McEWEN, Judge:
Appellant has taken this appeal from the order which granted appellee/wife’s petition to vacate a divorce decree entered January 16, 1987. We affirm.
Appellant/husband has in his brief adequately summarized the procedural history underlying this appeal:
Appellant, Maurice T. Foley, and appellee, Catherine A. Foley, were married on April 17, 1976. On April 16, 1976, they signed a pre-marital agreement which is designated as defendant’s Exhibit D and which is attached to appellee’s brief in support of her petition to vacate the divorce decree. No children were born of their marriage. Appellant filed a complaint in divorce under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code on September 15, 1986 and the same was served on appellee on September 16, 1986 and contained the required notice to defend and claim rights. On October 3, 1986, appellant and appellee signed a property settlement agreement which was not attached to nor incorporated with the divorce decree. On December 31, 1986, appellee signed an acceptance of service document [11]*11to clarify matters relating to the service upon her of the divorce complaint. On December 31, 1986, the required affidavits of consent under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code, signed on December 29, 1986 by both appellant and appellee, were filed. There were no other pleadings filed to the date of the entry of the divorce decree by either appellant or appellee. On January 16, 1987, a decree of divorce was entered under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code.
On April 25, 1988, appellee filed a petition to open the decree of divorce. On May 2, 1988, preliminary objections were filed to said petition by appellant. On May 23, 1988, trial was held before Honorable Michael T. Joyce. On June 2, 1988, both the brief of appellant and the brief of appellee with attached exhibits were filed with the court. On February 14, 1989, [the] trial court filed its opinion and order vacating the divorce decree.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted the petition to vacate the divorce decree essentially because (1) appellee waived any grievance by her failure to respond, or otherwise plead, or to present any claim during the pendency of the divorce proceeding and instead waited fifteen months after entry of the divorce decree to do so, and (2) appellee failed to establish that appellant had engaged in the extrinsic fraud which is a condition precedent to vacating a decree in divorce.
The initial argument of appellant focuses upon the interplay of Divorce Code Sections 401(c), 401(j), and 102. It is to be emphasized at the outset that the legislature, in Section 401(c), expressly granted the trial court broad equity powers in divorce proceedings:
(c) In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and [12]*12who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause.
Thus, despite appellant’s initial claim that section 401(j)1 of the Divorce Code precludes the retention by the court of jurisdiction over “any economic matters” following the entry of a divorce decree, the expansive terms of section 401(c) itself demonstrate with certainty that the equitable powers of the court are to survive the divorce decree.2 Moreover, it is the stated intent and policy of the Divorce Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to, inter alia, “effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.” 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6). In summary, then, the courts of this Commonwealth are empowered under section 401(c) to intercede upon petition by the aggrieved party to address and correct economic injustice. Appellant’s claim that section 401(j) precludes such an intervention by the court is unpersuasive in the face of the certain terms of section 401(c), especially when considered in light of the legislative intent proclaimed in section 102(a)(6) of the [13]*13Divorce Code. Thus, the trial court had the authority under the law to intercede on behalf of appellee were an injustice to so warrant.
Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish extrinsic fraud under section 602 of the Divorce Code. The record, however, demonstrates that the treatment inflicted upon appellee by appellant and the intimidation effected thereby certainly composed extrinsic fraud as that concept is defined in Section 602 of the Code. The legislature in Section 602 of the Code described the circumstances under which the trial court may proceed to the exercise of its equitable power, and specifically referred to the notion of extrinsic fraud:
§ 602. Opening or vacating divorce decrees
A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment may be made only within 30 days after entry of the decree and not thereafter. Such motion may lie where it is alleged that the decree was procured by intrinsic fraud or that there is new evidence relating to the cause of action which will sustain the attack upon its validity. A motion to vacate a decree or strike a judgment alleged to be void because of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or because of a fatal defect apparent upon the face of the record, must be made within five years after entry of the final decree. Intrinsic fraud is such as relates to a matter adjudicated by the judgment, including perjury and false testimony, whereas extrinsic fraud relates to matters collateral to the judgment which have the consequence of precluding a fair hearing or presentation of one side of the case.
Since more than fifteen months had elapsed between the date of the divorce decree and the date of the petition to open the decree, the trial court was empowered to exercise its equitable powers only if appellee demonstrated that appellant had secured the decree through the use of extrinsic fraud. Thus, we are obliged to determine the precise meaning of extrinsic fraud, and then examine the record to [14]*14determine if appellee sustained her burden of demonstrating that she was the victim of appellant’s extrinsic fraud.
The distinction between extrinsic fraud, i.e., fraud which relates to a collateral matter of consequence of which is to prevent a fair hearing, and intrinsic fraud, i.e., a matter relating to the adjudication of the judgment, was defined by the court in McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co., 267 Pa. 527, 536, 110 A. 366, 368 (1920):
By the expression ‘extrinsic or collateral fraud’ is meant some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair submission of the controversy. Among these are the keeping of the defeated party away from court by false promise of compromise, or fraudulently keeping him in ignorance of the action. Another instance is where an attorney without authority pretends to represent a party and corruptly connives at his defeat, or where an attorney has been regularly employed and corruptly sells out his client’s interest.
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McEWEN, Judge:
Appellant has taken this appeal from the order which granted appellee/wife’s petition to vacate a divorce decree entered January 16, 1987. We affirm.
Appellant/husband has in his brief adequately summarized the procedural history underlying this appeal:
Appellant, Maurice T. Foley, and appellee, Catherine A. Foley, were married on April 17, 1976. On April 16, 1976, they signed a pre-marital agreement which is designated as defendant’s Exhibit D and which is attached to appellee’s brief in support of her petition to vacate the divorce decree. No children were born of their marriage. Appellant filed a complaint in divorce under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code on September 15, 1986 and the same was served on appellee on September 16, 1986 and contained the required notice to defend and claim rights. On October 3, 1986, appellant and appellee signed a property settlement agreement which was not attached to nor incorporated with the divorce decree. On December 31, 1986, appellee signed an acceptance of service document [11]*11to clarify matters relating to the service upon her of the divorce complaint. On December 31, 1986, the required affidavits of consent under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code, signed on December 29, 1986 by both appellant and appellee, were filed. There were no other pleadings filed to the date of the entry of the divorce decree by either appellant or appellee. On January 16, 1987, a decree of divorce was entered under Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code.
On April 25, 1988, appellee filed a petition to open the decree of divorce. On May 2, 1988, preliminary objections were filed to said petition by appellant. On May 23, 1988, trial was held before Honorable Michael T. Joyce. On June 2, 1988, both the brief of appellant and the brief of appellee with attached exhibits were filed with the court. On February 14, 1989, [the] trial court filed its opinion and order vacating the divorce decree.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it granted the petition to vacate the divorce decree essentially because (1) appellee waived any grievance by her failure to respond, or otherwise plead, or to present any claim during the pendency of the divorce proceeding and instead waited fifteen months after entry of the divorce decree to do so, and (2) appellee failed to establish that appellant had engaged in the extrinsic fraud which is a condition precedent to vacating a decree in divorce.
The initial argument of appellant focuses upon the interplay of Divorce Code Sections 401(c), 401(j), and 102. It is to be emphasized at the outset that the legislature, in Section 401(c), expressly granted the trial court broad equity powers in divorce proceedings:
(c) In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and [12]*12who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause.
Thus, despite appellant’s initial claim that section 401(j)1 of the Divorce Code precludes the retention by the court of jurisdiction over “any economic matters” following the entry of a divorce decree, the expansive terms of section 401(c) itself demonstrate with certainty that the equitable powers of the court are to survive the divorce decree.2 Moreover, it is the stated intent and policy of the Divorce Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to, inter alia, “effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.” 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6). In summary, then, the courts of this Commonwealth are empowered under section 401(c) to intercede upon petition by the aggrieved party to address and correct economic injustice. Appellant’s claim that section 401(j) precludes such an intervention by the court is unpersuasive in the face of the certain terms of section 401(c), especially when considered in light of the legislative intent proclaimed in section 102(a)(6) of the [13]*13Divorce Code. Thus, the trial court had the authority under the law to intercede on behalf of appellee were an injustice to so warrant.
Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish extrinsic fraud under section 602 of the Divorce Code. The record, however, demonstrates that the treatment inflicted upon appellee by appellant and the intimidation effected thereby certainly composed extrinsic fraud as that concept is defined in Section 602 of the Code. The legislature in Section 602 of the Code described the circumstances under which the trial court may proceed to the exercise of its equitable power, and specifically referred to the notion of extrinsic fraud:
§ 602. Opening or vacating divorce decrees
A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment may be made only within 30 days after entry of the decree and not thereafter. Such motion may lie where it is alleged that the decree was procured by intrinsic fraud or that there is new evidence relating to the cause of action which will sustain the attack upon its validity. A motion to vacate a decree or strike a judgment alleged to be void because of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or because of a fatal defect apparent upon the face of the record, must be made within five years after entry of the final decree. Intrinsic fraud is such as relates to a matter adjudicated by the judgment, including perjury and false testimony, whereas extrinsic fraud relates to matters collateral to the judgment which have the consequence of precluding a fair hearing or presentation of one side of the case.
Since more than fifteen months had elapsed between the date of the divorce decree and the date of the petition to open the decree, the trial court was empowered to exercise its equitable powers only if appellee demonstrated that appellant had secured the decree through the use of extrinsic fraud. Thus, we are obliged to determine the precise meaning of extrinsic fraud, and then examine the record to [14]*14determine if appellee sustained her burden of demonstrating that she was the victim of appellant’s extrinsic fraud.
The distinction between extrinsic fraud, i.e., fraud which relates to a collateral matter of consequence of which is to prevent a fair hearing, and intrinsic fraud, i.e., a matter relating to the adjudication of the judgment, was defined by the court in McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co., 267 Pa. 527, 536, 110 A. 366, 368 (1920):
By the expression ‘extrinsic or collateral fraud’ is meant some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair submission of the controversy. Among these are the keeping of the defeated party away from court by false promise of compromise, or fraudulently keeping him in ignorance of the action. Another instance is where an attorney without authority pretends to represent a party and corruptly connives at his defeat, or where an attorney has been regularly employed and corruptly sells out his client’s interest. The fraud in such case is extrinsic or collateral to the question determined by the court. The reason for the rule is that there must be an end to litigation; and, where a party has had his day in court and knows what the issues are, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there: Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [25 P. 970]. Where the alleged perjury relates to a question upon which there was a conflict, and it was necessary for the court to determine the truth or falsity of the testimony, the fraud is intrinsic and is concluded by the judgment, unless there be a showing that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that by some fraudulent act of the prevailing party the other has been deprived of an opportunity for a fair trial. Bleakley v. Barclay, 75 Kansas 462 [89 P. 906].
Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, 348 Pa.Super. 237, 243, 502 A.2d 185, 188 (1985), quoting McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co., 267 Pa. 527, 536, 110 A. 366, 368 (1920).
The trial court found that the actions of appellant did intimidate appellee to the extent that she was fearful of [15]*15undertaking any effort to secure the economic justice to which she was entitled, and concluded that because she was thereby denied an opportunity for a fair trial, appellee had established the existence of extrinsic fraud. The trial judge stated:
In the instant case it appears that a great deal of influence must have been exerted upon the Defendant to obtain the result that presently stands. Defendant, after eleven years of marriage, received essentially only $1,500.00 and her personal clothing, while Plaintiff received property said to be worth $200,000.00 and everything else that arose from the marital relationship. The parties did enter into a marital property settlement agreement, however, that agreement purports to give with few exceptions all property, marital or otherwise to Plaintiff. This arrangement is unconscionable and cannot be accepted by the Court as a knowing, informed and freely given exchange by the Defendant. Therefore, in order to effect a fair and just determination and settlement of Plaintiffs and Defendant’s property rights this Court will allow Petitioner to proceed by granting her Petition to Vacate Divorce Decree.
“A proceeding to open a divorce decree is equitable in nature, and the appellate court will not reverse an order entered in such a proceeding unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Masciulli v. Masciulli, 194 Pa.Super. 646, 169 A.2d 562 (1961) (citations omitted). There is no basis for this Court to conclude that the decision of the trial judge was an abuse of discretion. There was an ample factual basis for the finding of intimidation, as well as for the conclusions that because she had been denied a fair trial, she had established such extrinsic fraud as to justify vacating the decree in divorce.
Order affirmed.
MONTGOMERY, J., joins.
POPOVICH, J., files a dissenting opinion.