OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
These appeals are from convictions for aggravated robbery. These appellants were tried together and each was assessed as punishment confinement for seven years.
The appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. In their sole ground of error they contend that certain evidence admitted at their trial was the product of an illegal search and seizure. We agree.
The appellants were among four persons accused of committing an aggravated robbery of the complainant, Robert Herdman, on March 25,1978, in Dallas. Herdman was reported missing during the early morning hours of March 25 by his fiancee, Carol Hutyra. Hutyra reported seeing Herdman leave his apartment with co-defendant William Paddock. As they left, Hutyra noted that the car had California license plates; she wrote down the license number. About 5:00 a. m. the car returned to the apartment complex without Herdman. Appellant Fry and co-defendant Paddock got out of the car. They then attempted to burglarize Herdman’s apartment. When Hutyra screamed they left. Hutyra reported the incident to a police officer who left a written report for his replacement watch.
Later that afternoon, Officer Swafford followed up the report. He picked up Hu-tyra at her apartment and took her back to Herdman’s apartment to see if he had returned yet. They arrived there about 2:00 [464]*464p. m. and discovered that Herdman had just arrived. Herdman had been very badly beaten.
Herdman then told Officer Swafford that at about 3:00 a. m. he had taken Paddock home. Upon arriving at the house, which was about three blocks from his apartment, Herdman was ordered into the house by appellant Martinez who was holding a shotgun. During the next ten or eleven hours Herdman was robbed and repeatedly beaten by four men inside the house. At about 2:00 p. m., the men finally agreed to release Herdman, and appellant Martinez drove him back to his apartment.
About 3:00 p. m., Officer Arnold arrived at the apartment. Herdman again related the day’s events to Arnold. He told Arnold that the men had discussed leaving for California that day. He also told him that at the time he was released three of the four men were asleep or had passed out.
Arnold left Herdman’s apartment about 3:30 p. m. and drove to a nearby police substation. He called the Crimes Against Persons Section downtown and requested additional manpower to assist him in arresting the four men described by Herdman. He told the sergeant on duty that he “knew where the suspects probably were” and that he “didn’t have time to secure a warrant.”
After making the call, Arnold drove to a position near the house. He kept it under surveillance until the back-up officers arrived about thirty minutes later. During that time Arnold saw nothing occur at the house.
About 4:15 p. m., Arnold and the other officers surrounded the house. Arnold knocked on the door and identified himself as a police officer. When one of the other officers saw movement inside the house, Arnold kicked open the door. All four men were then arrested, and numerous weapons and other items were seized. Only appellant Martinez was awake when the police officers entered the house.
Before their joint trial, the four co-defendants filed a motion to suppress all items seized as a result of their arrest and the search of their residence. After an extensive hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. At trial the following items were admitted into evidence: a sawed-off shotgun, a shotgun, a rifle, a baseball bat, a wooden club, a chain belt, a bayonet, a butcher knife, an aerosol spray can, three spent tubes of toothpaste, a knife, a shotgun shell, and hair specimens. In addition, thirteen photographs of various parts of the house, which were taken at the time of arrest, were admitted into evidence. Three photographs of the house which were taken three months after the arrest were also admitted into evidence.
The testimony at the suppression hearing established that no police officers ever attempted to contact a magistrate in order to obtain an arrest warrant. Officer Arnold testified that because it was Saturday he did not think such an attempt would be successful.
If there was previously any doubt, it is now clear that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless arrest of a person in his own home is per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). As the Court stated in Payton:
“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.’ That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.’ Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 [81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734]. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent [465]*465exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”
445 U.S. at 589-590,100 S.Ct. at 1381-1382.
However, we need not decide whether the warrantless arrest made in this case violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In Texas, a peace officer’s authority to make a warrantless arrest is controlled exclusively by statute. Lewis v. State, 598 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes very few exceptions to the general requirement that a peace officer obtain a warrant before making an arrest.1
At the pre-trial hearing held in this case, the State relied solely upon V.A.C.C.P., Art. 14.04, as authority for the warrantless arrest of the appellants. Art. 14.04 provides:
“Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.”
There is no question in this case concerning the credibility of the information given to the arresting officers by the complaining witness. Neither is there a question concerning whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed. The sole question in this case is whether the State met its burden of proving that the arresting officers reasonably believed that the appellants were about to escape, so that there was no time to procure an arrest warrant.
In Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), we stated:
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OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
These appeals are from convictions for aggravated robbery. These appellants were tried together and each was assessed as punishment confinement for seven years.
The appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. In their sole ground of error they contend that certain evidence admitted at their trial was the product of an illegal search and seizure. We agree.
The appellants were among four persons accused of committing an aggravated robbery of the complainant, Robert Herdman, on March 25,1978, in Dallas. Herdman was reported missing during the early morning hours of March 25 by his fiancee, Carol Hutyra. Hutyra reported seeing Herdman leave his apartment with co-defendant William Paddock. As they left, Hutyra noted that the car had California license plates; she wrote down the license number. About 5:00 a. m. the car returned to the apartment complex without Herdman. Appellant Fry and co-defendant Paddock got out of the car. They then attempted to burglarize Herdman’s apartment. When Hutyra screamed they left. Hutyra reported the incident to a police officer who left a written report for his replacement watch.
Later that afternoon, Officer Swafford followed up the report. He picked up Hu-tyra at her apartment and took her back to Herdman’s apartment to see if he had returned yet. They arrived there about 2:00 [464]*464p. m. and discovered that Herdman had just arrived. Herdman had been very badly beaten.
Herdman then told Officer Swafford that at about 3:00 a. m. he had taken Paddock home. Upon arriving at the house, which was about three blocks from his apartment, Herdman was ordered into the house by appellant Martinez who was holding a shotgun. During the next ten or eleven hours Herdman was robbed and repeatedly beaten by four men inside the house. At about 2:00 p. m., the men finally agreed to release Herdman, and appellant Martinez drove him back to his apartment.
About 3:00 p. m., Officer Arnold arrived at the apartment. Herdman again related the day’s events to Arnold. He told Arnold that the men had discussed leaving for California that day. He also told him that at the time he was released three of the four men were asleep or had passed out.
Arnold left Herdman’s apartment about 3:30 p. m. and drove to a nearby police substation. He called the Crimes Against Persons Section downtown and requested additional manpower to assist him in arresting the four men described by Herdman. He told the sergeant on duty that he “knew where the suspects probably were” and that he “didn’t have time to secure a warrant.”
After making the call, Arnold drove to a position near the house. He kept it under surveillance until the back-up officers arrived about thirty minutes later. During that time Arnold saw nothing occur at the house.
About 4:15 p. m., Arnold and the other officers surrounded the house. Arnold knocked on the door and identified himself as a police officer. When one of the other officers saw movement inside the house, Arnold kicked open the door. All four men were then arrested, and numerous weapons and other items were seized. Only appellant Martinez was awake when the police officers entered the house.
Before their joint trial, the four co-defendants filed a motion to suppress all items seized as a result of their arrest and the search of their residence. After an extensive hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. At trial the following items were admitted into evidence: a sawed-off shotgun, a shotgun, a rifle, a baseball bat, a wooden club, a chain belt, a bayonet, a butcher knife, an aerosol spray can, three spent tubes of toothpaste, a knife, a shotgun shell, and hair specimens. In addition, thirteen photographs of various parts of the house, which were taken at the time of arrest, were admitted into evidence. Three photographs of the house which were taken three months after the arrest were also admitted into evidence.
The testimony at the suppression hearing established that no police officers ever attempted to contact a magistrate in order to obtain an arrest warrant. Officer Arnold testified that because it was Saturday he did not think such an attempt would be successful.
If there was previously any doubt, it is now clear that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless arrest of a person in his own home is per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). As the Court stated in Payton:
“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.’ That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.’ Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 [81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734]. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent [465]*465exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”
445 U.S. at 589-590,100 S.Ct. at 1381-1382.
However, we need not decide whether the warrantless arrest made in this case violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In Texas, a peace officer’s authority to make a warrantless arrest is controlled exclusively by statute. Lewis v. State, 598 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes very few exceptions to the general requirement that a peace officer obtain a warrant before making an arrest.1
At the pre-trial hearing held in this case, the State relied solely upon V.A.C.C.P., Art. 14.04, as authority for the warrantless arrest of the appellants. Art. 14.04 provides:
“Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.”
There is no question in this case concerning the credibility of the information given to the arresting officers by the complaining witness. Neither is there a question concerning whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed. The sole question in this case is whether the State met its burden of proving that the arresting officers reasonably believed that the appellants were about to escape, so that there was no time to procure an arrest warrant.
In Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), we stated:
“In accordance with the strict construction given exceptions allowing warrant-less arrests, this court has always required a clear showing that the person arrested was about to escape. As is often said when considering an arrest without warrant, inarticulate hunches and suspicions are not enough to justify the arrest.”
499 S.W.2d at 665. See also, Hardison v. State, 597 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (“A showing that the offender is about to escape is indispensable under Article 14.04 ....”)
The State argues that the arresting officers reasonably believed that the appellants were about to escape, so that there was no time to procure an arrest warrant. It points out that the arrest took place on a Saturday afternoon, that the suspects had said that they intended to leave for California that day, and that the complainant, who had been released, knew where the suspects lived. The combination of these facts, the State contends, justified the arrest of the appellants without a warrant. We do not agree.
First, the testimony in the case is clear that Officer Arnold merely assumed that a magistrate would not be available to issue an arrest warrant for the appellants. Neither he nor anyone else even attempted to test that assumption by trying to locate a magistrate. In light of the other testimony in the case, Arnold’s assumption carries little weight.
Shortly after 2:00 p. m. Officer Swafford had received enough information from the complainant to begin the process of obtaining a warrant. He did not attempt to do so.
Officer Arnold arrived at the complainant’s apartment about 3:00 p. m. At about 3:30 p. m. he left the apartment and drove to a nearby police substation where he called for back-up officers. He, too, did not make any attempt to contact a magistrate himself or request that anyone else make such an attempt.
Arnold testified that he was aware that Dallas County had numerous judges who had the power to issue warrants. He also testified that on other occasions he had been able to obtain a warrant on a weekend or at night, and that to do so he had called [466]*466a magistrate at home, if necessary, and then had gone to the magistrate’s home to physically obtain the warrant. When he was asked why he did not attempt to obtain a warrant in this case, he replied:
“Because I have secured many warrants, and it takes a great deal of time in even locating a Judge on Saturday afternoon. It can take hours to get one.
“I did not have hours to sit out there and wait for those people to leave. I felt they were dangerous people and that the community would best be served if I arrested them at that time, rather than try to seek a warrant.
“Knowing the situation and how hard it is to get a Judge on Saturday afternoon, that was the best thing to do, considering the totality of the circumstances.”
Arnold was later asked about the times when he had gotten a warrant:
“Q All right. Before the times you have gotten a warrant, how long did it take on an average?
“A I couldn’t really give you an average figure. Sometimes, you can’t find anybody, so you can’t even place a time period on it.
“Q And sometimes you can just find them and get a warrant — like that? “A That’s right.
“Q So, it could run from thirty minutes to an hour, to not finding anybody? “A That’s right.”
Since Arnold testified that on other occasions he had been able to obtain a warrant on a weekend, and since he conceded that the time involved in doing so could have been as little as half an hour, depending on the availability of a magistrate, we are unwilling to hold that the State has met its burden of showing that there was no time to procure a warrant. Absent proof that attempts were made to locate a magistrate and obtain a warrant, Arnold’s bare assumption that such attempts would be unsuccessful carries little weight.
In addition, after their arrest, the appellants were transported to the city jail. They were then identified by Herdman, booked into the jail, and taken before a magistrate for arraignment. Thus the testimony establishes that a magistrate was on duty at least a few hours after the arrest.
Officer Arnold was questioned about the presence of a magistrate at the jail:
“Q When you took the defendants down to the station, you said you took them to arraignment?
“A No. I didn’t take them directly to be arraigned, no.
“Q But after you photographed them and they were processed, you finally took them to arraignment?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And who arraigned them?
“A Tom Boardman.
“Q And what is Tom Boardman?
“A Tom Boardman is a weekend Judge down there, the best I am able to determine, a practicing attorney.
“Q Are you aware that he can issue warrants?
“A Yeah, I guess he can.
“Q All right. Did you talk with Mr. Boardman before that — before you took them in for arraignment?
“A Yes, sir. I talked to him at the time I took them in.
“Q Was Mr. Boardman about to leave duty that day?
“A Yes, sir. He was fixing to come down to the County, as I recall.
“Q So, he had been there for some time, or at least before that time?
“A I don’t know how long he had been there. I know he said something about going down to the County. I don’t know when he came down.
“Q Have you ever secured a warrant from Mr. Boardman?
“A No, sir.
“Q Do you usually take people you arrest on Saturdays to be arraigned there at the City, after you finish with them?
“A No, sir. I usually don’t.
[467]*467“Q But do you have knowledge that they are usually taken to be arraigned?
“A They are usually arraigned, yes.
“Q And that’s by a Magistrate or a City Judge down there?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Do you remember approximately what time it was that you took them in to be arraigned?
“A Oh, eight or nine o’clock. I would have to guess. I don’t know.
* * * * * *
“Q Now, I believe you said a while ago that Judge Boardman was on duty at City Hall sometime when you got back down there, is that right?
“A He was up at the jail when I went up with the prisoners.
“Q Now, is there not always — at least on weekends, mostly in the daylight and evening hours — a Judge on duty in City Hall?
“A I don’t know, to tell you the truth. I would assume that they are down there for arraigning prisoners, but I really don’t know.
I normally don’t personally take prisoners to be arraigned.
“Q Well, isn’t it a fact, officer, that there is a Municipal Judge, at least one, on duty, or Peace Judges, or part-time Judges like Mr. Boardman on duty all weekend long at the City Hall?
“A That may be true. I don’t know.
“Q Are you aware of Judge Cleo Steele here in the County Courthouse?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And he’s a Peace Judge?”
“A Yes, sir.” (Emphasis added)
This testimony, too, undercuts the validity of Officer Arnold’s assumption that a magistrate would have been difficult to locate. Absent a showing that attempts to locate a magistrate were unsuccessful, Arnold’s assumption in this case simply cannot sustain the State’s burden of proof. See Hogan v. State, 631 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
Second, the testimony in the case regarding the reasonableness of the arresting officers’ belief that the appellants were about to escape is ambiguous at best. Since the State has the burden of proving that a warrantless arrest falls within one of the statutory exceptions, ambiguity must be resolved against the State.
The complaining witness testified as follows:
“Q ... As best you can recall, what were the words you told [the police officers] about what [the appellants] were going to do after they had let you off?
“A I just said every one of them was going to move out of the house and leave, and some of them were talking about going back to California.
“Q Did they give you any time frame of when they were going to do that?
“A That day.
“Q That same day?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Each of them told you that?
“A Yes, sir. They all said they was moving out that day.
“Q Were any of them packing while you were in there?
“A No, sir. Three of them were passed out on the floor, or asleep on the floor, or whatever, and Martinez was still awake.
“Q Did you tell the officers that three of them were passed out on the floor and one of them brought you back?
“A I believe so, yes, sir. I don’t know.”
According to this testimony, the appellants said that they intended to leave for California that day. There was no testimony in the record which indicated that they ever said that they planned to do so immediately after releasing the complaining witness. Furthermore, the complaining witness knew that three of the four assailants were incapable of immediate departure since they were passed out or asleep when [468]*468appellant Martinez took the complaining witness back to his apartment. The record does not clearly show whether the complaining witness communicated this knowledge to the police officers, but again, since the State has the burden of proving that the officers reasonably believed that the appellants were about to escape, any ambiguities must be resolved against the State.
In addition, Officer Arnold’s own testimony casts doubt upon the reasonableness of such a belief:
“Q You didn’t think [the appellants] would leave without getting in the car?
“A Without getting in the car or getting on a motorcycle. I didn’t think they would walk on foot, as long as they had transportation available, so I didn’t think they would be walking out the back door or something. * * * * * *
“Q Now, you had been told that — by Herdman — that the four individuals in that house had told him they were going back to California as soon as they could move out of the house?
“A They were talking about it among themselves.
“Q Now, during the twenty-five to thirty minutes that you observed the house, you knew the car was there?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q You had seen it as you were going to the Northwest Substation?
“A Uh-huh.
“Q It was still there in the same position when you came back by?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q You assumed they were in the house?
“A I assumed they were in the house. ******
“Q ... From your viewpoint, at your observation point, was there any attempt to move out of the house or escape by the people inside of it?
“A No, sir.
******
“Q ... Was there ever a point of time when that house was not under surveillance, guard, or security?
“A Yes, sir, there was.
“Q That was while you were at the substation making a phone call?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q That was the twenty-five or thirty minutes—
“A No, sir. It was more like five or six minutes, or seven minutes.
“Q So, at least five or six minutes from the time you learned the address or location of the house, where was never more than five or six minutes of time when the house wasn’t under police control or guard; is that right?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And would that have been by you and some other officers, or some other officers when you weren’t there, or what?
“A From the time I learned the location of the automobile and the address, there was only a five or six minute span — seven minutes — whatever— that it was not under observation.”
According to this testimony, Officer Arnold had the appellants’ house under continuous observation from the time he left the complaining witness’s house, which other testimony showed was about 3:30 p. m., until he and the back-up officers made the arrests about 4:15 p. m., with the exception of the five to seven minute period while he made the telephone call. Furthermore, the appellants’ expected means of departure, their car, was also under observation. At no time did Arnold see any attempt to escape, or even any preparations for escape. He simply waited at his observation post until the back-up officers arrived and then made the arrest. This is simply not a case where quick action by the police, so that there was no time to procure a warrant, was necessary to prevent the appellants’ imminent escape.
[469]*469The dissent characterizes our opinion as requiring the State to show that the appellants were in the midst of their escape. It should not be so read. We only hold that the State has not met its burden of proving that the arresting officer reasonably believed that the offenders’ escape was imminent.
The dissent cites a number of cases which it believes require us to uphold this war-rantless arrest. Our reading of those cases persuades us that they are distinguishable on the facts, or are not controlling authority because they simply do not appear to have addressed the issues presented by this appeal.
The dissent appears to cite Rose v. State, 470 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), for the proposition that the State can meet its burden of showing that a magistrate was unavailable by showing that a police officer assumed that fact. We do not so read Rose. The opinion in that case states, “The officers testified that they did not have time to procure a warrant after talking to Jeffries [the complaining witness] shortly before the arrest.” Id. at 199. Nowhere in the opinion is there an indication of what evidence the State presented; however, nowhere is there an indication that the defendant challenged the testimony of the officers. In this case, as indicated above, there was testimony which severely undercut the bare assumption of unavailability made by the arresting officer.
Furthermore, in Rose the complaining witness told the arresting officer that the defendant was about to leave or had possibly already left. When the witness and the police officer arrived at the address given by the complaining witness, they were told that the defendant had already left. Here, the arresting officer may have been told that three of the four assailants were incapable of immediate departure. The arresting officer also testified that he assumed that the appellants were still at their house, and that the house was under almost constant surveillance. We think Rose is distinguishable on the facts.
In Thornton v. State, 451 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), as in Rose, there is no indication in the Court’s opinion that the officers’ assertion that they did not have time to obtain a search warrant was disputed. Furthermore, there is no indication that the arrest was challenged upon the basis that no one had told the officers that the defendants were about to escape. The same is true of Flanagan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). For these reasons we do not regard these cases as authority for this cause.
In Maloy v. State, 582 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), the arrest took place at approximately 3:00 to 3:30 a. m. As the Court’s opinion stated, “the testimony is undisputed that there was no magistrate available at that hour.” Id. at 127. There is also no indication in the opinion that the complaining witness’ statement that the defendant was about to “bug out” and leave the city soon was disputed.
In Loving v. State, 559 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), the arrest took place a few hours after the crime. However, more importantly, the defendants were driving in a car at the time the arrest occurred. See also, Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Washington v. State, 518 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Green v. State, 470 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). In each of those cases the defendants were arrested shortly after the commission of the crime and while they were driving in their cars. They were, therefore, already mobile and able to escape. That is not the case here.
As we view it, V.A.C.C.P., Art. 14.04, contains four requirements: (1) the person who gives the information to the peace officer must be credible, (2) the offense must be a felony, (3) the offender must be about to escape, and (4) there must be no time to procure a warrant. In this case, there is no question that the first two requirements have been met. However, we hold that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof on the last two requirements.
[470]*470The evidence shows that the appellants were in their own home, under surveillance for at least forty-five minutes, that their expected means of escape was also under surveillance, that no attempt to escape or even preparation for escape was shown, and that the arresting officers may have been told that three of the four assailants were passed out or asleep when the complaining witness was released. In addition, the evidence shows that one of the arresting officers had secured warrants in the past on weekends and at night, that although it sometimes took a long period of time to do so, at other times it took no more than half an hour, that he was aware that there were numerous judges in Dallas County who could issue a warrant, that he was not sure whether a judge was on duty all weekend at City Hall, and that no attempt was ever made to contact a magistrate. On this record, we simply cannot hold that the State has met its burden of proving that the offenders were about to escape, so that there was no time to procure a warrant.
The facts of this case fail to justify the appellants’ arrest in their home without a warrant. For this reason, the items seized at the time of their arrest, and the photographs taken at or near that time, should not have been admitted into evidence. Y.A. C.C.P., Art. 38.23.
We turn now to the admissibility of the three photographs taken of the house three months after the arrest. These photographs were apparently taken after the appellants had moved out of the house, and at a time when the house was available for lease. We hold that under these circumstances, any taint from the illegal arrest was sufficiently purged. State’s Exhibits Nos. 45, 48 and 49 were properly admitted into evidence.
Because the other items and photographs were improperly admitted into evidence, these causes are reversed and remanded.