Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. General Motors Corporation

488 F.2d 202, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10513
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 17, 1974
Docket71-3635
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 488 F.2d 202 (Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. General Motors Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. General Motors Corporation, 488 F.2d 202, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10513 (5th Cir. 1974).

Opinion

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

The mutually profitable relationship between an automobile manufacturer and its dealer sometimes ends in an unpleasant separation. In this particular instance, like numerous other disputatious counterparts, litigation ensued. 1 Frank Coulson, Inc. — Buick 2 (Coulson), formerly a Buick dealer in Florida, brought suit in the Florida state courts against the General Motors Corporation (GM). Coulson asserted two independent grounds for relief: (1) Through duress and undue influence wrongfully exerted by GM, Coulson was forced to sell its dealership assets; and (2) GM had maliciously interfered with the contractual negotiations between Coulson and the dealership purchaser. 3 General Motors removed the case to federal district court because of diversity of citizenship. On the basis of special interrogatories, a jury found against Coulson on its first theory — forced sale. It awarded damages of $25,000, however, on the second theory — interference with contractual negotiations. The trial judge set aside the jury verdict by granting GM’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and Coulson appeals. We vacate and remand with directions.

Coulson had been at least a moderately successful dealership enjoying steadily increasing sales. In 1970 GM received two letters highly critical of the dealership. The letters allegedly had a substantial influence on Buick execu *204 tives and shortly after their receipt Coulson received a series of visits from GM representatives. Frank Coulson, corporation president, claimed that the visits were part of a plan by GM to force a sale of the dealership assets.

GM representatives apparently suggested that Frank Coulson, age 65, was getting old and should bring a younger man into the business. Coulson agreed to negotiate the sale of his dealership assets, and authorized GM to solicit buyers. In the course of finding buyers GM apparently “spread the word” that Coulson was going out of business. Coulson testified that dissemination of this information caused a decline in sales. He maintained that GM also coerced his sale by demands for unnecessary repairs on his facilities. Furthermore, Gene Miller, the Zone Manager for GM, allegedly intimated that the Coulson franchise would not be renewed. Nevertheless, the franchise was renewed in November 1970, one month before the eventual sale.

Coulson did enter into negotiations for the sale of the dealership assets with Glenn Ralph, a Buiek dealer from New York. Frank Coulson testified that in April 1970 he and Ralph agreed on a sales price of $100,000. Gene Miller, however, notified Ralph and Coulson that as GM’s Zone Manager he would not approve a sale for any amount in excess of $50,000. GM’s approval was essential because without it a purchaser would not receive the necessary Buick franchise.

Coulson testified that $50,000 was the value of the corporation’s tangible assets alone — $25,000 in parts and $25,000 in equipment. Thus, a sale at that price would allow nothing for intangible goodwill. Expert testimony was presented by Coulson that the dealership’s goodwill might be worth as much as $400,000. Even GM’s expert admitted that Coulson’s good-will was worth between $35,000 and $50,000. Moreover, GM recognized that Coulson’s parts were worth $25,000. Although GM contends that the dealership’s furniture, fixtures and equipment had been depreciated to zero, Mr. Miller seemed to recognize the value of $25,000. On cross examination Miller testified that the way he “looked at it” all Coulson had to sell were tangible assets.

Coulson and Ralph eventually consummated a sales transaction. In the written documents the sales price was stated to be $50,000. Additionally, Mr. and Mrs. Coulson entered into a $35,000 transaction with Kengle Realty, a New York corporation owned by Glenn Ralph and his brother. This transaction, in a rather complex manner, related to real estate improvements upon the premises in which the Coulson dealership was located. Ralph testified that the two transactions were actually part of the sale, and thus the actual price of the dealership was $85,000. According to Ralph, the second agreement, which related to the real estate, was designed to keep the true price concealed from GM. In response to a special interrogatory the jury found that the $35,000 transaction was indeed separate from the sale of the dealership assets. 4

The district court submitted each of Coulson’s grounds for recovery to the jury. The first theory of recovery, that GM had coerced Coulson in bad faith into a sale, was contained in the following interrogatory:

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, General Motors, was guilty of bad faith in its dealing with plaintiff ?

The jury responded in the negative. Coulson’s second ground, that GM-maliciously interfered with its negotiations *205 once they were under way, was embodied in another interrogatory:

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, General Motors, is guilty of malicious interference with the plaintiff’s contract negotiations with Ralph ?

The jury answered “Yes.” The jury, therefore, found that although GM did not coerce Coulson to sell, it had interfered with negotiations for the sale.

The district court granted GM’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict assigning three reasons as a basis for its decision: (1) the jury’s finding of no bad faith indicated that there was no substantial evidence of malicious interference; (2) GM was privileged to intervene and there was no substantial evidence that it overreached this privilege; (3) the evidence was clear and overwhelming that Coulson had suffered no damage from GM’s alleged interference in the contract negotiations. GM has properly urged us to judge the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, not the reasons relied upon. Since we view the result as error, however, we must necessarily explain our differences with the lower court.

The district court’s first assigned reason was based upon the inconsistency of a finding of no “bad faith” with a finding of “maliciousness.” We admit that in common usage “bad faith” may be an element of “maliciousness.” As we understand Florida law, however, a strict legalistic concept of maliciousness is not an element of an action based on interference with a prospective contractual relationship. In Florida, malice will be inferred where the interference is shown to be intentional. 5 Furthermore, we are convinced that the jury was entirely justified in treating the bad faith interrogatory as applicable to Coulson’s first theory — forced sale. 6 Coulson’s second theory was contained in the malicious interference interrogatory. We find that the jury’s answers are consistent with its award to Coulson Corporation.

Next, we shall consider the trial court’s finding that Coulson suffered no damage from any alleged interference by GM.

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488 F.2d 202, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-coulson-inc-buick-v-general-motors-corporation-ca5-1974.