Frost v. Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 29, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-02201
StatusUnknown

This text of Frost v. Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Frost v. Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frost v. Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VINTON P. FROST, Plaintiff, 22-CV-2201 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND CIVIL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. By order dated March 30, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND The complaint sets forth the following allegations. On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff delivered a FOIA request to the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice, seeking documents “pertaining to [him] in the custody of the Torts Branch.” (ECF 2 ¶ III and Exh. A.) Plaintiff did not receive a response within 20 business days, and he seeks an order from this Court directing Defendant to respond to his document request. DISCUSSION The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, provides members of the public a right of access to some information from federal executive agencies. Federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce this right if a requester can show that “an agency has (1) ‘improperly;’ (2) ‘withheld;’ (3) ‘agency records.’” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). “Unless each of these criteria is met, a district court lacks jurisdiction to devise remedies to force an agency to comply with the FOIA’s disclosure requirements.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989).

Before seeking judicial review, a FOIA applicant must exhaust administrative remedies by completing the administrative appeal process. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii); see Sloman v. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, 832 F. Supp. 63, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The exhaustion requirement allows the targeted agency to correct its own errors, which obviates unnecessary judicial review. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969); New York Times Co. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 340 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[P]rior to judicial review, the [plaintiff] must exhaust h[is] administrative remedies.”). The FOIA establishes the following administrative process: Each agency, upon any request for records . . . shall (i) determine within 20 days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request of – (I) such determination and the reasons therefor[.] 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i); see 28 C.F.R. § 16.6(b), (c). If the request is denied, the requester may appeal the adverse determination to the head of the agency within 90 days. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa). A FOIA requester is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies if he files a timely appeal but the agency does not respond within applicable limits. McKevitt v. Mueller, 689 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (relying on 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i)). Here, Plaintiff does not provide facts suggesting that he filed an appeal to the head of the agency. Plaintiff simply alleges that he submitted a request for documents and got no response. Thus, this Court cannot discern from the complaint whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
McKart v. United States
395 U.S. 185 (Supreme Court, 1969)
United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts
492 U.S. 136 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Sloman v. U.S. Department of Justice
832 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. New York, 1993)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
New York Times Co. v. United States Department of Labor
340 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D. New York, 2004)
McKevitt v. Mueller
689 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Frost v. Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frost-v-civil-division-us-department-of-justice-nysd-2022.