1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Sabina Carol Francois, No. CV-21-00071-PHX-JAT
10 Petitioner, ORDER
11 v.
12 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al., 13 Respondents. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Sabina Carol Francois’s Motion to Alter or 16 Amend. (Doc. 22). Plaintiff filed her Motion in response to this Court’s September 21, 17 2021, Order staying this case pending removal proceedings. (Doc. 21). The Motion has 18 been fully briefed, (Doc. 22; Doc. 23; Doc. 24), and the Court now rules. 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Francois is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago who seeks to become a naturalized 21 citizen of the United States. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 1-2 at 4). After the United States Citizenship 22 and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Francois’ 2019 naturalization application on the 23 basis that she had not established lawful permanent residency, Immigration and Customs 24 Enforcement (ICE) re-initiated removal proceedings against Francois. (Doc. 1-2 at 3–4; 25 Doc. 10-4 at 3). Francois appealed to this Court, seeking a de novo review of the USCIS’s 26 denial of her naturalization application. In its September 21, 2021, Order (“Order”), this 27 Court issued a stay of this matter pending completion of ICE’s removal proceedings. (Doc. 28 21). Francois now moves to alter or amend this Court’s Order pursuant to Rule 59(e), 1 arguing that this Court erred in determining that the Immigration Judge can make factual 2 findings during removal proceedings that bear on the merits of her naturalization 3 application. (Doc. 22). 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 A. Francois’ Motion Is Properly Filed Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 59(e) 7 As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Francois’ Motion is 8 procedurally proper. Francois brings her Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) allows for “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment . . . filed 10 no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” The Government argues that this 11 Court’s Order staying the case pending removal proceedings is not a “judgment” within 12 the meaning of Rule 59(e). Therefore, the Government contends that Francois’ Rule 59(e) 13 motion is not ripe. (Doc. 23 at 1–2). 14 The term “judgment” is defined as “any order from which an appeal lies.” Fed. R. 15 Civ. P. 54(a). “In other words, it is a final order or decision.” Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 16 928 (9th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000) 17 (“A ‘judgment’ is . . . in other words, a final order.”) (emphasis in original); Bankers Trust 18 Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 n.4 (1978) (“A ‘judgment’ for purposes of the Federal 19 Rules of Civil Procedure would appear to be equivalent to a ‘final decision’ as that term is 20 used in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”). 21 Typically, the staying of an action is not considered a final, appealable decision. 22 Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). However, 23 this rule is inapplicable to situations where the impact of the stay is such that the plaintiff 24 is “effectively out of court.” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 25 Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1983) (citation omitted) (holding that where parallel federal and 26 state actions involved the “identical issue,” “a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of 27 the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum”). 28 Here, Francois’ parallel removal proceedings and naturalization appeal depend on 1 the “identical issue”—Francois’ status as a lawful permanent resident. (Doc 10-3 at 12; 2 Doc. 22 at 2). If the Immigration Judge (IJ) determines that Francois is removable, her 3 naturalization appeal would effectively be moot and “there would be no further litigation 4 in the federal forum.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 10. Accordingly, Francois’ 5 motion is properly filed under Rule 59(e).1 6 B. Francois’ Motion Fails Because This Court Did Not Commit Clear Error 7 and Highly Unusual Circumstances Do Not Exist in This Case 8 Rule 59(e) was adopted to “mak[e] clear that the district court possesses the power 9 to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.” 10 Maxwell v. Sherman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61852, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2016) (quoting 11 White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)). “Although Rule 59(e) 12 permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an 13 ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of 14 judicial resources.’” Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) 15 (citation omitted). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly 16 unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 17 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 18 Id. (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). 19 Francois contends that this Court clearly erred when it determined that the IJ could 20 make factual findings about Francois’ status in the country that bear on the merits of her 21 naturalization application. (Doc. 22 at 2; Doc 21 at 6). Francois elaborates on her position, 22 alleging that “[t]he only factual findings about [Francois’] status in the country that bear 23 on the merits of her naturalization application relate to former District Director Ruth Anne 24 Myers’ Declaration and the approval notice bearing her stamped signature,” and further 25 that “the [IJ] does not have jurisdiction to make any factual findings as to these two
26 1 Because Francois could have also properly sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Court considers the merits of Francois’ argument regardless of this 27 procedural determination. See Camboni v. Brnovich, No. CV-15-02538-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 4592160, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[t]he Court must construe a motion to 28 reconsider . . . based on the type of relief that is requested by the movant”; “[t]he rule under which a movant advances for relief is not determinative.”) (citations omitted). 1 documents.” (Doc. 22 at 2). 2 Francois provides no support for her position, nor is the Court aware of any 3 supporting authority. The Court understands that the IJ does not have jurisdiction to review 4 the discretionary grant or denial of adjustment by the USCIS. (Doc. 20 at 2; Doc. 21 at 6). 5 However, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), the IJ shall “receive evidence, and interrogate, 6 examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses” to determine removability. (Doc. 7 20 at 2).
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Sabina Carol Francois, No. CV-21-00071-PHX-JAT
10 Petitioner, ORDER
11 v.
12 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al., 13 Respondents. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Sabina Carol Francois’s Motion to Alter or 16 Amend. (Doc. 22). Plaintiff filed her Motion in response to this Court’s September 21, 17 2021, Order staying this case pending removal proceedings. (Doc. 21). The Motion has 18 been fully briefed, (Doc. 22; Doc. 23; Doc. 24), and the Court now rules. 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Francois is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago who seeks to become a naturalized 21 citizen of the United States. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 1-2 at 4). After the United States Citizenship 22 and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Francois’ 2019 naturalization application on the 23 basis that she had not established lawful permanent residency, Immigration and Customs 24 Enforcement (ICE) re-initiated removal proceedings against Francois. (Doc. 1-2 at 3–4; 25 Doc. 10-4 at 3). Francois appealed to this Court, seeking a de novo review of the USCIS’s 26 denial of her naturalization application. In its September 21, 2021, Order (“Order”), this 27 Court issued a stay of this matter pending completion of ICE’s removal proceedings. (Doc. 28 21). Francois now moves to alter or amend this Court’s Order pursuant to Rule 59(e), 1 arguing that this Court erred in determining that the Immigration Judge can make factual 2 findings during removal proceedings that bear on the merits of her naturalization 3 application. (Doc. 22). 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 A. Francois’ Motion Is Properly Filed Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 59(e) 7 As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Francois’ Motion is 8 procedurally proper. Francois brings her Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) allows for “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment . . . filed 10 no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” The Government argues that this 11 Court’s Order staying the case pending removal proceedings is not a “judgment” within 12 the meaning of Rule 59(e). Therefore, the Government contends that Francois’ Rule 59(e) 13 motion is not ripe. (Doc. 23 at 1–2). 14 The term “judgment” is defined as “any order from which an appeal lies.” Fed. R. 15 Civ. P. 54(a). “In other words, it is a final order or decision.” Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 16 928 (9th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000) 17 (“A ‘judgment’ is . . . in other words, a final order.”) (emphasis in original); Bankers Trust 18 Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 n.4 (1978) (“A ‘judgment’ for purposes of the Federal 19 Rules of Civil Procedure would appear to be equivalent to a ‘final decision’ as that term is 20 used in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”). 21 Typically, the staying of an action is not considered a final, appealable decision. 22 Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). However, 23 this rule is inapplicable to situations where the impact of the stay is such that the plaintiff 24 is “effectively out of court.” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 25 Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1983) (citation omitted) (holding that where parallel federal and 26 state actions involved the “identical issue,” “a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of 27 the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum”). 28 Here, Francois’ parallel removal proceedings and naturalization appeal depend on 1 the “identical issue”—Francois’ status as a lawful permanent resident. (Doc 10-3 at 12; 2 Doc. 22 at 2). If the Immigration Judge (IJ) determines that Francois is removable, her 3 naturalization appeal would effectively be moot and “there would be no further litigation 4 in the federal forum.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 10. Accordingly, Francois’ 5 motion is properly filed under Rule 59(e).1 6 B. Francois’ Motion Fails Because This Court Did Not Commit Clear Error 7 and Highly Unusual Circumstances Do Not Exist in This Case 8 Rule 59(e) was adopted to “mak[e] clear that the district court possesses the power 9 to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.” 10 Maxwell v. Sherman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61852, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2016) (quoting 11 White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)). “Although Rule 59(e) 12 permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule offers an 13 ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of 14 judicial resources.’” Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) 15 (citation omitted). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly 16 unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 17 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 18 Id. (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). 19 Francois contends that this Court clearly erred when it determined that the IJ could 20 make factual findings about Francois’ status in the country that bear on the merits of her 21 naturalization application. (Doc. 22 at 2; Doc 21 at 6). Francois elaborates on her position, 22 alleging that “[t]he only factual findings about [Francois’] status in the country that bear 23 on the merits of her naturalization application relate to former District Director Ruth Anne 24 Myers’ Declaration and the approval notice bearing her stamped signature,” and further 25 that “the [IJ] does not have jurisdiction to make any factual findings as to these two
26 1 Because Francois could have also properly sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Court considers the merits of Francois’ argument regardless of this 27 procedural determination. See Camboni v. Brnovich, No. CV-15-02538-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 4592160, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[t]he Court must construe a motion to 28 reconsider . . . based on the type of relief that is requested by the movant”; “[t]he rule under which a movant advances for relief is not determinative.”) (citations omitted). 1 documents.” (Doc. 22 at 2). 2 Francois provides no support for her position, nor is the Court aware of any 3 supporting authority. The Court understands that the IJ does not have jurisdiction to review 4 the discretionary grant or denial of adjustment by the USCIS. (Doc. 20 at 2; Doc. 21 at 6). 5 However, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), the IJ shall “receive evidence, and interrogate, 6 examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses” to determine removability. (Doc. 7 20 at 2). 8 Here, Francois’ removability as a nonimmigrant “overstay” hinges on whether she 9 is a lawful permanent resident. Under § 1229a, the IJ has authority to receive and make 10 factual findings to determine Francois’ residency status. The IJ’s lack of jurisdiction to 11 review USCIS decisions does not shield the IJ from receiving and considering underlying 12 evidence. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged this conclusion in a previous iteration of this 13 case, stating that “under the specific facts of this case, the denial of Francois’ adjustment 14 application will not be ripe for judicial review until removal proceedings conclude before 15 the agency.” Francois v. Johnson, 667 Fed. Appx. 630, 631 (9th Cir. 2016). Further, even 16 if the IJ lacks jurisdiction to make factual findings as to the two documents at issue, the IJ 17 may make other factual determinations in the removal proceedings that could bear on this 18 Court’s de novo review of Francois’ naturalization application. (Doc. 21 at 7 (citing Dilone 19 v. Nielsen, 358 F. Supp. 3d 490, 503–04 (D. Md. 2019) (noting that factual findings in 20 removal proceedings may impact applicant’s burden to establish the “good moral 21 character” requirement for naturalization))). Therefore, the Court finds that it did not 22 clearly err in staying Francois’ appeal. 23 Additionally, in her reply brief, Francois alleges that “highly unusual circumstances 24 exist” to warrant the Court’s reconsideration of its Order. (Doc. 24 at 1). But Francois does 25 not provide any substantive support for this argument. Instead, Francois simply recites the 26 facts of the case with a focus on the history of the two documents at issue, providing no 27 reasoning as to why the circumstances alleged are highly unusual. (Doc. 24 at 2–3). The 28 Court finds that the circumstances of this case—specifically a dispute over the validity of pivotal documents—is not highly unusual. 2 Ht. CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing, 4 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court’s Order || (Doc. 22) is DENIED. 6 Dated this 22nd day of February, 2022. 7 8 '
10 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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