special circumstances would render such an award unjust, the general rule is that
the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees." IMS Health Corp.
v. Schneider, 901 F. Supp. 2d 172, 187 (D. Me. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
The City argues that special circumstances make an award of attorneys'
fees unjust in this case. "The special circumstances warranting the complete
denial of attorneys' fees are narrowly circumscribed." Cushing v. McKee, 853 F.
Supp. 2d 163, 171 (D. Me. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Special circumstances that permit the denial of a fee award "are few and far between." De Jesus Nazario
v. Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 2009).
The City relies on Schock v. United States, which involved a claim for
attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2412.
Schock v. United States, 254 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001). The City argues that its position
in this case was justified even though the City ultimately lost the case because the
law in Maine was unclear on the distinction between legislative and
administrative matters. Unlike § 1988, the EAJA requires a court to award fees
"unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 42 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(l)(A) (emphasis added). The "substantially justified" language is absent
from 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Schock is therefore not relevant to this case.
Federal courts have held that "mere uncertainty in the law is not a 'special
circumstance' justifying rejection of a statutory award of attorney fees in a civil
rights action." Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 635 (6th
Cir. 1979); see also J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474 (lOth Cir.
1985) (stating that "good faith" and "uncertainty in the law" do not amount to
special circumstances under§ 1988). As the Northcross court explained, "[a] major
purpose of the Fees Awards Act was to encourage the bringing of suits in new
and undeveloped areas of civil rights law, and it would be anomalous indeed ...
to deny fees for the very reason the statute was passed." Northcross, 611 F.2d at
635. The City has failed to articulate a valid special circumstance to justify
denying plaintiffs' fee award.
Furthermore, although the City contends that it acted in good faith to
protect its rights in. this case, the Court notes that the City withheld the citizens' initiative petition forms without any legal justification.' See Friends of Cong. Square
Park, 2014 ME 63, 'IT 4 n.3, 91 A.3d 601 ("The City Clerk does not have express
authority to reject citizens' initiative proposals submitted in compliance with the
petition procedure in the City Code on the grounds that they are not
legislative.") The City forced plaintiffs to file suit and litigate on an expedited
schedule just to obtain the requested petition forms. As the City concedes,
municipalities must proceed with caution when constitutional rights are
involved and should err on the side of ensuring the free exercise of political
speech.
The City does not contest the reasonableness of plaintiffs' fee request,
which is supported by affidavits from counsel. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion is
granted in full.
The entry is:
Plaintiffs' motion for award of attorneys' fees is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs are awarded their attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $50,834.50, plus post-judgment interest at 6.16% calculated from the October 31, 2013 judgment.
Dated: August 18, 2014 ~Wheeler Justice, Superior Court
Plaintiffs-Sarah McDaniel Esq Robert Levin Esq Defendant-Danielle West-Chuhta Esq Jennifer Thompson Esq
• Plaintiffs waived this argument, likely out of a desire to avoid further litigation. STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. A~-)3-0?5 . .JAW- cu..M- ;o;ai ;z_o;3 FRIENDS OF CONGRESS SQUARE PARK, FRANK R. TUREK, DAVID R. LaCASSE, HERBERT C. ADAMS, and PATRICIAM. O'DONNELL Plaintiffs ORDER ON SOB APPEAL v. AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG~ENfA~''~ ~ . CITY OF PORTLAND r_;r~~rnh~;:!:-,;"' ~ f"·
Defendant ocr 31 2013 Plaintiffs challenge the City of Portland's refusal to provide them the required~ ~:~ i
petition forms to gather signatures for a ballot initiative under the Portland City Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
Friends of Congress Square Park ("Friends") is a Maine nonprofit corporation
incorporated on July 15, 2013. (Pls.' S.M.F. ~ 2.) The individual plaintiffs are all Portland
citizens, registered voters, and board directors or officers of Friends. (Pls.' S.M.F. ~~ 1,
3.) Friends was formed in response to a proposal in 2013 to sell a portion of Congress
Square Park to a private developer. (Compl. ~ 10.) The organization ultimately adopted a
strategy of petitioning for a ballot initiative that would strengthen the current Land Bank
ordinance to protect Congress Square and other city parks. (Compl. ~ 11.)
The Land Bank Commission was established by the City Council in 1999. The
Commission manages the Land Bank properties and recommends properties for potential
Land Bank dedication. Under current law, the City Council alone has the authority to
approve any new acquisitions or dispositions of Land Bank properties. On September 6, 2013, plaintiffs submitted a citizen petition ("Park Initiative") to
the Clerk of the City of Portland. (Pls.' S.M.F. ~ 7.) The Park Initiative would accomplish
three things: 1) establish a new category of land for Land Bank eligibility called "urban
open public spaces," 2) designate 35 city-owned properties, including Congress Square
Park, as Land Bank properties, and 3) strengthen the protections for all new and existing
Land Bank properties. (Pls.' S.M.F. ~ 7; Exhibit D.) On September 13,2013, counsel for
the City informed the plaintiffs that the City would not issue the petitions requested by
plaintiffs because the initiative would affect administrative matters and because it related
to "appropriations." (Pls.' S.M.F. ~;Exhibit F.) On September 16, 2013, City Council
voted 6-3 to approve the sale of Congress Square Park. (Pls.' S.M.F. ~ 12.) The City
entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the park on October 4, 2013. (Def.'s
S.M.F. ~ 34.)
Plaintiffs commenced this action on September 25, 2013 by filing an emergency
motion for preliminary injunction asking the Court to order the City to issue the petitions.
Plaintiffs alleged three counts. Count I is a Rule SOB appeal of government action, count
II is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and count III is a § 19S3
claim. After a conference with counsel, the Court issued an order specifying the course of
proceedings on September 30, 2013. The order stayed consideration of count III pending
resolution of the first two counts. The Court accelerated the briefing deadlines for counts
I and II and ordered the parties to submit their filings on the SOB appeal and declaratory
judgment action in the form of a single motion for summary judgment.
2 Discussion
1. Standard of Review
The Court reviews interpretations of local ordinances de novo as a question of
law. Aydellot v. City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, ~ 10,990 A.2d 1024. In construing local
ordinances, courts "look first to 'the plain meaning [of the ordinance] to give effect to the
legislative intent."' Lewis v. Town of Rockport, 2005 ME 44, ~ 11, 870 A.2d 107 (quoting
Griffin v. Town of Dedham, 2002 ME 105, ~ 7, 799 A.2d 1239). "Any undefined or
ambiguous terms in the Ordinance 'must be construed reasonably with regard to both the
objects sought to be obtained and to the general structure ofthe ordinance as a whole."'
Adams v. Town of Brunswick, 2010 ME 7, ~ 11, 987 A.2d 502 (quoting Davis v. SBA
Towers II, LLC, 2009 ME 82, ~ 10, 979 A.2d 86).
2. Ministerial Duty
Plaintiffs argue that the Code imposes a ministerial duty on the City Clerk to issue
the petitions. Section 9-36 of the Portland Code outlines the procedure for invoking the
initiative process. It requires petitioners to file an affidavit of registered voters who will
circulate the petition, and then states:
Upon filing of such affidavit by ten (1 0) such voters, the city clerk shall have seven (7) calendar days to prepare the proper petition forms pursuant to section 9- 37 below with a copy ofthe submitted ordinance either printed on the petition or attached thereto and shall provide such petition to members of the petitioners' committee and to any other registered city voter who wishes to circulate it.
Code ofOrdinances, City ofPortland, Me ("Code")§ 9-36(c) (eff. July 17, 2007). The
plaintiffs point to the Code's own rules of construction, which instruct that "[t]he word
'shall' is mandatory." Code§ 1-2; see also Casco N Bank, NA. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Van
3 Buren Hasp. Dist., 601 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Me. 1992) ("[T]he word 'shall' is to be
construed as 'must' for the purpose of sustaining or enforcing an existing right.").
The City argues that the application of Code § 9-3 6( c) is constrained by the
limitations found in the preceding Code subsections. Section 9-36(a) provides that the
initiative process extends to "any proposed ordinance dealing with legislative matters on
municipal affairs." Section 9-36(b) states: "Neither this article nor ordinances dealing
with appropriations, tax levy, or with wages or hours of city employees shall be subject to
the initiative and 'people's veto' referendum provisions herein established." The City
contends that the initiative must satisfy these code sections before the City Clerk is
required to issue the petitions.
In Wyman v. Secretary of State, the Law Court considered limitations on the
statewide initiative process in Maine. Wyman v. Sec'y of State, 625 A.2d 307, 310 (Me.
1993) The court found that "although the right to invoke an initiative is a state-created
right, it does not follow that the state is free to impose limitations on that right without
satisfying the dictates of the first amendment." !d. at 311. In Wyman, the Secretary had
concerns about the legality of the proposed law, but the court held that "the potential
invalidity of the subject of an initiative petition ... is not a sufficient reason to pre-empt
the petition process itself or to bar the discussion of the issues raised in the petition." I d.
at 311. The court further found that "the Secretary's concerns of voter confusion and
wasted resources if potentially invalid questions are included on the ballot are not
implicated during the initial signature collection phase." !d.
4 The City reads Wyman to prohibit pre-screening initiative petitions only on the
substance of the proposed legislation, where the right to petition is otherwise clearly
available. Here, the City argues, the issue is whether the right to petition exists at all.
It relies on Palesky v. Town of Topsham, where the Superior Court held that "town
officials cannot, despite the mandatory language contained in the Town Meetings and
Elections subchapter to Title 30-A, be required to undertake actions which are illegal,
fruitless, or unauthorized." Palesky v. Town ofTopsham, 1994 Me. Super. LEXIS 334, at
*7-8 (Aug. 25, 1994). The court explained, "[t]o interpret§ 2528(5) to eliminate any
discretion on the part of the town's officials simply because a petition with sufficient
signatures is presented, regardless of the incomprehensible, illegal, or unenforceable
nature of the language sought to be added to the warrant, would invite chaos into town
government." Id at *8.
At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that the City Clerk could lawfully refuse to
issue petitions for initiatives that are not authorized by the City Code. While the Court
has concerns about the City Clerk exercising discretion to "pre-empt the petition process
itself," the Court will assume without deciding that the Clerk could refuse to issue
petitions for initiatives that are not authorized by the Code. Accordingly, the Court will
look to whether the Park Initiative complies with the initiatives provision of the City
Code.
3. Administrative vs. Legislative Matter
The City first argues that the Park Initiative improperly affects administrative or
executive matters. Under the initiatives provision of the Code, voters may petition for
"any proposed ordinance dealing with legislative matters on municipal affairs." Code § 9-
5 36(a). The City reads this provision to prohibit initiatives that affect an administrative
function.
In Albert v. Town of Fairfield, the Law Court considered a referendum
"overturning the town council's acceptance of a town way." Albert v. Town of Fairfield,
597 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1991). The Town of Fairfield's charter provided:
The qualified voters of the Town shall have power to require reconsideration by the council of any adopted Action and, if the Council fails to repeal an Action so reconsidered, then to approve or reject it at a Town Election.
Jd. The court explained the legislative versus administrative act distinction:
In other jurisdictions, the power of referendum is usually defined as restricted to legislative measures and does not extend to executive or administrative action taken by a municipality. See 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 16.55 (3d ed. 1989). Our law does not explicitly include such a distinction. In Maine, the constitutional grant of the power of referendum permits a municipality to "establish the direct initiative and people's veto for the electors of such city in regard to its municipal affairs ...." Me.Const., art. IV, pt. 3, § 21 (emphasis added). In Burkett v. Youngs, 135 Me. 459,464, 199 A 619, 621 (1938), we defined "municipal affairs" as "compris[ing] the internal business of a municipality" and described the referendum as affecting "only those ordinances and resolves that are municipal legislation." Thus far, we have attempted to distinguish between state and local affairs rather than between legislative and administrative action.
Jd. (footnote omitted). The Court concluded:
Whether the analysis is premised on municipal versus state affairs or legislative versus administrative duties, the goal remains the same: identify those areas in which the municipality has been given the discretion to do as it wishes. In such areas, the action of the municipality's legislative body is subject to the referendum procedure.
Id. at 1355.
The City attempts to sidestep Albert by pointing to the language of Code § 9-
36(a), which authorizes petitions on "any proposed ordinance dealing with legislative
matters . ... "(emphasis added). The City argues that this reference to legislative matters
6 in the City Code restricts voter initiatives from reaching "administrative" matters in a
way that the Fairfield code in Albert did not. Given the broad language in Albert,
however, the reference to "legislative matters" in the Code plainly refers to legislation
that the Portland City Council has the power to enact. Moreover, Code§ 9-36(b) outlines
the applicability of the initiative process and does not make any mention of
administrative versus legislative matters.
Under current law, the City Council alone has the authority to dedicate properties
into the Land Bank. See Code§ 2-42(a) ("All acquisitions of property interests under this
article shall be subject to the approval of the City Council .... ").While the Land Bank
Commission serves an advisory function in recommending properties for Land Bank
protection, it is ultimately the City Council that must vote on their approval. The Court
therefore finds that, to the extent the City Code requires initiatives to be on "legislative
matters," the Park Initiative satisfies this requirement. 1
1 Even accepting the City's position that the City Code prohibits initiatives that affect administrative functions, the cases on which the City relies are distinguishable from the present case. The City relies on two California cases to establish that voter initiatives cannot touch on administrative matters. Both cases involved voter initiatives that sought to modify policies previously adopted by voter initiatives. City of San Diego v. Dunk!, 86 Cal. App. 4th 384, 389-90 (2001); Citizens for Jobs and the Economy v. County of Orange, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1311, 1333 (2002). In those cases, the court found the proposed initiatives improperly attempted to change policy-implementing decisions that had been committed to administrative discretion. Dunk!, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 402; Citizens for Jobs, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1333. Unlike the initiatives in the California cases, the Park Initiative does not seek to implicitly negate prior policy. In both Dunk! and Citizens for Jobs, the court was concerned that the initiatives did not explicitly reverse prior policy. Rather, the initiatives sought to dictate results under policies already in effect. See Dunk!, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 402 ("The proposed initiative does not seek to change this policy by its plain language, but rather to change the substance of the implementing decisions that were created by Prop. C."); see also Citizens for Jobs, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1333 ("Measure F, as approved, would not have sought to change this policy by its plain language, but rather would have changed the procedure and substance of the implementing decisions that were created by Measure A."). The Park Initiative does not simply change the procedure and the substance of implementing the Land Bank ordinance, it actually changes the ordinance to protect a new category of properties. That the Park Initiative would also change the procedure for disposing of properties is part of its stated goal: to strengthen protections for Portland's public spaces. The Park Initiative therefore explicitly changes policy unlike the initiatives in the California cases.
7 4. Whether the Park Initiative affects "Appropriations"
The City next argues that the Park Initiative improperly affects "appropriations," a
category restricted by Code§ 9-36(b). The City quotes dictionary definitions of
"appropriation" that encompass control over property. For example, one definition of
"appropriation" in Black's Law Dictionary is: "The exercise of control over property;
taking of possession." Black's Law Dictionary 98 (7th ed. 1999). 2
The City's argument ignores the principle that the Court must "construe disputed
language reasonably and with regard to both the ordinance's specific object and its
general structure" and must "give undefined terms their common and generally accepted
meaning unless indicated otherwise by their context in the ordinance." DeSomma v. Town
ofCasco, 2000 ME 113,, 9, 755 A.2d 485 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In
the legislative context, an appropriation typically means "[a] legislative body's act of
setting aside a sum of money for a public purpose." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009). Plaintiffs point to eleven other sections of the Code that reference appropriations,
and every one of them relates to City expenditures. (Pls.' S.M.F., 30.) Moreover, the
other initiative restrictions contained in Code§ 9-36(b), matters dealing with "tax levy, or
with wages or hours of city employees," also relate to the City's fiscal affairs. The logical
intent behind Code § 9-36(b )' s restrictions on the ballot initiative process is to exclude
matters that would require the City to spend or collect money. See 42 Am. Jur. 2d
Initiative and Referendum § 11 (2013) ("The basic purpose of excluding specific
appropriation measures from the initiative process under a state constitution is to preserve
the legislature's general authority over the state treasury and to preclude special interest
2 The Court rejects the City's definition of"appropriation" in this context, but even if it were to accept it, the term thus defined is typically used in reference to the legislature's power of eminent domain. See, e.g., 23 M.R.S.A. § 3023. The plaintiffs' proposed ordinance does not affect the eminent domain power.
8 (
groups from attempting to usurp that authority through the use of initiatives which might
compel the expenditure of public funds in a piecemeal fashion.") If the City intended to
exclude land use or property matters from the voter initiative process, it would have done
so explicitly.
If approved, the Park Initiative would not require the City to make any
expenditures. 3 While it does restrict the power of the City Council to sell city-owned
property, "a prohibition against initiatives that appropriate public assets does not extend
to initiatives that regulate public assets so long as the regulations do not result in the
allocation of an asset entirely to one group at the expense of another." 42 Am. Jur.
Initiative and Referendum§ 11 (2013). The Park Initiative regulates the City's assets to
preserve them for the public. Since the measure has no other fiscal impact, the Court
rejects the City's argument that the initiative affects appropriations.
5. People's Veto
Finally, the City argues that the plaintiffs' petition is in reality an invalid people's
veto of a City Council Order. Unlike an initiative, which proposes new legislation, a
"people's veto" is a "petition to override any ordinance passed by the city council but
which has not yet gone into effect." Code § 9-36(a). The City contends that the petition
attempts to raise a people's veto question on the issue of whether the City should sell
Congress Square Park The City argues this is improper because only ordinances, and not
orders, passed by the City Council are not subject to the people's veto process. Ifthe
plaintiffs had petitioned for a people's veto the City might have a valid point, but that is
not the case here.
3 All 35 of the properties proposed for dedication to the Land Bank are city-owned properties. They are predominantly city parks, including areas such as Deering Oaks Park and the Eastern Promenade Park. (Exhibit D).
9 The Code specifically authorizes "a retroactive effective date of an initiated
ordinance, to the extent permitted by law, if such retroactive date is specifically provided
for in the petition and/or the question approved by the voters." Code § 9-42. The
retroactive date "shall not be earlier than the date of filing ofthe affidavit originating the
petition which is finally submitted to the voters." !d. Thus, by the plain language of the
Code, the plaintiffs were authorized to make the initiative retroactive to the date of filing
with the City Clerk, which in this case was September 6, 2013. (Pls.' S.M.F. ~ 7.) The
City Council did not approve the sale of Congress Square Park until September 16, 2013
(Pls.' S.M.F. ~ 12.) Thus, the plaintiffs' petition cannot be a people's veto because it was
filed with the City Clerk before the City Council voted to sell Congress Square Park.
Conclusion
Having considered the complaint, the motions, briefs, and the arguments of
counsel, the Court finds in favor of plaintiffs on count I and count II and concludes that a
permanent injunction should issue and for its reasons states as follows:
A. The Park Initiative constitutes a matter that is a proper subject of a citizens' initiative under Section 9-36 ofthe City ofPortland Code of Ordinances B. Pursuant to Rule 65(d) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant City of Portland, its agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, are hereby enjoined and restrained as follows: The City of Portland, acting by and through its City Clerk, is ORDERED AND DIRECTED to prepare and issue to Attorney Robert C. Levin, attorney for the petitioners' committee, on or before 3:00pm on Friday November 1, 2013 the petition forms for the Park Initiative that was filed by plaintiffs with the City Clerk on September 6, 2013.
Date: October 31, 2013
Friends-Sarah McDaniel Esq . Robert Levin Esq Clty-Danielle West-Chuhta Esq Jennifer Thompson Esq 10 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP~1j-<)55 ._jA vJ -CuM- t ljY I iJ,.Ol3
FRIENDS OF CONGRESS SQUARE PARK, et al., Plaintiffs
vs. ORDER ON MOTION FOR STAY
CITY OF PORTLAND Defendant NOV 04 2013
On October 31, 2013, the court issued an Order in favor of the plaintiffs on
Counts I and II of their Complaint and ordered the City to prepare and issue the petition
forms for the Park Initiative that was filed by plaintiffs with the City Clerk on September
6, 2013.
The effect of the City's motion for a stay is to ask this court to balance the
issuance of potentially unauthorized petitions with the deprivation of the right to petition
the government. In order to preserve the status quo and to insure effectiveness of any
eventual judgment, the City argues, a stay must be granted pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 62(d).
The only harms cited by the City include confusion and that once the City Clerk issues
the petition forms, there is no mechanism to prevent putting the Park Initiative to the
voters. This is not true if the Law Court acts expeditiously in favor of the City because
the earliest this issue may be put to the voters is on a June 2014 ballot. Moreover, even if
the City prevails, the City only needs a day to prepare the appropriate ballots. In any
event, in Wyman v. Secretary of State, 625 A. 2d 307 (Me. 1993), the Law Court held that "the potential invalidity of the subject of an initiative petition ... is not a sufficient
reason to pre-empt the petition process itself or to bar the discussion of the issues raised
in the petition." ld. at 311. This is what the City has attempted to do.
The Order does not require the City to undertake actions that are illegal, fruitless
or unauthorized. Rather, the court held that the Park Initiative constitutes a matter that is
the proper subject of a citizens' initiative under Section 9-36 of the City of Portland Code
of Ordinances and ordered the City to issue the petition forms for the Park Initiative that
were filed by the plaintiffs with the City Clerk. The City's failure to do so deprives the
citizens of their right to petition the government and bars the discussion of the issues
raised in the petition. This deprivation can never be undone and causes irreparable harm
to the first amendment rights of the citizens.
1. Order on SOB Appeal and Motion for Summary Judgment remains in
full force and effect except as modified below.
2. The City's motion for a stay is DENIED.
3. Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(2), since the only outstanding claim is for
attorney's fees, Judgment on Counts I and II shall be final.
4. Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 65(d) the City of Portland, its agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or
participation with them, and hereby enjoined and restrained as follows and
the City of Portland, acting by and through its City Clerk, is ORDERED
AND DIRECTED to prepare and issue to Robert C. Levin, Esq, attorney
for plaintiffs, on or before 4:00p.m. on Monday, November 4, 2013 the
2 petition forms for the Park Initiative that was filed by plaintiffs with the
City Clerk on September 6, 2013.
Date: November 4, 2013
Friends-Sarah McDaniel Esq -Robert Levin Esq City-Jennifer Thompson Esq -Danielle West-Chuhta Esq
3 ATTORNEY
For Plaintiff
DONALD FONTAINE, ESQ. LAW OFFICES OF DONALD F. FONTAINE PO BOX 7590 PORTLAND, ME 04112
HILLARY SCHWAB, ESQ. (PRO HAC VICE) FAIR WORK, P.C. 192 SOUTH STREET SUITE 450 BOSTON, MA 02111
HAROLD LICHTEN, ESQ. & SARA SMOLIK, ESQ. (PRO HAC VICE) LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C. 100 CAMBRIDGE STREET 20TH FLOOR BOSTON, MA 02114
For Defendants RB Portland LLC and Portland II Hotel Management LLC
JAMES ERWIN, ESQ. PIERCE ATWOOD MERRILLS WHARF 254 COMMERCIAL STREET PORTLAND, ME 04101
For Defendant MHG Portland LLC
JONATHAN SHAPIRO, ESQ. FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP ONE MONUMENT SQUARE SUITE 600 PORTLAND, ME 04101