Fuller v. Meloy

848 N.E.2d 1172, 2006 Ind. App. LEXIS 1118, 2006 WL 1652692

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 16, 2006
• Docket: 32A01-0511-CV-521
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

RATLIFF, Senior Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-Appellants Maurice D. Fuller, Jeffrey C. Ferguson, and Alonzo L. Jordan appeal the trial court’s denial of additional credit time toward their sentences.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Appellants present one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by denying the appellants’ petition for additional credit time toward their sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Appellants are incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction at the Plainfield Correctional Facility in Plain-field, Indiana, and, while incarcerated, each of them completed an approved vocational program. By statute, successful completion of such a program earns an inmate credit time toward his or her sentence. The Appellants each received a three month credit toward their individual sentences when they completed their programs. Believing they were to receive more than three months credit, they jointly petitioned the trial court for additional credit time toward their respective sentences. The trial court denied their petition, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The Appellants contend that the trial court improperly denied their joint petition for additional credit time. Specifically, the appellants argue that pursuant to the applicable statute, they should have received six months of credit time rather than the three months they each received for their completion of an approved vocational education program while incarcerated.

A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law, and we are neither bound by, nor are we required to give deference to, the trial court’s interpretation. Perry-Worth Concerned Citizens v. Board of Com’rs of Boone County, 723 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. When interpreting a statute, we look to the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. Indiana State Teachers Ass’n. v. Board of School Com’rs of City of Indianapolis, 693 N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). However, we may not interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous on its face. Schafer v. Sellersburg Town Council, 714 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Rather, the words of the statute are to be given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute itself. Id. Additionally, the language employed in a statute is deemed to have been used intentionally. Id.

The statute at issue in this case is Ind.Code § 35-50-6-3.3 and is entitled Credit Time for Successful Completion of Educational Degree. Ind.Code § 35-50-6-3.3(b)(3)(A) provides that a person may earn credit time while he or she is confined by the department of correction if, in addition to other requirements that are not at issue in this case, the person successfully completes a vocational education program approved by the department of correction. Additionally, Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(d) provides, in pertinent part:

The amount of credit time a person may earn under this section is the following:

(1) Six (6) months for completion of a state of Indiana general educational development (GED) diploma under IC 20-20-6.

(2) One (1) year for graduation from high school.

(3) One (1) year for completion of an associate’s degree.

(4) Two (2) years for completion of a bachelor’s degree.

(5) Not more than a total of six (6) months of credit, as determined by the department of correction, for the completion of one (1) or more vocational education programs approved by the department of correction.

(6) ⅞ ⅜ ⅜ *

(7) * * * * *

The Appellants argue that the wording of subsection (5) creates a mandatory award of six months of credit time for any prisoner who completes an approved vocational program.

This statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. Subsection (5) explicitly provides that a prisoner may be awarded not more than a total of six months credit as determined by the department of correction.1 Thus, the statute places the determination of the amount of credit time to be awarded within the discretion of the department of correction while limiting the amount of credit time to a total of six months. Although the legislature did not set forth a specific amount of credit time to be awarded upon completion of vocational programs, it did so for other educational programs. See Ind.Code § 35-50-6-3.3(d)(l), (2), (3) and (4) (providing specific amounts of credit time for completion of GED, high school, associate’s degree, and bachelor’s degree). Accordingly, if the legislature had wanted a specific, mandated amount of credit time to be awarded to inmates who successfully completed vocational programs, it simply could have stated so, as it did for other educational programs available in the department of correction.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Appellants’ joint petition for additional credit time.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J., concurs. DARDEN, J., dissents with opinion.

1 . Absent statutory or internal rules setting guidelines for the determination of the amount of credit time for the successful completion of vocational education programs, we believe the department's discretion to be unlimited.