Fryer v. Easy Money Title Pawn, Inc. (In Re Fryer)

183 B.R. 322, 1995 WL 356371
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 12, 1995
Docket17-30017
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 183 B.R. 322 (Fryer v. Easy Money Title Pawn, Inc. (In Re Fryer)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fryer v. Easy Money Title Pawn, Inc. (In Re Fryer), 183 B.R. 322, 1995 WL 356371 (Ga. 1995).

Opinion

AMENDED ORDER

JOHN S. DALIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

In his four count complaint, Lannice Fryer, Sr. alleges that the motor vehicle title pawn transaction entered into between Mr. Fryer and Easy Money Title Pawn, Inc. (“Easy Money”) violates the Georgia usury statute, O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18, the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (“Federal RICO”), the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. (“Georgia RICO”), and the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (“TILA”) and accompanying regulations, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226. At trial the parties presented evidence and legal argument, supplemented by post trial briefs regarding Mr. Fryer’s usury claim and claim that the contract failed to disclose the finance charge and annual percentage rate in accordance with the TILA. 1 After careful consideration of all the evidence presented and legal authority, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment for the plaintiff against defendant Easy Money.

Mr. Fryer entered into the complained of title pawn loan transaction on March 23,1993 with Easy Money, first defendant, which plaintiff claims is owned and operated by Marion “Bud” Arrington, second defendant. Under the agreement, plaintiff borrowed $700.00 while pledging as security title to his 1986 Pontiac Sunbird automobile. Plaintiff was to repay the loan with interest under one of several options: $223.25 per week if the loan were repaid in 30 days (total to be paid $893.00), $133.40 per week if the loan were repaid in 60 days ($1,068.00), and $103.58 per *325 week if the loan were repaid in 90 days ($1,244.00).

Plaintiff filed for relief under Chapter 13 on April 2, 1993. Easy Money filed a proof of secured claim for $893.00. This proof of claim evidences Easy Money’s claim of entitlement to the $700.00 principal plus $193.00 in interest and fees on the pawn transaction. The interest and fee portion of Easy Money’s claim gives rise to the dispute in this case. In its prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks actual and treble damages, 2 forfeiture of interest on the pawn transaction, reformation of the contract, cancellation of the security interest granted therein, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs of this action together with statutory penalties provided under the TILA. 3

I find that the interest charged in this pawn transaction exceeds that permitted by the Georgia usury statute, O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18, which provides in part:

Any person, company, or corporation who shall reserve, charge or take for any loan or advance of money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of money, any rate of interest greater than 5% per month, either directly or directly, by way of commission for advances, discount, exchange, or the purchase of salary or wages; by notorial or other fees; or by any contract, contrivance, or device whatsoever shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, however, that regularly licensed pawn brokers, where personal property is taken into their actual physical possession and stored by them, may charge, in addition to said rate of interest, not exceeding 25<t at the time the property is first taken possession of by them for the storage of said property.

O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18(a).

The defendant argues in its supplemental brief submitted since the trial that this statute does not apply to pawn brokers. 4 I find that contrary to the defendant’s contentions, this Code section is applicable to pawn brokers by the clear direct reference to pawn brokers in the statute and the plain language of the statute.

The contract in this case provides for a “Pawnshop and Interest Charge” of $175.00 under the 30-day repayment option, plus an $18.00 “Title Fee.” These charges plus the principal advanced of $700.00 totals $893.00, the amount of the filed proof of claim. At hearing, testimony was given by Mr. Arrington, who I find based on the unrefuted evidence is not the owner or operator but is simply an employee of Easy Money. According to the contract and the testimony of Mr. Arrington, the $175.00 charge is a 25% per month charge on the pawn transaction. This 25% per month charge is derived from O.C.G.A. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(A), which provides,

[djuring the first 90 days of any pawn transaction or extension or continuation of the pawn transaction, a pawn broker may charge for each 30 day period interest and pawnshop charges which together equal no more than 25% of the principal amount advanced, with a minimum charge of up to $10.00 per 30-day period.

The statute does not define interest or pawnshop charges. Mr. Arrington testified that the 25% per month charge is comprised of a 2% interest rate charge and 23% service charge. The services encompassed by this charge include, according to Mr. Arrington, the customer’s use of the pawned automobile, the risk to the lender of that continued use, cheeking and processing the title to the automobile apparently in addition to the itemized $18.00 title fee charged under the contract, verifying insurance on the automobile, and making a log for the Sheriffs department. I find that the charge for these services does *326 not constitute pawnshop charges but rather interest.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Moore v. Comfed Savings Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 842 (11th Cir.1990) interpreted the language of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18, supra, broadly, finding the statute should be enforced against any fee reserved, charged or taken by the lender for the advance of money, distinguishing between a fee charged as collection of interest or as payment for a service rendered. Under Comfed I must determine whether the charges imposed by Easy Money are for services rendered or are simply a vehicle for the collection of interest, which according to Comfed is a question of fact. Id. In doing so, I must harmonize the usury statute, O.C.G.A. § 7-4-18, with O.C.G.A.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
183 B.R. 322, 1995 WL 356371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fryer-v-easy-money-title-pawn-inc-in-re-fryer-gasb-1995.