COOPER, Justice.
Appellant Robert Fraser pled guilty to murder and to two counts of tampering with physical evidence and was sentenced to life in prison. His subsequent motion for relief under RCr 11.42 was denied without an evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we granted discretionary review to address the following issues: (1) When is an evidentiary hearing required on an RCr 11.42 motion? (2) When is an indigent movant entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing an RCr 11.42 motion? and (3) Was Appellant entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to appointment of counsel in this case?
In June 1995, Appellant and his girlfriend, Arlene Hall Rowe, along with Rowe’s brother, Gary Lee Young, were indicted for the murder and attempted disposal of the body of Rowe’s ex-husband, Everett Lee Hall. The Commonwealth gave written notice that it would not seek the death penalty against any of the defendants. On the morning of trial, April 21, 1997, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder. In response to an inquiry by the trial judge during the Boykin hearing, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), Appellant stated that he had not been promised any benefit in exchange for his plea. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant’s plea was accepted and the Commonwealth made no recommendation with respect to a sentence. Final sentencing was deferred until May 16, 1997. The case then proceeded to trial on the charges against the other two defendants. Appellant was the Commonwealth’s chief witness at trial. He testified -that he killed Hall upon Rowe’s solicitation and that all three defendants participated in an attempt to dispose of Hall’s body. Rowe was convicted of complicity to murder and two counts of complicity to tampering with physical evidence and was sentenced to life in prison ,1
At final sentencing on May 16, 1997, the Commonwealth again made no recommendation with respect to Appellant’s sentence and he was sentenced to life in prison. On May 20, 1997, Appellant’s attorney filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment requesting that the sentence be reduced to twenty years “[d]ue to the substantial assistance which Robert Fraser contributed to the Commonwealth’s efforts in successfully convicting co-defendant Arlene Hall .... ” The motion was set for hearing on [451]*451June 27,1997. The clerk’s record does not contain a written ruling on the motion or include a videotape or transcript of any relevant hearing. We assume the motion was overruled. On May 19, 1998, Appellant, pro se, filed this RCr 11.42 motion, as well as a motion for an evidentiary hearing, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with attached affidavit of indigency, and a motion for appointment of counsel to assist him at the evidentiary hearing.
I. RCr 11.42 PROCEDURES ...
The United States Constitution requires that indigent defendants be represented by counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and on a first appeal as a matter of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). There is no constitutional right to a post-conviction collateral attack on a criminal conviction or to be represented by counsel at such a proceeding where it exists. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2769, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). The Constitution of Kentucky provides for one appeal as a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 115, and contains no provision with respect to a post-conviction collateral attack except the prohibition in Section 16 against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Today, the vast majority of collateral attacks against criminal convictions are by motions filed pursuant to RCr 11.42.
The former Code of Practice in Criminal Cases, which governed criminal procedure in Kentucky from 1877 to 1963, contained no provision comparable to RCr 11.42. Section 276 of the Code merely provided that “[t]he only ground upon which a judgment shall be 'arrested is that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a public offense.” Thus, until 1963, the only avenues of collateral attacks on final judgments of conviction were petitions for writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis. The inadequacies of these remedies for collateral attacks on final judgments of conviction are analyzed at length in a Kentucky Law Journal article by John S. Gil-lig, Kentucky Postr-Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 1142, 83 Ky. L .J. 265, 295-330 (1994-95). To summarize, a writ of habeas corpus, the purpose of which was to provide swift resolution of claims of illegal confinement, had to be brought in the court having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, i.e., where he was imprisoned, rather than where he had been tried and where likely witnesses would be found. This also created a problem of “comity” whereby one trial judge was asked to overturn the judgment of another trial judge. Initially, at least, the only remedy upon the grant of a writ of habeas corpus was to release the prisoner from confinement and return him to immediate freedom. Later, the concept of a “conditional writ” was recognized whereby the prisoner would remain confined until retrial. Finally, the error alleged in the habeas petition had to be evident from the trial record, a requirement that bound the reviewing court to the clerk’s record and the transcript of proceedings at trial. Id. at 308-09. A writ of coram nobis was closely akin to our present CR 60.02 and was predicated on errors of fact, not law, which theoretically excluded constitutional arguments of law that now comprise the bulk of RCr 11 .42 claims. Further, the error had to be “hidden or unseen;” thus, common trial errors could not be raised. Some cases apparently required the petitioner to demonstrate what today would be termed “actual innocence.” Id. at 330.
In 1958, the General Assembly established a committee to study and recom[452]*452mend revisions to the Criminal Code, “including the transposition of general procedural rules from the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the Code and matters of substantive law from the Code to the Kentucky Revised Statutes.” KRS 447.310(2) (1958 Ky. Acts, ch. 45, § 1; repealed 1968 Ky. Acts, ch. 152, § 168). In 1962, the General Assembly accepted the recommendations of the committee and enacted the present Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234, at 788-827 (eff. January 1, 1963). In doing so, it “declared [it] to be the policy of the General Assembly, insofar as the Legislative Department is empowered to express policy on matters of judicial procedure, that prescription of rules governing details of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Judicial Department after the effective date of this Act.” Id. at 788-90 (Preamble). Thereafter, all amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been promulgated by this Court and its predecessor.
As originally enacted by the General Assembly, RCr 11.42 did not mention appointment of counsel. 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234, at 822. The Rule had been modeled on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which, until 1996, contained no provision for the appointment of counsel.2 Exercising the inherent rule-making power recognized in the Preamble to the 1962 enactment of the Criminal Rules, supra, our predecessor Court rejected the legislative version of RCr 11.42 and substituted a version that was more specific as to procedures and contained the same provision for appointment of counsel now found at RCr 11.42(5). The existing provisions of RCr 11.42 relevant to our present inquiry are as follows:
(2) The motion shall be signed and verified by the movant and shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to comply with this section shall warrant a summary dismissal of the motion.
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(5) ... If the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record the court shall grant a prompt hearing and, if the mov-ant is without counsel of record and if financially unable to employ counsel, shall upon specific written request by the movant appoint counsel to represent the movant in the proceeding, including appeal.
These provisions establish the following procedural steps with respect to an eviden-tiary hearing and the appointment of counsel:
1. The trial judge shall examine the motion to see if it is properly signed and verified and whether it specifies grounds and supporting facts that, if true, would warrant relief. If not, the motion may be summarily dismissed. Odewahn v. Ropke, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 163, 164 (1964).
2. After the answer is filed, the trial judge shall determine whether the allegations in the motion can be resolved on the face of the record, in which event an evidentiary hearing is not required. A hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, ie., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703, 126 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994); Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967). The trial [453]*453judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the record refuting them. Drake v. United States, 439 F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir.1971).
3. If an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel must be appointed to represent the movant if he/she is indigent and specifically requests such appointment in writing. Coles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 465 (1965). If the movant does not request appointment of counsel, the trial judge has no duty to do so sua sponte. Beecham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 234, 237 (1983).
4. If an evidentiary hearing is not required, counsel need not be appointed, “because appointed counsel would [be] confined to the record.” Hemphill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 448 S.W.2d 60, 63 (1969). (However, the rule does not preclude appointment of counsel at any stage of the proceedings if deemed appropriate by the trial judge.)
The wisdom of not requiring appointment of counsel if the allegations can be conclusively resolved by examination of the record is attested to by the number of frivolous or facially meritless motions filed under the rule, some of which have found their way into published opinions. E.g., Glass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 400, 401 (1971) (movant claimed his plea was involuntary because it was motivated by a desire to avoid a possibly harsher penalty at the hands of a jury); Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 721, 722 (1971) and Newberry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 670, 671 (1970) (movants claimed they were coerced to plead guilty, but the records in each case conclusively proved that, in fact, neither had pled guilty and both had been convicted by juries following jury trials). The sheer volume and relative futility of RCr 11.42 motions are apparent from statistics recited in Gil-lig’s Kentucky Law Journal article, supra. His survey of the 342 appellate opinions in RCr 11.42 cases published from 1963 to 1995 revealed that only five movants were granted new trials and only two obtained unconditional release from incarceration. In only 14% of the total cases did the movant obtain even minor relief, such as a remand for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 342-43. His survey of all RCr 11.42 appellate opinions, published and unpublished, for the years 1990 and 1991 revealed that relief was denied in 294 of 321 cases. In only seven cases were the movants granted new trials. The remaining twenty reversals granted minor relief such as a remand for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 344.
When RCr 11.42 was adopted in 1963, the representation of indigent criminal defendants in Kentucky and most other states was primarily provided on an involuntary, uncompensated basis. Typically, the presiding trial judge appointed the youngest members of the local bar to represent indigent defendants without compensation and under threat of contempt. See generally, B. Deatherage, Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710 (1971-72). The same procedure prevailed in federal jurisdictions until the enactment of the Criminal Justice Acts of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. The primary justification advanced for this imposition was that pro bono representation of indigent defendants upon court order was a traditional professional obligation of the bar. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636-38 (Appendix) (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966). Although our predecessor Court expressed concerns about the issue, it initially deferred to the legislature, because “[o]nly the legislature can provide suffi[454]*454cient funds to finance such a project, and of course the legislature must necessarily create the system under which these funds could be properly disbursed.” Commonwealth, Dep’t of Corrections v. Burke, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1968); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 457 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 964, 28 L.Ed.2d 229 (1971); Warner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 400 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 885, 87 S.Ct. 178, 17 L.Ed.2d 112 (1966).
In October 1971, the Franklin Circuit Court ordered the Commissioner of Finance to pay fees awarded to court-appointed criminal defense attorneys by trial judges in Campbell and Jefferson Counties. On appeal, our predecessor Court held that the existing system of court-appointed uncompensated counsel was unconstitutional. Bradshaw v. Ball, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 294, 299 (1972). In so doing, the Court also observed:
In the context presented, we are persuaded that it is the duty of the executive department to enforce the criminal laws, and it is the duty of the legislative department to appropriate sufficient funds to enforce the laws which they have enacted. The proper duty of the judiciary, in the constitutionally ideal sense, is neither to enforce laws nor appropriate money. The judiciary’s reason for existence is to adjudicate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the appeal in Bradshaw v. Ball, the 1972 General Assembly enacted KRS Chapter 31, establishing and funding the Department of Public Advocacy (“DPA”) for the purpose of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Of specific relevance to this case is KRS 31.110(2)(e):
(2) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under subsection (1) is entitled:
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(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction proceeding that the attorney and the needy person considers (sic) appropriate. However, if the counsel appointed in such post-conviction remedy, with the court involved, determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense, there shall be no further right to be represented by counsel under the provisions of this chapter.
The last sentence in subsection (c) appears to require a procedure akin to that described in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and adopted in Kentucky by Fite v. Commonwealth, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 357, 358 (1971) with respect to criminal appeals.3 See, e.g., Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 719 S.W.2d 742 (1986).
In Commonwealth v. Ivey, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 456 (1980), we interpreted KRS 31.110(2)(c) to require the appointment of counsel in an RCr 11.42 proceeding “upon request” of an indigent movant, id. at 457, regardless of the stage of the proceedings, because successive motions are barred by RCr 11.42(3), Butler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 108, 109 (1971), and “[wjithout the assistance of counsel Ivey could be effectively precluded from raising valid grounds by failure to include such grounds at the time of his first motion.”
[455]*455Ivey, supra, at 458 4. A literal reading of Ivey and KRS 31.110(2)(c) would require appointment of counsel upon request to assist a prospective RCr 11.42 movant in researching, preparing and filing the initial motion; and, if counsel determines that there are no meritorious grounds for such a motion, to submit an Anders brief to the trial judge explaining why the motion was not filed. However, in Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 856 (1983), we held that Ivey did not purport to expand either the purpose of RCr 11.42 or the scope of its relief. Id. at 858. Gilliam also held that a prospective indigent mov-ant was not even entitled to a free transcript of his trial to assist in preparing an RCr 11.42 motion, id. at 859, despite the fact that KRS 31.110(l)(b) provides that “[a] needy person ... being detained under a conviction ... is entitled ... [t]o be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation including investigation and other preparation.” (Emphasis added.) Gilliam clearly represented a retreat from the broad language in Ivey that KRS 31.110 requires appointment of counsel and the provision of services “upon request.”
In Commonwealth v. Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336 (1984), the trial judge denied motions for an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel, and overruled the RCr 11.42 motion solely on the basis of legal precedent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on the merits, but, citing Ivey, reversed for appointment of counsel to “permit appellant to present for adjudication any supplementary grounds that might reasonably appear for RCr 11.42 relief.” Id. at 337. On discretionary review, we agreed that, on the face of the record, an evidentiary hearing was not required and held that the failure to appoint counsel was “harmless error.” Id. at 337-38. Stamps also noted that although Ivey had construed KRS 31.110 as providing broader relief than RCr 11.42(5), “our rule of construction when dealing with a procedural matter mandated by statute for a criminal case is that “We do not believe the legislature intend(s) the statute to be construed so as to reach an absurd result.’ ” Id. at 339 (emphasis added) (citing Calloway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 501, 503 (1977)).
As observed in Bradshaw v. Ball, supra, it is the function of the legislature to enact substantive criminal laws and to appropriate sufficient funds to enforce them; it is the function of the judiciary to adjudicate. Like the right to trial by jury and the right of confrontation, the constitutional right to counsel is a matter of procedural due process, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), not substantive criminal law. The responsibility for determining when and whether counsel must be appointed for a criminal defendant in Kentucky is a func[456]*456tion of the judicial department, not the legislature. Ky. Const. § 116; see RCr 3.05(2). To its credit, the General Assembly has created and funded the DPA, and nothing except legislative parameters precludes that office from providing legal services to indigent defendants or movants even when not constitutionally required. We conclude, therefore, that RCr 11.42(5) establishes when a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent movant and that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the DPA may provide legal services even without judicial appointment.5 To the extent that Commonwealth v. Ivey, supra, holds that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent movant, it is overruled. Since the statute is broader than the rule, we can conceive of no situation where the judge would appoint counsel for an indigent RCr 11.42 movant who would be statutorily ineligible for representation by the DPA.
II.... AS APPLIED TO THIS CASE.
Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in two respects: (1) failure to pursue Appellant’s mental incompetency defense; and (2) failure to prepare for trial. The motion alleges that counsel told Appellant on the morning of trial that he was unprepared for trial, that he would be reduced to trying the case “by the seat of his pants,” and that if Appellant did not plead guilty he would be convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The motion also alleged that Appellant’s guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced by counsel’s representation that the Commonwealth’s attorney had agreed to a plea bargain by which Appellant would be sentenced to only twenty years in lieu of the maximum sentence of life in prison. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585 (3d Cir.1974); Roberts v. United States, 486 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.1973).
The trial judge overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing and without appointing counsel, finding that (1) the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was insufficiently specific to warrant a hearing; and (2) the allegation that the guilty plea was involuntary was belied by the absence from the record of a written plea agreement and by Appellant’s own denial at the Boykin hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, also noting that there was nothing in the record to support Appellant’s claim of a secret plea agreement. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erroneously held that Appellant’s motion should be dismissed because the record did not prove the allegations in his motion, not because the record conclusively disproved those allegations. In his motion for discretionary review, Appellant, still pro se, asserted that the reason for the silent record was that his consideration for the plea agreement was (1) he would testify against his codefendants and (2) he would keep the plea agreement secret so that it could not be used to impeach the credibility of his testimony at trial. He also noted compellingly that absent a plea agreement he would have had no motivation to testify against his girlfriend at trial. We granted discretionary review and appointed counsel to represent Appellant before this Court.
The two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel is (1) whether [457]*457counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Appellant’s allegation that his attorney told him to plead guilty because he (the attorney) was unprepared for trial was sufficiently specific to warrant a hearing on whether the attorney was functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The fact that Appellant received the maximum sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty satisfies the requirement of prejudice. Compare Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 734 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 946, 85 S.Ct. 1789,14 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965):
The record shows, however, that appellant entered a plea of guilty to the rape charge; he received [a] sentence of imprisonment for ten years, the minimum sentence permitted under KRS 435.090. Appellant does not assert that counsel badgered him into entering a guilty plea, nor does he claim that he failed to understand the consequences of his guilty plea.
Id. at 735. Here, Appellant not only received the maximum sentence, he asserts that counsel told him he was unprepared to try his case and represented to him that the consequence of his guilty plea would be the imposition of the minimum sentence.
As stated, the trial judge denied Appellant an evidentiary hearing with respect to the voluntariness of his guilty plea because of the absence from the record of a written plea agreement and Appellant’s statements at the Boykin hearing. However, the absence from the record of a written plea agreement does not “conclusively resolve” that a plea agreement was not, in fact, reached. Oral plea agreements are not uncommon. E.g., United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462, 464 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Saucedo, 226 F.3d 782, 786 (6th Cir.2000). And the very nature of the alleged agreement described by Appellant explains why it was not reduced to writing and filed of record.
We have held under the facts of particular cases that admissions made during a Boykin hearing can conclusively resolve a claim that a plea was involuntarily obtained. E.g., Beecham v. Commonwealth, supra, at 237; Glass v. Commonwealth, supra, at 401. However, part of this alleged agreement supposedly required Appellant to deny its existence. Proof of even a secret agreement has been held foreclosed on the basis of statements made during a Boykin hearing “absent extraordinary circumstances, or some explanation of why defendant did not reveal other terms.” Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir.1986) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 667, 93 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986). Nevertheless, while the representations of a defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor at a Boy-kin hearing, as well as any findings by the judge accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings,” Blackledge v. Allison, supra, 431 U.S. at 74, 97 S.Ct. at 1629, that barrier is not insurmountable if there is proof that the representations “were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.” Id. at 74-75, 97 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (emphasis added). Here, Appellant explains that his representations at the Boykin hearing were the product of his oral plea agreement. If so, the issue of whether there was, in fact, an agreement could not be “conclusively resolved” on the [458]*458face of the record of the Boykin hearing. An evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion is required.
The Commonwealth argues in its brief that “Appellant should not be permitted to lie on the record, induce the court to make decisions based on that deception and then subsequently seek to benefit from that deception.” The argument ignores the fact that if Appellant is now telling the truth, the Commonwealth was not only a party to the deception, but the instigator of it, and, to date, its only beneficiary. On the other hand, Appellant allegedly performed his part of the agreement and got nothing in return. He could not have fared worse if he had gone to trial represented by an unprepared attorney. In that event, however, the Commonwealth would have been required to try its case against Rowe and Young without the cooperation and assistance of its key witness. We do not condone, indeed we condemn, any plea agreement designed to conceal the true nature of a facially unconditional guilty plea for the purpose of denying due process of law to another criminal defendant. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 569 S.W.2d 139, 143-45 (1978). Nevertheless, if the Commonwealth entered into such an agreement and accepted the benefits thereof, it is now estopped to assert that Appellant is not entitled to his quid pro quo.
The question is not whether the Commonwealth’s bargain was wise or foolish. The question is whether the Commonwealth should be permitted to break its word.
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If the government breaks its word, it breeds contempt for integrity and good faith. It destroys the confidence of citizens in the operation of their government and invites them to disregard their obligations. That way lies anarchy.
Workman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 580 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Morton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 218 (1991). See also Matheny v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 756, 758 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reyes, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 62, 68 (1989).
Accordingly, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to the Pike Circuit Court with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and the voluntariness of Appellant’s guilty plea, to appoint counsel to represent Appellant at that hearing, and to resolve the issues raised in Appellant’s motion pursuant to RCr 11.42(6) and the contents of this opinion.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to Part I.
KELLER, J., dissents as to Part I by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J., joins.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur as to Part II.
KELLER, J., concurs as to Part II by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J., joins.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents as to Part II without separate opinion.