Fuller v. Roar Money

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 29, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-05284·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK STANLEY FULLER, Plaintiff, 22-CV-5284 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO ROAR MONEY, REPLEAD Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant failed to send him a refund check to which he is entitled. By order dated July 22, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who resides in South Carolina, filed this complaint against Roar Money,

formerly known as Money Lion, which is based in New York. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to send a refund check to him as promised. (ECF ¶¶ II, III.) Attached to the complaint is a July 9, 2021, email from Roar Money stating that “an electronic check for the balance of [Plaintiff’s] Money Lion checking account” would be sent “in the next 3 to 7 weeks.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff does not allege the amount at issue. He seeks his “money & interest charges.” (Id. ¶ IV.) DISCUSSION The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or, when the plaintiff asserts state-law claims under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, when the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different

states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”). A. Diversity jurisdiction To establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that he and the defendant are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory

jurisdictional amount. See § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff provides a South Carolina address for himself and a New York address for Defendant, suggesting that there is diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff does not, however, allege that his claim satisfies this jurisdictional amount, and thus his complaint does not establish that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over his claims. The Court therefore dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). B. Leave to amend granted Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the

1 There are no facts in the complaint suggesting that Plaintiff can assert any claims under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to amend his complaint to provide any additional facts suggesting that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this matter.

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