Fortunet, Inc. v. Melange Computer Services

412 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42068, 2005 WL 3729024
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedDecember 30, 2005
DocketCVSO4-1448-PMPPAL, CVSO4-0556PMPPAL
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 412 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (Fortunet, Inc. v. Melange Computer Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fortunet, Inc. v. Melange Computer Services, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42068, 2005 WL 3729024 (D. Nev. 2005).

Opinion

ORDER

PRO, Chief Judge.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Markman Claim Construction Brief (Doc. # 19); Plaintiffs’ Appendix to Mark-man Claim Construction Brief (Doc. # 20); Defendant Planet Bingo, LLC’s Markman Claim Construction Brief Regarding the ’784 Patent (Doc. # 21); Defendants Melange Computer Services and Planet Bingo, LLC’s Joint Markman Claim Construction Brief as to the ’787 Patent (Doc. # 22); Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Defendant Melange and Planet Bingo’s Joint Markman Claim Construction Brief as to the ’787 Patent (Doc. #23); and Joint Appendix to the Parties’ Claim Construction Briefs (Doc. #24), all filed on July 27, 2005. On August 15, 2005, the parties also filed Defendants Joint Mark-man Claim Construction Rebuttal Brief as to the ’787 Patent (Doc. # 27); Defendant Planet Bingo, LLC’s Markman Reply Brief Regarding the ’784 Patent (Doc. # 29); and Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Claim Construction Brief (Doc. #28). Defendants also filed a Joint Supplemental Markman Claim Construction Brief as to the ’787 Patent (Doc. # 42) on September 7, 2005. The Court held a hearing on these matters on December 15, 2005. (Mins, of Proceedings (Doc. # 55).)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff FortuNet, Inc. (“FortuNet”) owns the legal rights to United States patent numbers 4,856,787 (the “ ’787” patent) and 5,257,784 (the “ ’784” patent). (CV-S-04-1448, Compl.(Doc.# 1) at ¶ 17; CV-S-04-0556 Third Am. Compl. (Doc. # 14) at ¶ 21.) The ’787 patent describes an electronic gaming network on which two or more different games can be executed concurrently on the same player gaming device. (J.A. to the Parties’ Claim Construction Brs. (“JA”) (Doc. #24), Ex. I.) The ’784 patent describes a lottery-type wagering game in which at least one additional random element is added to the game’s conventional random elements. (JA, Ex. 3.) FortuNet brought suit in this Court alleging Defendants Melange Computer Services, Inc. (“Melange”) and Planet Bingo, LLC (“Planet Bingo”) infringed the ’787 patent. (CV-S-04-0556, Third Am. Compl.) Additionally, FortuNet alleges Planet Bingo infringed the ’784 patent. (CV-S-04-1448, Compl.) The parties dispute the meaning of certain terms within the two patents. The parties therefore submitted proposed claim interpretations, and this Court held a hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) to construe the disputed claim terms.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Patent claim construction is a question of law for the Court. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384. In interpreting a claim, the court looks first to the intrinsic evidence of record, which consists of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001). “ ‘Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). Among the sources of intrinsic evidence, the starting point is the claim language. Id. If the claim language is clear on its face, then consideration of other intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if those sources show a deviation from the claim’s clear language. Id.

*1074 The court should give the claim’s words their “ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-1313 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc) (quotation omitted). However, the court may construe a claim term differently from its ordinary meaning in at least four instances. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed.Cir.2002). First, if the patentee “acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history.” Id. at 1366. Second, “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” Id. at 1366-67. Third, if the patentee’s chosen term “ ‘so deprive[s] the claim of clarity’ as to require resort to the other intrinsic evidence for a definite meaning.” Id. at 1367. Finally, if the patentee phrased the claim in step- or means-plus-function format, “a claim term will cover nothing more than the corresponding structure or step disclosed in the specification, as well as equivalents thereto.” Id.

In construing a claim term’s ordinary meaning, the court must view the claim terms through the lens of a person of “ordinary skill in the art in question” as of the patent application filing date. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. For example, other claims in the patent in question may assist in determining a claim term’s meaning because claim terms normally are used consistently throughout the patent, so use of a term in one claim can clarify the meaning of the same term in other claims. Id. at 1314. Additionally, differences between claims within the patent also can be useful because “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Id. at 1314-15. Furthermore, “limitations stated in dependent claims are not to be read into the independent claim from which they depend.” Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quotation omitted).

If the claim language is not clear on its face, then consideration of other intrinsic evidence may resolve the ambiguity. Interactive Gift Exp., Inc., 256 F.3d at 1331. The specification “ ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). In reviewing the specification, the court must not read into the claims the limitations of particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification. Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed.Cir.1998).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
412 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42068, 2005 WL 3729024, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fortunet-inc-v-melange-computer-services-nvd-2005.