USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10992 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-01427-LCB
F.R., as parent and next friend of B.C., a minor,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
WALTER B. GONSOULIN, JR., in his official capacity and as representative of Jefferson County Board of Education,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(September 20, 2021)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 2 of 8
Plaintiff-appellant F.R., as parent and next friend of B.C., appeals the district
court’s dismissal of her complaint against defendants-appellees Dr. Walter
Gonsoulin, in his official capacity as representative of the Jefferson County Board
of Education, and the Jefferson County Board of Education (collectively, the
Board). F.R. filed suit against the Board, alleging that B.C. was denied enrollment
at McAdory High School in violation of the McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435. For the following reasons, we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the facts and
only set out those necessary to decide this appeal. In 2018, F.R., B.C., and F.R.’s
three other children lived in Bessemer, Alabama. However, in September of 2018,
F.R. experienced financial hardships that ultimately led to the family moving out
of their home in Bessemer and becoming homeless. Subsequently, B.C. attempted
to enroll at McAdory High School (McAdory) for the 2019–2020 school year, but
he was denied enrollment.
F.R. filed a complaint as B.C.’s “parent and next friend”—on behalf of B.C.,
who was a minor at the time—on August 29, 2019. The complaint alleged that the
Board denied B.C. enrollment in public school in violation of the McKinney-Vento
Homeless Assistance Act (McKinney-Vento Act). The complaint requested a
2 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 3 of 8
declaratory judgment that the Board violated B.C.’s rights, a preliminary and
permanent injunction admitting B.C. to McAdory, that the Board develop better
policies to ensure compliance with the McKinney-Vento Act, and attorneys’ fees.
On August 29, 2019, the same day F.R. filed the complaint, the district court
conducted a telephone conference with the parties, and the Board ultimately agreed
to admit B.C. to McAdory. On October 17, 2019, the Board filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss
and denied F.R.’s motion for declaratory relief. The court dismissed the case as
moot, finding that the Supreme Court decision in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974) (per curiam), controlled this case. 1 F.R. filed a motion to set aside the
court’s decision, arguing that two of the mootness exceptions—capable of
repetition, yet evading review, and voluntary cessation—applied. The court denied
F.R.’s motion. This appeal followed. While this case was pending on appeal, B.C.
graduated from McAdory and is no longer a minor.
II.
1 In DeFunis, Marco DeFunis sued the University of Washington Law School claiming that it violated his right to equal protection when it denied him admission. 416 U.S. at 312. The state trial court found for DeFunis and issued an injunction requiring the school to admit him as a law student. Id. at 315. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and DeFunis petitioned for writ of certiorari. Id. By the time the United States Supreme Court heard the case, DeFunis was already enrolled in his last semester of law school. Accordingly, the Court found that the case was moot, reasoning that any decision it might reach on the merits of the case would not affect DeFunis, who would complete law school at the end of the term. Id. at 319–20. 3 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 4 of 8
We review questions of justiciability, including mootness, de novo. Coral
Spring St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004).
III.
As an initial matter, B.C. is the true party to this suit and because B.C. is
now a legal adult, F.R. no longer has standing to bring this appeal as “next friend.”
Under Alabama law, when a person turns 19 years old they are no longer
considered a minor. Ala. Code § 26-1-1. B.C., as the named plaintiff who reached
the age of majority, can now control his case, and F.R. no longer holds a
representative role. Consequently, we evaluate mootness as it relates to B.C., the
named party, not F.R.
The Constitution limits federal court’s jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The mootness doctrine “is derived from
this limitation because an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active
case or controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th
Cir. 1997). Cases become moot when there is no longer a live controversy or if
“the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. In light of
B.C.’s graduation from high school, he no longer has a continuing interest in the
declaratory and injunctive relief that he seeks, and the case is thus moot unless an
exception to the mootness doctrine applies. See, e.g., Troiano v. Supervisor of
Elections in Palm Beach Cnty., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2004). The two
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 5 of 8
exceptions at issue here are referred to as “voluntary cessation” and “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” F.R. argues that both exceptions apply in this
case. We disagree and affirm the district court.2
A. Voluntary Cessation
Under the “voluntary cessation” doctrine, a defendant cannot unilaterally
render a case moot by the simple expedient of voluntarily ceasing its allegedly
illegal conduct after suit has been filed. See id. at 1282–83. Instead, “the
voluntary cessation of challenged conduct will only moot a claim when there is no
‘reasonable expectation’ that the accused litigant will resume the conduct after the
lawsuit is dismissed.” Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 633 F.3d 1297, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011).
F.R. argues that the voluntary cessation doctrine applies here, characterizing
the Board’s decision to allow B.C. to enroll in the high school of his choice as an
attempt to avoid liability by temporarily conforming its conduct to the law. She
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USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10992 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-01427-LCB
F.R., as parent and next friend of B.C., a minor,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
WALTER B. GONSOULIN, JR., in his official capacity and as representative of Jefferson County Board of Education,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(September 20, 2021)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 2 of 8
Plaintiff-appellant F.R., as parent and next friend of B.C., appeals the district
court’s dismissal of her complaint against defendants-appellees Dr. Walter
Gonsoulin, in his official capacity as representative of the Jefferson County Board
of Education, and the Jefferson County Board of Education (collectively, the
Board). F.R. filed suit against the Board, alleging that B.C. was denied enrollment
at McAdory High School in violation of the McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435. For the following reasons, we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the facts and
only set out those necessary to decide this appeal. In 2018, F.R., B.C., and F.R.’s
three other children lived in Bessemer, Alabama. However, in September of 2018,
F.R. experienced financial hardships that ultimately led to the family moving out
of their home in Bessemer and becoming homeless. Subsequently, B.C. attempted
to enroll at McAdory High School (McAdory) for the 2019–2020 school year, but
he was denied enrollment.
F.R. filed a complaint as B.C.’s “parent and next friend”—on behalf of B.C.,
who was a minor at the time—on August 29, 2019. The complaint alleged that the
Board denied B.C. enrollment in public school in violation of the McKinney-Vento
Homeless Assistance Act (McKinney-Vento Act). The complaint requested a
2 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 3 of 8
declaratory judgment that the Board violated B.C.’s rights, a preliminary and
permanent injunction admitting B.C. to McAdory, that the Board develop better
policies to ensure compliance with the McKinney-Vento Act, and attorneys’ fees.
On August 29, 2019, the same day F.R. filed the complaint, the district court
conducted a telephone conference with the parties, and the Board ultimately agreed
to admit B.C. to McAdory. On October 17, 2019, the Board filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss
and denied F.R.’s motion for declaratory relief. The court dismissed the case as
moot, finding that the Supreme Court decision in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974) (per curiam), controlled this case. 1 F.R. filed a motion to set aside the
court’s decision, arguing that two of the mootness exceptions—capable of
repetition, yet evading review, and voluntary cessation—applied. The court denied
F.R.’s motion. This appeal followed. While this case was pending on appeal, B.C.
graduated from McAdory and is no longer a minor.
II.
1 In DeFunis, Marco DeFunis sued the University of Washington Law School claiming that it violated his right to equal protection when it denied him admission. 416 U.S. at 312. The state trial court found for DeFunis and issued an injunction requiring the school to admit him as a law student. Id. at 315. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and DeFunis petitioned for writ of certiorari. Id. By the time the United States Supreme Court heard the case, DeFunis was already enrolled in his last semester of law school. Accordingly, the Court found that the case was moot, reasoning that any decision it might reach on the merits of the case would not affect DeFunis, who would complete law school at the end of the term. Id. at 319–20. 3 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 4 of 8
We review questions of justiciability, including mootness, de novo. Coral
Spring St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004).
III.
As an initial matter, B.C. is the true party to this suit and because B.C. is
now a legal adult, F.R. no longer has standing to bring this appeal as “next friend.”
Under Alabama law, when a person turns 19 years old they are no longer
considered a minor. Ala. Code § 26-1-1. B.C., as the named plaintiff who reached
the age of majority, can now control his case, and F.R. no longer holds a
representative role. Consequently, we evaluate mootness as it relates to B.C., the
named party, not F.R.
The Constitution limits federal court’s jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The mootness doctrine “is derived from
this limitation because an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active
case or controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th
Cir. 1997). Cases become moot when there is no longer a live controversy or if
“the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. In light of
B.C.’s graduation from high school, he no longer has a continuing interest in the
declaratory and injunctive relief that he seeks, and the case is thus moot unless an
exception to the mootness doctrine applies. See, e.g., Troiano v. Supervisor of
Elections in Palm Beach Cnty., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2004). The two
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 5 of 8
exceptions at issue here are referred to as “voluntary cessation” and “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” F.R. argues that both exceptions apply in this
case. We disagree and affirm the district court.2
A. Voluntary Cessation
Under the “voluntary cessation” doctrine, a defendant cannot unilaterally
render a case moot by the simple expedient of voluntarily ceasing its allegedly
illegal conduct after suit has been filed. See id. at 1282–83. Instead, “the
voluntary cessation of challenged conduct will only moot a claim when there is no
‘reasonable expectation’ that the accused litigant will resume the conduct after the
lawsuit is dismissed.” Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 633 F.3d 1297, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011).
F.R. argues that the voluntary cessation doctrine applies here, characterizing
the Board’s decision to allow B.C. to enroll in the high school of his choice as an
attempt to avoid liability by temporarily conforming its conduct to the law. She
argues that the district court erred in relying on DeFunis to reject her voluntary-
cessation argument because the defendant in that case ceased its illegal conduct in
response to a court ordered stay; it did not do so voluntarily. Here, however, this
2 While this case was pending on appeal B.C. graduated from McAdory. Subsequently, the Board filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that B.C.’s graduation was an intervening event that mooted the case. We carried this motion with the case because B.C.’s graduation did not change the district court’s analysis or materially change our review of the order on appeal. Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the case, we deny the Board’s motion to dismiss on appeal. 5 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 6 of 8
distinction makes no difference. That is because, as in DeFunis, “mootness in the
present case depends not at all upon a ‘voluntary cessation’ of the admissions
practices that were the subject of this litigation.” DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 318. As
was the case in DeFunis, it is the fact that the plaintiff has already been afforded
the relief that he sought—the opportunity to attend the school of his choice through
graduation—that has removed from the dispute any actual controversy between the
parties. See id.
The question of whether the Board’s decision to admit B.C. to McAdory
represented a permanent change in its policies or merely a temporary one no longer
matters; since B.C. has already attended and graduated from that very school, our
resolution “of the legal issues tendered by the parties is no longer necessary to
compel that result, and could not serve to prevent it.” Id. at 317. “No matter how
vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that
precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute is no longer embedded in
any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.” Already, LLC
v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013).
For these reasons, we find that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not
apply here.
6 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 7 of 8
B. Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review
To demonstrate that a case is capable of repetition, yet evading review, the
plaintiff must show “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action
again.” Adler, 112 F.3d at 1477–78 (alterations adopted).
F.R. argues that this case meets the first requirement because “the time a
minor has to attend school is limited and a particular student could graduate before
the challenged government agency’s conduct . . . could be determined to have
violated his/her federally guaranteed rights.” And, according to F.R., the second
requirement is also met because F.R. has standing under the McKinney-Vento Act
and this situation could recur with her three other children, who are still minors.
She also claims DeFunis is distinguishable from this case because that case was
about law school admission and there is no guaranteed right to attend law school
but there is a right to free public education for children, and because F.R. herself
has standing to bring this claim.
This case does not fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review
exception. F.R’s argument that DeFunis is different because there is a guaranteed
right to attend high school, but not law school, fails to recognize that DeFunis was
suing under his constitutional right to equal protection. Therefore, this distinction
7 USCA11 Case: 20-10992 Date Filed: 09/20/2021 Page: 8 of 8
does not affect the applicability of DeFunis to this case. And her argument that
she has standing to bring this suit herself fails to recognize that B.C. is the real
party to this suit. To this end, her arguments regarding how she and her other
minor children will be affected are not relevant. Under this exception the plaintiff
must show “the same complaining party”—in this case, B.C.—will be subjected to
the allegedly unlawful action again. Adler, 112 F.3d at 1478. F.R. cannot
demonstrate B.C. will be subject to this action again as he has already graduated
from McAdory. Therefore, just like in DeFunis, the capable of repetition, yet
evading review doctrine does not apply here.
IV.
Because we find that this case is moot and no exception to the mootness
doctrine applies, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing this suit.
AFFIRMED.