OPINION
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chris Froines appeals the superior court’s order limiting his award of Alaska Civil Rule 68 attorney’s fees to $10,000. Because the factors relied upon by the superior court do not justify this limit, we reverse.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This appeal represents the second time that this case has come before us.1 We recount here only those facts and proceedings necessary to understand and resolve the current dispute.
In 2000 Chris Froines, a commercial fisherman, filed suit against Valdez Fisheries Development Association (VFDA) for breach of contract. In 2001 the superior court granted summary judgment against Froines. Froines appealed and we reversed, holding that genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment.2
On remand, Froines made an offer of judgment to VFDA “in the amount of $15,000.00 inclusive of all costs, interest and attorney’s fees.” VFDA rejected the offer and the case proceeded to trial.
Following a five-day trial in Valdez in August 2005, the jury awarded Froines $10,000. Taking into account prejudgment interest, fees, and costs, this award exceeded Froines’s $15,000 offer of judgment by at least five percent. Consequently, in September, Froines filed a motion pursuant to Rule 68(b)(2)3 for fifty percent of his reasonable [1236]*1236and actual attorney’s fees incurred from the date of his offer of judgment through the end of proceedings in the trial court. In support of this motion, Froines filed itemized time sheets detailing the work performed and services provided by his counsel. At the time of this filing, Froines calculated his attorney’s fees award under Rule 68(b)(2) to be $37,197.25. This total represented half of his attorneys’ regular hourly rates multiplied by the number of hours they worked.
VFDA opposed Froines’s motion and argued that Froines was generally not entitled to an award based upon his attorneys’ hourly rates or hours worked because his attorneys had actually worked on a contingent fee basis. It further argued that the requested award was neither actual nor reasonable.
Froines responded about a week later, arguing that contingent fee arrangements have no effect on awards of attorney’s fees under Rule 68 and that the requested award was reasonable. Froines also increased the amount he was seeking to $39,676.25 as a result of the additional time his lawyers had worked on the ease since he had originally moved for attorney’s fees.
On October 14, 2005, the superior court entered an order granting Rule 68 attorney’s fees. Analogizing to our case law regarding Rule 82, the superior court reasoned that awards of attorney’s fees under Rule 68 must be based upon “the reasonable value of the attorney’s services, not what the client actually pays.”4 Nonetheless, the superior court then went on to award Froines only $10,000 in attorney’s fees because “a full reasonable fee should not have exceeded $20,000.” Although the superior court did not detail exactly how it arrived at this number, it noted several factors from Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including “the lack of novelty of the issues, the moderate time and labor that should have been required, the modest probable recovery, the minimal verdict, the lack of any serious time limitations and the contingent nature of the fee.”
Froines now appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s fact-based determinations regarding whether attorney’s fees are reasonable for an abuse of discretion.5 However, the proper interpretation of Alaska Civil Rule 68 is a question of law that we review de novo.6
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Froines claims that the superior court’s order limiting Froines’s reasonable attorney’s fees was unjustified. In assessing the reasonable value of the services provided by Froines’s attorneys, the superior court looked to Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which lists a number of factors relevant to determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. According to the superior court, “[t]he most important [Rule 1.5] factors in this ease include the lack of novelty of the issues, the moderate time and labor that should have been required, the modest probable recovery, the minimal verdict, the lack of any serious time limitations and the contingent nature of the fee.” On the basis of these factors, the superior court concluded that “a full reasonable fee” in this ease “should not have exceeded $20,000.” It therefore awarded Froines only $10,000 in attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Froines characterizes the superior court’s award as “arbitrary” and insists that he should have been awarded the full $39,676.25 — the amount produced by multiplying his attorneys’ regular hourly rates with the amount of hours they worked. VFDA disagrees and maintains that the superior court properly relied on Rule 1.5 to limit the award to a reasonable amount.
[1237]*1237Although we have previously relied upon Rule 1.5 factors to limit awards of Rule 82 attorney’s fees,7 several of these factors lose their probative value in the context of Rule 68 attorney’s fees. Unlike Rule 82, the purpose of Rule 68 is not merely to “partially compensate a prevailing party”8 for its reasonable expenses; rather, “the purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage pretrial settlement” so as to save both the litigants and the state from the time and expense of a trial.9 It works towards this purpose by subjecting litigants who reject pretrial offers of judgment to the risk of paying a percentage of their opponents’ attorney’s fees. As we have previously explained:
Offers of judgment force both the offeror and the offeree to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits. The penalties of Rule 68 raise the cost of litigation in the offeree’s risk-benefit analysis, thus making settlement more attractive.[10]
In the context of Rule 82, three of the Rule 1.5 factors noted by the superior court — a lack of novel issues of law, a modest probable recovery, and a minimal verdict — are probative only as to whether the prevailing party litigated its claim in an unreasonable manner, dedicating excessive time and money to a relatively simple or minor ease. When considered in the context of Rule 82, these factors weigh in favor of reducing an award of attorney’s fees. In the context of Rule 68, however, these factors cut both ways; although still probative as to whether the prevailing party litigated its claim unreasonably, these factors also tend to demonstrate that the case was particularly amenable to an offer of judgment. That a ease involved no novel issues of law suggests that the parties should have been able to reasonably assess the merits of their claims and arrive at a settlement. That a case involved only a modest probable recovery suggests that the parties should have had the incentive to avoid the costs of trial.
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OPINION
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chris Froines appeals the superior court’s order limiting his award of Alaska Civil Rule 68 attorney’s fees to $10,000. Because the factors relied upon by the superior court do not justify this limit, we reverse.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This appeal represents the second time that this case has come before us.1 We recount here only those facts and proceedings necessary to understand and resolve the current dispute.
In 2000 Chris Froines, a commercial fisherman, filed suit against Valdez Fisheries Development Association (VFDA) for breach of contract. In 2001 the superior court granted summary judgment against Froines. Froines appealed and we reversed, holding that genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment.2
On remand, Froines made an offer of judgment to VFDA “in the amount of $15,000.00 inclusive of all costs, interest and attorney’s fees.” VFDA rejected the offer and the case proceeded to trial.
Following a five-day trial in Valdez in August 2005, the jury awarded Froines $10,000. Taking into account prejudgment interest, fees, and costs, this award exceeded Froines’s $15,000 offer of judgment by at least five percent. Consequently, in September, Froines filed a motion pursuant to Rule 68(b)(2)3 for fifty percent of his reasonable [1236]*1236and actual attorney’s fees incurred from the date of his offer of judgment through the end of proceedings in the trial court. In support of this motion, Froines filed itemized time sheets detailing the work performed and services provided by his counsel. At the time of this filing, Froines calculated his attorney’s fees award under Rule 68(b)(2) to be $37,197.25. This total represented half of his attorneys’ regular hourly rates multiplied by the number of hours they worked.
VFDA opposed Froines’s motion and argued that Froines was generally not entitled to an award based upon his attorneys’ hourly rates or hours worked because his attorneys had actually worked on a contingent fee basis. It further argued that the requested award was neither actual nor reasonable.
Froines responded about a week later, arguing that contingent fee arrangements have no effect on awards of attorney’s fees under Rule 68 and that the requested award was reasonable. Froines also increased the amount he was seeking to $39,676.25 as a result of the additional time his lawyers had worked on the ease since he had originally moved for attorney’s fees.
On October 14, 2005, the superior court entered an order granting Rule 68 attorney’s fees. Analogizing to our case law regarding Rule 82, the superior court reasoned that awards of attorney’s fees under Rule 68 must be based upon “the reasonable value of the attorney’s services, not what the client actually pays.”4 Nonetheless, the superior court then went on to award Froines only $10,000 in attorney’s fees because “a full reasonable fee should not have exceeded $20,000.” Although the superior court did not detail exactly how it arrived at this number, it noted several factors from Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including “the lack of novelty of the issues, the moderate time and labor that should have been required, the modest probable recovery, the minimal verdict, the lack of any serious time limitations and the contingent nature of the fee.”
Froines now appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s fact-based determinations regarding whether attorney’s fees are reasonable for an abuse of discretion.5 However, the proper interpretation of Alaska Civil Rule 68 is a question of law that we review de novo.6
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Froines claims that the superior court’s order limiting Froines’s reasonable attorney’s fees was unjustified. In assessing the reasonable value of the services provided by Froines’s attorneys, the superior court looked to Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which lists a number of factors relevant to determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. According to the superior court, “[t]he most important [Rule 1.5] factors in this ease include the lack of novelty of the issues, the moderate time and labor that should have been required, the modest probable recovery, the minimal verdict, the lack of any serious time limitations and the contingent nature of the fee.” On the basis of these factors, the superior court concluded that “a full reasonable fee” in this ease “should not have exceeded $20,000.” It therefore awarded Froines only $10,000 in attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Froines characterizes the superior court’s award as “arbitrary” and insists that he should have been awarded the full $39,676.25 — the amount produced by multiplying his attorneys’ regular hourly rates with the amount of hours they worked. VFDA disagrees and maintains that the superior court properly relied on Rule 1.5 to limit the award to a reasonable amount.
[1237]*1237Although we have previously relied upon Rule 1.5 factors to limit awards of Rule 82 attorney’s fees,7 several of these factors lose their probative value in the context of Rule 68 attorney’s fees. Unlike Rule 82, the purpose of Rule 68 is not merely to “partially compensate a prevailing party”8 for its reasonable expenses; rather, “the purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage pretrial settlement” so as to save both the litigants and the state from the time and expense of a trial.9 It works towards this purpose by subjecting litigants who reject pretrial offers of judgment to the risk of paying a percentage of their opponents’ attorney’s fees. As we have previously explained:
Offers of judgment force both the offeror and the offeree to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits. The penalties of Rule 68 raise the cost of litigation in the offeree’s risk-benefit analysis, thus making settlement more attractive.[10]
In the context of Rule 82, three of the Rule 1.5 factors noted by the superior court — a lack of novel issues of law, a modest probable recovery, and a minimal verdict — are probative only as to whether the prevailing party litigated its claim in an unreasonable manner, dedicating excessive time and money to a relatively simple or minor ease. When considered in the context of Rule 82, these factors weigh in favor of reducing an award of attorney’s fees. In the context of Rule 68, however, these factors cut both ways; although still probative as to whether the prevailing party litigated its claim unreasonably, these factors also tend to demonstrate that the case was particularly amenable to an offer of judgment. That a ease involved no novel issues of law suggests that the parties should have been able to reasonably assess the merits of their claims and arrive at a settlement. That a case involved only a modest probable recovery suggests that the parties should have had the incentive to avoid the costs of trial. And that a case ultimately concluded with a minimal verdict only slightly higher than the prevailing party’s offer of judgment suggests that the prevailing party made a reasonable offer that should have been accepted. Stated more simply, the fact that a case was relatively simple, involved relatively modest sums of money, and resulted in a relatively minor verdict is just as likely to be evidence of the losing party’s unreasonableness in rejecting an offer of judgment as it is to be evidence of the prevailing party’s unreasonableness in dedicating substantial resources to the case. Given that these three factors cut both ways in the context of Rule 68, the mere existence of these factors is not sufficient to limit a Rule 68 award and cannot, standing alone, justify such a limited award.
We turn now to consider whether any of the other factors cited by the superior court can justify limiting Froines’s attorney’s fees. In addition to the three factors already discussed, the superior court also cited the lack of any serious time limitations, the contingent nature of Froines’s fees, and the moderate amount of time and labor that the case should have required as factors militating in favor of limiting Froines’s award. However, the lack of time limitations and the contingent nature of the attorney’s fees have little relation to the reasonableness of Froines’s attorney’s fees. And although the moderate amount of time and labor required to litigate this case certainly is relevant to the reasonableness of Froines’s attorney’s fees, we are unable to determine if the superior court would have limited Froines’s award so severely on this basis alone. Consequently, we remand this case to the superior court for recalculation of reasonable attorney’s fees in light of this opinion.11
[1238]*1238V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, we REVERSE the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and REMAND for a recalculation in accordance with this decision.
BRYNER, Justice, not participating.