GRAY, Justice.
This appeal is from a summary judgment.
Appellant, Gladys Brown Fuller, sued Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Wilson Temple for damages for personal injuries sustained by her while a passenger and seated on Southwestern’s bus. She alleged that while she was seated on the bus and it was stopped at the bus terminal in Temple, Texas, she was struck on the head by a heavy suitcase which was carelessly and violently swung against her by a “porter.” She alleged that Wilson Temple operated the bus terminal; that Southwestern and Wilson Temple were engaged in a joint venture, and that the “porter” supra was the employee of each. In the alternative she alleged that Southwestern and Wilson Temple were not engaged in a joint venture but that said “porter” was at the time the servant of each of them; or that said “porter” was the servant and employee of Southwestern, or that he was the servant and employee of Wilson Temple.
Southwestern answered by a general denial and specially denied: that it was engaged in a joint venture with Wilson Temple, and that the “porter” in question was its servant and employee. It then alleged that appellant’s injuries were directly and proximately caused by her own negligence, or, in the alternative, that they were the result of an unavoidable accident.
[457]*457Southwestern filed its motion for a summary judgment and accompanied it with the affidavit of its claim agent. This affidavit recites that the affiant, at the time appellant alleges she sustained injuries, was familiar with the location of the bus terminal operated by Wilson Temple and that:
“At that time the buses operated by Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., together with other carriers and bus companies, used said property as a terminal for boarding passengers and the handling of baggage, express and mail. Mr. Temple sold tickets for Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., permitting it to board and discharge passengers, baggage, express and mail and permitted Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. to maintain a sign on said premises. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. paid Temple a commission on the sale of tickets and transportation charges. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. did not pay nor obligate itself to pay any expense with reference to the operation of said terminal, did not have any employees connected with said terminal, said Temple or said operation; that it had no employees or servants located in or around said terminal or connected therewith, or with said operations; that it did not employ any porters or any other employees at said terminal; that any porter or employee who carried baggage, luggage or the suitcase mentioned in plaintiff’s petition was not any employee or servant or agent of Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.; that at none of, the times mentioned in plaintiff’s petition did Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. have any agent, servant or employee working in or around the terminal in question except the driver of its bus; that the unnamed person mentioned in plaintiff’s pleadings as being a porter was not the agent, servant or employee of Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.; that Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.was not engaged in any joint venture with said Temple and the only connection it had with said Temple was as set out above.”
Thereafter, on March 3, 1959, appellant filed her first amended original petition. She repeated her allegations supra and:
“In the alternative plaintiff says that the man who struck plaintiff in the head with a large suitcase was not an employee of either defendant and that said man was a stranger to defendants and was neither an employee nor a customer of defendants and was untrained and unskilled in handling baggage. The defendants and each of them, their agents, servants and employees, were negligent in that they permitted said unknown man to board: the Greyhound bus, and in that they permitted said unknown man to carry onto said bus a suitcase of such size and weight as to be dangerous to plaintiff and other passengers on the bus. Plaintiff says that the suitcase with which she was hit was so large and so heavy that it could not safely be stored and carried in the passenger area of the bus, and defendants were negligent in that they failed to require that said suitcase be checked and carried in the baggage compartment of the bus. Defendants were negligent in that each of them, their agents, servants and employees, failed to provide a baggage handler, trained in handling and storing baggage in the passenger area on buses, for the purpose of loading onto the bus the suitcase with which plaintiff was hit; and defendants were negligent in that they failed to prohibit an untrained and unskilled stranger from violently swinging about a large' heavy suitcase within the passenger area of the bus.”
Appellant did not file counter affidavits and only the pleadings and the affidavit supra were before the court. On March 6, 1959 Southwestern’s motion was sustained. [458]*458On March 26, 1959 appellant’s motion to sever her cause as to Wilson Temple was granted and on the same day the trial court rendered judgment that appellant take nothing by her suit against Southwestern.
Wilson Temple is not a party to this appeal and the cause as to him will not be further noticed. Southwestern will later be referred to as appellee.
! Giving full credit to the affidavit supra it states as a fact that appellee was not engaged in a joint venture with Wilson Temple. It also states as a fact that the bus terminal was used by appellee “for loading passengers and the handling of baggage, express and mail.” It also denies that the “porter” was an employee or servant of ap-pellee. It does not controvert the alternative pleading supra nor the allegation that the suitcase was so large and so heavy that it could not “safely be stored and carried in the passenger area of the bus” nor that it was of such size and weight as to be dangerous to appellant and other passengers on the bus. Further it does not controvert the allegations that the accident happened and the manner of its happening.
By the provisions of Rule 166-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court was authorized to render judgment for appellee on its motion “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” However the burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact existed was on appellee. It was the province of the trial court to decide from what was then before him (the documents named in the rule supra, here the pleadings and the affidavit) only the question of whether any genuine issue of fact as to any material matter was presented and whether as a matter of law appellee was entitled to judgment. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929; Haley v. Nickels, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 683.
In Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310, the court said:
“The general rule with respect to joint adventures is stated in 33 C.J. p. 841, as follows: ‘A joint adventure has been aptly defined as a “special combination of two or more persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought without any actual partnership or corporate designation.” ’
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GRAY, Justice.
This appeal is from a summary judgment.
Appellant, Gladys Brown Fuller, sued Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Wilson Temple for damages for personal injuries sustained by her while a passenger and seated on Southwestern’s bus. She alleged that while she was seated on the bus and it was stopped at the bus terminal in Temple, Texas, she was struck on the head by a heavy suitcase which was carelessly and violently swung against her by a “porter.” She alleged that Wilson Temple operated the bus terminal; that Southwestern and Wilson Temple were engaged in a joint venture, and that the “porter” supra was the employee of each. In the alternative she alleged that Southwestern and Wilson Temple were not engaged in a joint venture but that said “porter” was at the time the servant of each of them; or that said “porter” was the servant and employee of Southwestern, or that he was the servant and employee of Wilson Temple.
Southwestern answered by a general denial and specially denied: that it was engaged in a joint venture with Wilson Temple, and that the “porter” in question was its servant and employee. It then alleged that appellant’s injuries were directly and proximately caused by her own negligence, or, in the alternative, that they were the result of an unavoidable accident.
[457]*457Southwestern filed its motion for a summary judgment and accompanied it with the affidavit of its claim agent. This affidavit recites that the affiant, at the time appellant alleges she sustained injuries, was familiar with the location of the bus terminal operated by Wilson Temple and that:
“At that time the buses operated by Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., together with other carriers and bus companies, used said property as a terminal for boarding passengers and the handling of baggage, express and mail. Mr. Temple sold tickets for Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., permitting it to board and discharge passengers, baggage, express and mail and permitted Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. to maintain a sign on said premises. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. paid Temple a commission on the sale of tickets and transportation charges. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. did not pay nor obligate itself to pay any expense with reference to the operation of said terminal, did not have any employees connected with said terminal, said Temple or said operation; that it had no employees or servants located in or around said terminal or connected therewith, or with said operations; that it did not employ any porters or any other employees at said terminal; that any porter or employee who carried baggage, luggage or the suitcase mentioned in plaintiff’s petition was not any employee or servant or agent of Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.; that at none of, the times mentioned in plaintiff’s petition did Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. have any agent, servant or employee working in or around the terminal in question except the driver of its bus; that the unnamed person mentioned in plaintiff’s pleadings as being a porter was not the agent, servant or employee of Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.; that Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.was not engaged in any joint venture with said Temple and the only connection it had with said Temple was as set out above.”
Thereafter, on March 3, 1959, appellant filed her first amended original petition. She repeated her allegations supra and:
“In the alternative plaintiff says that the man who struck plaintiff in the head with a large suitcase was not an employee of either defendant and that said man was a stranger to defendants and was neither an employee nor a customer of defendants and was untrained and unskilled in handling baggage. The defendants and each of them, their agents, servants and employees, were negligent in that they permitted said unknown man to board: the Greyhound bus, and in that they permitted said unknown man to carry onto said bus a suitcase of such size and weight as to be dangerous to plaintiff and other passengers on the bus. Plaintiff says that the suitcase with which she was hit was so large and so heavy that it could not safely be stored and carried in the passenger area of the bus, and defendants were negligent in that they failed to require that said suitcase be checked and carried in the baggage compartment of the bus. Defendants were negligent in that each of them, their agents, servants and employees, failed to provide a baggage handler, trained in handling and storing baggage in the passenger area on buses, for the purpose of loading onto the bus the suitcase with which plaintiff was hit; and defendants were negligent in that they failed to prohibit an untrained and unskilled stranger from violently swinging about a large' heavy suitcase within the passenger area of the bus.”
Appellant did not file counter affidavits and only the pleadings and the affidavit supra were before the court. On March 6, 1959 Southwestern’s motion was sustained. [458]*458On March 26, 1959 appellant’s motion to sever her cause as to Wilson Temple was granted and on the same day the trial court rendered judgment that appellant take nothing by her suit against Southwestern.
Wilson Temple is not a party to this appeal and the cause as to him will not be further noticed. Southwestern will later be referred to as appellee.
! Giving full credit to the affidavit supra it states as a fact that appellee was not engaged in a joint venture with Wilson Temple. It also states as a fact that the bus terminal was used by appellee “for loading passengers and the handling of baggage, express and mail.” It also denies that the “porter” was an employee or servant of ap-pellee. It does not controvert the alternative pleading supra nor the allegation that the suitcase was so large and so heavy that it could not “safely be stored and carried in the passenger area of the bus” nor that it was of such size and weight as to be dangerous to appellant and other passengers on the bus. Further it does not controvert the allegations that the accident happened and the manner of its happening.
By the provisions of Rule 166-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court was authorized to render judgment for appellee on its motion “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” However the burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact existed was on appellee. It was the province of the trial court to decide from what was then before him (the documents named in the rule supra, here the pleadings and the affidavit) only the question of whether any genuine issue of fact as to any material matter was presented and whether as a matter of law appellee was entitled to judgment. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929; Haley v. Nickels, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 683.
In Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310, the court said:
“The general rule with respect to joint adventures is stated in 33 C.J. p. 841, as follows: ‘A joint adventure has been aptly defined as a “special combination of two or more persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought without any actual partnership or corporate designation.” ’
“The rule is also defined in 25 Texas Jurisprudence, pp. 159 and 160, in the following language: ‘It is constituted by a special combination of persons in the nature of a partnership — more particularly, a limited or special partnership — engaged in the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for mutual benefit or profit.’ ”
Also see: Gill v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d 223, 228. Er. ref., n. r. e., Eastep w. Travelers Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 732, 734, er. ref., n. r. e.
Even if the affidavit supra was sufficient to eliminate any issue of fact as to the existence of a joint venture between appellee and Wilson Temple and was also sufficient to eliminate any issue of fact as to the “porter” being a servant or employee of appellee we cannot rest our decision here. This is true for the reason that ap-pellee owed to its passengers the duty of exercising a high degree of care to protect them from injuries by strangers or intruders on its buses or premises provided the danger was or by the exercise of due care could have been known to its employees and prevented by them, and if it failed in its duty in this respect it is liable for resulting injuries. This duty arises when the danger is foreseen in time to prevent it, or is of such nature that under attending circumstances it might reasonably have been anticipated. 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 696, p. 1303; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew, Tex.Com.App., 66 S.W.2d 659; Houston Electric Co. v. Bragg, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 641; Bennevendo v. Hous[459]*459ton Transit Co., Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 271, er. ref., n. r. e.
The affidavit made no reference to the suitcase except only that the person carrying it on board the bus was not an employee or servant of appellee. It places appellee’s bus driver at the terminal and in effect denies that he was the “porter” who carried the suitcase on board the bus. There is left uncontroverted the size and weight of the suitcase, the allegation that it could not be safely stored in the passenger area of the bus, the manner in which it was handled and appellant’s injuries.
It is reasonable to say that when appellee, by its bus driver, authorized or permitted the suitcase to be carried into the passenger area of the bus it anticipated that it would be stored there. Then if, as alleged, it was too large and too heavy to be safely stored there without danger to appellant and other passengers injuries ought to have been foreseen and anticipated. The statement of the court in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Baldwin, Tex.Civ.App., 2 S.W.2d 520, 523, is applicable here. There the court said:
“Appellee, being a passenger on appellant’s train, the law enjoined upon appellant the exercise of such a high degree of foresight as to possible dangers, and such a high degree of prudence in guarding against them, as would be used by a very cautious, prudent, and competent person under similar circumstances. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Welch, 86 Tex. 203, 24 S.W. 390, 40 Am.St.Rep. 829; International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Halloren, 53 Tex. 46, 37 Am.Rep. 744. We are of the opinion that the evidence in this case was sufficient to raise the issue of the failure of appellant to exercise this care as to her safety as such failure was alleged in the petition. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Storey, 29 Tex.Civ.App. 483, 68 S.W. 534; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Wolf, 40 Tex.Civ.App. 381, 89 S.W. 778.”
The liability here asserted by appellant does not rest on the tort of the “porter” but rather it rests on the negligence of appellee in failing to anticipate injuries and to prevent them by not permitting the suitcase in question to be carried into the passenger area of the bus. 10 Am.Jur., Sec. 1454, p. 268. In order for a negligent act to be the legal proximate causé of an injury it is not essential that the precise injury and the exact manner of its infliction could have been foreseen or anticipated but it is only necessary that some similar injury reasonably could have been foreseen or anticipated. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew, supra. In cases such as the one here the question of negligence and proximate cause are usually issues of fact and cannot be determined on a motion for summary judgment.
From the record before us it cannot be held as a matter of law that appellee could not reasonably have foreseen or anticipated injuries under the facts alleged. The pleadings as above noted make allegations that were not controverted by the affidavit and upon a trial the issues so made are to be determined as issues of fact under the evidence that may be adduced.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.