Fogg v. Garland

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 1, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-0792
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MATTHEW FOGG,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-0792 (CRC)

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, 1

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Former Deputy United States Marshal Matthew Fogg has spent decades litigating against

the U.S. Marshals Service over alleged discrimination. In 1994, he filed an administrative

complaint against the Marshals Service with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”), asserting Title VII discrimination claims on behalf of current and former African

American Deputy U.S. Marshals, and African American applicants for Deputy U.S. Marshal

positions. Nearly thirty years later, in 2023, the parties agreed to settle the complaint. An EEOC

Administrative Judge approved the settlement in June 2024, but its terms and conditions will not

take effect until after any appeals of the settlement are exhausted and the agency’s Office of

Federal Operations approves the settlement.

Meanwhile, in March 2024, Fogg filed this putative class action, alleging that the class

counsel in the administrative action did not adequately protect the class’s interests before the

EEOC. Fogg also brings an individual retaliatory harassment claim. The government responded

with a motion to stay the case pending the Office of Federal Operations’ approval of the

1 The Court substitutes Attorney General Bondi in place of Attorney General Merrick Garland. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). administrative settlement, which Fogg opposed. In May 2025, Fogg filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction to halt the EEOC proceedings. Another dissatisfied class member,

Clarence Brown, filed a motion to intervene in this litigation shortly thereafter. All three

motions are fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Fogg’s motion for a

preliminary injunction, grant the government’s motion for a stay, and deny Brown’s motion to

intervene.

I. Background

A. Prior District Court Cases

In 1978, Fogg became a Deputy U.S. Marshal in Washington, D.C. Fogg v. Gonzales,

492 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In 1985, he filed an administrative complaint with the

Marshals Service alleging racial discrimination because he had “received a harsh reprimand” and

was transferred “ostensibly as punishment for having misused a government car.” Id. From

1989 to 1992, while Fogg was assigned to a task force that tracked fugitives, he claimed to have

faced discriminatory actions—including not receiving an expected promotion to the GS-13 level.

Id.

Experiencing “severe psychological stress” as a result, Fogg stopped working in March

1993. Id. After the Marshals Service dismissed him for insubordination, Fogg brought a civil

lawsuit. Id. A jury found that the Service had violated Title VII by subjecting Fogg to a racially

hostile work environment from 1985 until his dismissal in 1995 and by discriminating against

him on account of his race. Id. After several rounds of appeals and remands, Fogg ultimately

obtained a judgment against the Marshals Service, including $300,000 in damages. J., Fogg v.

Gonzales, No. 94-cv-2814 (JAR) (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (ECF No. 8-1).

2 In 2018, Fogg pursued additional claims against the Marshals Service, alleging among

other things that the Marshals Service had failed to properly implement the relief associated with

the court judgment just referenced. See Am. Compl., Fogg v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-1075 (JEB)

(D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2018) at 5–9. The court ultimately dismissed the case because Fogg failed to

serve the defendants. See Min. Order, Fogg v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-1075 (JEB) (D.D.C. Nov. 28,

2018).

B. EEOC Complaint

In July 1994, Fogg, then proceeding pro se, filed an administrative class complaint with

the EEOC alleging that the Marshals Service discriminated against him and other African

American Deputy U.S. Marshals based on their race. See Order Granting Prelim. Approval of

Settlement Agreement, Fogg v. Garland, 1 No. 570-2016-00501X (E.E.O.C. Sept. 21, 2023),

(ECF No. 8-6) 2. In 1996, an EEOC AJ declined to certify the class complaint, citing a lack of

specific information to support class certification. Id. at 1. Nearly ten years later, Fogg

successfully petitioned the Commission’s Office of Federal Operations to reopen the case. Id.

In 2006, the Commission overturned the 1996 dismissal of the class complaint and

remanded the complaint to the EEOC’s Washington Field Office for a decision on class

certification. Id. After another round of appeals, in 2015, the Commission modified the class

definition to include “African Americans who served in law enforcement or operational positions

and were subjected to discrimination in recruitment, assignments, training and promotional

opportunities” and remanded to the agency—directing Class Counsel to file an amended class

complaint. Id. at 2.

2 The name of the case was changed to Hedgepeth v. Garland, No. 570-2016-00501X (E.E.O.C.), following Fogg’s removal as a class agent in May 2024.

3 In 2016, Administrative Judge (“AJ”) Sharon Debbage Alexander granted counsel’s

motion to amend the complaint. Id. Following several years of discovery and motions practice,

in 2020, Judge Alexander granted Class Agents’ motion to again amend the class definition. Id.

In early 2022, the parties reported they were engaged in settlement negotiations. Id. Then, in

September 2023, Judge Alexander granted the class’s unopposed motion for preliminary

approval of a proposed class settlement agreement. Id. at 1. The agreement provides $15

million in monetary relief for the class, as well as non-monetary programmatic relief. Id. at 3.

The deadline to object to the Settlement Agreement was January 11, 2024. Class Compl.

Notice of Resolution at 3, 10. And to request payment from the settlement, class participants

were required to submit a claim form by January 26, 2024. Id. at 9. By submitting the claim

form, a claimant also expressly released any and all claims he or she may have had against the

Marshals Service. See Blank Claim Form & Release at 10. Fogg executed a claim form and

release on January 25. See Claim Form & Release for Fogg.

A fairness hearing was scheduled to take place on March 20, 2024. See Order Granting

Prelim. Approval of Settlement Agreement at 5. The day before, Fogg filed the complaint in this

case, alleging that he was dissatisfied with the underlying administrative proceeding and the

class’s legal representation. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 85. The complaint brings putative class claims

of race discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and harassment on behalf of a

putative class, id. ¶¶ 92–111, as well as an individual claim of retaliatory harassment, id. ¶¶ 112–

20.

Judge Alexander canceled the fairness hearing and ordered briefing from both parties on

the impact of Fogg’s federal-court filing. Order Retaining Jurisdiction Over Class Complaint &

Removing Fogg as Class Agent (ECF 11-1) (“ALJ Decision”) at 2. A few days later, the other

4 class agents filed a motion to remove Fogg as a Class Agent. Id. In its response to Judge

Alexander’s order, the agency expressed the position that “it appears that this matter should be

administratively dismissed, with further proceedings to be held before the district court.” Id. at

5. The class agents opposed, contending that the agency had the discretion to retain jurisdiction

over the administrative class complaint under the applicable regulations. Id. at 6.

In May 2024, Judge Alexander issued an order retaining jurisdiction over the class

complaint and granting the rest of the class agents’ motion to remove Fogg. Id. at 1. Judge

Alexander first explained that, as no final approval of the Settlement Agreement had yet been

issued, Fogg’s civil action was timely filed. Id. at 10. She then observed that two regulatory

provisions cited by the Commission—29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 and § 1614.409—apply to appeals

before the Commission, not class complaints at the administrative hearing stage. Id. Turning to

the regulations governing administrative complaints, Judge Alexander reasoned that while the

agency must dismiss an entire complaint “prior to a request for a hearing,” following such a

request, “the Commission intended something other than mandatory divestment of jurisdiction.”

Judge Alexander then concluded that “if there were ever a case where an administrative

judge should exercise discretion to decline to dismiss a class complaint, this is it.” Id. at 11.

Crucial to that holding was Judge Alexander’s finding that “it is clear from the record that

Matthew Fogg did not have the authority or permission of the other Class Agents to move the

class complaint to federal court.” Id. She also relied on the fact that “the class complaint is

thirty years along, already certified, and there are multiple other Class Agents already

representing the interests of the class” who would have no recourse if the class complaint were to

be dismissed. Id. at 11–12.

5 As a second, independent reason for declining to dismiss the class complaint, Judge

Alexander observed that Fogg’s district court complaint “does not make the same allegations as

the class complaint; it is both overinclusive, and underinclusive.” Id. at 12. For instance, Fogg

dropped the administrative class’s claims related to discrimination in hiring practices, id., while

including several allegations “that have nothing to do with the pending class complaint,” such as

an individual retaliatory harassment claim, id. at 11–12.

After deciding to retain jurisdiction, Judge Alexander turned to the class agents’ motion

to remove Fogg from their ranks. Opining that Fogg’s “eleventh hour federal district court filing

purporting to terminate the Commission’s jurisdiction over this thirty year old class complaint

hours before a hearing on final approval of the Settlement Agreement, six months after the

hearing was scheduled, and two years after the parties signed [a Memorandum of Understanding]

outlining the terms of the Agreement” “demonstrated both poor judgment and a deep lack of

consideration for the Class Members he purports to represent,” Judge Alexander granted the

motion. Id. at 14–15.

In June 2024, the EEOC granted final approval of the settlement between the class and

the Marshals Service. Decl. of Christine Dunn (“Dunn Decl.”) ¶¶ 6–7. There are two appeals

pending before the EEOC challenging that final approval, including one filed by Fogg. Mot. to

Stay at 7; Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3. The Marshals Service and Class Agents provided a

settlement implementation plan to the EEOC in June 2025. Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3.

Also in June 2025, Clarence Brown, another member of the certified class, filed a motion

to intervene as a plaintiff in this litigation, which the government opposes. That motion, along

with Fogg’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the government’s motion to stay the

proceedings, are ripe for the Court’s consideration.

6 II. Legal Standards

Beginning with Mr. Fogg’s motion, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4]

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir.

2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

“[I]t is especially important for the movant to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.”

Nat’l Head Start Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (D.D.C.

2004) (citing Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). A

preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary” remedy and so “should not be granted unless the

movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.

968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K.

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948 (2d ed. 1995)).

As for the government’s motion to stay, “[a] trial court has broad discretion to stay all

proceedings in an action pending the resolution of independent proceedings elsewhere.” Marsh

v. Johnson, 263 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,

254 (1936)). In considering a stay, courts must “‘weigh competing interests and maintain an

even balance’ between the court's interests in judicial economy and any possible hardship to the

parties.” Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 732–33 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). “In other words, hardship to the parties and benefits to

judicial economy are the key interests to consider in evaluating a motion for a stay.” Nat’l Indus.

for the Blind v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 296 F. Supp. 3d 131, 137 (D.D.C. 2017). “The

7 proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,

708 (1997) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).

Finally, as relevant to Mr. Brown’s motion to intervene: The Court must permit a party

to intervene in a case if the party meets four requirements: (1) it filed a timely motion; (2) it has

a legally protectable “‘interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the

action’”; (3) “‘the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [its]

ability to protect that interest’”; and (4) that interest will not be “‘adequately represented by

existing parties.’” Fund For Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)). The legally protectable interest required by the second prong of

this test must be “‘of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or

lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’” Defs. of Wildlife v. Jackson, 284

F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom., Defs. of Wildlife v.

Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642

F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) grants the Court discretion to permit

intervention by a party who “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common

question of law or fact.” In evaluating such motions, “the court must consider whether the

intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights,’” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3), and may also consider “‘whether parties seeking intervention will

significantly contribute to . . . the just and equitable adjudication of the legal question

presented.’” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 274 F.R.D. 305, 313 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting

Aristotle Int’l, Inc. v. NGP Software, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2010)).

8 III. Analysis

A. Fogg’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

The Court will begin with Fogg’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin all further

action in the case before the EEOC, Hedgepeth v. Garland, EEOC Case No. 570-2016-00501X.

Because Fogg cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his argument that the

filing of this suit divested the EEOC of jurisdiction, the Court will deny his motion without

considering the other factors for preliminary relief.

1. The EEOC Is Not a Defendant to this Action

As an initial matter, Fogg seeks injunctive relief against the EEOC, but the agency is not

a party to this action. This Court is “‘powerless to issue an injunction against’ non-parties.”

Hamilton v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 240 F. Supp. 3d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Citizens

Alert Regarding the Env’t v. EPA, 259 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17 n.7 (D.D.C. 2003)). Accordingly,

Fogg’s request for preliminary relief fails for that reason alone.

2. The EEOC Did Not Lose Jurisdiction Over the Administrative Complaint

Even assuming the Court had the power to order some relief in this case, 3 Fogg’s

assertion that the agency lost jurisdiction over the administrative class complaint when he filed

this action appears incorrect. Fogg relies almost entirely on 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. See Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. at 4–6. That regulatory provision states: “Filing a civil action under § 1614.407 or §

3 Once again, the Court doubts that it does. Fellow courts in this district have expressed “some reservation as to whether [they have] jurisdiction to review” decisions of the Office of Federal Operations on class action settlement agreements. Rahman v. Johanns, 575 F. Supp. 2d 132, 135 (D.D.C. 2008). In Rahman, the court noted that “[i]n the course of researching the issues involved in this case, the Court has found no case in which a federal district court reviewed the merits of an administrative settlement agreement resolving discrimination claims pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204 or any other authority.” Id. at 135.

9 1614.408 shall terminate Commission processing of the appeal. A Commission decision on an

appeal issued after a complainant files suit in district court will not be enforceable by the

Commission.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. If a suit is filed “subsequent to the filing of an appeal and

prior to a final Commission decision,” the complainant must notify the Commission. Id.

This provision does little to support Fogg’s argument. It requires mandatory divestment

of jurisdiction over an appeal of an agency decision to the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. Here,

Fogg filed this suit in March 2024, on the eve of the fairness hearing and prior to the AJ’s final

approval of the class settlement agreement. Other regulations govern the agency’s jurisdiction

under those circumstances, as Judge Alexander noted in her opinion retaining jurisdiction—

specifically, 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(a)(3) and §1614.204.

Section 1614.107 provides that, “[p]rior to a request for a hearing in a case, the agency

shall dismiss an entire complaint . . . [t]hat is the basis of a pending civil action in a United

States District Court . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(3) (emphasis added). Section 1614.204, in

turn, provides that “[t]he administrative judge may dismiss the complaint, or any portion, for any

of the reasons listed in § 1614.107[.]” Id. § 1614.204(d)(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the

regulations indicate that following a party’s request for a hearing, an administrative judge has the

discretion to dismiss a complaint that forms the basis of a pending district court action. That

contrasts with an administrative judge’s nondiscretionary duty to dismiss such a complaint prior

to a request for hearing.

And here, Judge Alexander exercised her discretion to retain jurisdiction over the

complaint with good reason, including that Fogg “did not have the authority or permission of the

other Class Agents to move the class complaint to federal court.” ALJ Decision at 11.

Moreover, Fogg’s complaint here includes some claims brought only on an individual basis—for

10 example, his retaliatory harassment claim, Compl. ¶¶ 112–20, and drops other claims, including

those alleging discriminatory hiring practices, ALJ Decision at 12. Nor does Fogg contest this

reasoning—his entire argument is that the Commission’s regulations provide for mandatory

divestiture of jurisdiction in these circumstances. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 4–6. As just

explained, they do not.

True, the final approval of the administrative class complaint has now been appealed to

the EEOC. But by that point, Fogg had been removed as a class agent and could not terminate

the agency’s jurisdiction. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 (“[A]n agent who has filed a class

complaint . . . is authorized . . . to file a civil action[.]”).

3. Fogg’s Representation of the Putative Class

The government also argues that Fogg’s claims on behalf of the class will fail because his

interests are not aligned with the other members of the class. Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6–

7. That does not appear to be directly responsive to the jurisdictional argument that is the basis

for Fogg’s motion. Having moved past the jurisdictional issue, however, the Court agrees that

Fogg’s class-wide claims are unlikely to succeed because he cannot adequately represent the

putative class members. That only confirms the Court’s decision to deny preliminary relief.

In his district court action, Fogg seeks to represent a class of “[a]ll current and former

African American Deputy U.S. Marshals who are serving or have served with the [Marshals

Service] at any time during the liability period.” Compl. ¶ 74. The class covered by the EEOC

administrative complaint includes “[a]ll current and former African American Deputy U.S.

Marshals who were subjected to [Marshals Service] policies and practices regarding promotions

under the Merit Promotion Process, Management Directed Reassignments, and Headquarters

Division assignments.” Order Granting Prelim. Approval of Settlement Agreement at 2. Thus,

11 the classes overlap, though Fogg’s is broader. Given that Fogg was removed as a class agent in

the administrative proceeding because he took unilateral action to file a district-court

complaint—without consulting and against the wishes of the other thirteen class agents, see

Decls. (ECF No. 11-2)—the Court concludes it is unlikely that he will be deemed an adequate

representative to bring claims on behalf of the class. That is particularly so given the other class

agents’ assertion that Fogg filed this action to pursue his individual interests at the expense of the

class. Mot. to Remove Fogg as Class Agent (ECF No. 13-2) at 5–7.

4. Fogg’s “Termination” of Class Counsel

Fogg also argues that the Commission’s “continued recognition of terminated class

counsel, despite their explicit termination by Mr. Fogg on November 1, 2023, requires

immediate injunctive relief[.]” Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 7. Yet Fogg offers no evidence

demonstrating that he terminated class counsel, who have continued to represent the class before

the EEOC. See Dunn Decl. ¶ 3. The Court also doubts that Fogg would have had the authority

to do so unilaterally, even if he had tried, given that the thirteen other Class Agents appear

satisfied with Class Counsel’s services. See Decls. Accepting Settlement Agreement (ECF No.

11-3). Accordingly, this argument is unavailing.

For the reasons stated, the Court will deny Fogg’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

B. Motion to Stay

The Court turns next to the government’s motion to stay these proceedings pending final

approval of the administrative class settlement. The government seeks a stay “because once the

Office of Federal Operations rules on the Administrative Judge’s approval of the Settlement

Agreement, most, if not all, of Plaintiff’s claims in this case will be barred by res judicata or

related doctrines[.]” Mot. for Stay at 9.

12 The government is correct that any claims resolved by the class settlement will be barred

by res judicata. Under that doctrine, “once a claim is litigated and that litigation results in a final

decision on the merits, be it by a motion for summary judgment, by a trial, or by a settlement

between the parties resulting in a final judgment, the issue is decided permanently.” Brown v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp. 3d 144, 148 (D.D.C. 2014). And “[a] class action

settlement has the same preclusive effect as a prior individual action settlement if the moving

party can show that the nonmoving party ‘was adequately represented by a party who actively

participated in the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008)).

To be sure, if Fogg opted out of the class settlement, his claims would not be barred by

res judicata. See id. at 148 (“[T]o establish that a plaintiff’s claim is precluded under res judicata

by a prior class action, a defendant must show that . . . the plaintiff in the instant action did not

opt out[.]”). As the matter stands, however, in January 2024, Fogg executed a claim form

seeking payment from the settlement and releasing all claims against the Marshals Service. See

Claim Form & Release for Fogg. Fogg does not suggest otherwise. Instead, he explains that he

“felt obligated to sign the Claim Form” because he knew “that a failure to sign could

demonstrate he was not acting appropriately for the class.” Opp’n to Mot. to Stay at 13. And he

complains that the form was “disguised as a questionnaire” and “hides the substantial loss of

rights within the boilerplate text of the otherwise interactive form.” Id. But “[a]bsent a showing

of fraud or duress, parties are bound by the agreements that they sign, without regard to whether

they regret their decisions after the fact.” Schmidt v. Shah, 696 F. Supp. 2d 44, 62 (D.D.C.

2010).

Thus, without deciding whether Fogg is bound by the release he signed, the Court

concludes that “interests in judicial economy” favor a stay. Belize, 668 F.3d at 732–33. It

13 would be inefficient to proceed with litigation in this case only for the issue of Fogg’s waiver to

become ripe once the Office of Federal Operations approves the settlement agreement.

Moreover, the potential “hardship to the parties” points in the same direction. Id. Fogg will

suffer little hardship from waiting for EEOC approval of the settlement agreement, especially

given that: (1) his jurisdictional argument, as already explained, is unavailing; (2) he is unlikely

to be certified as an adequate representative of the putative class; and (3) his claims are likely

barred by the release he signed. On the other hand, requiring the government to participate in

discovery on claims that are ultimately likely to be barred or unsuccessful would impose

unnecessary burdens. Cf. Steele v. United States, No. 1:23-CV-918 (RCL), 2024 WL 1111639,

at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2024) (“Permitting a ‘class counsel in exile’ to unleash parallel,

duplicative litigation against a defendant is not in the interest of judicial economy, fairness to

defendants, or sound judicial policy.”).

Accordingly, the Court will grant the government’s motion to stay pending final approval

of the settlement agreement and will order the parties to promptly notify the Court following any

such approval.

C. Brown’s Motion to Intervene

Lastly, the Court turns to Clarence Brown’s motion to intervene in the litigation. 4 He “is

a retired African American Deputy United States Marshal with decades of dedicated federal

service and a member of the certified class” in the administrative class action. Brown Mot. to

4 In addition to moving to intervene in this matter, Brown attaches to his motion a proposed complaint. It is thus unclear to the Court whether Brown seeks only to join Fogg’s putative class complaint as a named plaintiff or to litigate his own complaint in tandem with Fogg’s.

14 Intervene at 1. Brown seeks either intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or permissive

intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Id. at 3–4. He is entitled to neither.

Brown does not qualify for intervention as of right because the disposition of this action

will not “impair or impede” a legally protectable interest “relating to the property or transaction

which is the subject of the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). As already explained, Fogg filed suit

in this Court against the wishes of the rest of the class he purports to represent, so there is

unlikely to be a “class of which Brown can be a part.” Opp’n to Intervene at 4.

Moreover, the sparse factual allegations in Brown’s proposed complaint do not seem to

be related to Fogg’s individual discrimination claims. Brown’s opaque allegations include that

he was “improperly placed at top of special assignment list contrary to policy” and “was

assigned to a high-risk FEMA distribution point previously targeted by arson,” as well as that he

was denied unspecified promotions in retaliation for raising discrimination concerns. See Brown

Proposed Compl. (ECF No. 16-3) ¶¶ 34, 35, 38. Fogg alleges different instances of retaliatory

harassment, including a failure to properly adjust his worker’s compensation benefits. Fogg

Compl. ¶ 114. Thus, while Brown’s claims may be similar in some respects to Fogg’s, “the

factual sufficiency of each claim would be assessed for each plaintiff . . . individually.” Peters v.

District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 218 (D.D.C. 2012). Accordingly, Brown has no

legally cognizable interest in Fogg’s claims and does not have a right to intervene.

The Court will also decline to permit Brown to intervene in this litigation under Rule

24(b)(1)(B) for largely the same reasons. Brown’s and Fogg’s claims “do not sufficiently share

common questions of law or fact in common with each other or the main action that these claims

could be efficiently considered together.” Id. at 219. Based on the sparse allegations in Brown’s

15 proposed complaint, “the fact remains that each [plaintiff] asserts particular individual

circumstances.” Id. at 220.

The Court will therefore deny Brown’s motion to intervene.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Fogg’s motion for a preliminary

injunction, grant the government’s motion for a stay, and deny Mr. Brown’s motion to intervene.

A separate Order accompanies this Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: July 1, 2025