief when warranted. See also Donoghue v. T.O.M. Co., 45 Nev. 110, 198 Pac. 553 (1921). In [306]*306American National, unlike the instant case, the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Here, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to act on the late filed claims. NRS 533.170.
Finally, Bailey and Livingston further argue that NRS 533.1801 supports the trial court’s action since as the district court had the authority to remand the case to the state engineer, it could avoid the harsh consequence of the application of NRS 533.170 and proceed as it did. This contention is without merit, as NRS 533.180 cannot be used to enlarge upon the court’s jurisdiction, which jurisdiction has been well defined by our legislature. See Carpenter, supra.
The writ will issue to prohibit the district court from assuming jurisdiction and from hearing the untimely exceptions of water rights claimants Bailey and Livingston.
Mowbray, C. J., and McKibben, D. J.,2 concur.