Fornix Holdings LLC v. Unknown Party

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJune 15, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-01942
StatusUnknown

This text of Fornix Holdings LLC v. Unknown Party (Fornix Holdings LLC v. Unknown Party) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fornix Holdings LLC v. Unknown Party, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Fornix Holdings LLC, et al., No. CV-22-01942-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Unknown Party, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Fornix Holdings LLC and CP Productions Incorporated (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 16 have filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Doc. 62) against Defendants John Doe 17 #1 d/b/a/ Daftsex.com (“DS”) and John Doe #2 d/b/a/ Pornwild.com (“PW”) (collectively 18 “the Infringing Defendants”). The Infringing Defendants were served with the Complaint, 19 Summons, and this Motion; however, they have not answered or otherwise appeared in this 20 action. The Court must decide whether default judgment is proper under 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. For the following reasons, the Court grants, in part, 22 Plaintiffs’ Motion. The Court will enter declaratory relief against DS and PW and issue a 23 permanent injunction against PW. 24 I. BACKGROUND1 25 This matter stems from Plaintiffs’ copyright infringement claims against DS and 26 PW. Plaintiffs have produced and distributed 967 adult entertainment photos and videos 27 1 The Court’s prior Orders contain extensive background information. (See Docs. 28; 41) 28 The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with case and thus provides only an abbreviated version of the background facts here. 1 (“Works”), 157 of which are registered and protected by copyright. (Doc. 28 at 2). 2 Plaintiffs allege DS and PW have stolen and promoted Plaintiffs’ Works on domain names 3 owned and operated by DS and PW, respectively. (See generally Doc. 28 at 3–5). 4 On November 23, 2022, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 5 (the “TRO”) (Doc. 28) that granted Plaintiffs injunctive relief against PW, denied Plaintiffs 6 injunctive relief against DS, and granted Plaintiffs’ request for alternative service and 7 expedited discovery. In granting Plaintiffs injunctive relief against PW, the Court (1) 8 ordered Namecheap, Inc. (“Namecheap”)2 to immediately disable PW’s three domain 9 names; and (2) ordered Defendant Cloudflare, Inc. (“Cloudflare”) to suspend all services 10 to and place an administrative lock on PW’s three domain names. (Doc. 28 at 15).3 On 11 December 6, 2022, the Court converted the TRO into a Preliminary Injunction (the “PI”) 12 (Doc. 41) that also applied to a fourth domain name operated by PW.4 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Once a party’s default has been entered, the district court has discretion to grant 15 default judgment against that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 16 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who 17 has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into 18 its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 19 (9th Cir. 1999). 20 Once a court finds jurisdiction, it must consider: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to 21 the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the 22 complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 23 concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the 24 2 Namecheap was originally named as defendant in this case. The parties later stipulated 25 to dismiss Namecheap as defendant (Doc. 65), which the Court granted. (Doc. 66).

26 3 The TRO applied to the following domain names operated by PW: ; ; and . 27 4 The PI applied to the following domain names operated by PW: ; 28 ; and ; . 1 strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 2 merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). In applying these Eitel 3 factors, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of 4 damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 5 1977). 6 III. Eitel factors 7 The Court has original jurisdiction over this matter because the Complaint contains 8 a federal cause of action arising out the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 501. See 28 9 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs have also established this Court may exercise jurisdiction over 10 the Infringing Defendants. (Doc. 28 at 10). Having found subject matter jurisdiction and 11 personal jurisdiction over the Infringing Defendants, the Court will proceed to assess the 12 merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment under the Eitel factors. 13 A. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 14 The Infringing Defendants have not responded or otherwise appeared in this action 15 Thus, without an entry of default judgment, Plaintiffs’ damages would remain unrelieved. 16 This factor therefore favors default judgment. 17 B. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claim and Sufficiency of Complaint 18 “Under an Eitel analysis, the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the 19 sufficiency of the complaint are often analyzed together.” Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. 20 Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The second and third Eitel factors favor 21 a default judgment where the complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief upon which 22 the plaintiff may recover. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388–89 (9th Cir. 1978)); 23 Pepsico, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. “Upon entry of default, the facts alleged to establish 24 liability are binding upon the defaulting party.” Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388. “However, it 25 follows from this that facts which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing 26 party, or claims which are not well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the 27 judgment.” Id. 28 Plaintiffs allege the Infringing Defendants are liable for willful copyright 1 infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. To present a prima facie case of direct copyright 2 infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) ownership of the copyright at issue; (2) a 3 violation of an exclusive right set forth in copyright, and (3) causation by the defendant; a 4 plaintiff need not prove damages. Bell v. Wilmott Storage Servs., LLC, 12 F.4th 1065, 1080 5 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 6 2017)). The Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleged each of these elements. 7 (Docs. 1 at ¶¶ 98–103; 1-1; 1-2); see also Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (“[T]he factual 8 allegations of the complaint . . . will be taken as true.”).

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Fornix Holdings LLC v. Unknown Party, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fornix-holdings-llc-v-unknown-party-azd-2023.