Michael Robertson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0699
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0699-MR

MICHAEL ROBERTSON APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CR-00641

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING

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BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Michael Robertson, pro se, appeals from an order of the

Daviess Circuit Court, which denied relief regarding his motion made pursuant to

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42. For the reasons stated

herein, we strike Robertson’s brief and dismiss the appeal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2021, following a four-day jury trial, Robertson was convicted of

two counts of first-degree rape of his stepdaughter, A.C. The Trial Court sentenced Robertson to 20 years’ incarceration on each count, to be served

concurrently, per the recommendation of the jury. Robertson appealed his

conviction, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. Robertson v.

Commonwealth, 677 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. 2023). On February 26, 2024, Robertson,

pro se, filed the underlying motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. He also filed, concurrently, motions for appointment of

counsel; for an evidentiary hearing; and to proceed in forma pauperis. After the

Commonwealth filed a response, the Trial Court denied relief to Robertson without

an evidentiary hearing; however, his motion to proceed in forma pauperis was

granted. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Robertson’s brief is deficient in numerous ways. In contravention of

Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(1), he does not include a

statement concerning oral argument. In contravention of RAP 32(A)(2), Robertson

does not include a statement of points and authorities. In contravention of RAP

32(A)(3), he does not include a statement of the case. Finally, in contravention of

RAP 32(A)(4), Robertson’s brief contains absolutely no statements of preservation

and zero citations to the record.

“While pro se litigants are sometimes held to less stringent standards

than lawyers in drafting formal pleadings, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92

-2- S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), Kentucky courts still require pro se litigants to

follow the Kentucky Rules of [Appellate] Procedure.” Watkins v. Fannin, 278

S.W.3d 637, 643 (Ky. App. 2009). The rules of appellate procedure are “critical”

to effective appellate review and substantial compliance is mandatory. Oakley v.

Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380-81 (Ky. App. 2012). This Court has three options

when a party fails to follow the mandates of the RAP: ignore the deficiency, strike

the brief in whole or in part, or review only for manifest injustice. Ford v.

Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021). The manifest-injustice standard

of review is reserved only for errors in appellate briefing related to the statement of

preservation; if a party fails to inform the appellate court of where in the record his

issue is preserved, the appellate court can treat that issue as unpreserved. Id. See

also RAP 31(H)(1), which states that this Court may strike a brief “for failure to

substantially comply with the requirements of these rules.”

Here, Robertson did not comply with the RAP in any meaningful way

at all. It does not appear that he even looked at the rules or made any attempt at

compliance. One ignores our mandatory rules at his own peril. Because of

Robertson’s abject failure, we cannot offer him any leniency here. He has not even

requested it. Accordingly, we strike Robertson’s brief and dismiss the appeal.

We do pause to note, however, that even if we were to review

Robertson’s arguments for manifest injustice only – which we are not compelled to

-3- do and find no reason to do – we would find no manifest injustice here. Robertson

argues that the Trial Court erred by failing to appoint counsel and failing to hold an

evidentiary hearing. If a motion made pursuant to RCr 11.42 is refuted by the

record, there is no need for the Trial Court to hold an evidentiary hearing and, if

there is no evidentiary hearing, appointment of counsel is not necessary. Fraser v.

Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Ky. 2001). We agree with the Trial Court

that Robertson’s arguments are either conclusory or made without supporting facts;

are based upon his subjective belief only; and were addressed or should have been

addressed on direct appeal.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Robertson’s brief is stricken, and the appeal

dismissed.

ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: ___06/20/2025___ JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

-4- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael Robertson, pro se Russell Coleman La Grange, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew R. Krygiel Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

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