Frank v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co.

23 F. 123, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 1879
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Colorado
DecidedFebruary 12, 1885
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 23 F. 123 (Frank v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 23 F. 123, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 1879 (circtdco 1885).

Opinion

Hallett, J.

June 6, 1878, the Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Insurance Company entered into contract with the Denver & Bio Grande Bailway Company “to lease to and place upon the railroad” of the latter company certain cars and locomotives which should be delivered to the first-named company for that purpose by the Philadelphia & Colorado Equipment Trust. Defendant company was to pay “for every car and locomotive an annual rent equivalent to the one-sixth of the original cost thereof,” and the lease to continue for 10 years, when the cars and locomotives would become the property of the railway company. By this method of computation, it is said that upon completing the contract the railway company would pay the cost of the. rolling stock, and 8 per cent, interest on deferred payments. Under this agreement cars and locomotives of the value of $345,500 were delivered to the railway company, of which $217,000 has been paid, and interest and cost of trust amounting to $123,-396.20.

Other contracts of similar character, to the, number of five, were afterwards made by the railway company with the Bio Grande Extension Company by which the railway company obtained rolling stock of the value of $4,970,000. These agreements were assigned to the Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Company, of Philadelphia, a defendant in the bill and the present holder. In all these instruments it was provided that, upon default in payment of the annual rent, or failure to observe any covenant of the lease, the right of the railway company in the rolling stock would be determined, and the property might be reclaimed by the lessor. The same result would follow “any proceedings of law or in equity, or otherwise, in which the said party of the second part may be a party, whereby any of the rights, duties, and obligations of the party of the second part under this contract shall or may be transferred, abridged, or in any manner whatever al[125]*125torn! or impaired, or its control and custody of the leases, cars, and locomotives be in anywise interfered with; and any termination of this lease under this covenant shall have the same effect as if the party of the first part or its assigns had repossessed themselves of the said cars and locomotives, as hereinbefore provided.”

These instruments, in the form of leases, and having somewhat of the aspect of conditional sales, were a disguise of the real transaction between the parties. The rolling stock was not, at any time, owned or held by the parties assuming to lease the same, or by any one represented by such parties. Under the first contract of June 6, 1878, the Philadelphia & Colorado Equipment Trust, an association of shareholders, to the amount of ip 500 each, furnished money, with which the railway company either bought or constructed cars and locomotives for its own use. In like manner, under the other contracts with the Eio Grande Extension Company, the railway company bought or constructed rolling stock for its own use with money furnished by shareholders through the Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Company, to be returned, with interest, from the payments made under the contracts by the railway company. Thus it appears that the payees of these instruments cannot stand in the character assumed by them, of lessors of the rolling stock, and, in so far as they may have any position in the law, they are to be regarded as mortgagees of the property. This assumption of a false character by the payees, with much verbiage of the law in the several contracts, will not, however, affect the result; if the equities of the transaction shall appear to be with them, of which more will he said further on.

In July last, when the original bill was filed, and the receiver was appointed, plaintiffs had not discovered any defect in the contracts, and were disposed to recognize them as valid and binding, and requiring fulfillment on the part of the railway company, in order to retain the interest already acquired through and by means of the large payments previously made under the contracts by the railway company. Accordingly, they asked that the receiver appointed in the cause bo directed to pay the sums falling due under the contracts for principal and interest; and this was done. The receiver has since paid, from the current earnings of the road, all such sums; and the plaintiffs, having amended their bill, now move to vacate or modify the order in that respect, on the ground that the rolling stock is subject to the consolidated mortgage which they seek to foreclose, and the said several contracts are invalid as against them. The consolidated mortgage, under which plaintiffs claim, bears date January 1, 1880, and covers “the rolling stock and equipment, of whatever nature and kind, owned, or hereafter to be acquired and owned, and as acquired by the said company, subject to a first mortgage of the company, of date April 13, 1871. The first of the contracts, relating to rolling stock, was prior to the consolidated mortgage, but, as the property thereby acquired is subject to the first mortgage of the road, [126]*126and the lien of that mortgage was complete before the consolidated mortgage was executed, it will not be necessary to consider the relation of the latter mortgage to that property. In any view of the question presented, the plaintiffs cannot resort to the rolling stock acquired under the first contract until the first mortgage shall be satisfied, a contingency which does not call for discussion at this time. The other contracts were subsequent in date to the consolidated mortgage, and. the property therein mentioned falls within the designation, in that mortgage, of after-acquired property. The provisions of the statute of this state, relating to chattel mortgages, (Gen. Laws 1877, p. 122,) were not observed in form and substance, in the manner of acknowledging or recording these instruments, and therefore they do not establish a lien on the property in favor of the defendants, as against creditors of the railway company proceeding by attachment and execution, or purchasers from the railway company in good faith. Harvey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; George v. Tufts, 5 Colo. 162.

And this is the pith and substance of plaintiffs’ argument: that these rolling-stock contracts, being invalid as to creditors of the railway company, and purchasers from the railway company without notice, are also invalid as to them. But the rule is that mortgagees of property to be acquired by the mortgagor take only the interest of the mortgagor therein. As declared in U. S. v. New Orleans R. R. 12 Wall. 365, “a mortgage intended to cover after-acquired property can only attach itself to such property in the condition in which it comes into the mortgagor’s hands. If that property is already subject to mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does not displace them, though they may be junior to it in point of time. It only attaches to such interest as the mortgagor acquires; and if he purchase property and give a mortgage for the purchase money, the deed which he receives and the mortgage which he gives are regarded as one transaction, and no general lien impending over him, whether in the shape of a general mortgage or judgment or recognizance, can displace such mortgage for purchase money.” Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
23 F. 123, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 1879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-v-denver-r-g-ry-co-circtdco-1885.