Frick v. Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 29, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3222
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TYLER FRICK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-03222 (UNA) ) COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS ) GENERAL ON INTEGRITY ) AND EFFICIENCY, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )

Memorandum Opinion

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and initial screening of his pro se complaint. See ECF Nos. 1, 2. The court grants the in

forma pauperis application. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the complaint

for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff sues the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (“CIGIE”)

and several of its employees for damages. See ECF No. 1 at 4–7. He alleges that Defendants

discriminated against him under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”) in their response to an administrative

complaint he filed with CIGIE. See id. at 5–6. Plaintiff contends that this unfairly denied him

access to CIGIE services and that Defendants’ manner of communication was “callous, cold, and

unfeeling,” causing him “severe mental anguish and injury.” See id. at 6–7.

Plaintiff’s ADA claim must be dismissed because “the ADA does not apply to employees

of the federal government.” Ahmed v. Napoliano, 825 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Klute v. Shinseki, 797 F. Supp. 2d 12, 17 (D.D.C. July 12, 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i)

(specifically excluding “the United States” from the definition of “employer”)).

Although the Rehabilitation Act applies to the federal government, see Woodruff v. Peters,

482 F.3d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 791(g); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)), Plaintiff’s

complaint contains only “bare assertions” which are insufficient to survive dismissal. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). Even accepting all “well-pleaded factual allegations” set forth in

the complaint as true and granting all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, no facts alleged

in the plaintiff's complaint support anything “more than a sheer possibility that [the] defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Plaintiff states that he told defendants that he was

disabled and that he was treated disrespectfully, but he has not alleged specific facts to infer that

he has been discriminated against. See Easaw v. Newport, 253 F. Supp. 3d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2017)

(“Stating simply ‘I was turned down . . . because of my [protected class]’ is precisely the kind of

conclusory allegation that is patently incompatible with Twombly and Iqbal’s pleading

requirements.”); Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that

“there can be no reasonable inference of [ ] discrimination where an individual just happens to be

a member of a protected class.”). Nor does the complaint identify the nature of his disability or

otherwise establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. See Am.

Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 1

1 Plaintiff’s complaint raise only claims of discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. To the extent Plaintiff also wishes to challenge CIGIE’s determination to pass on his administrative complaint, he may lack standing to do so. See Jefferson v. Harris, 170 F. Supp. 3d 194, 220 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge CIGIE’s decision not to investigate a particular matter). Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint that does not comply with

D.C. Local Civil Rules 7(i) or 15.1. See ECF No. 9. However, even considering the proposed

amendment, it would simply add a claim under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act and does not cure

the above bases for dismissal. See ECF 9 at 2.

For these reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion

for CM/ECF password, ECF No. 3, motion to appoint attorney, ECF No. 4, motion for exemption

from PACER fees, ECF No. 5, motion for status of the case, ECF No. 7, motion for leave to appear

by telephone, ECF No. 8, motion for leave to amend, ECF No. 9, first motion to expedite, ECF

No. 10, motion to assign to judge, ECF No. 11, second motion for status of the case, ECF No. 13,

motion to assign to chief judge, ECF No. 14, second motion to expedite, ECF No. 15, third motion

to expedite, ECF No. 16, and motion to compel, ECF No. 17, are all denied as moot. An order

consistent with this memorandum opinion is issued separately.

Date: January 29, 2025 /s/______________________ AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge