1 |} AARON D. FORD Attorney General 2 || LORIN M. TAYLOR (Bar No. 14958) Deputy Attorney General 3 State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General 4 ||555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 5 (702) 486-2389 (phone) (702) 486-3773 (fax) 6 Email: lmtaylor@ag.nv.gov 7 || Attorneys for Defendanis Harold Wickham, Dwight Neven, and 8 || Richard Ashcraft 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 12 |} AMBER FOSTER, Case No. 2:19-cv-00969-GMN-VCF 13 Plaintiff, 14 || v. AMENDED JOINT PRETRIAL ORDER 15 || STATE OF NEVADA, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 Following pretrial proceedings in this case, 18 IT IS ORDERED: 19 20 NATURE OF ACTION AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 21 NATURE OF ACTION 22 This is an inmate civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff 23 || Amber Foster is an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections and is 24 ||currently incarcerated at Jean Conservation Camp. Foster sued under the Fifth and 25 ||Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.! The Court screened the 26 |;Complaint and allowed Foster’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims to proceed 27 ECF 7. 28 Page 1 of 15
1 |{against Defendant Harold Wickham, Dwight Neven, and Richard Ashcraft; dismissed 2 || Foster’s Fifth Amendment claim; and dismissed Amber Parkerson and Gabriela Garcia.? Foster sued for injunctive relief for events that took place while incarcerated at 4 ||Florence McClure Women’s Correctional Center. On June 21, 2018, an unknown 5 ||individual sent Foster mail without a return address.4 Mail without a return address 6 ||cannot be delivered to inmates.5 Former Correctional Officer Parkerson, per protocol, 7 ||opened the mail and noted it appeared to be sprayed with an unknown substance.® The 8 ||substance tested positive for methamphetamine, and Foster was charged with an MJ53: 9 || possession, introduction, or sales of any narcotics, drugs, alcohol, or other intoxicants or 10 || possession of materials/items suitable for such manufacture and/or use.7 11 Defendant Ashcraft conducted Foster’s disciplinary hearing on July 1, 2018.8 12 || During the hearing, Foster stated she did not know who had sent her the mail, that she 13 || has no control over who sends her mail, and that she would never have asked for mail to 14 sent to her anonymously because she knew that it would not be delivered.? Ashcraft 15 || found her guilty of the offense. !® 16 Foster appealed the guilty finding via the administrative grievance process.!! 17 ||Neven denied Foster’s grievance at the first level, and Harold Wickham denied her 18 grievance at the second level.!2 As a result of the guilty finding, Foster received multiple 19 |}sanctions, including loss of canteen privileges for ninety days, loss of personal calls for 20 21 ———________________ ECF 8. 22 ECF 7. 4 23 : at 4. 24 at 4-5. 95 fd. at 6. 9 Id. 26 || 1° Id. ie at 7.
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1 j|ninety days, placement in segregation for sixty days, and “stat ref’ for sixty days.!3 Based 2 these allegations, Foster asserts NDOC Employees violated her right to due process 3 under the Fourteenth Amendment, !4 4 CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 5 1, Plaintiff's Contentions 6 Foster asserts the guilty finding from Offense in Custody No. 445464 and the 7 ||punishments of “segregation confinement & other numerous sanctions. . . occurred 8 || without any evidence indicating that there was any knowledge on [Foster’s] behalf of this 9 || illegal action therefore the defendants violated [Foster’s] due process rights.” !5 10 2. Defendants’ Contentions 11 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Foster’s claims. 12 The evidence does not support Foster’s allegations. 13 Foster's constitutional rights have not been violated. 14 Foster is not entitled to any of the relief demanded in the complaint. 15 Defendant Ashcraft relied on some evidence with indicia of reliability to support 16 ||the guilty finding in OIC No. 445464, 17 Defendants Wickham and Neven were not personally involved any alleged 18 constitutional violation. 19 Foster's prayer to reverse of the guilty finding in OIC No. 445464 and to clear her 20 |/institutional record of the disciplinary infraction is barred under Preiser v. Rodriguez!¢ 21 Heck v. Humphry." 22 Foster did not pray for recovery of monetary damages in her complaint and as a 23 24 95 || Id. "Id. at 8. 26 Id. at 3. 16 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). 27 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994). 28 Page 3 of 15
1 result Foster cannot seek monetary damages at trial.!8 2 To the extent that Plaintiff sues Defendants for damages in their official capacities, 3 ||state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under § 1983 and the 4 ||claims against Ashcraft, Neven, and Whickham in their official capacity should be 5 || dismissed. !9 6 A. C. RELIEF SOUGHT 7 Foster seeks injunctive relief in the form of reversing the guilty finding, the 8 ||sanctions, and “clearing [Fostev’s] institutional record of any disciplinary infractions.”2° 9 I. 10 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 11 This is a civil action for injunctive relief commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This 12 || Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 13 Ii. 14 UNCONTESTED FACTS ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES WHICH REQUIRE NO 15 PROOF 16 1. On June 21, 2018, Foster was an inmate housed at Florence McClure 17 || Women’s Correctional Facility. 18 2. Under Nevada Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation (AR) 19 ||750 - Inmate General Correspondence and Mail, effective date December 17, 2013, 20 “Inmates are responsible to comply with mail and correspondence procedures.”2! 21 22 See Bain v. California Tehrs. Ass'n, 891 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting plaintiffs 23 attempt to “transform their lawsuit from a request for prospective equitable relief into a plea for money damages to remedy past wrongs.”); Seven Words LLC v. Network Solutions, 260 F.3d 94 || 1089, 1092, 1096-1097 (9 Cir. 2001) (plaintiff cannot assert a late-in-the-day damages claim to avoid mootness when plaintiff “consistently represented that it was seeking only declaratory and 95 injunctive relief’ throughout the litigation). 18 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 26 Id. at 14. Nevada Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 750.1 — Inmate General 27 Correspondence and Mail, effective date December 17, 2013 28 Page 4 of 15
1 3. On June 21, 2018, the Florence McClure Women’s Correctional Facility 2 || mailroom received two envelopes addressed to Foster. 3 4, The envelopes had no return address. 4 5. Envelopes with no return address are not delivered to an inmate pursuant to 5 || AR 750. 6 6. The envelopes were opened by Correctional Officer Parkerson. 7 7. Correctional Officer Parkerson observed that each envelope contained a 8 || greeting card. 9 8. Correctional Officer Parkerson observed that each greeting card “appeared 10 || to be bubbly as ifit were sprayed with something.” 11 9. Correctional Officer Parkerson suspected that the cards contained drugs. 12 10. Correctional Officer Parkerson contacted Correctional Lieutenant Clinton 13 || Snowden. 14 11. Correctional Lieutenant Snowden tested the cards for drugs. 15 12. The first test, test number 902 Marquis Regent lot number 1009065-1 tested 16 || positive for Methamphetamine. 17 13. Asecond test, 923 MDMA (Methamphetamine regent) lot number 1012884-1 18 || also tested positive for Methamphetamine. 19 14. Foster was charged with Offense in Custody No. 445464, an MJ53 20 || Possession, introduction, or sales of any narcotics, drugs, alcohol, or other intoxicants or 21 || possession of materials/items suitable for such manufacture and/or use under Nevada 22 || Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 707 — Inmate Disciplinary Process, 23 || effective date May 16, 2017. 24 15. Under AR 707, an MJ53 is a class A Offense. 25 16. Per AR 707.2 — Disciplinary Sanctions, effective date February 12, 2017, 26 || Class A Offenses are sanctionable as follows: 27 28 Page 5 of 15
1 ® Up to 60-days Disciplinary Segregation or Austere Housing, but these 2 sanctions will not be consecutive. 3 □ Class Stat up to 60-days 4 ® Loss of Privileges may be imposed consecutive to Disciplinary 5 Segregation but they are not to be served concurrently to Disciplinary 6 Segregation. These sanctions may include: 7 o Loss of Outside Recreation for up to 30-days. 8 Loss of Telephone Privileges for up to 90-days. 9 o Loss of Inmate Store/Commissary for up to 90-days. 10 oO Loss of Visiting for up to 60-days. 11 □ Restitution for loss or damage of property. 12 17. Foster was issued a written Notice of Charges on June 22, 2018. 13 18. On June 22, 2018, Correctional Sergeant Karissa Currier referred Foster to 14 Disciplinary Hearing. 15 19. On July 1, 2018, Correctional Lieutenant Ashcraft held a disciplinary 16 || hearing on Offense in Custody No. 445464, 17 20. Based on Correctional Officer Parkerson’s report and the representations 18 || therein, Foster was found guilty of the MJ53. 19 21. Foster was sanctioned to 60-days of disciplinary segregation; 60 days of Stat 20 || loss; loss of phone privileges for 90-days; loss of canteen privileges for 90-days. 21 22. “Stat loss” or a “stat ref’ refers to the loss of good time credits under NRS 22 209.4465. Under NRS 209.4465(1) inmates incarcerated within the Nevada Department 23 ||of Corrections who have no “serious infractions” of NDOC regulations “and who perform[] 24 |/in a faithful, orderly and peaceable manner the duties assigned to the offender” earn “a 25 || deduction of 20 days from his or her sentence for each month the offender serves.” 26 23. Foster had a total of 30 days of statutory good time credit removed from her 27 credit history. 28 Page 6 of 15
1 24. Foster was in disciplinary segregation for 66 days. 2 25. Foster lost her phone and canteen privileges for 90 days. 3 IV. 4 FACTS UNADMITTED THAT WILL NOT BE CONTESTED 5 The following facts, though not admitted, will not be contested at trial by evidence 6 || to the contrary: NONE 7 V. 8 CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT TO BE TRIED AND DETERMINED UPON 9 TRIAL 10 PLAINTIFF’S CONTESTED FACTS 11 It is Foster’s position that there was “no evidence” that she committed an 12 |linfraction. 13 DEFENDANTS’ CONTESTED FACTS 14 Defendant Ashcraft relied on Correctional Officer Parkerson’s report and the 15 ||representations therein to find Foster guilty of the MJ53. That report is some evidence 16 || bearing indicia of reliability that Defendant Richard Ashcraft relied upon when he found 17 || Foster guilty of the MJ53. 18 VI. 19 || CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW TO BE TRIED AND DETERMINED UPON TRIAL 20 PLAINTIFF 21 That there was no evidence to support the guilty finding for OIC No. 445464. 22 ||B. DEFENDANT 23 1. Defendants Did Not Violate Plaintiffs Due Process Rights 24 Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives 25 written notice of the charges, a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison officials, 26 the reasons for disciplinary action.22 An inmate has a limited right to call witnesses 27 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 28 Page 7 of 15
1 to present documentary evidence if permitting the inmate to do so would not unduly 2 ||threaten institutional safety and goals.23 Findings that result in the loss of liberty will 3 ||satisfy due process if there is some evidence that supports the decisions of the 4 disciplinary board.2! Due process requires that there be “some evidence” supporting a 5 j[prison disciplinary proceeding that deprives a prisoner of good time credits.25 This 6 standard “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of 7 credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence,” but asks “whether there is any 8 ||evidence in the record that could support” the challenged finding.?6 The Hill standard is 9 ||minimally stringent and the evidence the hearing officer uses to make his decision only 10 || needs to bear “some indicia of reliability.”27 District Courts in this circuit have found that 11 ||a Correctional Officer’s report or testimony based upon her observations and findings is 12 ||some evidence bearing some indicia of reliability.22 ,Even evidence susceptible to more 13 || than one logical conclusion suffices to meet the Hill standard.29 14 Here, the Defendant Ashcraft relied on some evidence—Correctional Officer Amber 15 ||}Parkerson’s report that greeting cards with drugs on them had been sent to inmate 16 || Foster—that could support the charge of an MJ53 — Possession, introduction, or sales of 17 ||any narcotics, drugs, alcohol, or other intoxicants or possession of materials/items 18 ||suitable for such manufacture and/or use under AR 707. Because Defendant Ashcroft 19 |/relied on some evidence to find Foster guilty, the guilty finding did not violate Foster’s 20 ||rights to due process of law. Because Defendant Ashcroft did not violate Foster’s rights to 21 process of law when he found her guilty of the MJ53, Defendants Neven and 22 2 laa 24 24 Superiniendent vu. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 26 Fd. at 455. 95, fd. at 556 (emphasis added). 27 Cato vu. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). 26 See, Salerno v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2410367, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2007); Carrillo v. Stainer, 1997 WL 16312, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1997), aff'd, 131 F.3d 145 (9th Cir. 1997). 27 See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. 28 Page 8 of 15
1 |] Whickham did not violate Foster’s rights to due process of law when they upheld the 2 || guilty finding. 3 2. Foster’s Claims are Barred by Preiser v. Rodriguez, or Heck v. 4 Humphry. 5 Claims for injunctive relief that seek to terminate or shorten a prison sentence, 6 |{and claims for damages because the prison reached the wrong result in a disciplinary 7 ||proceeding are not cognizable causes of action under § 1983. Inmates cannot use § 1983 to 8 ||(1) attack the “fact or duration of . . . confinement, based. . .the alleged 9 |] unconstitutionality of state administrative action”?° or (2) recover damages that “call into 10 || question the lawfulness of conviction or confinement.”?! 11 Here, Foster seeks injunctive relief overturning the guilty finding and clearing her 12 |\institutional record which will result in the return of her NRS 209.4465 good time credits 13 the shortening of her confinement. Such relief is explicitly foreclosed by Prieser 14 because relief is properly sought by a writ of habeas corpus: “[s]uch a challenge is just as 15 ||close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner’s conviction, for it goes 16 ||directly to the constitutionality of his physical confinement itself and seeks either 17 ||immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of its duration.”3? “Preiser 18 || habeas jurisdiction is proper where a challenge to prison conditions would, if successful, 19 necessarily accelerate the prisoner's release.”33 20 If, however, Foster’s request to overturn the guilty finding and clear her 21 ||institutional record is treated as damages, the claim is barred under Heck v. Humphry’s 22 ||favorable termination rule, which applies every time a challenge to conviction, sentence, 23 ||disciplinary hearing, or administrative sanction will affect the overall length of the 24 25 Preiser uv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). 31 Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994). 26 Id. 33 Ramirez uv. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 27 |! (9th Cir.1997). 28 Page 9 of 15
1 ||plaintiffs confinement.?! Foster’s claim must be dismissed because Foster has not 2 ||provided proof that the guilty finding has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 3 ||executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 4 ||determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 5 || corpusf[.]” 35 6 Whether Foster’s request for relief is classified as injunctive relief or damages, the 7 ||claim is barred. 8 3. If the Relief Foster Requests is Deemed Damages and Not Injunctive 9 Relief, Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity 10 In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, qualified immunity protects state officials from civil 11 liability for damages resulting from discretionary acts, as long as those acts do not violate 12 ||clearly established constitutional rights.3¢ Qualified immunity is not just a defense to 13 ||hiability, but it is also “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 14 || litigation.”3? In Saucier v. Katz, the United States Supreme Court held that: (1) the court 15 || must first determine whether the facts as pled point to a constitutional violation, and (2) 16 so, then the court must decide whether the constitutional right was clearly established 17 ||at the time of the alleged violation.3® United States Supreme Court has since instructed 18 || lower courts that they may follow the Saucier formula, or they can elect to take the two 19 || parts out of order and examine the knowledge component first, ending the inquiry if the 20 || defendant would not have had notice of a constitutional violation. 21 It is a plaintiffs burden to establish that a right was “clearly established” at the 22 || time of the alleged misconduct.‘ The law is clearly established when “[t]he contours of [a] 23 94 Galaza, 334 F.3d at 858. 35 Heck, 512 U.S, at 486-87. 95, ||°° Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). 37 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 26 Saucter v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 39 Pearson vu. Caliahan, 555 U.S, 233, 240—42 (2009). 27 || 40 Green v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009). 28 Page 10 of 15
1 |/right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that 2 ||what he is doing violates that right.”4! Under a qualified immunity analysis, clearly 3 |/established law “should not be defined at a high level of generality.”42 “[T]he clearly 4 |/established law must be particularized to the facts of the case.’43 A plaintiff cannot 5 ||deprive defendants of entitlement to qualified immunity by alleging violations of 6 |jextremely abstract rights.44 A defendant is not required to foresee judicial decisions that 7 ||do not yet exist, where the requirements of law are far from obvious.45 8 In determining “whether a [constitutional] right was clearly established,” the Court 9 {|surveys the law within this Circuit and under Supreme Court precedent “at the time of 10 |/the alleged act.”46 “[L]iability will not attach unless there exists a case where an officer 11 |/acting under similar circumstances . .. was held to have violated the [First 12 || Amendment.]’47 Although there need not be an identical case, “existing precedent must 13 ||have placed the ... question beyond debate.”48 14 Defendants do not concede they violated any constitutional right, but should the 15 ||Court decide otherwise and in the event that the court finds that Foster’s request for 16 j/relief is in fact damages and not injunctive relief, it is Defendants’ position that the 17 ||constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation and 18 || Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for such damages. 19 20 || —————__—— Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 1381S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 21 || 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 42 See White v. Pauly, 137 8. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (internal citation omitted); see aiso S.B. v. Cnty. 22 || of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). 43 Td, 23 Ta. 24 ||* See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 8. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2018) (internal citations omitted). 46 Perez v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1208 (S. D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Cmty. House, Inc. 25 City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (2010) (citing Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 933 (9th Cir. 2010)). 26 Emmons v. City of Escondido, 921 F.3d 1172, 1174 (th Cir. 2019) (citing White v. Pauly, 137 U.S. 548, 551-52 (2017) (per curiam). 27 || 48 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 28 Page 11 of 15
1 VIL, 2 EXHIBITS 3 STIPULATED EXHIBITS AS TO AUTHENTICITY AND ADMISSIBILITY 4 1. Disciplinary Forms I, II, and III for Offence in Custody No. 445464. 5 2. Audio Recording for Offence in Disciplinary Hearing dated July 1, 2018. 6 3. Grievance No. 2006-30-68733. 7 4, IR-2018-SNWCC-001089. 8 5. Credit History by Sentence Report for Amber Foster 1164057. 9 6. Historical Bed Assignments for Amber Foster 1164057. 10 7. Accounting statements for Amber Foster 1164057. il 8. Nevada Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 750 — Inmate 12 General Correspondence and Mail, effective date December 17, 2013. 13 9, Florence McClure Women’s Correctional Center Operational Procedure 750 14 — Inmate General Correspondence and Mail, effective date December 17, 15 2013. 16 10. Nevada Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 707 — Inmate 17 Disciplinary Procedure, effective date May 15, 2017. 18 11. Nevada Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 707.02 — 19 Disciplinary Sanctions, effective date February 13, 2017. 20 STIPULATED EXHIBITS AS TO AUTHENTICITY BUT NOT 21 ADMISSIBILITY 22 1. Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation 23 Presentence Investigation Report 473998 for Amber Allene Foster in case no. C- 24 15-308163-1, dated September 25, 2015. 25 2. Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation 26 Violation Report for Amber Allene Foster, dated April 18, 2016. 27 PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBITS SUBJECT TO OBJECTIONS 28 Page 12 of 15
1 NONE. DEFENDANTS’ EXHIBITS SUBJECT TO OBJECTIONS 3 Foster objects to the admission of the Presentence Investigation Report as 4 |/irrelevant. 5 Foster objects to the admission of the Violation Report as irrelevant. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 7 Neither party intends to present electronic evidence for purposes of jury 8 || deliberations. 9 ||F. DEPOSITIONS 10 NONE. 11 VIT. 12 WITNESSES 13 Plaintiff and Defendants reserve the right to interpose objections to the calling of 14 named witness listed below prior to or at trial. 15 PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES: 16 Plaintiff may call the following persons: 17 1. Plaintiff Amber Foster 1164057, 3 Prison Rd., Jean, Nevada 89019. 18 2. Defendant Richard Ashcraft, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, Office of Attorney 19 General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. 20 3. Defendant Harold Wickham, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, Office of Attorney 21 General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. 22 4, Defendant Dwight Neven, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, Office of Attorney 23 General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. 24 5. Former Correctional Officer Amber Parkerson, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, 25 Office of Attorney General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, 26 Nevada 89101. 27 28 Page 13 of 15
DEFENDANTS’ WITNESSES: 2 Defendants will call the following persons: 3 1. Defendant Richard Ashcraft, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, Office of Attorney 4 General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. 5 2. Former Correctional Officer Amber Parkerson, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, 6 Office of Attorney General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, 7 Nevada 89101. 8 3. Former Correctional Lieutenant Clinton Snowden, c/o Lorin M. 9 Taylor, Office of Attorney General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las 10 Vegas, Nevada 89101. 11 Defendants may call the following persons: 12 4, Plaintiff Amber Foster 1164057, 3 Prison Rd., Jean, Nevada 89019. 13 5. Defendant Harold Wickham, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, Office of Attorney 14 General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. 15 6. Defendant Dwight Neven, c/o Lorin M. Taylor, Office of Attorney 16 General, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. 17 Defendants reserve the right to call the following persons: 18 7. Any and all rebuttal witnesses that might be called to respond to 19 claims made by either Foster or any of her witnesses. 20 8. Any and all other witnesses that have personal knowledge supporting 21 Defendant’s statements of fact or law cited herein. 22 9. All witnesses identified by Foster, whether or not called to testify at 23 trial. 24 25 26 27 28 Page 14 of 15
1 IX. 2 AVAILABLE TRIAL DATES 3 Foster and Defendants’ Counsel expressly understand that the Clerk shall set the 4 ||trial of this matter at the convenience of the Court’s calendar. A jury has been requested 5 any issues triable of right by a jury. 6 The following are three weeks in which both parties are available: 7 1. October 10 — October 14, 2022. 8 2. October 17 — October 21, 2022. 9 3. October 24 — October 28, 2022. 10 X. 11 TIME EXPECTED FOR TRIAL 12 It is estimated that the trial will take a total of 3-5 days. 13 Respectfully Submitted August 8, 2022 by: Approved as to form and Content by: AAROW D. FORD 14 || Att 15 WA (MA A Lbabl A- LOR AV LOB/(Bar No. 14958) ER A. FOSTER 16 erp Dep 9 neff eneral Plaintiff in proper person 17 || Atte dr Defendants Harold Wichhant, Dwight Neven, and 18 || Richard Ashcraft. 19 20 XI. 21 ACTION BY THE COURT . . . 4/10/23 22 This case is set for court/jury trial on the fixed/stacked calendar on ! 4/4/23 at 9:00 a.m. in 7D oo 23 || Calendar call will be held on □□ DATED: August 10, 2022 25 26 27 UNITE ATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 Page 15 of 15