Follett v. Voris

104 F. Supp. 827, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4408
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedMay 1, 1952
DocketNo. 1031
StatusPublished

This text of 104 F. Supp. 827 (Follett v. Voris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Follett v. Voris, 104 F. Supp. 827, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4408 (S.D. Tex. 1952).

Opinion

KENNERLY, Chief Judge.

This suit in Admiralty arises under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Section 901 et seq., Title 33 U.S.C.A. Libellant, suing under Section 921, complains that the Deputy Commissioner, upon the undisputed facts before him, should have allowed libellant compensation in the sum of $2,183.60, when in fact he only allowed $1,113.

It is undisputed that libellant was injured, duly presented his claim, and is entitled to compensation under such Act. That his average weekly wages were $103 per week. That, as a result of such injury, libellant suffered temporary total disability under Section 908(b)1 for 10 weeks, for which he has been overpaid and about which there is no dispute here. That also as a result of such injury, libellant suffered 15% permanent partial disability to his left hand under Section 908(c),2 entitling him to 212 weeks compensation.

[828]*828Libellant complains that the Deputy Commissioner, in figuring libellant’s compensation, was controlled by Section 906(b) as well as Section 908(c), and made the following calculation:

“$35.00 the maximum weekly compensation allowed by Statute

15% of $35.00 per week.... $5.25

525 x 212 weeks..........$1,113.00.”

Libellant says he should have been controlled only by Section 908(c) and should have made the following calculation:

“66%rd of $103.00......... $68.66

15% of $ 68.66......... 10.30

$10.30 x 212............$2,183.60.”

The exact question is whether libellant is entitled under Subparagraph (c) of Section 908 to have his compensation figured at 66%% of $103, his average weekly wages, or whether he is only entitled under both Subparagraph (c) of Section 908 and Subparagraph (b) of Section 906 to have it figured at 66%% of the maximum compensation, $35 per week.

Counsel have cited many cases,3 and I am without doubt that the weight of authority sustains the Deputy Commissioner and what seems to be the settled procedure under the Act.

It seems necessary to only discuss a few of the cases. The leading and controlling case is Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 409, 52 S.Ct. 187, 76 L.Ed. 366,4 even though the exact question we have here was not decided there. There, the longshoreman’s actual average weekly wages were $36.06, and 66%% thereof was $24.04, or less than the then maximum wage of $25 fixed by Section 906(b). Neither was the exact question decided by this Court in Southern Stevedoring Contracting Co. v. Sheppeard, D.C., 1 Supp. 867. In that case, the actual average weekly wages of the longshoreman were $30, and 66%% thereof was $20, or less than the then maximum wage fixed by Section 906(b). However, in Phonville v. New York & Cuba S. S. Co., in a case arising under the New York Workmen’s Compensation Law, McK.Consol.Laws, c. 67, the average weekly wages were $35.90, and 66%% thereof would have been $23.39, and the compensation was held to be $20 per week, the maximum under the New [829]*829York Act. In Longshoremen’s Act, Opinion No. 34, reported in 1929 American Maritime Cases, page 100, the opinion does not show the actual average weekly wages. The same is true in Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Pillsbury, 9 Cir., 54 F.2d 1077, in Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Norton, D.C., 23 F.Supp. 829, and in Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v. Marshall, D.C., 36 F.2d 814.

Libellant relies upon certain Texas cases, typical of which is Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 196 S.W.2d 390, construing the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306 et seq., but I think they are not controlling here.

Believing as I do that the Deputy Commissioner correctly decided the question, his Award is approved.

Let appropriate Decree be drawn and presented.

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104 F. Supp. 827, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4408, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/follett-v-voris-txsd-1952.